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Servicium Debitum and Scutage in Twelfth Century England With Comparisons to the *Regno* of Southern Italy

N.J.C. Smith

The purpose of this study is to re-assess the system of military obligation in England at the earliest time sufficient documents survive to provide an in-depth explanation. It is both an examination of the twelfth-century feudal structure and lordship arrangements as described by these documents, and how they came to be in their twelfth-century forms. This is supplemented by a similar, but briefer, evaluation of the *Regno* of southern Italy and of the occasional relevant documents from Normandy. An examination of the place of military obligation in the kingdom of England covers three major areas: the assessment of this obligation, the cost of service both to the king and the individual knight, and how the men actually served. These three areas offer insight into how the Normans established the *servicium debitum*, how knights exempted themselves from their obligation or were compensated for extra service, and various aspects of what their service entailed, such as castle guard.

A study of the returns made by tenants-in-chief in 1166 suggests that these have been misinterpreted in the past; their inspiration lay in the desire of the barons to protect themselves from excessive royal demands, rather than in the crown's desire to update the *servicium debitum*. The survey conducted in the *Regno* earlier is unlikely to have served as a prototype for the 1166 inquiry; it was different in purpose and in form. Scutages are examined, to show the complex patterns of payment, and to suggest that under Henry II a significant number of tenants-in-chief performed their service, rather than commuted it. The Pipe Rolls are used to analyse military expenditure at a local level in two counties, Kent and Shropshire; in particular pay rates are reconstructed. A series of appendices provide details of this expenditure, along with evidence of scutages.

Servicium Debitum and Scutage in Twelfth Century
England

With Comparisons to the *Regno* of Southern Italy

Two Volumes

Volume 1

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Table of Contents

List of Tables	4
Abbreviations	5
Introduction	7
Part I. Assessment	
Chapter 1. Feudal Surveys	25
<i>The Cartae Baronum</i>	25
<i>The Infeudationes Militum</i>	45
<i>The Catalogus Baronum</i>	52
<i>Summary</i>	60
Chapter 2. Infeudation	63
<i>Practices and Patterns</i>	63
<i>Infeudation in Apulia and Capua</i>	91
<i>The Constabularies and the Conroi</i>	101
Part II. Cost	
Chapter 3. Commutation	106
<i>The English Scutage</i>	106
<i>Normandy and the Italian Adohamentum</i>	125
Chapter 4. Knights' Pay and Wages	131
<i>Money Payments</i>	131
<i>Provisions</i>	143
<i>Crossbows and Foreigners</i>	149
<i>Southern Italy and the Trends in England</i>	157
Part III. Service	
Chapter 5. Service Levels	165
<i>The English Campaigns</i>	165
<i>The Various Services of Southern Italy</i>	180
<i>The Magna Expeditio</i>	183
<i>Naval Service</i>	185
Chapter 6. Castles and Castle Guard	194
<i>The English Example of Dover</i>	196
<i>Service Period and the Origins of Castle Guard</i>	213
<i>Southern Castles and Serjeants</i>	222
Conclusion	229
Bibliography	240

Appendices

Appendix 1. List of Knight Fees as Recorded by Payment in the 1168 <i>auxilium</i>	254
Appendix 2. Scutage Payments by County in the Reign of Henry II	255
1159 Scutage for the Expedition to Toulouse	256
1161 Scutage	264
1162 Scutage	272
1165 Scutage for the Expedition to Wales	279
1168 Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter	286
1169 Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter	295
1172 Scutage for the Expedition to Ireland	304
1187 Scutage for the Expedition to Galloway	313
Appendix 3. Military Expenditures in the Counties of Shropshire and Kent	320
Shropshire	321
Kent	337
Appendix 4. Wages and Service Periods of Knights and Serjeants	353
Appendix 5. Dover Castle Guard as Recorded in the <i>Red Book of the Exchequer</i>	370

List of Tables

Table 1:	Scutage Rates under Henry II	37
Table 2:	Scutage Rates under Richard I and John	39
Map 1:	The Geographical Arrangement of the <i>Catalogus Baronum</i> ...	57
Table 3:	Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of England	64
Table 4:	Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of Normandy	65
Table 5:	Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of Apulia and Capua ...	65
Table 6:	Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of England	66
Table 7:	Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of Normandy	67
Table 8:	Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of Apulia and Capua ...	67
Table 9:	Enfeoffments of the Earls of England... ..	71
Table 10:	Enfeoffments of the Counts of Normandy	73
Table 11:	Enfeoffments of the Counts of Apulia and Capua	73
Table 12:	Percentages for Henry II's Scutages	120
Table 13:	Payments in Kent for Porters and Watchmen... ..	133
Table 14:	Hierarchy of Pay for Knights and Serjeants in the Reign of R. I	136
Chart 1:	Military Expenditures in Shropshire and Kent from H. II to John	160
Table 15:	The Number of Knights Serving or Commuting in H. II's Reign	179
Table 16:	Royal Castle Guard	195
Table 17:	Baronies and Fees Serving at Dover Castle	198
Table 18:	The Inheritance of Dover Castle Guard by Barony	200
Figure 1:	The Bronze Doors of San Clemente a Casauria	223

Abbreviations

<i>Catalogus</i>	<i>Catalogus Baronum</i> , Evelyn Jamison (ed.) (Rome, 1972).
<i>Dialogus</i>	Richard fitz Nigel, <i>Dialogus de Scaccario</i> , Emilie Amt and S.D. Church (eds. and trans.), New Edition (Oxford, 2007).
Falcandus (eng.)	Hugo Falcandus, <i>The History of the Tyrants of Sicily</i> , Graham Loud and Thomas Wiedemann (eds. and trans.) (Manchester, 1998).
Falcandus (lat.)	Ugo Falcando, <i>La Historia o Liber de Regno Sicilie</i> , G.B. Siragusa (ed.), Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, 12 (Rome, 1897).
<i>Feudal Assessments</i>	Keefe, Thomas K., <i>Feudal Assessments and the Political Community under Henry II and His Sons</i> (Berkeley, 1983).
<i>Feudal England</i>	John Horace Round, <i>Feudal England</i> (London, 1895; Reprint, London, 1964).
Jamison, 'Additional Work'	Evelyn Jamison and Dione Clementi, 'Additional Work by E. Jamison on the <i>Catalogus Baronum</i> ,' <i>Bullettino dell'Istituto italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano</i> , 83 (1971), 1-63.
<i>Le Régime Féodal</i>	Claude Cahen, <i>Le Régime Féodal de l'Italie Normande</i> (Paris, 1940).
Malaterra (eng.)	Geoffrey Malaterra, <i>The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard</i> , Kenneth Baxter Wolf (trans.) (Ann Arbor, 2005).

Malaterra (lat.)	Gaufredo Malaterra, <i>De Rebus Gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae Comitis et Roberti Guiscardii Ducis Fratris Eius</i> , Ernesto Pontieri (ed.), <i>Rerum Italicarum Scriptores</i> , 5 pt. 1 (Bologna: 1928).
<i>Military Organization</i>	C. Warren Hollister, <i>The Military Organization of Norman England</i> (Oxford, 1965).
<i>P.R.</i>	<i>Pipe Rolls</i> . References to the Pipe Rolls are listed by regnal year of the king concerned, and are published by the Pipe Roll Society.
<i>RBE</i>	<i>Red Book of the Exchequer</i> , Hubert Hall (ed.), 3 vols., <i>Rolls Series</i> , ic (London, 1896).

Both personal and place names have been translated into English where the English equivalent is either obvious or commonly known. All other names have been left in the original Latin as recorded in the source. Additionally, some place names have been left in the original Latin for certain comparative purposes. Maps are based on those provided in E. Jamison, *Catalogus Baronum* and R. Bartlett 'Provisioning War in the Twelfth Century,' *Atlas of Medieval Europe*, Angus Mackay and David Ditchburn (eds.) (London, 1997), 125-7.

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Introduction

There is no clear documentation of the structure of military obligation in medieval England before the twelfth century, and the reign of Henry II. A hundred years previously, England had been invaded and conquered by the Normans in the year 1066. The Battle of Hastings and subsequent Norman Conquest have been seen by later medieval chroniclers and modern historians as leading to the creation of the system of *servicium debitum*, or owed military service, in England. The events of 1066 place the Normans centrally in the development of English feudalism, and it is from the feudal structures in pre-conquest Normandy that many historians have perceived the arrangements established in England.¹ The feudal structure of England is well documented from the twelfth century and needs little comparison to the arrangements of Normandy to reveal its workings, just some interpretation to account for the nature of the surviving evidence. However, comparative work can be useful, not only with the Duchy of Normandy, but with the other region famously established by men who came from Normandy: the *regno* of southern Italy and Sicily. In many ways, the information gained by comparing the system of military obligation in southern Italy to England provides a better understanding of what the Normans implemented since these services were not established on an equal basis in

¹ It is recognized that the term 'feudal' has various and problematic definitions, and that much debate has already occurred in the modern historical community to establish what is meant by this word. It has been used here and throughout this study as a neutral, descriptive means of describing the most basic terms of military obligation where a knight or some other soldier receives a portion of land or a money-rent in return for serving in an unpaid army. Likewise, the term 'Norman' is generally used as a description of anyone coming from the county of Normandy or their descendants and is not meant as an exact reference to a race or specific biological identity.

both regions. While the information gained from looking at southern Italy is useful, the focus will remain on the workings of England.

The purpose of this study is to re-assess the system of military obligation in England at the earliest time sufficient documents survive to provide an in-depth explanation. It is to be both an examination of the twelfth-century feudal structure and lordship arrangements as described by these documents, and how they came to be in their twelfth-century forms. This is to be supplemented by a similar examination to a lesser extent of the *regno* of southern Italy and of the occasional relevant documents from Normandy. An examination of the place of military obligation in the kingdom of England shall be covered in three major areas: the assessment of this obligation, the cost of service both to the king and the individual knight, and how the men actually served. These three areas offer insight into how the Normans established the owed service of their knights, how knights exempted themselves from their obligation or were compensated for extra service, and various aspects of what their service entailed.

The feudal surveys of the twelfth century are vital to the understanding of military obligation in England, as well as the regions of Normandy and southern Italy. Each of these areas carried out a survey in the late twelfth century: the *Cartae Baronum* of England in 1166, the *Infeudationes Militum* of Normandy in 1172 and the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy in the 1150-60s. These three surveys deserve a close examination of not only their contents, but why they were gathered and the historical context from which they were created. How these documents were used is not necessarily the reason why they were gathered, and the latter reason for their existence may have more bearing on their importance than the former. These documents reaffirmed the king's right to the service of knights and re-established the

notion that the knights involved must perform a military duty to the king. The information that can be gathered from these surveys can help in understanding how these knights were established and how their owed service was performed.

The role of money has always been vital in warfare, and twelfth-century England was no different. A system by which knights could forgo their service by rendering a money payment called scutage was certainly in existence in England during the twelfth century, and may have had a role in southern Italy as well. Conversely, knights could serve beyond their owed service and expect some type of pay or wages for this service. The rate at which these wages were paid can render an account of the economic realities for the twelfth-century knight, how reliant the king was on paid soldiers instead of the *servicium debitum*, and how both of these would impact how many men would actually serve.

How often knights served rather than commuted their service played an important role in warfare, for without these knights, the king was unlikely to have had a sufficient military force to accomplish his aims. In what capacity these knights served, be it in the field, at sea, or within the king's fortresses, holds equal importance. If these services should prove to be similar in the areas of England and southern Italy, then perhaps some details that were recorded in southern Italy, but lost from the English sources, may help further the knowledge of both.

Feudal England and the question of the introduction of feudalism has been a reoccurring feature of English historical interest. A central question has always been, 'did the Normans bring feudalism to England with the Conquest?' The nationalist inclinations of nineteenth-century English historians led to a tendency to emphasise the achievements and institutions of the Anglo-Saxons from whom many of these historians believed themselves to have descended. There was general agreement that

the Normans and their conquest of England, while a spectacular event, had relatively little impact on what was thought to be the natural progression of English history. This produced what has been called the ‘theory of continuity’; a notion that the ‘progress’ of the Anglo-Saxons continued across the events of the Conquest, and that institutions and social structures recorded after 1066 had evolved from similar Anglo-Saxon structures, rather than having been imposed by the Normans. One aspect of this ‘theory of continuity,’ was the basis by which knights were enfeoffed in England. It was agreed that knighthood as a term, not necessarily as a concept, was introduced by the Normans, and that the Anglo-Saxon office of ‘thegn’ was considered to be its equivalent. In the words of William Stubbs, “The growth of knighthood... is a translation into Norman forms of a thegnage of the Anglo-Saxon law.”² In other words, the language changed, not the substance.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the historian John Horace Round performed an in-depth study into the earliest records of knight service in England, which challenged the theory of continuity.³ Round would produce analyses so vital to the study of feudalism in England that any subsequent work regarding the subject must refer back to him, whether the authors agreed or disagreed with Round’s conclusions. His works attempted to re-establish the notion of an arbitrarily assigned *servicium debitum*, or the ‘owed service’ often referred to as a ‘quota,’ in post-conquest England and that knight fees and enfeoffments were established by tenants-in-chief: not following a prescribed binding of military service coming from every five hides as was the system for the Anglo-Saxon *fyrð*.

Twelfth-century documents provide the most effective means to study the *servicium debitum* of knights in England. In the year 1166, King Henry II ordered a

² William Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England: Its Origin and Development*, 1, (Oxford, 1880), 297.

³ *Feudal England*, 182-245.

survey of all the knights' fees in England, and that each baron and tenant-in-chief was to return a listing of the knights he had enfeoffed. It is here that any study of owed service must begin. While by no means comprehensive, the *Cartae Baronum* of 1166 recorded knight fees, the military obligation of many of the barons and tenants-in-chief, and occasionally recorded extra information such as the value of a fief, the size, and other services which may be performed. Round was able to use the information in this survey, in conjunction with scutage payments in the Pipe Rolls, to establish the owed services of the barons and ecclesiastics throughout England. By comparing the scutage payments to the survey, Round noticed certain infeudation patterns, which he claimed could only have been made by a recent imposition of knight service on the realm, and that these patterns could not be consistent with a traditional service that had existed since before the conquest of 1066. The scutage payments, according to Round, were a tax in lieu of service, and Round believed that these payments helped define the service recorded in the *cartae* more clearly, since the *cartae* contained fees split into three different categories (old fees, new fees, and fees on the demesne) and none seemed to adequately define their *servicium debitum*. While exploring the importance of the scutage payments and how they were determined, Round also established a rate of pay for a knight in the mid-twelfth century as being 8*d.* a day, and he used this number to explore the relationship between scutage payments, field service and castle guard.⁴

Round's work revealed aspects of English feudalism which he believed was the work of the Normans, and laid the groundwork for other historians to follow. The historical discussion about military obligation and its related aspects began to flourish after Round's work, and the key discussions and historical interpretations which hold a bearing on this work are here outlined. An important contribution to

⁴ Round, 'Castle Guard,' *Archaeological Journal*, 59 (1902), 144-159.

the discussion of Norman influence came from Charles Homer Haskins's *Norman Institutions*, which focused mainly on Normandy during the reigns of William the Conqueror through to that of Henry II.⁵ While the institutions he concentrated on were primarily of a judicial nature, he also provided insights into military service in Normandy; strongly suggesting that it was under William the Conqueror that military service was established for the monasteries of Normandy, and not before. Frank M. Stenton's *The First Century of English Feudalism* (1932) also pursued an argument for the Norman introduction of knight service in England, and introduced the theory that the actual knight's fee was established by the value of the land it was on, and not the pre-Norman area measurement of the hide.⁶ This would be another piece taken away from the theory of Anglo-Saxon continuity, as well as provide a means for measuring the size of a fief, which had previously been taken to be an area of land rather than a monetary value.

After Stenton, the debate continued concerning the military obligations of Anglo-Norman England. Marjory Hollings' 'The Survival of the Five Hide Unit in the Western Midlands' brought a short return to the theory of continuity with new evidence that the lands of the Bishop of Worcester were in fact enfeoffed according to the land measure of five hides for every knight.⁷ C. Warren Hollister's *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions*, and its sequel *The Military Organization of Norman England*, disagreed with the continuity theory in England, but presented what he believed to be evidence of the continuation of *fyrð* service in conjunction with normal feudal service by knight fief in England after the conquest.⁸ Salley Harvey

⁵ Charles H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (Cambridge, 1925).

⁶ Frank Stenton, *The First Century of English Feudalism: 1066-1166*, Second Edition (Cambridge, 1995).

⁷ Marjory Hollings, 'The Survival of the Five Hide Unit in the Western Midlands,' *The English Historical Review*, 63, no. 249 (1948), 453-487.

⁸ C. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest* (Oxford, 1962) ; *Military Organization*.

took up the debate on knight fees five years later with an argument that further refined Stenton's original idea that the fief was a unit of value and not a unit of land.⁹ These arguments concerning the value and area of land of a fief play a role in the practicality of knightly enfeoffments, while Hollister's suggestion of the Norman use of the *fyrð* brings into question the use of ordinary freemen in the military, much like the Norman *arrière-ban*.

At the same time that these debates concerning military obligation and enfeoffments occurred, questions of military obligation, scutage payments and knightly wages were also reassessed, notably in a debate between Hollister and J. C. Holt.¹⁰ Hollister argued that Round's theory of an 8*d.* wage was too high, and that the period of service was 60 days, rather than 40, based on Anglo-Saxon precedent. He backed his argument by using the same arithmetical equation Round used to come to a forty-day period with an 8*d.* wage being a scutage of 2 marks. Holt believed Hollister made too many assumptions concerning the relationship between scutage and actual owed service, and maintained that Hollister was basing too many of his conclusions on too little evidence. Hollister then released *Military Organization of Norman England*, which covered all of the previous topics, including an attempt to amalgamate the castle guard theories of Round (commutation of castle guard service was equal to the knights' wages)¹¹ and Sydney Painter (commutation rates of castle guard was a result of individual bargaining)¹² by essentially saying some castles worked on Round's theory, and others on Painter's.

⁹ Salley Harvey, 'The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England,' *Past & Present*, 49 (1970), 3-43.

¹⁰ Hollister, 'The Significance of Scutage Rates in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century England,' *English Historical Review*, 75, no. 297 (1960), 577-588 ; J.C. Holt 'Feudalism Revisited,' *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 14, no. 2 (1961), 333-340 ; Hollister, 'Two Comments on the Problem of Continuity in Anglo-Norman Feudalism,' *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 16, no. 1 (1963), 104-113 ; Holt, 'Anglo-Norman Feudalism,' *The Economic History Review*, New Series, 16, no. 1 (1963), 114-118.

¹¹ Round, 'Castle Guard.'

¹² Sidney Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' *The American Historical Review*, 40, no. 3 (1935), 450-459.

Hollister's contribution, while not without controversy as seen in his debate with Holt, would cover many aspects of feudal obligation in England to make his work an essential source.

John Gillingham reignited the continuity debate in 1981 using a variety of new material, but essentially relying on the silence of contemporary chroniclers to argue that the introduction of knight fees was not a new development for the English.¹³ Holt produced another article two years later that, while not a direct response to Gillingham, provided a means by which the imposed knightly enfeoffments of the Normans could be accounted for in the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* and explained how an initially clear pattern of enfeoffment had partially broken down a hundred years after the conquest.¹⁴ Marjorie Chibnall used a similar method to refute Haskins' old position concerning the Conqueror imposing knight service on Norman monasteries, arguing that the monasteries that owed service had been old enough to lose their land, which was then enfeoffed and subsequently regained, hence why they owed military service.¹⁵ Holt's methods were later refined by Judith Green in *The Aristocracy of Norman England*.¹⁶ Green used genealogy to follow subinfeudation and attempted to establish large and substantial fees as the original Norman enfeoffments, but small fractional fees as later creations. These studies on infeudation practices are necessary to understanding how the substance of the fees could degrade by the time sufficient records become available in the twelfth century, and aid in interpreting the available documents for this type of study.

¹³ John Gillingham, 'The Introduction of Knight Service into England,' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 4 (1982), 53-64.

¹⁴ Holt, 'The Introduction of Knight Service in England,' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 6 (1984), 89-106.

¹⁵ Marjorie Chibnall, 'Military Service in Normandy Before 1066,' *Anglo Norman Studies*, 5 (1982), 65-77.

¹⁶ Judith Green, *The Aristocracy of Norman England* (Cambridge, 1997).

In the course of the debate concerning fiefs, Thomas K. Keefe published his study of the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* and the 1172 *Infeudationes Militum* conducted in Normandy.¹⁷ Keefe used the barons' returns in conjunction with evidence from the Pipe Rolls to survey the use of knight fees and scutage payments under Henry II and his sons. His work contributed statistical evidence to the debates concerning the use of scutage and the infeudation practices under the Angevins. By using his statistical data, Keefe also countered the long-held belief that Henry II and his sons practised an oppressive taxation policy towards the barons of England. It was Henry's tax policy that was usually held to be the reason for the making of the *Cartae Baronum*, and with Keefe providing evidence to the contrary, another theory must be posited to account for the creation of a fundamental text in studying feudal England. Keefe followed Stubbs' belief that the *Cartae* was made in preparation for the marriage of Henry II's daughter, but there are other possibilities that will be considered.

Keefe was not the first historian to utilize sources from Normandy to supplement a study of England; after all, Normandy was the place of origin for the English aristocracy in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, and for much of this time shared the same ruler. The 1172 *Infeudationes Militum* survey created by Henry II is a relevant Norman document that can be used to compare practices in England with Normandy. However, the wealth of information available for England compared to that for Normandy means that English sources are more likely to be used to supplement the history of Normandy than the other way around.

Normandy, however, is not the only area that could prove useful as a comparison to establish the history of England. Groups of Normans were found serving in the capacity of mercenaries for various lords in southern Italy almost fifty years before the conquest of England. These areas, by no means homogenous when

¹⁷ *Feudal Assessments*.

the Normans first came, would eventually be taken over by these men and their heirs, and would be forced into a political whole. The counties of Apulia, Capua, Calabria and Sicily were ruled by individual Norman lords until they all came under the hold of the Count of Sicily, Roger II, later fashioned the King of Sicily.

Historians have often used the example of England to further their understanding of southern Italy, and in particular Norman Italy, but the reverse has rarely been the case. England has such a wealth of primary sources that it has often been studied in isolation, and if there were ambiguities or difficulties, Normandy might be turned to suggest answers. The *Regno* of southern Italy can also be used for comparative purposes, though few have taken this approach.

At the same time that English historians were emphasizing the continuity between Anglo-Saxon and Norman England, aggrandizing the role of Anglo-Saxons in post-conquest England, others held a general belief that there was a close similarity between the regions of England and southern Italy due to a sense of shared Norman identity. Haskins provided one of the first actual comparisons between these two regions in 1911, but, while recognizing many differences between the two regions, was still operating under the assumption of an inherent Norman ability to establish well-governed states.¹⁸ Comparisons with England rarely occurred unless it was a part of a larger work looking at all aspects of the 'Normans,' and were inevitably split into three sections covering Normandy, England and southern Italy, but providing little actual analysis of the relations of each of these regions. It was not until the work of R.H.C. Davis' *The Normans and their Myth* that these assumptions of a shared Norman identity would begin to break down and the condition of Norman studies would focus more on a shared origin rather than a

¹⁸ Charles H. Haskins, 'England and Sicily in the Twelfth Century,' *English Historical Review*, 26, no. 103 (1911), 433-447 ; Charles H. Haskins, 'England and Sicily in the Twelfth Century (Continued),' *English Historical Review*, 26, no. 104 (1911), 641-665.

shared identity.¹⁹ Still, comparisons rarely came in a form other than in generalized works covering the topic of ‘the Normans.’²⁰

Unlike the Norman invasion of England, the conquest of southern Italy was a slow process, taking over a hundred years from when the Normans were first found in the south until the time the *regno* was established and recognized in 1130. The English invasion was a planned expedition by the leader of the Normans, whereas the Italian invasion was through bands of opportunistic Norman knights. The invasion of England, being a swift and decisive campaign, enabled the Normans to make necessary changes to the English institutional structure to fit their needs, and the consistency of control by the same individual, William the Conqueror, ensured that the Norman needs were adhered to both in Normandy and in England. The invasion of Italy, being a slow infiltration, would have necessitated the following of local custom for many years, and by the time the Normans gained complete control of the area, they were unlikely able to impose their own structure upon the lands they had conquered. It is for these reasons that little comparative work has been done between the Norman institutions of England and those of southern Italy.

While the slow takeover of southern Italy may present an obstacle to studying the Norman impact on the area, and thus complicate a comparison with England, there were still Normans arriving into southern Italy and joining battles for many years after the initial settlers. If the original settlers and these additional Normans entering their service were able to retain or bring some of the customs of Normandy through their years to power, a comparison of their military institutions with the English equivalent may further our understanding of how the Normans changed and

¹⁹ R.H.C. Davis, *The Normans and their Myth* (London, 1976).

²⁰ One exception is a piece produced by Graham Loud that outlined a few political and administrative connections directly between England and southern Italy. G.A. Loud, ‘The Kingdom of Sicily and the Kingdom of England, 1066-1266,’ *History*, 88, no. 292 (2003) 540-567.

operated in these areas. After all, these Normans were not establishing themselves in these different parts of Europe without contact to the outside world, and many Normans in both England and southern Italy were known to have had influence in both of these countries, and some in all three areas of England, Normandy and southern Italy.²¹ Several officials from both England and the kingdom of Sicily had been natives of one land and had worked in the administrations of the other. On the English side, perhaps the most famous is the case of Master Thomas Brown, who was known to have held special rights in the English exchequer, contrary to custom.²² Brown was a high ranking member in Roger II's court of Sicily, and was lauded by Richard fitz Nigel as being "virtually the top man in the confidential business of the realm," but he fled Sicily after the succession of King William I in 1154.²³

Roger II was known to have made use of the experience of other kings and kingdoms for the administration of his own. Hugo Falcandus reports that he "made every effort to find out about the customs of other kings and peoples, in order to adopt any of them that seemed particularly admirable and useful."²⁴ This would have certainly been a reference to the use of the *dîwân at-tahqîq* in Sicily, but was surely truthful in other aspects.²⁵ Some of the appointments in the royal administration of southern Italy were both foreigners and Englishmen. Examples include Roger's chancellor Robert, who was a cleric from England, and Richard

²¹ The Norman Family of the Ridels had lands and prominence in each of these three regions. G. A. Loud, 'How 'Norman' was the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy?' *Conquerors and Churchmen in Norman Italy* (Aldershot, 1999), II, 22-3.

²² *Dialogus*, 26-7.

²³ *Ibid.*, 54-5. Brown originally came from England, worked for King Roger in Sicily, then returned to England.

²⁴ Falcandus (eng.), 58 ; '*aliorum || quoque regum ac gentium consuetudines diligentissime fecit inquiri, ut quod in eis pulcherrimum aut utiles videbatur sibi transumeret.*' Falcandus (lat.), 6.

²⁵ The *dîwân at-tahqîq* was an administrative office created in Muslim Sicily.

Palmer, who was appointed Bishop of Syracuse.²⁶ It has been suggested that some of the similarities between the Sicilian *dîwân* and the English exchequer were due to an Anglo-Norman influence.²⁷ There seems to be an extraordinary number of English men arriving in southern Italy at this time (one of the popes in this same time, Adrian IV, was from England), and the personal connections between these two kingdoms have been recorded before, so further examples need not be included here.²⁸

The English and Norman chroniclers began to take notice of the Sicilian kingdom by the twelfth century, with the occasional reference creeping in to the works of authors such as Robert de Torigni and William of Newborough.²⁹ The *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* includes a letter from the Sicilian King William II to King Henry II of England, as well as an account following the journey of Henry's daughter, Joanna, on her way to be married to William II.³⁰ While most of the references are from the mid to late twelfth century, there are occasionally earlier ones, such as Orderic Vitalis who follows the adventures of William Grandmesnil, who travelled back and forth between southern Italy and Normandy.³¹ These chronicle references and records have given an impression of interest in the Normans in southern Italy by their other Norman contemporaries in England and France. Earlier historians attached significance to this and other statements by chroniclers which spoke of the great Norman deeds and their military prowess and superiority to

²⁶ Romuald of Salerno, *Chronicon sive Annales, 1153-69*, in Falcandus (eng.), 220 ; *Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon*, C. A. Garufi (ed.), *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 7 pt. 1 (Città di Castello, 1935), 233-4 ; Falcandus (eng.), 137 ; Falcandus (lat.), 88.

²⁷ Haskins, 'England and Sicily (Cont.)', 651.

²⁸ For detailed examples of the political connections between England and Sicily, see Loud, 'The Kingdom of Sicily,' 540-567 ; Haskins, 'England and Sicily,' 433-447 ; and Haskins, 'England and Sicily (Cont.)', 641-665.

²⁹ William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum, Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I.*, R. Howlett (ed.), 1, Rolls Series, lxxxii (London, 1884) ; Robert de Torigni, *The Chronicle of Robert of Torigni*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, etc.*, vol. 4.

³⁰ *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis: The chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I, 1169-1192, known commonly under the name of Benedict of Peterborough*, W. Stubbs (ed.), 1, Rolls Series, ii (London, 1867), 169, 172.

³¹ Haskins, 'England and Sicily,' 435 ; Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History*, Marjory Chibnall (ed. and trans.), 4, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1973), 16, 32, 339.

suggest that there was a shared sense of identity between these three areas. Evidence of peculiarly 'Norman' institutions in these three areas, such as the outlawing of personal warfare, had acted as further evidence of a shared culture, rather than separate cultures with a similar origin.³²

While the notion of a shared Norman identity is unlikely, it is still surprising that detailed evidence of military obligation is recorded in southern Italy around the same time it was recorded in England. The south-Italian Normans produced a survey of knights in the twelfth century, known as the *Catalogus Baronum*. This survey's origin had no relation to the creation of the other two surveys from England and Normandy; in fact, the south-Italian survey came first, but it is striking that these three areas, all controlled by those with a cultural origin from Normandy, and with a strong sense of their own military superiority, produced a knight survey in roughly the same time period before any other area of western Europe. As striking as it may be, little comparison work on the aspects of military obligation has been done between all three of these areas to determine what extent these surveys reveal similarities or differences between their feudal military structure, particularly between the conquered territories of England and southern Italy.

Haskins, early in the twentieth century, did attempt comparisons between Anglo-Norman England and Norman Sicily.³³ In these papers, Haskins covered little on the subject of military obligation or infeudation, but did provide evidence of a large amount of institutional interaction of the two kingdoms and provided a comparison of their similar administrative techniques. This is the only study to date to compare the *Cartae Baronum* of England and the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy in any substantive manner, although many of Haskins conclusions are based on

³² Evelyn Jamison, 'The Norman Administration of Apulia and Capua, more especially under Roger II and William I,' *Papers of the British School at Rome*, 6 (London, 1913), 242.

³³ Haskins, 'England and Sicily,' ; Haskins, England and Sicily cont.'

assumptions that are not revealed in a closer analysis of the texts. Graham Loud likewise looked at the diplomatic interactions of the two regions and their perceptions of one another via their shared Norman heritage in an article published nearly a century later, but covered nothing on military obligation.³⁴ It is the theme of Norman administrative practices in southern Italy that would receive the most attention from historians, producing several works such as Jeremy Johns' *Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily* and Hiroshi Takayama's *The Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily*.³⁵

The first major work to focus on the feudal aspects of southern Italy was by Claude Cahen in his book *Le Régime Féodal de l'Italie Normande*, published in 1940.³⁶ Cahen covered all the basic elements of feudalism as it pertained to Norman Italy, but as with many general works, it lacks the detail necessary to give a full picture of the impact the Normans had on this region. Evelyn Jamison began to provide some of the finer details concerning Norman feudalism in Italy when she was working on her edition of the *Catalogus Baronum* in the early 1970s. Jamison unfortunately died while writing her detailed introduction to the *Catalogus*, but this work was later published separately with some editing and additions by Dione Clementi.³⁷ Jamison's work, although incomplete, revealed a small possibility of a scutage-like system of commutation in the south and also showed a military overhaul in the organization of fees.

More recently, Graham Loud has contributed work on feudal obligation in Norman Italy. His interests lie mainly with ecclesiastical matters, and this has led

³⁴ Loud, 'The Kingdom of Sicily.'

³⁵ Jeremy Johns, *Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily: The Royal Dîwân* (Cambridge, 2002) ; Hiroshi Takayama, *The Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily* (Leiden, 1993).

³⁶ *Le Régime Féodal*.

³⁷ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 1-63.

him to investigate the military obligations of the church.³⁸ Loud established that the south-Italian churches were exempt from providing service, but still owed service that was provided for them by the laity. Loud went on to refine his theory and postulate why the churches appear largely to be left out of the *Catalogus Baronum* in a chapter of one of his later books, *The Latin Church in Norman Italy*.³⁹

Military obligation was an important political and even social tool in medieval England, and it is through studying this service, supplemented by additional information from the other land the Normans conquered, southern Italy, that a sense of the impact the Normans had on England can be gained. A study of this must necessarily begin with the documents of the twelfth century, due to the scarcity of the sources from earlier periods. As such, what will be seen is an imprint of an imposed feudal system that was implemented at least a hundred years before the major sources revealing it were written. The primary surveys of the *Cartae Baronum* of England, the *Infeudationes Militum* of Normandy and the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy will be analysed in conjunction with their historical context to provide a better understanding of the relationship between these documents and the events surrounding their creation.

After an analysis of the essential texts for this study, the practice of infeudation will be examined in relation to the patterns of enfeoffment that previous historians have observed. An assessment of these patterns in southern Italy will then be pursued to see if previous historical assumptions can be maintained in this area, and if any differences may have a bearing on the situation in England.

The study will then move to analyse the means by which knights in England abstained from their service via commutation, and by what basis this commutation

³⁸ Loud, 'The Church, Warfare, and Military Obligation in Norman Italy,' *Conquerors and Churchmen in Norman Italy* (Aldershot, 1999), Part IX, 31-45.

³⁹ Loud, *The Latin Church in Norman Italy* (Cambridge, 2007), Chapter 6.

was established. Southern Italy's forms of feudal taxation will also be considered to see if any relevant parallels exist. These relations will then be used to examine the royal expenditures on knights and other military necessities, which will attempt to establish a relationship between different types and quality of service. Means of providing wages other than money payments will also be considered, as well as the role of specialist units and the use of soldiers who came from outside of England.

The levels of service in twelfth-century England will also be examined to the furthest extent possible. This will mostly be conducted for Henry II's major campaigns, and will generally be reserved for the army that served in the field. Other services, particularly those revealed in an appraisal of southern Italy, will also be viewed, particularly the roles of coast guard and serving in the navy. Finally, castle-guard service will be analysed with examples of various service requirements in royal castles, the origins of these services, and the types of soldiers typically serving in castles.

In this study, many statistical analyses have been used, particularly pertaining to the evidence presented in the Pipe Rolls of England. Much of the raw data from these analyses is provided in the various appendices. Analysis of scutage payments has been reserved for the reign of Henry II, since these are the earliest available and the event of the marriage of his daughter also provides an interesting comparison to an *auxilium* similar to scutage. Information pertaining to the military expenditures through the reigns of Henry II, Richard I and John have been kept to the counties of Shropshire and Kent. The limited time to perform this study has necessitated a smaller focus for these expenditures, but the counties of Shropshire and Kent have been chosen as the representatives due to their status as border counties which would more likely provide instances of military payments.

Part I

Assessment

Chapter 1

Feudal Surveys

The Cartae Baronum

For an understanding of military obligation, it is necessary to begin with the twelfth century knight survey from England called the *Cartae Baronum*. This survey survives primarily in two sources from the thirteenth century: the *Red Book of the Exchequer* and the *Black Book of the Exchequer*. The *Red Book* was compiled in part by Alexander Swerford who was a part of the exchequer from 1199 to 1246, but his compilation is usually dated as being before 1231. The *Black Book* is believed to have been compiled in the first decade of the thirteenth century.¹ These two volumes were collections of documents relating to the financial office of the exchequer, and many of the documents copied within are from the twelfth century, such as the *Dialogus de Scaccario* and the *Constitutio Domus Regis*. In general, neither is believed to have been a copy of the other, but Hall has given reasoning for the *Cartae* in the *Red Book* to have been copied from the *Black Book* such as repeated omissions and the copying of later insertions.² However, the *Red Book*'s layout in terms of paragraphs and rubrics is independent of that found in the *Black Book* which caused Hall to suggest that the *Red Book* is actually a copy made from a copy of the

¹ *Dialogus*, xxvii, lx. For information on Alexander Swerford's life, see the introduction to the *Red Book* by Hubert Hall, and the article by Nicholas Vincent, 'New Light on Master Alexander Swerford (d. 1246): The career and connections of an Oxfordshire civil servant,' *Oxoniensia*, 61 (1996), 297-309.

² *RBE*, li-lii.

Black Book.³ Located in the *Red Book* is perhaps the best preserved, if later copy, of the *Cartae Baronum*, aside from the occasional survival of an original return.⁴ The *Red Book* was edited and printed as part of the Rolls Series in 1896 by Hubert Hall, who also included discrepancies from the *Black Book*, and any surviving original returns for the *Cartae Baronum* in the footnotes.⁵

Several theories exist about the purpose behind Henry II's knight survey of 1166. Within certain returns, a sense of the purpose of the survey is mentioned as being so Henry would know what old enfeoffments existed at the time of his grandfather Henry I, what new enfeoffments were made since the death of Henry I, how many knights a tenant-in-chief owed from his demesne, and the names of these knights.⁶ This straight-forward explanation has been taken at its word, and has been coupled with evidence from the 1168 *auxilium*, or aid, based on the knight fees, and the response from the barons to that aid as evidence of Henry attempting to increase his monetary assets as part of a new revolutionary finance system.⁷ This was an idea

³ Ibid., liv.

⁴ Ibid., li-lij ; *Dialogus*, xxvii-xxviii.

⁵ Hall's edition was plagued with errors, causing the historian J. H. Round to go to such lengths as self-publishing a book to denounce Hall's work, and stating in the most rancorous way possible, that Hall's work was "so replete with heresy and error as to lead astray for ever all students of its subject." Round, *Studies on the Red Book of the Exchequer*, (Privately Published, 1898), v. Hall would eventually reply to Round, stating that Round held a personal grudge against Hall, and that Round had actually proofread the work (or at least the index where many of the mistakes of names occur) and failed to point out mistakes before the work was published.⁵ Hubert Hall, *The Red Book of the Exchequer: A Reply to Mr. J. H. Round* (London, 1898), 1-6. While the dispute between Round and Hall provides entertaining reading, it is illustrative of the fact that Hall's edition, while the best one to date, needs to be used with some caution.

⁶ The main source for these criteria comes from the return of the Archbishop of York, *RBE*, 412-13.

⁷ *Feudal England*, 194. There is also the single contemporary reference to the survey which coincides with this theory, that of Ralph Niger, who states that "Henry II made all the barons [*milites*] state openly how many knights or fees each one of them possessed; desiring that knight service should be assessed according to the number of their fees." *Feudal Assessments*, 12 ; '*Rex Henricus II omnes milites jurare fecit ut quot militum jura seu feoda unusquisque illorum obtineret, palam ediceret, volens ut pro feoforum numero servitia militum exigerentur : quod stare non potuit.*' Ralph Niger, *Radulfi Nigri Chronica*, Robert Anstruther (ed.), Caxton Society, 13 (London, 1851), 171. While Ralph Niger is believed to have been in Henry's court in the late 1160s, his exact location at the time of the survey is unknown. He is known to have been with the exiled Becket in 1165, and may have been in Poitiers in 1166. Ralph was later exiled by Henry (possibly because of his support for Becket) and did not begin writing his chronicle until the 1190s. A. J. Duggan, 'Niger, Ralph (b. c.1140, d. in or before 1199?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edn, (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004) [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20192>, accessed 22 Aug 2010].

which was meant to provide a better explanation than that originally given by Stubbs. Stubbs' explanation, later championed by Keefe, was that the extra enfeoffments were recorded so Henry could use them in assessing an aid for his daughter's marriage.⁸ This explanation fits nicely with a known use of aids requested from enfeoffed knights as explained in *Magna Carta*, and also takes advantage of the known historical event of the marriage of Henry II's daughter, Matilda, which occurred just before 1168 when the first and only aid on the extra enfeoffed knights was called.⁹ Another idea is that the true purpose was to gain the names of all the knights so that they may swear fealty to Henry, and perhaps his son, the Young King, as well, which is also one of the expressed purposes mentioned by the Archbishop of York.¹⁰

While there is no doubt that the 1166 survey was *used* for the assessing of the extra enfeoffments, this may not necessarily have been its *purpose*. For its use, one need only look at the document itself and the baronial response to it, particularly that of the 1168 aid and the 1172 scutage. But to determine its purpose, and why it was created, one need also look at the historical events leading up to the creation of the *Cartae Baronum* and what factors may have influenced its creation in the year 1166, and not some other point in Henry II's reign.

One remarkable aspect of the baronial returns, which is either puzzling to historians or simply dismissed as 'the way it was,' is the fact that the barons and tenants-in-chief were so willing to state truthfully that they had new enfeoffments. Round even states that the church "must have uniformly and systematically adopted an attitude of protest" yet must admit in the very next sentence that "there is no trace

⁸ *Feudal Assessments*, 13-15 ; Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England*, vol. 1, 655.

⁹ J.C. Holt, *Magna Carta*, Second Edition (Cambridge, 1992), 454-5, cap. 12.

¹⁰ W.L. Warren, *Henry II*, (London, 1973), 277-8; *RBE*, 412-13. This return does not mention swearing fealty to the Young King, but other documents of the time mention this as a requirement. *Feudal Assessments*, 13.

of such a protest in her [the church's] returns.”¹¹ It only stands to reason that if a baron were to inform his lord that he had enfeoffed more knights, then the lord would try to obtain money from these knights when aids and scutages were called, or obtain their service. Yet it is well known that the aid on the extra enfeoffments in 1168 was met with anger by the barons. It is unlikely that in the two years between the *Cartae Baronum* and the aid of 1168 the barons and tenants-in-chief had simply forgotten that they had reported these figures to the king.

It also seems remarkable that in 1166, Henry would be trying to increase the money he could receive via scutage, the theory put forward by Round. Henry had just received a scutage from the previous year that was at the normal scutage rate of one mark, in addition to receiving large *dona* which were known to be a scutage (in essence) on the serjeants, an unusual service to commute.¹² Many of the *dona* came from ecclesiastics, and the major cities that did not usually contribute to the king's military campaigns, but had been charged at previous times such as the 1159 campaign to Toulouse. For the campaign to Toulouse, and for two other expeditions, Henry was able to charge a scutage at double the normal rate of one mark, and to also collect a *dona* from various ecclesiastics and burghers. With these tools available to Henry, it would seem odd that a document would be needed to assess extra enfeoffments, particularly when the extra enfeoffments created were so small (a fact that Henry most likely knew).¹³

In 1165, before the knight survey, Henry mounted one of his largest campaigns against the Welsh when he received the large sums previously mentioned. He was able to extract these agreements from the church easily in light of the Becket

¹¹ *Feudal England*, 195.

¹² *Ibid.*, 223-4 ; *P.R. 11 Henry II*, passim.

¹³ In the return of the Archbishop of York, it is stated that the names on the returns would be compared to a roll which Henry already had, suggesting that Henry had a relatively good idea of the number of knights enfeoffed. *RBE*, 412-13.

dispute: the other bishops wanted to keep their distance from Becket in order to appease the king.¹⁴ In 1164 at Northampton, Becket was charged with being in violation of the Constitutions of Clarendon, and of being in debt to the king for the Toulouse campaign of 1159.¹⁵ Becket soon went into exile, and the king began seizing all of his possessions after Christmas of 1164 and ordered Becket's resignation as archbishop.¹⁶ If the king had this much power over the Archbishop of Canterbury, and was even willing to turn on his former chancellor and close friend, then he would be willing to be just as harsh to these other bishops should they not comply with his wishes.

In addition to the fear instilled in his bishops by Becket's exile, Henry was acting on the defensive for the Welsh campaign: the Welsh, led by Owain Gwynedd, were in open revolt against English rule, and Henry was concerned about the prospect of an alliance between the Welsh and the French.¹⁷ These sorts of worries and apprehensions would have allowed Henry to take advantage of his barons and vassals to exploit the utmost amounts of capital for this defensive campaign, not only against the Welsh, but the French king as well. By 1165, Henry seemed to have all the necessary means for the financial subjugation of his barons and tenants-in-chief for use in his military campaigns, and a final victory would solidify his ability for financial control.

The Welsh campaign was then promptly lost. Henry's forces were unable to cope with inclement weather, or the unorthodox fighting tactics adopted by the Welsh, even though he had been exposed to their guerrilla warfare in the previous

¹⁴ Paul Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign Against the Welsh in 1165,' *The Welsh History Review*, 14 no. 4 (1989), 551.

¹⁵ Frank Barlow, *Thomas Becket* (London, 1986), 110-11.

¹⁶ This was also a huge financial gain, as the archbishopric was put to farm to Ranulf de Broc for an annual sum of £1562 5s. 5½d. which the king collected. *Ibid.*, 124-5.

¹⁷ Seán Duffy, 'Henry II and England's Insular Neighbours,' *Henry II, New Interpretations*, Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent (eds.) (Woodbridge, 2007), 135.

campaign of 1157. The planned naval blockade failed as well, as Henry did not receive enough ships from Ireland.¹⁸ News of Henry's defeat spread, as Henry left England for the continent, where he would remain for another four years. In addition to this, Henry once again had to face Becket, who was prevented from forcing hostilities by the pope until Easter of 1166. Once Easter arrived, Becket would not only be allowed to resume his harassment of Henry, but was even encouraged to do so by the pope.¹⁹ This is the state of affairs with which we find Henry dealing when the *Cartae Baronum* of 1166 was created.

In order to put the *Cartae Baronum* in the proper context of what Henry faced at the time, it is important to determine its date. The traditional date was set by Robert Eyton as between February and March of 1166.²⁰ This general time period was then reaffirmed by Keefe, whose evidence is here summarized. Gilbert Marshal, who is mentioned as a tenant in the *Cartae*, was described as having received the inheritance to his land in the 1165 Pipe Roll, and in the 1166 Pipe Roll, it is written that he had passed away just after the account was recorded. This suggests clearly that the survey was compiled in 1166, particularly in light of the mention in the Archbishop of York's return that the survey was to be returned before Lent. Lent that year began on March 9, and it is unlikely that the survey took more than the few months before March to complete.²¹

With the date firmly established, one has to wonder why Henry chose this moment to perform the survey amidst all these other events. Perhaps more importantly, *did* Henry choose to perform this survey himself, or was this the will of the barons? It has been noted above how strangely willing the barons appear to have

¹⁸ Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign,' 535-7.

¹⁹ Barlow, *Becket*, 144-6.

²⁰ R. W. Eyton, *Court, Household, and Itinerary of King Henry II* (London, 1878), 90-1.

²¹ *Feudal Assessments*, 12.

been in performing the survey accurately, and in addition to this, several barons include more information in their returns than what seems to have been the requirement as laid out by the Archbishop of York.²² This willingness may be the evidence that the barons themselves were behind the *Cartae Baronum*, and not Henry II.

After the 1165 campaign, Henry was certainly in a weaker position than he had been before. The large and unconventional scutage would no doubt have angered many of the barons, as it certainly did the ecclesiastics who paid the *dona*. Writing to Becket, John of Canterbury commented on the proceedings before the Welsh campaign to prepare for it, stating only “We do not know what was done at the Shrewsbury conference, except that the king fleeced the bishops...”²³ Another letter to Becket from Gilbert Foliot in September 1166, while generally violent in nature towards Becket, is particularly harsh on the subject of scutage for the Toulouse campaign since Becket was responsible for this scutage as chancellor in 1159.²⁴ While possibly unrelated to the 1166 survey, this statement at least shows that the subject of scutage for Henry’s campaigns was a sore one during the same time.

It is entirely possible that Henry felt he did not receive enough of the money due to him for his campaign in 1165, and so ordered the survey to again re-establish the number of men and number of knights fees, perhaps as a way of reminding the tenants-in-chief that Henry was keeping an eye out for those who neglected payment. To examine this theory, a more detailed look at the Pipe Rolls is needed.

²² Ibid., 9 ; *RBE*, 412-13.

²³ ‘Letter 51: Bishop John of Poitiers to Archbishop Thomas of Canterbury,’ *The Correspondence of Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury 1162-1170*, Anne J. Duggan (ed. and trans.), 1 (Oxford, 2000), 216-17.

²⁴ ‘Letter 109: Bishop Gilbert of London to Archbishop Thomas of Canterbury,’ Ibid., 504-5.

Of the money levied for the 1165 campaign, only 66% of the amount due in *dona* or scutage for the campaign was paid, but of the amount not paid, 13% was pardoned by the king.²⁵ To look at even more specific numbers, the majority of the counties paid over half the amount due, with some remarkably good results. Most of the counties farthest away from Wales to the north and east paid 84% or more of their owed scutage by the Michaelmas meeting of the exchequer in 1165. The stand-out exception to this is Yorkshire, which only paid 65%, but it had the highest amount due of all the counties at £883 2s. 8d., and the amount of money actually collected totaled more than that due by any other county. Northumberland had a remarkable turnout with 100% of the money due paid (although the scutage was only £187 10s. 10d.), and Norfolk and Suffolk, with the second largest amount due of £555 5s. 8d. managed to collect 95% of this.

It seems that the most troublesome area in terms of collecting scutages was in the south-west. The areas with the least amount paid by the autumn exchequer session occurred in the counties of Sussex, Hampshire, Wiltshire, Gloucestershire and Herefordshire. It is unclear exactly what was going on in these regions, as all have a relatively high amount of scutage due (Herefordshire being an exception at £106, but this is more likely due to it bordering the area where the war was taking place; after Herefordshire, Wiltshire has the lowest due at £264). A fairly large proportion of the money owed in these areas was also pardoned by the king, except only 2% pardoned in Sussex. Pardons by the king were considered to be simply ‘gifts’ as Richard fitz Nigel explains in the *Dialogus de Scaccario*, but no other explanation of why pardons are given is presented, and is for the most part unknown.²⁶ It is entirely possible that some of these pardons were for tenants-in-

²⁵ *P.R. 11 Henry II*, passim. See also Table 12 and Appendix 2.

²⁶ *Dialogus*, 74-5.

chief who provided his owed service instead of paying the scutage. The only explicit example of this in the Pipe Roll for 1165 is in Gloucestershire where Earl Richard of Pembroke, who owed £76 5s., was pardoned this amount because he provided 20 knights and 40 serjeants. However, it is more likely that when a baron provided his owed service it was not recorded in the Pipe Rolls with scutages.²⁷

The case of the earl of Pembroke raises a further issue with regard to the amounts still owed to the crown from scutage. These debts were not owed by a large number of people, but a few individuals had not paid, and so owed a large amount in scutage. This non-payment would then affect the percentile. Conan, Duke of Brittany owed over £175 in Yorkshire, which accounts for over 60% of the amount outstanding in that county.²⁸ Almost the whole amount owed in Herefordshire was owed by the bishop, and was subsequently pardoned by the king in the following year.²⁹

It is not known why these men failed to pay their scutage as there seems to be clear evidence that the barons knew this war was going to come, and that the demands of the scutage were going to be substantial. Not only was there the conference held at Shrewsbury which indicates this, but there is also evidence within the Pipe Rolls in the early payments recorded by tally. The exchequer would sit in session twice a year, once at Easter and once at Michaelmas. At the second session, all of the accounts would be recorded in the Pipe Rolls, including any payments

²⁷ *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 13. There are several examples of barons / tenants-in-chief who have a large number of enfeoffed knights, and most likely a large *servicium debitum*, but owed a very small scutage, if any. One such example is the Earl of Arundel who had at least 84 knights enfeoffed, but only owed (and paid) 20s. of scutage. *RBE*, 201 ; *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 93. Keefe lists Earl Richard of Pembroke's *servicium debitum* as being 65 ½ knights, but this is not based on the 1166 returns (Richard did not give a return), but on a scutage payment of 1187 when the barony was in the king's hand (thus the king could collect as the Earl would: on all the fees, not just the *servicium debitum*). However, William Marshal, who eventually becomes Earl by marrying Richard's daughter, would pay for 65 ½ fees twice in the latter years of John's reign. *Feudal Assessments*, 180, n. 115.

²⁸ *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 49.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 101 ; *P.R. 12 Henry II*, 84.

made at the Easter session. If a payment was made during the Easter session, the sheriff who made the payments would receive a stick of wood, cut in a certain way so that it would record the payment made. The servant of the chamberlain in the exchequer would have a mirror copy, or countertally, made much like a chirograph. This tally would then be produced at the Michaelmas session as proof of the payment made at the Easter session, and would be recorded in the Pipe Rolls as received *in talles*.³⁰

There is a strangely consistent order of payments by tally for the 1165 scutage, and thus proof that payments were being made at the Easter session in the beginning of the year. While payment by talley does occur in some of the other scutage payments, they do not occur in such frequency as in 1165. In almost every county, the section on the scutage for the expedition to Wales begins with one of the more powerful earls or abbots of the region who paid his whole scutage by the Easter session, or if not the whole of it the majority, and the remainder was then pardoned. After several other scutage entries, there is then one by the sheriff on behalf of the most important city in the county, or the burghers in these cities, which likewise made the majority of a payment by tally. Richard fitz Nigel tells us that these payments by a city only occur when the city offers to give aid to the king for a certain undertaking, and are then usually paid by certain wealthy men of the city, and not the general populace.³¹ £930 of the 1165 scutage was paid by the Easter session,

³⁰ *Dialogus*, 32-5 ; R. L. Poole, *The Exchequer in the Twelfth Century*, The Ford Lectures (Oxford, 1912), 92-3. Talley payments in this year can be found in *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 7-9, 13, 19, 23-4, 43, 49, 50, 58-9, 70-1, 92, 96, 101, 105, 107. Examples from other years include *P.R. 5 Henry II*, 2 ; *P.R. 7 Henry II*, 10 ; and *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 9.

³¹ *Dialogus*, 162-3. Although payments by the general populace can occur under certain conditions, particularly if the king has demanded this 'gift' from the city. Whether this is the case in this year is unclear.

and accounted for 17% of the entire amount due, and 26% of the entire amount actually paid in this year, all paid by 19 people, and 8 cities.³²

In the 1166 Pipe Roll, Henry did not receive the payments still due from the previous year's scutage in any large amount. Of the £780 19s. 7d. recorded in 1166 as still being owed, £517 10s. 8d. was still owed after the Michaelmas session.³³ Again, the majority of what was owed seemed to fall in the hands of a few individuals: Conan Duke of Brittany and Earl of Richmond, Simon of St Liz III Earl of Northampton, and an unnamed earl with lands in Sussex (who is actually John, Count of Eu), each owing approximately £175, £35, and £125 respectively.³⁴ Many of the bishops appear to have simply received a pardon from the king. Both the bishops of Chichester and of Hereford had their debts pardoned by the king, with a specific mention for Hereford that his pardoned £76, 5s. was for 100 serjeants.³⁵ This would indicate that it was unusual in the case of the 1165 scutage to demand payment from the bishops. Once the campaign was over and the troops no longer needed, the request was dropped.³⁶ The Bishop of Bath only had £4 5s. of his £30

³² *P.R. 11 Henry II*, passim.

³³ *P.R. 12 Henry II*, passim. As one could note by looking at the chart for the 1165 scutage (See Appendix 2), £1147 8s. 11d. was marked in that year as still owed, a difference of £366 9s. 4d. of what was recorded in 1166. This figure is simply unaccounted for, and could possibly have been entered in the Normandy exchequer, since this was both a possibility, and Henry himself had 'fled' to the continent at this time. The Norman records for this year unfortunately no longer exist.

³⁴ *P.R. 12 Henry II*, 39, 90.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 84, 90.

³⁶ The Count of Eu may be a secular example of the pardoning of payment for serjeants as well. To determine this takes a little bit of calculation, starting with the amount of scutage owed, which was £152 0s. and 10d. of which he paid £26 13s. 4d. in 1165, and was pardoned the rest in 1168. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 92 ; *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 193. In the 1166 *Cartae*, the Count claims that he had enfeoffed 60 knights on his land in the Rape of Hastings, but that 4 of these knights had been taken from him, and then had 6 ½ knights on his desmesne. *RBE*, 202-3. If we are to take the enfeoffed knights as his *servicium debitum*, including the 4 knights taken from him as Henry was probably not aware of this until the 1166 survey, his scutage would only have been £80. The other £72, 10d. has to have been a payment for 95 serjeants at the rate of 15s. 2d. *Feudal Assessments*, 28 table 1 shows the count's payment was wholly serjeants, but for 200 serjeants, and that the payment of £152, 10d. was a mistake for £152, 10s. (which could not possibly be the case considering the £26 13s. 4d. the count paid, plus the £125 7s. 6d. he is recorded as still owing, add up to the original sum of £152 10d.). Either way, the point still stands that after the expedition in 1165, people who still owed money for serjeants were being pardoned.

debt recorded as still owed, but no record of his having paid the other £26.³⁷ Not all of the bishops appear to have wrangled their way out of their payments. The bishop of Ely paid about half of his £60 debt, and was forced to borrow the remaining £30 from Aaron the Jew.³⁸ The Bishop of Salisbury still owed £76 5s., and the Bishop of Winchester, while only owing 25s., ended up paying 26s. 8d.³⁹ Of the money that was paid back, only 50 marks were noted as being paid by tally, and therefore by the Easter session, making it seem as though few felt an urgency to pay these debts to the king.⁴⁰

The numbers are even more depressing for Henry after 1166. In the 1166-7 Pipe Roll, only £12 14s. 7d. was paid, with a large amount pardoned. The majority of the pardoned amounts, some £175 3s. 4d. of it, were from what Duke Conan still owed for serjeants.⁴¹ Earl Simon was also pardoned his £35 6s. 8d. for serjeants, as was John fitz John of 72s. 6d.⁴² It seems that the effects of the survey were being seen by this time, though. Some of the entries begin to have explanations entered as to why they are not being paid, most explicit of which is that of William de Reimes who refused to pay the 8 marks he owed because “he charges that the King himself and Earl Hugh and Earl Aubrey and Simon de Cantelu hold the fees.”⁴³ Looking at William’s return, we see that he did have a total of 8 knight fees of the old enfeoffment, and states that Earl Hugh seized 2 ½ of these before the time of King

³⁷ *P.R. 12 Henry II*, 98.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 73, 103.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴¹ *P.R. 13 Henry II*, 80. Conan, Earl of Richmond, paid £52 6s. 8d. in 1165, making his total scutage £227 10s.: enough for 300 serjeants at the 15s. 2d. rate, and on par with the payments made by Hugh Bigod and the Earl of Gloucester. For what he did pay in 1165, the amount £52 6s. 8d. does not add up to an even payment for any number of serjeants, although it is close to (just over) paying for 69 serjeants. Conan is not in the *Cartae Baronum*, other than a non contemporary addition made to the *Liber Niger*, which said he only had one knight. *RBE*, 435.

⁴² *P.R. 13 Henry II*, 80, 128.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 154. “*sed calupniat[u]r q[uo]d Rex ipse & com[es] Hug[o] & com[es] Alb[er]ic[us] & Sim[on]us de Cantelu tenent feodu[m].*”

Table 1
Scutage Rates Under Henry II

Year	Amount per Fief	Year	Amount per Fief
1156	£1	1165	1 Mark & Serjeants' <i>Dona</i>
1157	(2 Marks) ⁴⁶	1168	1 Mark ⁴⁷
1159	2 Marks & <i>Dona</i>	1169 ⁴⁸	-
1161	2 Marks & <i>Dona</i>	1172	£1
1162	1 Mark	1187	£1

Stephen, and even more striking in Essex: “Dedham, the fee of half a knight which the king has in his hand, and that service is computed at the Exchequer.”⁴⁴ So here at least is one instance in the returns of a complaint stated in the 1166 knight survey which has shown itself in the exchequer rolls.⁴⁵

In 1167-8, no payments were made, and the big pardons came from two secular lords owing for serjeants: £76 5s. from Roger de Nonant and £25 7s. 6d. from the Count of Eu.⁴⁹ Little change occurs after this year, as most of the entries for what was still owed stayed the same: the same 8 marks from William de Reims, £4 from the Bishop of Bath, which was in the hand of the king, and several entries in different counties where the Abbot of Westminster owed £20, but these occur at least as far

⁴⁴ *RBE*, 353-4. “*Bedham, feodum dimidii militis quam Rex habet in manu sua, et illud servitium computatum est ad Scaccarium.*”

⁴⁵ There are some difficulties in making sense of William’s scutage payment in the 1165 Pipe Roll, as he owed a total of 10 marks, and paid 2. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 20. Of his owed scutage in 1166-7, only 3 of the ‘seized’ fees were reported as such in the *Cartae Barounum*, and so the owed number cannot be seen as just what he refused to pay, it must be for the whole of his fees. One possible way to reconcile the 10 marks owed versus the 8 knight fees is that William actually did have 10 fees, but two of them were not recorded when the *Cartae Baronum* was being rewritten into the books of the Exchequer. William’s return splits his fees into the three different counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, and while Norfolk and Essex have fees listed under them, Suffolk does not. *RBE*, 354.

⁴⁶ The Pipe Roll for 1157 has little evidence to support a scutage in this year but for one entry. The Abbot of Abbotsbury in Dorset is recorded as paying money ‘*de exercitu Wal(ensi)*’ and is likewise the only record for ‘*scutagio*’ in 1157. *P.R. 3 Henry II*, 99. This is the ‘isolated’ 2 mark scutage as referred to by Hollister in *Military Organization*, 206. For the expedition to Wales, the abbot owed 2 marks, and it is known from his return in the *Cartae Baronum* that the abbot only had one knight enfeoffed, which would suggest a 2 mark scutage. *RBE*, 211. Robert de Torigni gives an interesting statement about this campaign, saying: *Circa festivitatem Sancti Johannis Baptistæ, rex Henricus præparavit maximam expeditionem, ita ut duo milites de tota Anglia tertium pararent ad opprimendum Gaulenses terra et mari.* Robert de Torigni, *Chronicle*, 193. That every two knights should support a third could be an indication of a large scutage being called, but again the Pipe Roll has little evidence to back this up.

⁴⁷ This was not a scutage, but an aid for the marriage of the king’s daughter, still based on the knight’s fief.

⁴⁸ The aid of the previous year was also charged to the burghers and moneyers, but only half of what they owed was paid in 1168, the other half was paid in this year.

⁴⁹ *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 126, 193.

back as the 1159 Pipe Roll. By the 1168-9 Pipe Roll, all debts had been paid or pardoned, and the majority of the pardons came from those who owed money for serjeants and not their *servicium debitum*.

In all these payments, Henry may not have managed to get the full amount of the scutage he was trying to obtain, but he did not fail in his efforts to exact a large sum from the barons. Since almost 80% of the amount due in 1165 was accounted for as either paid or pardoned, it would be difficult to see his fund raising efforts as a failure. However, it certainly appears that after the failure of the expedition to Wales that Henry's edge in extracting the funds still owed was blunted. With 66% of the funds still due unpaid after 1166, and an almost complete inability to collect from the bishops, Henry evidently no longer possessed the full dominance that he had been able to exercise earlier.

Looking past 1165 and 1166, Henry still continued to wage wars and call for aids and scutages, but none attempted on the same scale as 1165 or before. Previous campaigns, such as 1159 to Toulouse and 1161 into northern France saw a calling of scutages much closer to 1165 than any other year,⁵⁰ by charging scutage at a rate double what was normally assessed: 2 marks instead of 1 mark and asking for a large *dona* from the burghers and ecclesiastics. The years 1159, 1161, and 1165 (and possibly 1157) all had scutages at above the traditional rate.⁵¹

After 1165 and Henry's major defeat in Wales, no more attempts to collect a scutage at what seems to be this higher rate were made until the reign of King John.⁵² Henry was either unable or unwilling to enact a scutage of higher than the traditional rate, which suggests once again that his extortionist scutage policy, epitomized by the 1165 scutage and his subsequent loss to the Welsh, had backfired on him. While

⁵⁰ A possible addition is the expedition to Wales in 1157.

⁵¹ See Table 1.

⁵² See Table 2.

Table 2
*Scutage Rates under Richard I and John*⁵³

Year	Amount per Fief	Year	Amount per Fief
1190	10s.	1204	£1, 1 Mark
1194	£1	1205	2 Marks
1195	£1	1206	£1
1196	£1	1209	£1
1199	2 Marks	1210	£2 (3 Marks)
1201	2 Marks	1211	2 Marks
1202	2 Marks	1214	£2 (3 Marks)
1203	2 Marks		

Henry did face a rather serious military threat after 1166 in the form of his sons' rebellion, he never raised a scutage for this civil war, and reasonably so as any knight who commuted his service to Henry could then join the battle on the side of his sons. The other scutages levied after 1166 appear to be for rather benign things: an aid in 1168 for the marriage of the king's daughter levied at 1 mark, and a scutage in 1172 for Henry's expedition to Ireland, forced on him by the activities of Richard Strongbow. The only other scutage to occur before Henry's death was in 1187, where Henry led an expedition up to Carlisle to face a Scottish enemy who had destroyed one of his towns. Unlike the 1159 campaign, Henry had a traditional scutage rate at £1 per knight fee, and this could be due either to Henry's unwillingness to launch a full-scale campaign against this Scottish invader, his inability to strain the barons again after 1165, or most likely both.

What, then, was the purpose of the 1166 survey, and who was responsible for its creation? Given all the evidence, it seems likely that the barons' complaints concerning the excessive scutage for, and then subsequent failure of, the expedition to Wales gave rise to their calling for the survey to be made. As the barons felt that they were being charged excessively for their knight fees, a fully compiled document to record their traditional military fees and services would have cleared any

⁵³ Adapted from *Feudal Assessments*, 30, table 2.

confusion regarding what the king could and could not ask for in a military expedition; a sort of *Domesday Book* for the enlisted.

There may even be evidence within the 1166 returns to suggest that their creation was a product of the 1165 expedition to Wales. In the return of the Earl of Arundel, it is stated that a dispute of some sort arose among his knights concerning the said expedition. The king was somehow a part of this dispute, and it was settled by having four honorable men survey the Honour of Arundel and report its knight service.⁵⁴ The report of these four men was included as the Earl of Arundel's return, and is quite possibly the instigator for the survey being conducted over the rest of the country. The return for Arundel does not conform to the usual pattern of the rest of the returns, and while it is impossible to say that the *Cartae Baronum* was uniform in terms of what it reported, almost all at least followed a pattern of stating 'This is what I hold of the old enfeoffment, this of the new, and this on my demesne.' The Earl's statement does mention knight fees and what he owes the king, but the detailing of old and new enfeoffments, which is the outstanding characteristic of the *Cartae Baronum*, was not included.

While there is evidence to suggest that the *cartae* were a product of the barons' complaints, when these complaints were brought to the king, and the official orders sent from the king to the barons via the sheriffs, is more difficult to pinpoint. The king's men would have had plenty of opportunities to voice their complaints while on campaign, but there would have been little opportunity for the king to issue orders or for an agreement of the terms of the *cartae* to be drawn up. Even then, the complaints leading to the *cartae* were likely to occur after the campaign had failed. No contemporary source indicated when and where the provisions of the *cartae* were

⁵⁴ *RBE*, 200-1.

agreed to and drawn up, but there were several opportunities between the end of the campaign in Wales and Henry's departure to Normandy. Soon after the campaign, Henry traveled to Woodstock and issued several writs and charters with some notable members of the barony acting as witnesses.⁵⁵ Later, around Christmas, a council or synod was held at Oxford where the Cathari were excommunicated.⁵⁶ Finally, in early 1166 there was the council of Clarendon where the Assize of Clarendon established the system of itinerant justices in England. The Assize notes that it was made with the "assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and barons" suggesting that at this occasion, a large number of the men who would hold a grievance over the conduct of the Welsh war would have been present.⁵⁷ It is difficult to say if the Council of Clarendon was the actual meeting that discussed the creation of the *Cartae*, but the return of the Archbishop of York does state that he had little time to prepare his return.⁵⁸ Since the Council took place in February and the returns were due by 13 March of that year, it is likely that this was when agreement for the creation of the *Cartae* was made, due to the Archbishop of York's return.

While the barons may have been responsible for the creation of the *Cartae*, some of the information included was clearly a product of Henry's influence. The incorporation of new enfeoffments since Henry I's time was obviously a desire of Henry's, and a seemingly reasonable one. The majority of the barons do not appear to have suspected that this would then lead to the charging of these extra

⁵⁵ These men would include the Earl of Essex, William fitz Hamo, William de Hastings, Ralph fitz Stephen (the chamberlain), Robert Earl of Leicester, Richard de Luci, and of course, the Earl of Arundel. Eyton, *Itinerary of Henry II*, 84-5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 88 ; William of Newburgh, 133-4.

⁵⁷ *Select Charters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional History*, William Stubbs (ed.), Ninth Edition (Oxford, 1929), 170. The Assize of Clarendon also mentions that 'four of the more lawful men' of each vill are to testify towards any known robbers murderers or thieves, raising an interesting parallel to the men of the Earl of Arundel, but no real connection.

⁵⁸ *RBE*, 412.

enfeoffments for scutage, as the idea for the survey would have been to establish the traditional owed service. Extra knights would have been enfeoffed to help meet the *servicium debitum*, but they would not have been enfeoffed as *additions* to the *servicium debitum*. A couple of tenants-in-chief certainly foresaw this as a possibility and made sure to include in their returns a phrase stating exactly what they did and did not owe, rather than simply stating the number of fees. A case in point is the return of William Fitz-Alan, who had five knight fees, but stated that he owed none of these to the king, save one knight in Norfolk for the defense against the Danes.⁵⁹ Being that the barons were so willing and forthcoming with the information for this survey conveys not only a sense of naiveté as to how the information could be used, but also a willingness and even desire on their part to provide the recorded data.

The inclusion of the names of all of the knights also appears to be a stipulation of Henry's for this survey. This was certainly to ensure that these men paid homage to the crown, as mentioned in the return of the Archbishop of York, but may also have been a way to obtain homage for the Young King as well, and to ensure loyalty in the face of Becket's return from exile.⁶⁰ Naming each of the knights in the returns was doubtless the result of Henry's influence because of the rejection of a return from Northamptonshire that failed to include these names.⁶¹ One then has to wonder what benefit Henry would have gained by rejecting a return. In the obvious hypotheses, he would simply be without the names of men who might need to pay homage to him, a fact that could be followed up later, but he would also be losing any possible new enfeoffments, and therefore revenue that could have been included in these returns. However, if the returns were a product of the barons'

⁵⁹ Ibid., 271-2.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 270.

⁶¹ Ibid., 335 ; *Feudal Assessments*, 7-8.

influence, then this rejected *cartae* has more meaning to it. Since the tenant-in-chief in question failed to include one of the aspects Henry desired as part of an agreement to create the *Cartae Barounum*, his return would not be included in a survey that had the potential to be used to protect the barons' rights from excessive tariffs of the king. At one point in his study, Keefe expresses surprise that Henry never attempted to find out the number of enfeoffments on the lands that did not return a *cartae*.⁶² While most of these baronies that did not make a return were in the king's hand, the fact that Henry did not follow up on them afterwards shows a lack of interest in the information.

It is also telling that Henry did not assess this larger 2 mark scutage after 1166. Why would Henry have been so concerned with recording all the knight fees, including new enfeoffments, if he could have simply used the same tactic as 1165 and the double rates from before to gain even *more* money via scutage, than he would have by using the traditional rate on a very few extra fees? This could be explained easily by again suggesting that the barons were responsible for the creation of the survey. Their anger at the excessive rates, combined with Henry's weakened position after 1165, created a document outlining the owed service of every baron and tenant-in-chief in the land to prevent his overstepping the traditional boundaries again. And Henry did stay within those boundaries for the remainder of his reign, with a 1 mark aid in 1168, a £1 scutage in 1172, and more importantly a £1 scutage in 1187 when the need for an army to defend an area of the king's domain under threat would have justified the attempts at a higher rate of payment. The barons' tactic was successful in that Henry's military finance strategy would remain static for the remainder of his reign, as well as for the entirety of Richard's, whose constant

⁶² Ibid., 48.

military expeditions in foreign lands and renowned attempts at funding his crusade would have benefited greatly from attempting to collect scutages on the scale his father did.

The *Cartae*'s construction may even bear an insight into its being a baronial creation. Rather than sending out official surveyors and recording the fees and the knights one county at a time, as for example *Domesday Book*, the survey was performed by the tenants-in-chief and returned as a single listing of each enfeoffment, regardless of physical locality. This haphazard collecting process also produced returns of a varied and different nature, rather than one that would have been uniform from a survey performed by the king's own men: a means of collection that would have been much more useful, if perhaps a little slower.⁶³

Even after the construction of the survey, the collection of the *Cartae* appears to present a lack of interest in the documents on Henry's part. They were certainly looked at and used, as shown in the 1168 aid which was levied on the new enfeoffments found by the survey, but there appeared to be little desire on the king's part to make it a regular document for consultation. It is known that Henry purchased a chest for the keeping of the documents, but he certainly did not invest in converting them into a more usable form by copying the returns into a single manuscript.⁶⁴ The *Cartae* remained uncollected in this chest until the reign of King John when the returns were collected and copied into the *Black Book of the Exchequer*.⁶⁵ In contrast, *Domesday Book* was almost immediately copied from the original source material into a large manuscript. However, either Henry of his own

⁶³ This is not to say the government had no involvement in the process. Round has shown how the formal survey was presented to the barons via the sheriffs and returned in the same manner. *Feudal England*, 192.

⁶⁴ *P.R. 12 Henry II*, 72. Simply purchasing a chest to store the returns certainly sounds to modern ears like a disorganized and haphazard way of keeping a large set of documents, but it is unknown just what sort of organization this chest had, if any, and how it was used by Henry's officials. The chest may simply have been a means to move the returns from Wiltshire, where the chest was purchased.

⁶⁵ *RBE*, lii.

volition, or at the insistence of the barons, probably wanted to keep the *Cartae* in their original form because they contained the seals of those who wrote them. The added authority offered by the seals may account for why these returns were not copied into manuscript form until much later.

The Infeudationes Militum

Nearly six years after the *Cartae Baronum* in England, another feudal survey was conducted, this time in the Duchy of Normandy under the supervision of Henry II. This survey, known as the *Infeudationes Militum*,⁶⁶ took place in 1172 almost immediately after Henry's successful expedition to Ireland: a stark contrast to the 1166 survey that occurred after the failed invasion of Wales. Richard de Clare (Strongbow) had come to the aid of the king of Leinster in exchange for the marriage of the king's daughter in 1170. When Dermot, king of Leinster, died in 1171, Henry had little choice but to invade Ireland to prevent his entrepreneurial vassal de Clare from creating his own kingdom there.⁶⁷ Henry faced no opposition from de Clare who immediately gave up Leinster in order to hold it in fief from Henry.

Henry stayed for several months in Ireland (partly due to inclement weather), returned to England in April 1172, and continued on to Normandy in May where he attended the Council of Avranches and was absolved for Thomas Becket's murder in the midst of Becket being proclaimed a saint.⁶⁸ It is believed that Henry stayed in France throughout this period, and through to the time that the *Infeudationes Militum* was conducted in September at Caen (but it is not known whether Henry was actually present for the survey). During this time, Henry the Young King and his

⁶⁶ The full title as in the *Red Book of the Exchequer* is '*infeudationes militum qui debent servitia militaria duci normanniae, et in quot militibus quilibet tenetur ei servire.*' Ibid., 624.

⁶⁷ Warren, *Henry II*, 114.

⁶⁸ Eyton, *Itinerary*, 165-8.

wife Margaret (daughter of Louis VII, king of France) were crowned at Winchester as part of a political move by Henry to ensure the succession of his eldest son.⁶⁹ It was a move that had unforeseen consequences for Henry the elder shortly after.

In general, the *Infeudationes Militum* contains much the same information as the *Cartae Baronum*, in that it shows how many knight fees each baron or tenant-in-chief owed to the duke (King Henry II), and how many knights they then held in total. While in England there appears to have been an attempt to ensure the number of knights enfeoffed were equal to the number of knights owed, no such attempt is seen here. The tenants-in-chief clearly owed fewer knights than they had enfeoffed. Where the number of 'new' enfeoffments in England was small, the numbers of 'extra' enfeoffed knights in Normandy were extremely large. For examples, the Bishop of Bayeux only owed 20 knights to the duke but had 120 in his service, meaning he had an extra 100 knights at hand than what he needed to perform his military obligation to the duke.⁷⁰ Count John of Ponthieu likewise only owed 20 knights but had 111 in his service, and the Earl of Leicester (Robert ès Blanchemains) only owed 10 knights, but had 121 knights at his service in two different honors.⁷¹ The number of owed knights was significantly lower as well, with the maximum any one person owed to the Duke being 29 and 5/8 for the honor of the Count of Mortain, and only three persons who owed the next highest amount at 20 knights.⁷²

The results of the survey at Caen were originally recorded in two writs by each baron. In the first of the barons' writs, which were sealed, was written the

⁶⁹ This was the second coronation of the Young King with his wife Margaret, performed after the death of Thomas Becket. The first coronation was performed by the Archbishop of York in 1170. Warren, *Henry II*, 111.

⁷⁰ *RBE*, 625.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 626-7.

⁷² These being the Bishop of Bayeux, the Bishop of Lisieux, and Count John; *Ibid.*, 625-6, 643.

number of men owed to the Duke, and then the second unsealed writs contained the names of all his men, which no doubt acted as the record of how many men the barons held in total.⁷³ Having only the owed amounts sealed shows that Henry was content with the amount of service he was collecting from Normandy, or acknowledged that he could not attempt to collect on the extra fees of Normandy as he did on the new fees in England. The fact that the writs containing details of the barons' *servicium debitum* were sealed gave them an extra sense of legitimacy, preventing Henry from trying to collect more than was due. The second writs, which contained the names of all the men who owed service to the barons, were not sealed, most likely because the names would change over the years through death and inheritance, and so there was no reason to give these writs the added permanence that a seal would. The individual writs were then written together on a roll (possibly when the survey was conducted at Caen) which then somehow became jumbled before being recorded in a register of Philip Augustus and separately into the Red Book of the Exchequer in England as they survive to this day.⁷⁴ Only one other portion of this survey survives separately, and that is a portion which is listed under a heading as being from the fief of Mortain; and this is no doubt a later copy directly from the two primary texts, and not a contemporary record.⁷⁵

The arrangement of the *Infeudationes Militum* is more regular and organized than its insular counterpart. Rather than being a haphazard collection of individually scripted documents as the *Cartae Baronum*, the 1172 survey was systematic, beginning with the bishops of five of the Norman dioceses, then the abbots, the

⁷³ *Feudal Assessments*, 5 ; Robert de Torigni, 349.

⁷⁴ F. M. Powicke, 'The Honour of Mortain in the Norman *Infeudationes Militum* of 1172,' *English Historical Review*, 26, no. 101 (1911), 89-93 passim.

⁷⁵ Hall mentions the passage being preserved in a collection of documents relating to Mortain which Powicke identifies as being in the Trésor des Chartes, Mortain, no.2, carton J 224. Powicke, 'The Honour of Mortain,' 91, n. 9 ; *RBE*, 627, n. 2.

counts and the remaining barons starting with those who owed the most to those who owed the least. It then ends with a list of those who failed to respond to the survey. This list appears to follow the same order as the survey since it starts out with the Archbishop of Rouen, continues with the Bishop of Evreux, then the counts, and then others. This organization is no doubt due to the differences between how this survey was performed and recorded compared to the *Cartae Baronum*.

In the case of 1172, it is known from Robert de Torigni that Henry II ordered all of his Norman barons to assemble at Caen and swear in front of the justiciars how many men they owed to the duke, and how many they had in their total service.⁷⁶ This fact alone makes it clear that Henry had taken the initiative to conduct the survey, and chose to do so in a much more useful manner. This also shows that Henry had the option and ability to call all of his men together in one place to perform an official survey, rather than relying on each tenant-in-chief to report in writing.

The large list of barons at the end of the survey who did not report their fees gives an indication of how this survey was received as opposed to the 1166 survey in England. There are some very important tenants-in-chief listed here who were likely to have substantial holdings, such as the Archbishop of Rouen. Some of the men on this list even made a return for the 1166 survey, such as the Earl of Gloucester and Hugh Bigod.⁷⁷ This could indicate that, unlike the 1166 survey, the 1172 *Infeudationes Militum* was an unwelcomed investigation into the barons' service. By its organization through a central meeting in Caen and the collection and uniform

⁷⁶ Robert de Torigni 349 ; *Feudal Assessments*, 5.

⁷⁷ *RBE*, 644. In *Cartae Baronum*, see *Ibid.*, 288-92, 395-7. Both Gloucester and Hugh Bigod report a large number of men in 1166: for Gloucester, 22 and 5/6 in Kent, 258 old fiefs in Gloucester, and 13 new fiefs ; for Hugh, 125 of the old enfeoffment, and 36 ½ new enfeoffments. The count of Eu is also listed as not reporting, but the count who made a return in 1166 was John who died in 1170; therefore it was his son, Henry, who did not report for his holdings in 1172. *Ibid.*, 202-3 for Count John of Eu in 1166.

recording, the survey was certainly instigated by Henry, rather than by the barons as in 1166. The barons not reporting could be taken as an indication that they simply did not wish to travel to Caen, but this eventuality was planned for by the statement that the barons were permitted to send a representative in their stead.

Why Henry desired a survey in this instance is a little bit of a mystery. The conclusion that Keefe came to was that Henry was trying to “preserve the customary quotas” in Normandy, rather than raise them as he argues was the case of England.⁷⁸ This appears to be a contradictory argument: if Henry was trying to raise quotas by charging the new enfeoffments in England, then surely he would also try to raise the *servicium debitum* of Normandy with the revealing of these extra enfeoffments. If the argument were to be turned around and viewed first from Henry’s standpoint (Henry desires as many knights to serve as he can), then perhaps more consistency can be found in the reason for performing these surveys. In the case of 1166, the barons requested a survey because *they* were trying to keep their service levels down to their traditional size, and Henry tried to increase these with the finding of the new enfeoffments. So in Normandy, where Henry clearly is the instigator of the survey, service levels must have been diminishing, or the barons were not providing as many men as they should, the evidence being in the list of uncooperative barons who did not report their fiefs (not in their interest). Furthermore, there is no evidence that Henry tried to collect on the extra enfeoffments, but was satisfied with the traditional quotas.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *Feudal Assessments*, 5-6.

⁷⁹ The Pipe Rolls for Normandy during Henry’s reign are for the most part lost, so it is impossible to say whether Henry did or did not collect on these extra enfeoffments. However, Keefe has shown that scutages collected during the reigns of Richard and John were on the owed service, and not on the total enfeoffment (excepting where the duke holds a fief through escheat or wardship, in which case he collects from the whole enfeoffment just as the baron normally would). *Feudal Assessments*, 5.

There is very little evidence to suggest that either of the above mentioned theories of lowered service levels, or the barons not providing their service, are applicable. There is only one piece of evidence to suggest that a decreasing of service levels occurred at some point either during or before Henry's reign. An earlier survey from 1133 of the feudal tenants of the bishop of Bayeux recorded that the bishop owed 40 knights in service to the duke of Normandy.⁸⁰ Forty years later, in the 1172 survey, the bishop only owed 20.⁸¹ It is entirely possible that Bayeux was an exception for the service being lowered, as 40 owed knights is much higher than any other number available for Normandy. Forty knights may have been an exceptionally high *servicium debitum*, but the bishop was certainly capable of providing them, as the number of knights in his service changed little during this time: 119 ½ in 1133 to 120 in 1172. However, this is misleading since the English record in the *Red Book of the Exchequer* contains an error. The same survey of 1133 survives in a French manuscript in a fuller form, and in this case, the bishop only owes 20 knights in 1133, the same as in 1172.⁸² It is possible that there was some discrepancy between the English record and that which survived in France, but Henry likely would have had access to the fuller record for Bayeux, and there is no evidence for when the mistake in the *Red Book* occurred.

The limited survival of Norman records, especially of Pipe Rolls, probably makes it impossible to know whether or not the Norman barons were providing their whole service. It is possible that by examining the evidence from England for the expedition to Ireland, by making the tenuous assumption that the situation in England was similar to that in Normandy, some answers may be revealed. For the 1171

⁸⁰ *RBE*, 647. This record, while recorded in 1133 is actually a survey of the knight fees of the Bishop of Bayeux in the time of Bishop Odo, thus they occurred even earlier than 1133. J. H. Round, *Family Origins* (London, 1930), 201-5.

⁸¹ *RBE*, 625.

⁸² *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, Dom Martin Bouquet (ed.), 23 (Paris, 1894), 699.

expedition, the number of men who served from England were around 2100: about 1500 fewer than from a decade previously.⁸³ From the list of men who refused to report their owed service, one might suspect a guilty conscience arising from misrepresenting their owed service. Some of these men may have been involved in the rebellion of the Young King in 1173, and so in refusing to report their fees may have been taking part in some form of civil disobedience. Whether their part in the rebellion was really due to insubordination to the duke, or hedging their bets that the Young King would arise the victor, is hard to say. Either way, only one of the names of those not reporting his fees was known to have supported the Young King in 1173, and so this explanation seems unlikely.⁸⁴

In the case of those who did not serve from England in 1171, only 68% paid their owed scutage.⁸⁵ Although this was a better return than for the aid for the marriage of Matilda, it was worse than the amount Henry received from his last military outing in 1165. While the rate of scutage for this expedition was lower (returned to a traditional £1 rate) and the king may have initially collected from more of his barons than in 1165, he did not pardon as many barons as in that year, and so a much higher percentage of Henry's tenants-in-chief still owed their scutage for 1171 (recorded in 1172) than for 1165. Henry had the survey from 1166 forced on him and could use it to follow up on his barons in England (as he already did collecting the *auxilium* of 1168/9), but had no such document for his Norman tenants-in-chief (again, assuming the service levels and payment provided in England were comparable to Normandy for some expedition). It is obvious that Henry saw some

⁸³ See below, Chapter 5.

⁸⁴ The rebel in question was Hugh Bigod. Of those who were known to have joined on Henry II's side and not reported were the Earls of Gloucester and Arundel and the Count of Aumale. To whom loyalties were owed by many of the other names listed are unknown. *RBE*, 644 ; Eyton, *Itinerary*, 172. It is possible that the reason the Archbishop of Rouen and the Bishop of Evreux did not report was that they only arrived in Normandy on the day of the survey (according to Eyton, *Ibid.*, 168), but this does not explain why they did not send someone else to account for them.

⁸⁵ See Appendix 2.

sort of benefit from having the English survey since he definitely used it to collect on new fees in 1168, so perhaps found reason, in a lack of service or payment from Normandy, to perform a similar survey on the continent to ensure that he collected what was rightly his due.

Catalogus Baronum

Southern Italy and Sicily present a separate and distinctly different form of feudal survey than those produced under the English king (whether he be in Normandy or England). The survey from this area of Norman incursion is contained in the *Catalogus Baronum*, and specifically in the portion that is called the *quaternus magne expeditionis*.⁸⁶ The *Catalogus* survives primarily in a 1972 printed edition by Evelyn Jamison and two collections of photostats.⁸⁷ It was originally in the manuscript Angevin Register 1322 A (242), Archivio di Stato, which was unfortunately destroyed during the Second World War, with many other historical documents that had been moved from the Archivio for their safety.⁸⁸ This manuscript was the work of copyists from the fourteenth century, who in turn used a late thirteenth century manuscript (known as the Swabian Copy), which was derived from the original Norman *quaternus*.⁸⁹ The *quaternus* was originally constructed in

⁸⁶ This is the initial portion of the *Catalogus*, the remaining two parts are additions to the fourteenth century manuscript that are of a similar nature. Jamison, *Catalogus*, xv-xvi. For the purposes of this work, the names *Catalogus* and *quaternus* are used interchangeably.

⁸⁷ Jamison's text is the most recent edition and perhaps the best, but there were three earlier printed versions cited by Jamison: *Catalogus Baronum neapolitano in regno versantium qui sub auspiciis Gulielmi cognomento Boni, expeditionem ad Terram Sanctam sibi vindicandam susceperunt*, Carlo Borrelli (ed.), in *Vindex neapolitanae nobilitatis* (Naples, 1653) ; *Catalogus Baronum regni neapolitani sub Gulielmo Il rege conditus pro expeditione ad Terram Sanctam*, Carmine Fimiani, (ed.) in *Commentariolus de subfeudis ex iure langobardico et neapolitano* (Naples, 1787) ; *Catalogus Baronum neapolitano in regno versantium qui sub auspiciis Gulielmi cognomento Boni ad Terram Sanctam sibi vindicandam susceperunt*, Giuseppe Del Re (ed.), in *Cronisti e Scrittori sincroni napoletani, Storia della Monarchia*, vol. I (Naples, 1845).

⁸⁸ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 23.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-2, 23, 40.

1150-51 when the kingdom was preparing for an attack from both the Eastern and Western emperors, and was revised in 1167-8 after an actual attack in 1167.⁹⁰

Internal evidence also suggests that another revision occurred sometime between 1156 and 1158. This evidence comes from the names of some of the constables and chamberlains included in the *Catalogus* whose dates of appointment are known from external sources.⁹¹ This would be a reasonable date anyway, considering what events occurred in the history of the kingdom just prior to 1156. Roger II had died in 1154, and his son and co-king William I held a second coronation at Palermo.⁹² With William's ascension, the kingdom's enemies began to form alliances with the intention to wipe out Norman rule in Sicily.

The story of the southern kingdom's troubles after the coronation began with a snub by Pope Adrian IV. After the new pope's election, William made attempts to make peace with the papacy, whose holder was normally hostile towards the *Regno*. Adrian sent a reply, but addressed it to the 'Lord' of Sicily, rather than the 'King' which prompted William to reject the response without hearing it, and appoint his new chancellor Asclettin (the replacement for Maio who had been created Admiral) with the task of attacking Benevento (the Papal lands which were completely surrounded by the southern kingdom).⁹³ Hugo Falcandus saw this attack as preparation against the Germans who were approaching (for Frederick Barbarossa's coronation as Emperor), and gives no mention of an attack on Benevento.⁹⁴ Robert of Loritello, the king's cousin, then began his rebellion after refusing to send his enfeoffed knights into the Abruzzi to be placed under the command of another count,

⁹⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁹¹ Jamison, 'Norman Administration,' 340.

⁹² Hubert Houben, *Roger II of Sicily, A Ruler Between East and West*, G. A. Loud and Diane Milburn (trans.) (Cambridge, 2002), 166. William had been co-ruler since 1151 after the deaths of his brothers Roger, Anfusius and Tancred. Falcandus (eng.), 59; Falcandus (lat.), 7.

⁹³ Romuald of Salerno, 221-2. ; *Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon*, 237-8.

⁹⁴ Falcandus (eng.), 63; Falcandus (lat.), 11.

and claiming that he should be king due to William's incompetence.⁹⁵ Robert of Loritello then began attacking and taking cities within Apulia, and shortly received aid from the Greek emperor who sent money and leaders to take Brindisi. Meanwhile, Robert of Capua began working with the pope to take back the principality of Capua, which once belonged to him. This army began attacking the Terra di Lavarò in southern Capua and made its way to Benevento. The land was then occupied everywhere, according to Roamuld of Salerno, except Naples, Amalfi, Salerno, Troia and Melfi.⁹⁶

When William finally responded, after rumors of his death, he did so quite effectively.⁹⁷ He crossed from Sicily at Messina into Calabria, where he raised his army (or at least increased its numbers) to take back Apulia.⁹⁸ The king first took Brindisi back from the Greeks, and then headed farther north to Bari, destroying both. Robert of Loritello escaped to Benevento, while Robert of Capua attempted to flee the Papal city via the lands of his vassal, the Count of Fondi, Richard of Aquila (in southern Capua). Robert was captured by Count Richard while crossing the River Garigliano and was handed over to King William.⁹⁹ Eventually a peace was called and a treaty signed at Benevento in 1156.¹⁰⁰ The quieting of the rebellion and William's consolidation of power would certainly have been a catalyst for the revising of the *quaternus*. Some of the redistributed lands of the rebels are reflected

⁹⁵ Falcandus (eng.), 63-4 ; Falcandus (lat.), 11-12.

⁹⁶ Roamuld of Salerno, 223 ; *Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon*, 239 ; Falcandus (eng.), 66 ; Falcandus (lat.), 14.

⁹⁷ Falcandus (eng.), 66 ; Falcandus (lat.), 14.

⁹⁸ Falcandus (eng.), 73 ; Falcandus (lat.), 20-1.

⁹⁹ Roamuld of Salerno, 223-4 ; *Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon*, 240 ; Falcandus (eng.), 74 ; Falcandus (lat.), 21-2.

¹⁰⁰ 'The Treaty of Benevento, 1156,' Hugo Falcandus (eng.), 248-52 ; No. 12 'König Wilhelm beurkundet den mit der Römischen Kirche unter Papst Hadrian (IV.) geschlossenen Vertrag,' *Guillelmi I. Regis Diplomata*, Horst Enzensberger (ed.), *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Siciliae*, 1, Book 3 (Cologne, 1996), 32-6.

in this revision, as well as some of the destruction.¹⁰¹ This explains why the city of Brindisi has only one very small entry, and the city of Bari has none: they both occur in the beginning portion of the *Catalogus* which had been updated after the cities were destroyed.¹⁰²

The *quaternus* was clearly an initiative taken on by King Roger II to record not only the military dues of his enfeoffed knights, 3453 fees in all, but also the extra knights and serjeants provided for the *magna expeditio* from those enfeoffed knights, patrimonial properties and ecclesiastics.¹⁰³ The survey is so focused on the numbers for the *magna expeditio* that this was certainly the reason it was conducted. However, the numbers for the men provided for the *magna expeditio* conform to such a regular pattern (2 knights obtained for the *magna expeditio* for every 1 knight provided in fee) that the numbers included in the *quaternus* were most likely a quota of men the king expected to serve, rather than a pre-arranged feudal agreement.¹⁰⁴ The calling of the *magna expeditio* was to be for all able bodied men to serve in defense in case of an attack or internal rebellion, and there most certainly would be more able-bodied men available than a regular two-to-one ratio to enfeoffed knights. The recording in the *quaternus* was most likely a reasonable compromise.

It is clear from the text that the survey was performed in local courts, in which the tenants-in-chief would have reported their military holdings. In many entries, it is said that the tenant-in-chief has *said* what he owes. The lone entry for Brindisi provides a normal example of such an entry in the *Catalogus*: “*Petronus*

¹⁰¹ Jamison, ‘Norman Administration,’ 262.

¹⁰² *Catalogus*, 39, ¶236 Brindisi ; 3, ¶1* contains an interpolated note stating that it includes the ‘*Terre Bari*,’ but as Jamison explains in n.2, this is just a means of denoting the Constabulary of Frangalius de Bitricio and not the city of Bari.

¹⁰³ *Le Régime Féodal*, 66.

¹⁰⁴ This pattern has been recognized before, firstly by Jamison, ‘Norman Feudalism in Southern Italy with special reference to a new edition of the *Catalogus Baronum* of the Twelfth Century,’ *VIII^e Congrès International des Sciences Historiques*, (Zurich, 1938), 235 and more recently by Loud, *The Latin Church*, 347.

says that he holds in Brindisi the fee of half a knight and with the *augmento* he obtains one knight.”¹⁰⁵ There is mention of one of the courts being held at Taranto and there are several entries at the beginning of the *Catalogus* that refer to the older survey, written in a *quaternus*, being held at a court.¹⁰⁶ The order in which the tenants-in-chief are included also fall within the established constabularies or the counties, depending on the region, suggesting the *quaternus* was compiled from the lists of the local courts as recorded by the chamberlains. This system would lend itself to easier updates (as occurred with the *quaternus*) as opposed to the individual letter-writing of the barons of England or the ‘convention-like’ single gathering in Normandy.¹⁰⁷


The arrangement of the *Catalogus* is largely geographical, by constabulary, but then when a particular county was surveyed, only the lands belonging to the count, regardless of geographical place, were recorded, much like the English *Cartae*. The confusion of different means of assemblage is due to the many revisions the *Catalogus* underwent in the years of its use. It begins in the Duchy of Apulia in the constabulary of Frangalius of Bitritto in the eastern part of Apulia, bordering the Adriatic (A in Map 1; ¶1* in *Catalogus*).¹⁰⁸ It continues west into the constabulary of Angot de Arcis (B; ¶34*), south to the Constabulary of Count Roger of Tricarico (C; ¶100*), jumping back north to the Adriatic coast with the Constabulary of Roger Bursellus (and William Scalfo after Roger’s death) (D; ¶380), immediately south of this to the sub-constabulary of Richard son of Richard (E) in the Constabulary of Guimund of Montilari (F; ¶396*), then jumping down south again to the

¹⁰⁵ *Petrone dixit quod tenet in Brundisio feudum dimidii militis et cum augmento obtulit militem unum. Catalogus*, 39, ¶236.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 121, ¶683 ; 6, ¶15, 16.

¹⁰⁷ A similar record called the *dafetir* (*defetarios*) was known to have been updated in the early 1160s and was probably updated regularly. Falcandus (eng.), 121 ; Falcandus (lat.), 69.

¹⁰⁸ This and all subsequent paragraph listings are to *Catalogus*.



Map 1. The Geographical Arrangement of the *Catalogus Baronum*. Constabularies are outlined and indicated by capital letters in the order that they appear in the *Catalogus*. The *caput* of counties are also numbered in the order they appear. Counties with no discernable head appear in parenthesis in the area where most of their fees are located.

Constabulary of Lampus of Fasanella along the Tyrrhenian Sea (G; ¶437**). Lampus of Fasanella's sub-constabulary of Robert of Quaglietta just to the north is next (H; ¶463*), followed immediately north by the constabulary of Gilbert of Balvano (I; ¶694), where the record then jumps to the farthest north-west to the constabulary of Count Boamund which covers parts of both Apulia and Capua (J; ¶1095*). The constabularies of Roger Fleming (X) and Llandulf Burrellus (Y) (not to mention the duchies of Naples, Amalfi and Gaeta), plus the sub-constabulary of Adenulf of Caserta (Z), are not headed in the *Catalogus*, but are included in the listings under the counties (except for the duchies). The counties are listed in this order: Gravina (1 in Map 1; ¶53* in *Catalogus*), Andria (2; ¶72), Conversano (3; ¶89*), Tricarico (4; ¶100*), Montescaglioso (5; ¶135*), Lecce (6; ¶155*), Civitate (7; ¶295), Buonalbergo (8; ¶344), Loritello (9; ¶357*), Lesina (10; ¶387), Avellino (11; ¶392), Principato (12; ¶463 which was taken during the creation of the sub-constabulary of Robert of Quaglietta), Marsico (13; ¶596), Principato again (14; ¶604), Conza (15; ¶694), Balvano (16; ¶702), Molise (17; ¶725), Carinola (18; ¶824), Alife (19; ¶956), Caserta (20; ¶964), Fondi (21; ¶995), Manoppello (22; ¶1013), Aprutium (23; ¶1030), Sangro (24; ¶1079*), Loreto (25; ¶1095), Celano (26; ¶1105), Albe (27; ¶1110). This layout follows the geographical arrangements of the constabularies, which seems to indicate that the compilation of the *Catalogus* does not indicate a route by which the information was created; each county/constabulary must have been compiled in a separate court and then gathered together to create the *Catalogus*. Only one entry in the *Catalogus* survives in a separate form taken from these courts, and that is the entry ¶1221, but this separate document does not provide

the extra information of the *augmentum* for the *magna expeditio* as recorded in the *Catalogus*.¹⁰⁹

The area of the survey only takes into account the Duchy of Apulia and the Principality of Capua. This could be for any number of reasons. It is possible that Roger either conducted a similar survey in all of the territories of his kingdom, or that such surveys were already performed for the old Greek and Muslim areas of Calabria and Sicily via the Muslim-run *dīwān* and Roger had to fill the gap of the new Norman territories of Apulia and Capua. Either way, the territories of Calabria and Sicily, if they ever had surveys performed to begin with, no longer have such military surveys in existence (at least from this time period). Although the *quaternus* covers Apulia and Capua, it is not complete. The republics of Naples, Amalfi, and Sorrento were not recorded; neither are the demesne lands of the king.¹¹⁰ It is known that royal lands were kept in a separate record, known as the *dafetir*, which was held at the *ad-dīwān al-ma'mūr*.¹¹¹ The area of Benevento is also completely omitted, but this should not be surprising as it was technically a part of the Papal domain.¹¹²

It is likely that the Normans did not actually begin these records themselves, but took over the use of existing records, and perhaps changed what was already surveyed to gain the knowledge they wished. In Sicily, there was already extant a land survey akin to *Domesday Book* that was kept in Arabic, and that was created in the royal financial department known by the name of *dīwān at-tahqīq al ma'mūr*, *μέγα σέκρετον*, or *duana de secretis* in Arabic, Greek and Latin respectively. A later

¹⁰⁹ Jamison, *Catalogus*, 253, n. d. A copy of the document can be found in *Il Catulario della Chiesa Teramana*, Francesco Savini (ed.) (Roma: 1910), no. xxxii, pg. 66-7. It is interesting to note that this copy says that it is a 'brief' statement like many of the English *Cartae*.

¹¹⁰ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 57.

¹¹¹ The *ad-dīwān al-ma'mūr* was one of the two offices known under the Latin term *duana de secretis*; the other was the *dīwān at-tahqīq al-ma'mūr* which was mostly responsible for the collecting of taxes on the royal lands. The *ad-dīwān al-ma'mūr* inspected these royal lands to record any changes, hence why it was in charge of the creation and maintaining of the *dafetir*. Takayama, *Administration of the Norman Kingdom*, 87, 133.

¹¹² Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 61.

section of this department, called the *duana baronum*, or σέκρετον τών ἀποκοπών, was not given an Arabic name and can safely be identified in the Norman period, showing that the Normans were in fact using older established administrations and the documents created by them.¹¹³

Summary

These three documents then form the basis for the study of military obligation in the ‘Norman’ world. As tempting as it is to try to create some notion of cultural and political connectivity between these geographical areas due not only to the creation of these surveys, but also how close they were created to one another temporally, the evidence within the surveys suggest that they were a product of separate influences. Although having said that, it cannot be denied that the English and the Norman surveys were both created under the same king, so the former would have had some influence on the latter (being the earlier of the two). However, there seems to be more similarities between the Norman and the southern Italian surveys than the English survey has with either. Both the Norman and the Italian surveys were instigated by the king and the information adhered to uniform entries, whereas the English survey was probably instigated by the barons as a means to protect their traditional rights and adheres to no regular pattern (but does have some regular information, such as old fees, new fees, and fees on the desmesne).

The circumstances that gave rise to each of the three military surveys do share a similarity in that they arise from hostilities (as one would expect considering the subject matter), but from different circumstances in each case. The earliest

¹¹³ D. Clementi, ‘Notes on Norman Sicilian Surveys,’ in V.H. Galbraith, *The Making of Domesday Book*, (Oxford, 1961), 55-6. There is even evidence of orders for all Greek and Arabic documents to be translated into Latin for the use of officials, *Ibid.*, 55, and *Urkunden Und Kanzlei König Rogers II. Von Sizilien*, Carlrichard Brühl (ed.) (Köln, 1978), 25-6.

southern Italy survey came from a time period where the kingdom was just being formed and was under constant threat of outside attack and internal rebellion (which provides the reason for why it was constantly updated). As a consequence, the focus of the survey is on the *augmentum*: men the barons and tenants-in-chief must obtain beyond their *servicium debitum* to provide for the national defense. The English survey then came next, and arose after a failed military campaign into Wales. The barons, in an attempt to protect their traditional service numbers, instigated the survey, which shows clearly the number of knights they had enfeoffed, and the number of extra knights still owed in *servicia* that were held on the desmesne. The number of new enfeoffments created since the death of King Henry I were then also added, most likely at the request of Henry II (although the barons almost universally rejected the notion that they owed service for these new enfeoffments). The final survey in this early period is the Norman survey instigated by Henry II in 1172. It is difficult to tell what gave rise to the *Infeudationes Militum*, but it is likely that Henry was not receiving his full service owed from his knights, which instigated the survey. The results of the survey reflect this in the explicit naming of the knights the barons owed to the duke (King Henry II), but also the extra enfeoffed knights which the barons did not owe: there is no evidence to suggest that Henry ever attempted to collect on these knights, which indicates he was not trying to raise service levels.

The events that led to the inquiries and the information that they collected thus make clear why certain practices were used for conducting the surveys. In the Italian case, the need for constant updating meant the assessments were performed at the local courts, and most likely sent off to a central location in a batch to be recorded initially, then updated within the *Catalogus*, which would explain its uniformity of recording and the pattern-less form of the arrangement of the

Catalogus. England's *Cartae*, probably initiated by the barons, then gave way to their individual returns with little to no uniformity, and were only arranged somewhat geographically when finally compiled into the *Red Book of the Exchequer*. With Henry then enforcing a survey in Normandy, the convention-like approach of gathering all the barons and tenants-in-chief into one place and then arranging the document as it was recorded into a very hierarchical structure would have been the best method for ascertaining the owed service, and who was not performing this service.

These surveys all convey very different methods and means, deriving from different circumstances, to convey the same information: how many knights are at the king's disposal. In a way, they are a microcosm of medieval administration: very similar, yet completely different. Looking at just the surveys and how they were conducted would suggest that there was not a shared 'Norman experience' for military obligation in these different geographic regions, but the information the surveys *contain* may show some similarities.

Chapter 2

Infeudation

Practices and Patterns

The observed patterns of knightly enfeoffment in England have been used to further the argument of a Norman implementation of knight service, rather than the continuity theory of service originating with the Anglo-Saxons. The idea of Norman implementation is that if the Normans did put into practice knight service in the areas they conquered, there would be a recognizable pattern due to the arbitrary assignments. If the Normans did not introduce knight service, there would then be no pattern due to the long history of sub-infeudation and inheritance that probably would have occurred, which would have split up the fiefs. If a recognizable pattern can be seen in England, Normandy, and southern Italy, it would be an indication that the Normans were in fact introducing their own brand of knight service into these areas.

It has been established by Round that the enfeoffment in England followed a decimal or quintuple pattern.¹ Barons and tenants-in-chief were granted land, by William the Conqueror, in exchange for an arbitrarily assigned number of men to be provided in service to the king for military purposes. The best evidence for this practice can be seen in the records of the bishoprics and religious houses, since they were less likely to have been broken up before the collection of the *Cartae Baronum*

¹ *Feudal England*, 202-7.

Table 3
*Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of England*³

See	Service Due	See	Service Due
Canterbury	60	Bath	20
Winchester	60	London	20
Lincoln	60	Exeter	17 ½
Worcester	50	‘Chester’ ⁴	15
Norwich	40	Hereford	15
Ely	40	Durham	10
Salisbury	32	Chichester	4
York	20		

in 1166.² Round provided a list of the bishoprics in England and the amount of their service due, which can be compared with evidence from Normandy and southern Italy through the *Infeudationes Militum* and the *Catalogus Baronum* respectively.

The pattern of decimalization is clearly shown in the larger holdings of Normandy, but southern Italy does not appear to conform (except in the case of serjeants, which were arbitrarily assigned anyway). The case of the ecclesiastics in southern Italy can be explained by the exemptions of service granted to the church in this area. Loud has produced an argument that the churches in southern Italy were capable of providing for their own defense before the inauguration of Norman control, but with the consolidation and creation of the *regno* under Roger II, churches became exempt from performing military service.⁵ Roger II even enacted a law, repeated by Frederick II in the *Liber Augustalis*, which forbade the giving up of feudal land to churches so that the king would not lose the service they provided.⁶ The only way an enfeoffed tenant could give his land to a church was if he performed the service owed, the church received an exemption from the king to the

² See Holt, ‘The Introduction of Knight Service in England.’

³ *Feudal England*, 199.

⁴ As listed in *Ibid.*, 199. This is the bishopric of Coventry and Lichfield which was often known as ‘Chester’ in the middle ages.

⁵ See Loud, ‘Church, Warfare, Military Obligation,’ 31-45.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 36 ; *The Liber Augustalis or Constitutions of Melfi Promulgated by the Emperor Frederick II for the Kingdom of Sicily in 1231*, James M. Powell (trans.) (Syracuse, 1971), Bk. 3, title V, 108.

Table 4
*Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of Normandy*⁷

See	Service Due	Enfeoffed Knights	See	Service Due	Enfeoffed Knights
Bayeux	20	120	Sées	6	6
Lisieux	20	30 ¹ / ₃	Coutances	5	18
Avranches	10	10			

Table 5
*Enfeoffments of the Bishoprics of Apulia and Capua*⁸

See	Service Due	<i>Pro Magna Expeditio</i>	Total Knights	Serjeants
Aprutium	10	24	34	40
Tricarico	10	20	30	50
Melfi	4	8	12	100
Forconensis	3	6	9	12
Civitate	1 ¹ / ₂	3	4 ¹ / ₂	15
Penne	1	2	3	-
Capaccio	-	8	8	20
Angola	-	6	6	40
Muri	-	3	3	-
Troia	-	-	-	-

service, or the church somehow performed the service.⁹ However, churches may not have performed service but were still required to provide service from their lands (as evidenced by most having to obtain knights in *augmento*). This service was normally taken over by the laity, and thus was recorded under the lay-person's name in the *Catalogus*.¹⁰ The *Catalogus Baronum* in effect masks the service due from ecclesiastical holdings by recording their service under the names of the laity who actually performed the service. The records of service obtained for the *augmento* may be reflection of the real *servicium debitum* of the ecclesiastical houses. This is not reflected in the numbers of enfeoffed knights for the bishoprics in the *Catalogus*,

⁷ RBE, 624-5. The Archbishop of Rouen and the Bishop of Evreux did not produce a return, 644.

⁸ *Catalogus*, ¶145, ¶1221, ¶491, ¶386, ¶1222, ¶402, ¶1104, ¶107. Some of the Bishoprics are stylized as 'electus' (e.g. Muri ¶490 and Troia ¶402*) because they lacked papal approval. Haskins, 'England and Sicily (Cont.)', 660.

⁹ Loud, 'Church, Warfare, Military Obligation,' 37.

¹⁰ Ibid., 38. The Bishopric of Muri has an example of this in the *Catalogus*. Richard Longrande is listed as holding six villeins from the elect of Muri and that he should do the service for them. *Catalogus*, ¶683. Jamison provides a number of entries for lands which she believed belonged to the Bishop of Aprutium in the *Catalogus* which are not listed under his entry. These would be entries ¶1047, ¶1050*, ¶1055, and ¶1058-63. Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 19. On *augmentum*, see Chapter 5.

Table 6
*Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of England*¹¹

House	Service Due	House	Service Due
Peterborough	60	Wilton	5
Glastonbury	40	Ramsey	4
St Edmundsbury	40	Chertsey	3
Abingdon	30	St Bene't of Hulme	3
Hyde	20	Malmesbury	3
St Augustine's	15	Pershore	2
Westminster	15	Cerne	2
Tavistock	15	Winchcombe	2
Coventry	10	Middleton	2
Shaftesbury	7	Sherburne	2
St Alban's	6	Michelney	1
Evesham	5	Abbotsbury	1

but perhaps looking at the enfeoffments of the monasteries of England, Normandy and southern Italy will show a difference.

In the case of the monasteries, southern Italy begins to conform to the decimal/quintuple pattern when looking at the extra knights obtained for the *magna expeditio* (since the enfeoffed knights are misrepresented in the *Catalogus*) for the monasteries of Montecassino, S. Trinitatis de Venosa, and S. Marie de Montepiloso. These could be instances of the *servicium debitum* being reflected in the *augmento* knights. There is a consistent pattern of doubling the owed service in the *Catalogus* to establish the number of knights obtained in the *augmento* for the *magna expeditio*. If this were the case with these three abbeys, then they would have had the fees of 30, 15, and 5 knights respectively, whose service would have been performed by laymen. In this instance, the abbeys conform to a quintuple pattern, but account for a very small number of abbeys listed in the *Catalogus*. The remainder of the abbeys does not conform to the pattern either in the knights for the *magna expeditio* or in totaling *augmentum* knights and knight fees.

¹¹ *Feudal England*, 200.

Table 7
*Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of Normandy*¹²

House	Service Due	Enfeoffed Knights
Fécamp	10	13 ½
Mont St. Michel	7	7
Sainte-Cathérine-du-Mont (La Trinité)	6 ⅓	6 ⅓
Saint-Ouen	6	14
Jumièges	4	5
Saint-Wandrille	4	4
Montivilliers	3	5 ⅓
Bernai	2	2
Saint-Évroul	2	2
Caen ¹³	1	1
Saint-Denis of France ¹⁴	1	1

Table 8
*Enfeoffments of the Religious Houses of Apulia and Capua*¹⁵

House	Service Due	<i>Pro Magna Expositio</i>	Total Knights	Serjeants
S. Johannis in Venere	46 ½	95	141 ½	126
S. Clemente in Piscaria	7	14	21	18
Santo Stefano in Rivomare	6	12	18	8
Banzi ¹⁶	4	9	13	-
S. Giovanni in Lamis	4	8	12	100
Rofrano	3	6	9	15
S. Angelo in Cornacchiano ¹⁷	1	-	1	-
Montecassino	-	60	60	200
S. Trinitatis de Venosa	-	30	30	230
S. Marie de Montepiloso	-	10	10	50
S. <Angeli> Ursarie	-	-	-	-
S. Nicolai Troie	-	-	-	-
S. Trinitatis Cave	-	-	-	-
De Vultu	-	-	-	-

¹² *RBE*, 625-6. No abbots are listed as failing to submit their numbers, but many of the Norman monasteries are missing, which suggests these missing houses did not owe service.

¹³ Haskins' claim that Caen's single fee is one that had simply come into the monastery's possession and is not really a part of its service; much like the fee of Roger Gulafre, which the king forced the service from the Abbot of Saint-Évroul (and is not recorded in Table 7 above). Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 9.

¹⁴ St. Denis is of course not in Normandy, but did hold the fee of Berneval in Normandy, *RBE*, 626.

¹⁵ *Catalogus*, ¶1215, ¶1217, ¶1219, ¶87, ¶403, ¶376, ¶492, ¶1098, ¶823, ¶408, ¶124, ¶402*, ¶409**

¹⁶ 3 of these fees and 7 knights obtained for the *magna expositio* are held by a layman William Rapollensis. *Catalogus* ¶87.

¹⁷ Held by a layman, Richard Grandenatus. *Catalogus*, ¶1098

In this cross-section of the surveys, it seems the Norman monasteries do not conform to the pattern established by Round either. This does not necessarily mean that the theory of decimal enfeoffment is nugatory, as these monastic fees are all of a small amount. In most of the examples above, the decimal pattern begins to break down when the holding goes below 10 fees. This is most likely because these small fees are either newly created fees, or older fees that had been broken up over time, which is an occurrence that is more forgivable to the theory in Normandy than in the places conquered. When initially established, the decimal pattern was due to the controlling hand of the king doling out territory quickly, as he would have been more likely to have handed out a few large fees than getting caught up in the minutia of many small fees. The small fees occurred later through sub-infeudation.

If the peculiarities of the Normandy abbeys may be a product of age, it is prudent to determine the age of each of these monasteries. Haskins collected this information and found that the only abbey in the list above to be established after 1050 was Saint-Évroul. ‘Jumièges, Fécamp, Mont-Saint-Michel, Saint-Ouen, and Saint-Wandrille were restored under the early dukes; Bernai goes back to the reign of Richard II, La Trinité and Montivilliers to that of Robert, while Saint-Denis had held Berneval since 968.’¹⁸ Haskins hints that the reason Saint-Évroul had been given knight fees was that the land the monastery was given already had knights enfeoffed on them, and the duke wished to retain that service.¹⁹ Chibnall later took up this argument, suggesting that the reason for the eldest monasteries to be included in 1172 and owing service was not due to William imposing service upon the abbeys that existed when he gained the dukedom, but that the oldest monasteries had lost

¹⁸ Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 9-10. Haskins then goes on to explain that other monasteries which claimed to be older than the Conqueror were not organized enough by the time of his ascension, and were thus considered by Haskins to be ‘newer’ monasteries.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 10, n. 24.

land, which became secularized and granted as fees, and then were returned to their respective monasteries at some point with the service intact.²⁰ These, after all, were the only monasteries old enough for such a long process to have occurred and some, such as Jumièges, Saint-Wandrille and Fécamp, had lost much of their lands under Robert I's reign. The lands of Fécamp in particular are known to have been given up to the military class and then restored to the abbey.²¹ Chibnall also attacks the problem of Saint-Évroul, determining that the abbot had probably enfeoffed knights of his own for protection on the marcher land on which the abbey stood, and some of this was on land that previously owed service to the duke prior to the abbey coming into possession of it. These are the fees of Cullei and Bocquencé, both of which were charged for service to Phillip Augustus, and whose ancestors were known to have provided military service for the dukes of Normandy prior to the twelfth century.²² If this is the case, then it seems the Norman monasteries follow the example of Italian exemption for ecclesiastics (except that monasteries were completely exempt from their inception, rather than still owing service, only for it to be provided by someone else) more so than the English example of largely imposed decimal service. This would also explain the small numbers of knights the abbeys owed since service would not have been imposed, but only grew in a few instances due to the passing and regaining of secularized land.

²⁰ Chibnall, 'Military Service in Normandy,' 69.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 71-2; Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 12. These two fees are mentioned specifically by name in a register of Philip Augustus, after their record in the *Infeudationes Militum*; *RBE*, 626 and *Recueil des historiens*, 694. The register, which lists the names of the fees, is in Ibid., 637. The fee of Bocquencé is mentioned in a charter by Henry II, concerning a dispute which arose between the knight of the fee, Roger (who is named in the *Infeudationes Militum*), and the monks of Saint-Évroul. There was apparently confusion over what services Roger was suppose to provide, and Henry, acting as duke, specifically had to declare that "Roger is to serve the abbot and monks, for the knight's fee, with horse and arms in the king's host as often as he shall be summoned by them at the king's commands..." *Calendar of Documents Preserved in France Illustrative of the History of Great Britain and Ireland, 918-1206*, J. H. Round (ed.) (London, 1899), 224-5, no. 639. Whatever either side was claiming the service actually was, it is at least illustrative that there was confusion about the service of a knight in the employ of a monastery and that the duke had to step in to say that, yes, he serves in a military capacity to the duke/king.

Gaining secularized land, and the service with it, did not necessarily mean that the abbeys were required to perform military service. This service could usually be commuted via scutage in the areas that allowed this, but some monasteries were even exempted from doing this. For example, at some time in Henry II's reign, before the *Infeudationes Militum*, he exempted some of Saint-Évroul's monastic lands from its dues, which included both aids and specifically scutage.²³ Whether these lands actually performed any service or held any fees at the time of the exemption is unknown, but the mechanism for exemption was certainly present.

It is far more difficult to distinguish this decimal pattern amongst lay baronies, due to the realities of private ownership. Unlike a corporate entity such as the church, private estates could be broken up for any number of reasons, including being split up amongst heiresses (should a male heir survive, he would have inherited the entire estate), escheat to the king, or vassals managing to break away from their lord to become tenants-in-chief.²⁴ Perhaps the easiest baronies to take as a sample group are the earls in England and the counts of Normandy and southern Italy, since they were more likely to show up in the records, being of importance to their respective kings.

England appears not to follow the decimal pattern, but where it misses the decimal mark, the service due is usually off by less than one fee. The explanation for this can then be seen in the sub-infeudation of the fees. Just as the king would have enfeoffed his most important tenants-in-chief (the earls and barons) with large fees, so too did these men dole out large fees to their most important men.²⁵ A baron would still be obliged to distribute land to his vassals occasionally as reward for service, and would be forced to distribute smaller lands (and thus smaller fees) to

²³ Ibid., 223-4, no.638.

²⁴ Holt, 'The Introduction of Knight Service,' 91.

²⁵ Green, *Aristocracy*, 197-8.

Table 9
*Enfeoffments of the Earls of England*²⁶

Earl	Service Due	Earl	Service Due
Gloucester	289 $\frac{1}{3}$	Essex ²⁷	60
Cornwall	215 $\frac{3}{4}$	Surrey	60
Norfolk	125	Lincoln ²⁸	57
Hertford ²⁹	85 $\frac{23}{40}$, 34 $\frac{29}{36}$, 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	Salisbury	40
Warwick	100	Oxford	29 $\frac{1}{8}$
Buckingham	98	Richmond ³⁰	1
Arundel	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	Chester ³¹	-
Huntingdon ³²	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	Leicester ³³	-
Count of Eu	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	Pembroke ³²	-
Derby	60	Devon ³⁴	-

²⁶ *RBE*, 189-190, 288-91, 262, 396, 200-2, 325-6, 312-13, 340, 381-4, 202-3, 346-7, 204, 378, 240, 352-3, 435. Round's numbers for the bishoprics and monasteries given above were calculated on a combination of the returns given in the *cartae* and the amounts listed as paid via scutage in the Pipe Rolls. This method, while sufficient for an ecclesiastical institution that would most likely be commuting its owed military service, does not seem relevant for lay barons who could be commuting all, some, or none of their service. This may lead to lay barons having misleading numbers listed in the Pipe Rolls (not to mention the possibility of individual scutage payments that do not conform to the rate). Although this was not a hard rule, the story of William Rufus complaining about the quality of knights which Archbishop Anselm sent from Canterbury is one such example of an ecclesiastical lord providing service. Eadmer, *Eadmeri Historia Novorum, et. Opuscula duo de Vita sancti Anselmi et quibusdam miraculis ejus*, Martin Rule (ed.), Rolls Series, lxxxi (London, 1884), 78. This is why the decision has been made to take the numbers listed here directly from the *cartae*, which records the *servitium debitum* in the form of the old enfeoffment and what remained on the demesne, (Round initially says this is not the case, but then contradicts himself three pages later. *Feudal England*, 190, 193). There are some differences between this list and that presented in *Feudal Assessments*, appendix II. In some cases, Keefe has used outside sources to supplement the information found in the *cartae*, but in many cases the differences appear to be simply miscalculations.

²⁷ The Earl of Essex actually records 97 $\frac{1}{3}$ knights, but claims he only owes the king 60. *RBE*, 346-7.

²⁸ These are the fees of William II of Roumare while in his minority as earl. *RBE*, 376-8.

²⁹ Roger de Clare's entry is split into three, with the old enfeoffment, his holdings in Surrey, and then the holdings of his wife (which incidentally are all half fees but two; one of a whole fee and the other of a fourth of a fee). *RBE*, 403-7. There is also an entry amongst the fractional fees that says 20s. 6d are ensured, but who is doing the ensuring is unclear. Peter de Brokel is also listed as not having a fee, but of providing 20s. 6d.

³⁰ This is the single fief recorded in the *Liber Niger* by a later hand, not one reported by Earl Conan. Keefe was unable to determine Richmond's *servitium debitum*, but writes that the earldom had 187 $\frac{1}{2}$ knight fees, basing his number off of a thirteenth century document recording the number of knights who owed castle guard at Richmond. *Feudal Assessments*, 182.

³¹ Hugh of Cyveiliog, Earl of Chester, did not submit a return, but perhaps he did not need to because his earldom was a palatinate. However, if the survey was created at the behest of the barons, perhaps Chester did not feel the need to submit a return, or the return he did submit was rejected, much like the example from Northamptonshire, *RBE*, 335. Keefe found from a later survey that Chester had 80 knights' fees. *Feudal Assessments*, Appendix 3, 190; *RBE*, 184-5.

³² Earl Simon of Huntingdon is listed as having 68 old fees, but 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ "new" fees on the demesne. It appears he has confused demesne fees with newly created fees by the unusual layout of his return. *RBE*, 381-4.

³³ Neither Robert de Beaumont of Leicester nor Richard fitz Gilbert (Strongbow) of Pembroke appear to have sent a return. While it is interesting that Richard was married to Robert's sister, Isabella, the two men seem to be at differing ends of royal favour. Richard constantly had a strained relationship with Henry II, whereas Robert was Henry's Justiciar despite having supported Stephen over Matilda. Robert's office was certainly the reason why he did not submit a return. Keefe found that Robert's heir held 157 knights' fees, but which of these were old, new, or what his *servitium debitum* was remains unknown. Keefe also calculated the fees of the Earl of Pembroke to be 65 $\frac{1}{2}$ based on what the scutage the earldom paid in 1168 while in the king's hand. *Feudal Assessments*, 162, 180.

these men. While the barons would have been aware that they had a certain amount of *servicium debitum* that they would eventually need to reach in enfeoffments, any amount that had not been enfeoffed was recorded in the *Cartae Baronum* as under the demesne. The barons continued to award small portions of land at a time until they reached the amount needed for their *servicium debitum*. In some cases this number had been reached by the time the *cartae* was recorded; sometimes it had not and the remainder was recorded on the demesne; and in several cases the enfeoffment had been surpassed, thus giving the record of the new enfeoffments. In all of the cases of the new enfeoffments listed in the *cartae*, the number of men enfeoffed is extremely low, usually one fief or less. William Percy in Yorkshire provides an example of this with his new fees:³⁵

Hugo de Poville, half a knight.
 Nigel de Stoclelde, half a knight.
 Richard fitz Osbert. half a knight.
 Gilbert fitz Fulcher, half a knight.
 Peter de Mihausa, three parts of 1 knight.
 Hugo fitz Fulcheri, the fourth part of a knight.
 Robert Dapifer, half a knight.
 Gilbert de Archis, half a knight and the fourth part of a knight.
 Nigel de Plintone, 1 knight.
 Baldwin fitz Radulf, 1 knight, and the fourth part and the tenth part [of a knight].
 Durant fitz Joelin, Theobald fitz Oviet, Walter fitz Richard, Joilinus de Aichatune, Swein Child, and William Martin, all these one knight.
 Robert de Hallai, half a knight.
 Ragnerus Flandrigena, and Peter de Miausa, and William de Arundel, and William Martin, all these the third part of a knight.

³⁴ Baldwin de Redvers, Earl of Devon, was a minor at the time of the survey and did not make a return. Keefe reckoned he had a total of 131 knights' fees based off a thirteenth century survey, but the earl never paid a scutage on more than 100 fees. *Ibid.*, 182.

³⁵ *RBE*, 425-6.

Table 10
*Enfeoffments of the Counts of Normandy*³⁶

Count	Service Due	Enfeoffed Knights
Ponthieu	20	111
Meulan	15	73 ½
Earl Chester	10	51 7/8
Earl of Leicester	10	121

Table 11
Enfeoffments of the Counts of Apulia and Capua

Count	Service Due	Augmentum	Total Knights	Serjeants
Molise (¶805) ³⁷	319	71 ½	390 ½	605
Aprutii (¶1072)	181 ½	227	408 ½	716
Civitate ³⁸	124 ½	175	299 ½	344
Manoppello (¶1029)	98	122	220	482
Sangro (¶1094)	77	120	197	476
Gravine (¶53-¶71)	68	100	168	44
Albe (¶1110)	68	71	139	200
Fundi (¶1007**)	63 ½	76	139 ½	200
Consia (¶698)	63	126	189	100
Marsico (¶603)	62	125	187	320
Celano (¶1109)	62	124	186	200
Caserta (¶970)	50 ½	58 ½	109	300
Avellini (¶395)	49	51	100	130
Buonalbergo (¶382*)	47	51	98	130 and 2 balistas
Lecce (¶155-¶175)	46	94	140	-
Loreto (¶1104)	45	57	102	183
Alifie (¶960)	39	47	86	250
Avellini(¶808-¶822)	38	53	91	-
Tricarico ³⁹	37	36	73	66
Alesine ⁴⁰	35	37	72	200
Andria (¶72-¶88)	24 ½	50	74 ½	200
Balbano (¶705)	15	34	49	76

³⁶ The Earls of Gloucester, Arundel, Albemarle and the Count of Augi all failed to show for this survey. *RBE*, 626-7, 644.

³⁷ This entry is somewhat confusing because the knights obtained for the *augmentum* on the demesne are not listed in the *summa*, and several entries for the demesne are missing both in *Principatu* and in *Ducatu*. What is listed is that the count receives in service 75 ½ knights, 71 ½ *augmentum* knights, and 138 serjeants. On his demesne he has 247 ½ knights. The total of all the demesne knights and those in service, both enfeoffed and *augmento* is 486 knights and 605 serjeants (which would suggest the number of *augmentum* knights on the demesne is 95 ½ and 467 serjeants).

³⁸ *Catalogus*, ¶295-¶339, ¶390. ¶39. This count's holdings are slightly confused and incomplete. See Jamison, *Catalogus*, 69 ns. *f*, *g* and 57 n. *a*.

³⁹ ¶100-¶107. It is unknown whether the Bishop of Tricarico held of the count or not. His fees have been included in this entry, and account for 10 knights, 20 *augmento* knights, and 50 serjeants. It is possible subsequent entries, not included in this figure, belong to the Count of Tricarico. See Jamison, *Catalogus*, 20, n. *e*.

⁴⁰ ¶377, ¶383, ¶387

It is little wonder that these new fees would have been small, considering that the barons had a finite amount of land, and in order to continue granting land to vassals, the amount given would have to continue to get smaller. This of course would not be an issue until the belief that service came with land, which was not necessarily the mindset immediately after the conquest. The information recorded in the *Cartae Baronum* is essentially the imprint of a system that had begun a hundred years before it was recorded, and many changes were likely to have occurred since its installment. It needs to be remembered that the beginnings of infeudation in England were for a strict military purpose; that William the Conqueror "...allocated land to knights and arranged their contingents in such a way that the kingdom of England should always have 60,000 knights, ready to be mustered at a moment's notice in the king's service whenever necessary."⁴¹ The initial placement in England of enfeoffed knights would have been in large numbers (although not as large as the number quoted by Orderic Vitalis), as the Normans were still in hostile territory and the military would have been needed, but a hundred years after the fact, attitudes towards enfeoffment and towards what it meant to be a knight were changing.⁴²

Without the constant threat of invasion or uprising, relative peace in England permitted the idea that the service due from the land could be commuted. With this would come the idea that a certain arbitrary amount of land would consist of a whole knight's fee, and that less of that amount would constitute a fraction of a knight's fee. It would of course be impossible for the person owing service for half a fief to act in the capacity of half a knight. He would have to serve either for half the time period

⁴¹ Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 2, 266-7

⁴² Green, *Aristocracy*, 197-8.

expected, or serve on a rotating basis with another knight who held half a fee.⁴³ The other option would be the simple commutation of service via a money payment, thus making an enfeoffment the equivalent of a rent. There are many records throughout the *Cartae Baronum* of demesne manors and the like, and a record of their worth, which suggests the importance of money payments and the value of fees. Walter de Medway in Kent mentions a manor on his demesne and a church, stating the value of both these properties and that neither owed service.⁴⁴ This appears to be an instance where a tenant-in-chief was searching for something to report for the enfeoffments on his demesne, since the questions asked by Henry were how many old enfeoffments, new enfeoffments, and how many were left on the demesne. If a tenant-in-chief were to list both old and new enfeoffments, as Walter did, it might be expected that no other knights would remain on the demesne. This does not always appear to be the case in the *Cartae* though, since most returns either consist of old enfeoffments (which reached the *servicium debitum*) and new enfeoffments (which surpassed the *servicium debitum*) or they consist of the old enfeoffment (which is short of the *servicium debitum*) and the remaining men on the demesne (who make up the difference between old enfeoffment and *servicium debitum*). Walter however, provides all three categories: old, new, and demesne, as asked by Henry's questions. Only two half-knight fees are listed as being new enfeoffments, and the other 'new enfeoffments' listed are all said to be on his demesne, and have no service. These men on his demesne must simply be grants of land that were equal in size to a knight-fee (or fraction thereof), but without the service. Nevertheless, Walter felt it

⁴³ In later periods, half a knight would be a serjeant, but it is difficult to tell if that distinction was made in the twelfth century. The service case still holds if the example were changed to a third of a fee: a knight would have to serve for a third of the period, or on a rotational basis with two other knights. In some cases, sub-enfeoffment eventually came to be fractions of a fractional fee. In these instances, the tenant must have paid a commutation. A. L. Poole, *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries*, (Oxford, 1946), 45.

⁴⁴ *RBE*, 196.

was prudent to record these, including the worth of the manor and church. The return of Payn de Muntdulel in Gloucestershire also mentions manors, one without stating its worth, three being the total of £60 and a fourth valued at £20: none of which did service to Payn.⁴⁵ The manors of Payn de Muntdulel are listed under his new enfeoffments, showing that by this time a knight's fee in a strict military sense was not always the case.

There are other cases concerning actual fees that indicate the enfeoffments were being considered via a money payment. Some of the new enfeoffments of Hugh de Lacy are listed as being 100 shillingworth fees, and not in the form of a whole, fractional or multiple knight's fees.⁴⁶ The return of William de Abbrincis states that when the king receives an aid of 20 shillings, his knights only pay 12, and likewise if the king receives a mark, his knights will only pay 8 shillings.⁴⁷ This is no doubt a reference to scutage, as these rates were customary under Henry I and before.⁴⁸

Many old enfeoffments can also be split in small fractional parts. The very convoluted return of Roger de Clare provides an excellent example of an old enfeoffment with many fractional fees, including fees which may have been recorded simply as a money payment. De Clare's return is also remarkable because the original return still exists and can be checked against that which was written in the *Red Book of the Exchequer*.⁴⁹ On the surface, there is little that is strange about the barony. Roger de Clare inherited the estate from his brother Gilbert II, who died

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 297-8.

⁴⁶ Green, *Aristocracy*, 167 ; *RBE*, 283.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁴⁸ *Feudal Assessments*, 36. These are also the same rates as mentioned in *Dialogus*, 78-9. For further discussion of scutage rates, see Chapter 3.

⁴⁹ Hall provides any differences between the *Red Book* and the original return in the footnotes. *RBE*, 403-7.

without children in 1152.⁵⁰ Roger married Maud, who was the daughter and heir of James de St. Hilary of Field Dalling in Norfolk, which is where her lands recorded in the *Cartae* are located.⁵¹ Roger's return is striking in that many of his tenants who hold large fees also hold a fraction of a fee, meaning the fractional fees were not limited to just being held in isolation, but could be made up into larger whole fees. For example, Walter fitz Umfridi had 5 ½ knights, Robert fitz Galfridi 4 ½, Hugo de Capella 2 ¼, and Richard fitz Soeni 2 ¾, Richard fitz Simon 13 ½. The strictly fractional fees are even stranger in size, with some men owning tenths, three fourths, an eighth, and then two entries listed as simply 20s. 8d. If this money assessment was presented in terms of a traditional scutage payment of one mark, then 20s. 8d. would be very close to 1 ½ fees, which would be 20s. 2d. The return for the lands in Surrey also has a few fractional fees listed, mostly half fees, but two men owe a sixth of a knight, and one a ninth. The fees belonging to Maud are almost entirely half fees, except a quarter fee that is listed in the original return, but is recorded as a half fee in the *Red Book*.⁵² These fractional fees do not appear to be a case of fees being owned by a certain vassal and being broken up amongst his heirs, since the fees do not add up to whole round numbers. As can be seen in Table 9 above, when trying to add the fractional fees in to the lowest common denominator, the fees must be broken down into fortieths and thirty-sixths in the case of Surrey. The de Clare return also passes many fractional fees for the newly created fees.⁵³ The new fees

⁵⁰ I.J. Sanders, *English Baronies: A Study of their origin and Descent 1086-1327*, (Oxford, 1960), 35.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 35, 44.

⁵² *RBE*, 403-7, 407, n. 4.

⁵³ The new fees listed for the Earl presents a bit of a problem with dating the document. It clearly says that the fees were created by 'my father,' which would be Richard. Several of the fees are created by the current earl, as they are listed as 'my gift.' The problem is identifying the current earl who recorded these fees. It is assumed that Roger de Clare wrote the return, since he was alive and in possession of the earldom in 1166 when the survey was performed. However, in the new fees, Roger is listed as owning $\frac{2}{3}$ of a fee, and is stylized as 'my brother,' which would suggest that Gilbert, whom Roger inherited from, actually recorded the fees. However, it still cannot be ignored that the

are mostly two-thirds of a fee and one fourth.⁵⁴ Even stranger is the new fee of William of Hastings, who is listed as holding 20 *librates* of land and one knight fee, but he does not do the service except for one and a half knights. This entry is strange, not only because of the inclusion of the size of his lands, but also the differences in the original return, and that recorded by the exchequer. The two are as follows:⁵⁵

Original:

*Willelmus de Hastings xx libratas terrae tenet et j militum feodatum,
de quibus non facit nisi servitium j militis et dimidii.*

Red Book:

*Willelmus de Hastings tenet xx libratas terrae et j militem feodatum,
de quibus non facit servitium nisi j militis.*

In the original return, de Clare states that this man William does not do service except for one and a half knights, but that the fee is only one knight and 20 *librates* of land, which may suggest that the enfeoffments by the Earls de Clare were following a strict correlation to the amount of land granted to each man; 20 *librates* equaling half a knight. This could account for why there are many strange fractions within the Earl's holdings, because he was actually enfeoffing based on a measurement of land given (and would account for the many fractions considering the worth of 20 *librates* / £20; a very large amount for only half a knight). If 20 *librates*, in this case, is considered to be half a knight's fee, this could explain why it was recorded in the *Red Book* differently. The scribe copying the return may have seen the land and the fee, and not knowing that the Earl enfeoffed based on measurements of land, simply read the one fee listed and so chose to ignore this extra half fee owed.

fees of Roger's wife, Maud, are also listed, both in the original return and in the exchequer copy. Ibid., 405 ; Sanders, *English Baronies*, 35.

⁵⁴ *RBE*, 405.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 405, ns. 10-12.

Stenton provides an alternative to the amount of land granted a knight, specifically in terms of librates. The term for a librate of land comes from the meaning of its worth, £1, and so should be read as a value statement, and not an area of land.⁵⁶ Stenton found that many enfeoffment charters that use the term *librata terrae* or *solidata terrae* tended to follow a pattern of 20 librates to the service of one knight.⁵⁷ But even these assessments at 20 librates are not universal; Stenton found many more examples of knights who held a whole fee for only 10 librates of land, such as was acknowledged in the early 1160s by Robert Earl of Leicester who was the Justiciar of England.⁵⁸ While there may be some similarities in librates, variances did occur, and it has to be remembered that these are all sub-enfeoffments.

This is not to say all of the barons and tenants-in-chief who enfeoffed their land did so on a set equation of *x* amount of land equals *y* number of fees. Three charters from the honour of Mowbray show different amounts of land were each given to a different knight for one fee: Beler for 10 ½ carucates and a mill, Coleville for 12 carucates and Malebisse for upwards of 24 carucates.⁵⁹ Even Mowbray's calculations for service when it came to fractional fees were written down based on land, but showed no correlation to one another, as the following examples show:⁶⁰

[R]ogerus de Mubray dapifero suo et omnibus hominibus suis salutem. Sciatis me concessisse et dedisse Reynaldo de Mildeby unam carucatam terre in Birnebem pro quinta decima parte servicii militis, donec reddidero ei sum plenum servicium sicut carta mea testatur quam habet. T(este), Radulfo Beler, [etc.]

⁵⁶ The same of course applies to the shillingsworth fees above, the two being in latin *librata* or *solidata terrae*.

⁵⁷ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 166-7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁵⁹ *Charters of the Honour of Mowbray, 1107-1191*, D. E. Greenway (ed.), *Records of Social and Economic History*, New Series, 1 (London, 1972), nos. 341, 356, 371.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 375. Dates from 1138 x 1157.

Again, if Roger de Mowbray were enfeoffing by a set land-to-service equation, one would expect the aforesaid full knight fees given above to equal 15 carucates of land, since the above example has a man performing 1/15 of a fee for a single carucate. The arbitrariness is even further stressed when two more charters of Mowbray's actually state the amount of land which makes up a fee, and they are both different:⁶¹

...Sciatis me reddidisse et concessisse et presenti carta mea confirmasse Valtero de Meinil de Turkillebi duas carrucatas terre in Parua Turkillebi quas pater eius tenuit. Et in eadem uilla dedi ei unam carrucatum terre de meo dominio cum Ascelina sponsa sua in liberum maritagium ... perfaciendo seruicium quinte partis feudi unius militis . sicut contingit feudo militis . decem carrucatas terre.

... per seruicium quantum pertinet sexaginta acris unde duodecim carrucate terre faciunt seruicium unius militis.

In these cases, the first for Valtero de Meinil, his two carucates of land will count for the amount of service he does if a knight's fee were ten carucates of land, hence why he has $\frac{1}{5}$ of a fee. The second is a gift to Richard de Hedonna. He is given 60 acres of land and must do the service required of that land if a knight's fee were made up of 12 carucates. That a fief could be measured by the amount of land given a knight has led to some thought of continuity with the more amorphous hidage and hundred system of the Anglo-Saxons. Rather than strictly following the five-hide unit of assessment for providing a knight, the theory consists of five hides as the basis, but the assessment was on the hundred. This would account for the patterns in enfeoffments in units of 20 rather than 10, and would account for the highest numbers of enfeoffment generally being around 60 knights (which would equal 300 hides, or

⁶¹ Ibid., nos. 374 (c.1138 x c.1148), 366 (c.1170 x c.1181).

what was a common Anglo-Saxon arrangement known as a ship-soke).⁶² The numbers in the tables above show this pattern of twenties to be a possibility for the English church holdings, but this does not appear to hold for the laity. This may have been an arrangement that made sense for the ecclesiastics, being that there was a greater chance for continuity at the head of the house or bishopric, and following the previous system would have been easier for them to arrange for military service. However, it cannot be ignored that a pattern of tens is shown in the fees of Normandy, which obviously did not have any hundreds to conform to, and clearly suggests a Norman imposition.⁶³ The Abbot of Worcester, however, did choose to enfeoff his knights following the five hide unit, even to the point of stating in a survey of 1208 that “Four virgates of land make one hide and five hides make one knight.”⁶⁴ Salley Harvey used evidence of knights from Domesday Book to suggest that knights who actually served were enfeoffed on usually small amounts of land: about 1 ½ hides. However, the size varied between location, value of the land, and status of the knight; the size mattered little, since it was likely going to be subinfeudated anyway, and broken up from how it originally passed to the tenant-in-

⁶² *Military Organization*, 34.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 35-6. Hollister also notes that none of the tenancies which hold sixty knight fees make up 300 hides, as suggested by the ship-soke theory. *Ibid.*, 40.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 46. Hollings noted that there were several instances in which 4 hides were said to make a knight, including the superscript note in Red Book of Worcester, the cartulary of Glastonbury Abbey and the Ramsey Cartulary. Her thoughts were that these 4 hide units were for fiscal assessments only, but when it came to actually providing service, the five hide unit is clearly used. Hollings, “Survival of the Five Hide Unit,” 454, n. 7, 455. There is also an entry in the register of Wetheral priory that gives a similar value for a knight’s fee in terms of land, saying that “Ten acres make one ferndell, four ferndells one virgate (which is half a carucate), four virgates one hide, and four hides one knight’s fee.” *Sciendum est, quod x acrae terrae faciunt unam ferndellam ; et iiij ferndellae faciunt unam virgatum, sive dimidium carucatae ; et sic iiij virgatae faciunt unam hidam, sive duas carucatas ; et iiij hidae, viii carucatas ; quod est feodum militis.* J. Nicolson and R. Burn, *The History and Antiquities of the Counties of Westmorland and Cumberland*, 1 (London, 1777), 19-20. It should be noted that J. E. Prescott, editor of the Wetheral register, believed Nicolson and Burn used the ‘Machels Manuscript’ copy of the register, which Prescott does not mention anywhere else in his edition of the register. The above quote from Nicolson and Burn does not appear in Prescott’s edition, which relies on transcripts of the register since it had been lost by the time Prescott compiled his edition. *The Register of the Priory of Wetherhal*, J. E. Prescott (ed.) (London, 1897), xlii.

chief.⁶⁵ The generosity of the lord enfeoffing his knights also plays a case, as in the example of Bishop Bernard of Saint Davids who, according to Gerald of Wales, gave away lands so that “when 10 carucates were required for military purposes, he would, with a liberal hand, give 20 or 30 carucates.”⁶⁶ It seems that when it comes to enfeoffments, the tenant-in-chief could simply choose whatever method he wished.

The idea that multiple enfeoffment systems could exist side by side is not entirely new. Gillingham suggested it as a possibility when he argued for the existence of fees in England before 1066.⁶⁷ There are, however, some problems with Gillingham’s arguments. His assertion that the enfeoffment of knights occurred before the conquest of 1066 is backed mostly by the argument of silence from the sources; particularly that of the ecclesiastical writers who were the most likely to raise objections to new services being imposed. Of these writers, nine are named: “Giso bishop of Wells, Hermann of Bury St. Edmunds, Goscelin of St. Bertin, Eadmer of Canterbury, Hemming, Colman and John at Worcester, Hugh the Chanter and, finally, William of Malmesbury.”⁶⁸ Before assuming that the ecclesiastical writers would find fault in the imposition of knight fees and write about them, one must take a look at the background of these authors insofar as this can be determined.

Only one of Gillingham’s writers is known to be an Anglo-Saxon: Eadmer of Canterbury. Eadmer was only a child at the time of the conquest and grew up to be Archbishop Anselm’s biographer. He was known to have mingled with the older Anglo-Saxon monks, particularly when they held masses over the tomb of St. Dunstan, but there is some indication that he saw the English monks as holding a too

⁶⁵ Harvey, ‘Knight and Fee,’ 15.

⁶⁶ *Feudal Assessments*, 22; ‘*ut ubi militibus officiis decem terrae carucatas, viginti, vel triginta amplissima manu largiretur*,’ Gerald of Wales, *Itinerarium Cambriae*, *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, J.F. Dimock (ed.), 6, Rolls Series, xxi (London, 1868), 106.

⁶⁷ Gillingham, ‘Knight Service,’ 63.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

secular life, and thus shows an influence of the Norman monks put in charge of him as a novice.⁶⁹ Eadmer does have something to say about knight fees, however, in the dispute between Anselm and William Rufus.⁷⁰

We have little knowledge of four of the writers' backgrounds. Hugh the Chanter was possibly English, but he had familial ties to Flanders. Whatever his ethnic origin may be, he did not begin writing his history of the church of York until the 1120s, well after the conquest.⁷¹ Goscelin of St. Bertin was Flemish and a little more background information about him is available, but Gillingham claims that little stock can be attributed to his silence since he deals "with human tragedies rather than with institutional problems."⁷² Hemming was possibly of Danish descent, and while he may be silent on knight fees, he did see fit to record a relief imposed by William Rufus.⁷³ Hermann of Bury St. Edmunds was probably an Anglo-Saxon, but he did his work at the behest of Abbot Baldwin of Bury St. Edmunds.⁷⁴ Baldwin was a native of Chartres and came to England from St. Denis. He was Edward the Confessor's choice for the position and held over by William the Conqueror.⁷⁵ Whatever Hermann's origins may be, it cannot be ignored that he was writing for a Norman.

Of the final four authors, it is best to begin with Giso, bishop of Wells. Concerning Giso, Gillingham says he "believed that he had successfully preserved the

⁶⁹ Eadmer, *Lives and Miracles of Saints Oda, Dunstan and Oswald*. Andrew J. Turner and Bernard J. Muir (eds. and trans.), Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 2006), xv ; 'Miracles of St. Dunstan,' 184-5, cap. 19.

⁷⁰ R. W. Southern, *Saint Anselm and His Biographer* (Cambridge, 1963), 154-160.

⁷¹ Gillingham, 'Knight Service,' 59, n. 71.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 59, n. 66.

⁷³ J. F. A. Mason, 'Hemming (fl. c.1095)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edn (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004) [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12893>, accessed 22 Aug 2010].

⁷⁴ Hermann, *de Miraculis sancti Edmundi*, in *Annals and Memorials of St. Edmund's Abbey*, T. Arnold (ed.), 1, Rolls Series, xcvi (London, 1890), 27.

⁷⁵ *Annals and Memorials of St. Edmund's Abbey*, vol. 1, xxx.

summa libertas of his church.”⁷⁶ There are two things to be said about Giso, firstly if he had ‘successfully preserved the *summa libertas* of his church,’ then this statement suggests that the liberties were under assault by William. Secondly, Giso was a Lotharingian who not only was brought over to England by Edward the Confessor, but was a strong supporter of William the Conqueror.⁷⁷ If Giso was such a staunch supporter of the Conqueror in hopes of bettering the bishopric, then he is unlikely to offer any criticism of the man. Regarding Coleman, it is known that his writings survive only as a portion of the work by William of Malmesbury, and Gillingham admittedly “assumes” William was copying this work closely and accurately.⁷⁸ William of Malmesbury was born after the conquest and had one parent (most likely his father) who was a Norman. John of Worcester was also a Norman. In addition to these authors, Gillingham also mentions as evidence the letters of Lanfranc, Anselm, and Herbert Losinga as being completely silent on the matter of new knight fees.⁷⁹ Lanfranc was a Lombard who was a monk in Normandy before becoming Archbishop of Canterbury; Anselm was from Aosta in Italy and was the Abbot of Bec in Normandy before he was Archbishop of Canterbury; and Herbert Losinga was born in Normandy and raised in the Abbey of Fécamp. All three of these men of prominence came to England from Normandy, and would therefore be accustomed to the Norman ways and would find nothing strange about the imposition of knight fees. The same familiarity could be said for John of Worcester and William of Malmesbury.

Assuming one accepts Gillingham’s premise that the silence of the sources indicates that no knight fees were implemented with the conquest, there is still perhaps a better explanation. John of Worcester makes a note that one of the

⁷⁶ Gillingham, ‘Knight Service,’ 59, n. 64.

⁷⁷ Julia Barrow, ‘Giso (d. 1088),’ *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edn (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004) [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10778>, accessed 22 Aug 2010].

⁷⁸ Gillingham, ‘Knight Service,’ 59, n. 69.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

questions of the *Domesday* survey was how many knights were enfeoffed.⁸⁰ This suggests one of two things: that William the Conqueror imposed knight fees, or that he was working under the assumption that knight fees existed in England (perhaps in confusing the Anglo-Saxon recruitment system of the 5-hide unit with that of a knight's fee). It is well known that in *Domesday* there is little to no mention of knight fees.⁸¹ If William imposed the fees upon taking England, he would have had little reason to need a survey to tell him what they were: William already knew. But *if* one were to believe John of Worcester that William was asking how many knights were enfeoffed in England for the recording of *Domesday Book*, the answer that William must have received based on what is actually in *Domesday* was 'none' (or, in reality, very few). This would mean that the implementation of knight fees in England must have occurred *after Domesday Book*. Again, following Gillingham's premise behind the silence of the sources, what would be a more likely explanation (other than the date of 1070 which is more widely accepted) is that in William's final year he would have begun the implementation of knight fees, and this work would have been continued under his son William Rufus.

Certainly in William Rufus' reign we see the outrage of the church towards royal impositions that Gillingham would expect to see with the creation of new knight fees, but is not seen in the reign of William the Conqueror. A famous incident involving the dispute of feudal service and the enfeoffment of knights came when

⁸⁰ *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, P. McGurk (ed. and trans.), 3, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1998), 44-5. "*Willelmus rex fecit describi omnem Angliam, quantum terre quisque baronum suorum possidebat, quot feudatos milites, quot carrucas, quot uillanos, quot animalia, immo quantum uiue pecunie quisque possidebat in omni regno suo, a maximo usque ad minimum, et quantum redditus queque possessio reddere poterat...*" This passage not only specifically states that it was enfeoffed knights William asked about, but also lists the other items which clearly are included in the Domesday survey, suggesting that the fees were to be a part of *Domesday Book*.

⁸¹ There are however some men who are specifically recorded as the knights of the Archbishop of Canterbury in Kent, and a portion of the Bishop of London's land in little Domesday is called the fief of the bishop, but none of these are specifically mentioned as a knight's fee. *Domesday Book*, Ann Williams and G. H. Martin (eds. and trans.), Alecto Historical Editions (London, 1992), 10-11, 977.

Anselm of Bec was to be invested to the Archbishopric of Canterbury. During the vacancy of the archbishopric, William Rufus had created several military tenancies on the archbishop's lands and wanted Anselm to confirm these. Anselm refused to do so, but eventually agreed to take the see as a feudal tenant of the king in the same manner as had Lanfranc.⁸² Anselm's investiture as archbishop and baron may have been the impetus behind the creation of the *Domesday Monachorum* which is probably the first record of knight fees in England, and certainly the first record of the knights of Canterbury.⁸³ The *Domesday Monachorum* lists several knights who were a part of the original invasion of 1066, including Vital who is pictured on the Bayeux Tapestry.⁸⁴ Knowing the dates of their deaths, D. C. Douglas has reasoned that the list of knights could not be later than 1096, and while the date of Anselm's investiture is convenient, the document still cannot be dated any earlier than 1087, which is when the listed knight Richard fitz Gilbert succeeded to his lands.⁸⁵ This would place the

⁸² *The Domesday Monachorum of Christ Church Canterbury*, David C. Douglas (ed.) (London, 1944), 64 ; Eadmer, *Historia Novorum*, 40-1.

⁸³ While the fees listed in the *Domesday Monachorum* are not specifically called 'fees,' some of the names do correspond to an early thirteenth century document that refers to them as fees. *Domesday Monachorum*, 38, n. 6 ; *RBE*, 469-73, 724-7. The numbers in the *Domesday Monachorum* add up to 98 ¼ fees, which does not correspond to the Archbishop's *Cartae* of 1166. In the 1166 return, the Archbishop only has 84 ¾ fees, but the 15 fees of the Abbot of Saint Augustine are included with the Archbishop's fees in the *Liber Niger*; the two ecclesiastics were later divided in the *Liber Rebeus*, and a rubrication was added to the Abbot, which separated their returns. With both of these added together, the total fees equal 99 ¾ fees, which would suggest a not-so-unreasonable creation of 1 ½ fees since the time of the *Domesday Monachorum* to the 1166 *Cartae Baronum*. The *Cartae* however does not produce any of the names of these knights, so the two cannot be checked for continuity. *Domesday Monachorum*, 105 ; *RBE*, 193-4. Hollister suggests that these extra knights above the number of fees listed in 1166 could be English soldiers of the fyrd that Canterbury owed, since the term *milities* could apply to both knight and soldier. *Military Organization*, 58. The early thirteenth century survey by King John does, however, provide the names to be checked against the *Domesday Monachorum*. In adding up these fees, the archbishop has 84 ¾ fees, or essentially the 84 ¾ of the 1166 *Cartae*. The survey also lists the 15 fees belonging to the abbot of Saint Augustine's separately, which had not changed. While the Archbishop did pay for all 84 ¾ fees for the aid in 1168, he immediately resumed paying for only the 60 knights, which he "recognized" for the scutage of 1172. *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 154 ; *P.R. 18 Henry II*, 140. The Abbot of Saint Augustine is only listed as paying scutage after 1166 in 1187, and this is for 15 knights *P.R. 33 Henry II*, 209. The reason for the archbishopric paying the full number of enfeoffed knights rather than the *servicium debitum* is due to the Becket dispute and the archbishop being in exile: with the archbishopric in the hand of the king, it would have been the king's right to collect from the entire fee. This is also probably the reason why none of the names of Canterbury's knights are recorded in 1166, just the number of fees.

⁸⁴ *Domesday Monachorum*, 63, 105.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 40-1, 63.

earliest known document concerning knight fees squarely in the reign of William Rufus.

Two pieces of evidence may contradict this theory. The first is the feudal summons William the Conqueror sent to the Abbot of Evesham. In this, William asks for the five knights that the abbot owes, and this number corresponds with the number of knights enfeoffed in the abbot's 1166 return.⁸⁶ As mentioned above, this could have just been an instance where William assumed knight fees were in existence and had confused them with the 5-hide system of recruitment, but this is a tenuous argument.⁸⁷ The other difficulty could lie in the report of Robert Foliot of his 1166 return which states that his enfeoffments date back to after the conquest.⁸⁸ Since Foliot states that his tenancies date to *after* the conquest, this statement could be a reference to William Rufus' reign, but that is unlikely. Historians, however, have been debating for over a century just when knight fees were introduced into England, and it is not the intention here to join the argument, but merely to discuss how the Normans have influenced the military system. It seems reasonable to accept Matthew Paris' date of around 1070 for the introduction of knight service; even if he was not contemporary, he was following the tradition of St. Albans.⁸⁹ In any case, the date of 1070 is much more plausible than a later date in Rufus' reign.

Returning now to the enfeoffments in England, it is not always the case that new enfeoffments were created in small fees that do not follow the decimal pattern.

⁸⁶ *Select Charters*, 97 ; *RBE*, 301-2. The number of men the abbot has enfeoffed of the old enfeoffment is only 4 ½, but he does have ½ a fee of the new. *Military Organization*, 28, n. 4.

⁸⁷ The numbers do not support this either. The Abbot of Evesham had 142 ½ hides according to *Domesday Book*; 21 of these hides were free of geld and 6 were rented out. That left the abbot with 115 ½ hides which, if split into 5-hide units, would account for roughly 23 knights. Even if the reckoning were only one knight from every holding that had 5 or more hides, the abbot would still have been responsible for 8 knights. *Domesday Book*, 485.

⁸⁸ *RBE*, 332. "*Post conquestum Angliae tenuerunt antecessores ipsius Roberti Foliot per servitium xv militum et ipse post illos.*"

⁸⁹ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, H.R. Luard (ed.), 2, Rolls Series, Ivii (London, 1874), 6 ; H.M. Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief and Knight Service*, (Oxford, 1932), 3.

The above examples are from sub-infeudation only, and not examples of fees that the king had created. One example of a new enfeoffment created by the king can be seen in the Honour of Mowbray, created by Henry I in 1114. Initially, the honour was created to have 60 knight's fees, but by the time of the *Cartae*, Nigel d'Aubigny had created a further 28, and his son Roger, who made the return, had created an additional 11 $\frac{3}{4}$.⁹⁰ The enfeoffments created by Henry II after the campaign in Ireland also show examples of new royal enfeoffments taking the decimal quotas, to include Leinster at 100 fees, Limerick at 60, Cork at 60 and Meath at 50.⁹¹ There is even some hint of how these fiefs were distributed via sub-infeudation in the poem *The Song of Dermot and the Earl*, believed to be a faithful retelling of the events as witnessed by an Irish participant (though not the author). Many men are named as being placed on these lands by Earl Richard and others (not the king), but a small number include the number of fiefs they were granted. Maurice de Prendergast received 100 fees, for the service of 10 knights⁹²; Maurice, son of Gerald 20 fees⁹³; Reinaud, 15 fees⁹⁴; and Baron Richard the Fleming received 20 fees.⁹⁵ Many more names are listed of men who were enfeoffed, but no mention of the number of fees they received. This of course is not substantial proof that these men actually received these exact numbers of fees, but it at least presents the mindset of the

⁹⁰ Green, *Aristocracy*, 166; *RBE*, 418-21; 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ of the twelfth century fees correspond with the tenancies of Geoffrey de La Guerche in *Domesday*, the largest fees being created in the time when Robert de Stuteville possessed the lands from 1086-1114 in the midland territories; the northern territories were enfeoffed by Nigel d'Aubigny when he possessed the honour, and few of these possess more than one fee. Four of the known enfeoffments made after 1166 are recorded in Greenway's collection and account for two holdings of half a fee and two of a quarter of a fee. *Mowbray Charters*, xxxiii-iv and nos. 343, 349, 360, 364-5.

⁹¹ Holt, 'Introduction of Knight Service,' 105; J. Otway-Ruthven, 'Knight Service in Ireland,' *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 89 (1959), 1. Here, Holt's numbers have been followed since he and Otway-Ruthven shows the differing figure of Cork at 50 fees.

⁹² *The Song of Dermot and the Earl*, Goddard Henry Orpen (ed. and trans.) (Oxford, 1892), 224-5, lns. 3078-9. The editor has changed the 100 fees to be 10, because Maurice de Prendergast's service is 10 knights.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 224-5, ln. 3096

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 226-7, ln. 3119

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 230-1, ln. 3176

author, and most likely his contemporaries, that infeudation occurred in these decimal patterns. As in England, the sub-enfeoffments of Ireland did not necessarily follow the strict decimal pattern, such as in the 37 tenants-in-chief of Dublin who mostly held half fees, and there was no discernable pattern of how much land makes a knight's fee. Ireland of course had its differences from England, most notably in the fact that more fees were created as fee farms, which were hereditarily held by a fixed rent and not by military service, but perhaps this is not so unusual considering that the practice of paying a scutage rather than performing service was becoming more common by the late twelfth century. However, there is no evidence to suggest men who held by fractional fees were jointly performing the service of a single knight, as was done in England, since a scutage payment was a much more acceptable and expected contribution, but the Anglo-Normans who invaded Ireland *still* enfeoffed men by knight fees in large blocks of knights in a decimalized pattern, as if expecting the military service of these men.⁹⁶

While the *Infeudationes Militum* does not give a good example of sub-infeudation in Normandy, there is at least another document that does. The Bishop of Bayeux performed a survey on behalf of King Henry I in 1133, ostensibly to determine what the bishopric held in the time of Bishop Odo.⁹⁷ The survey is preserved in detail in a French manuscript, and in an abridged version attached to the *Infeudationes Militum* in the *Red Book of the Exchequer*.⁹⁸ This shows the bishop owing 10 knights to the king of France and 20 knights (or 40 according to the abridged version) to the duke of Normandy.⁹⁹ However, the bishop had a large number of knights enfeoffed compared to the service that he owed; 117 $\frac{3}{4}$ in the full

⁹⁶ Otway-Ruthven, 'Knight Service in Ireland,' 2, 3, 10.

⁹⁷ Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 15.

⁹⁸ *Recueil des historiens* supplies the best and fullest version of the inquest on 699-702, and a copy of the abridged version added to the *Infeudationes Militum* on 698-9 which is also found in *RBE*, 645-7.

⁹⁹ *Recueil des historiens*, 699 ; *RBE*, 646-7.

return, 119 ½ in the abridged.¹⁰⁰ Only one of these sub-enfeoffments is as much as ten knights, and only five tenants hold five fees. The remainder are for the most part small, consisting of only one or two fees, but very few fractional fees.

With such large numbers of men being enfeoffed above their *servicia debita*, one must question how these knights fulfilled their service for their fees, if they were not being called to do so militarily. In some cases, perhaps these men served as castle guard, but it is more likely that they were enfeoffed so that the tenant-in-chief could collect a scutage from them above what he owed to his lord.¹⁰¹ The men must have been performing some sort of guard service to their lords as well; perhaps serving as escorts or as a means to intimidate one's local enemies. There is an example of this usage from southern Italy where, in Palermo, a pair of men summoned their knights and paraded them around each other's home to threaten one another.¹⁰² In England, these services can be determined by the exemption clauses in charters, particularly to those granting lands held by knight service to monasteries, where the service was exempt. Stenton provides an excellent example in the case of Walter de Aincurt and the lands he gives to Kirkstead Abbey being free "*de exercitu et warda et scutagio et equitatione et opera et omni servitio quod ad militem pertinet.*"¹⁰³ In order, these are the duties of host service, castle-guard, scutage, riding, and works. The first three are obviously of a military nature (although scutage could also include *auxilium*, or aids, which were a tax on knight fees at the same rate as a scutage for specific occurrences), riding was the performance of escort, and works was most likely the repairs of the lord's castle.¹⁰⁴ These may not

¹⁰⁰ Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 16, n. 48 ; *Recueil des historiens*, 699-702 ; *RBE*, 646.

¹⁰¹ Poole, *Obligations of Society*, 40.

¹⁰² Falcandus (eng.), 103. ; Falcandus (lat.), 49.

¹⁰³ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 172, Appendix, no. 36.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 175-6.

be the only services expected of a knight, but they were certainly the most important ones.

Infeudation in Apulia and Capua

With the services and patterns for England in mind, it is useful to look at the other Norman invasion of southern Italy in detail. While decimalization appears to be the mindset in England, the fees recorded in the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy present another story. From the charts given above, it appears that on the whole, decimalization was *not* occurring in southern Italy. While it is difficult to judge the *servicium debitum* of the ecclesiastics due to the performance of these fees being fulfilled by the laity, the service of the counts should not present such a problem. As can be seen from the chart, none of the counts list a number of fees that is close to a round decimal except for Caserta at 50 ½; and only three follow a quintuple pattern. Considering that the *Catalogus* makes a point of adding up the total number of knights owed for each count, it is possible that the decimalization pattern could be shown in the *summa*. It is conceivable that an artificially imposed quota was to include enfeoffed and *augmentum* knights, and that the counts could then sub-infeudate and demand *augmentum* however and from whomever they chose, the evidence for this being that few of the counts record their own demesne as owing *augmentum* knights, but instead collect the *augmentum* from those who do the service for the count.¹⁰⁵ However, the decimalization of enfeoffment is not reflected in the total number of knights when the *servicium debitum* and the *augmentum*

¹⁰⁵ Jamison believed that the *augmentum* was based on the wealth and ability of each fee to provide the men, and while this may be the case for the fees listed as being poor, it does not correlate with the evidence of the secular barons providing little from their demesne lands, but their subtenants providing the usual doubled *augmentum*. It is the consistency of this practice which makes the assigning of *augmentum* knights arbitrary, rather than their based on the wealth or size of the fief. Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 8-9.

knights are added together. Only six counts have a total that is either in a decimal pattern, or is less than one knight from this pattern. The total number of knights for the ecclesiastic houses also fails to reflect a decimal pattern.

There has been a basic belief that the fees of southern Italy would reflect this established 'Norman' decimal pattern, since it is so clearly seen in England and Normandy, but the evidence from the *Catalogus* simply does not support this view. Haskins expressed it by looking at the ecclesiastical holdings, claiming that "The Norman origin of South-Italian feudalism is seen ... in the more distinctive arrangements of the knight's-fee unit and the group of five and ten knights, both of which are peculiarly Norman..."¹⁰⁶ His evidence for this is reflected in only five ecclesiastical houses thus: "Venosa owes thirty knights, Monte Cassino sixty, S. Giovanni in Venere twenty-five *in demanio*, and the bishops of Tricarico and Teramo [Aprutium] each ten."¹⁰⁷ Of these listed, only the two bishoprics could really be considered legitimate evidence, since there are certain problems with the others. To begin, Haskins gives away the fault in his method in S. Giovanni by only counting the fees that are on the demesne. If the idea is to insist on the 'Norman' pattern of infeudation as established in England and Normandy to southern Italy, then surely the rules of enfeoffed and demesne knights would apply as well. If the *servicium debitum* is to be established in patterns of fives and tens, then all of the knights must be accounted for, not just those who had been enfeoffed, nor those who remained on the demesne to make up the remainder of the *servicium debitum* and had not been enfeoffed. As for Venosa and Montecassino, these numbers are the *augmentum* knights of these two monasteries, and not a reflection of the true *servicium debitum*. True, they could be a reflection of the *servicium debitum* as seen through the

¹⁰⁶ Haskins, 'England and Sicily (Cont.),' 661.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 661, n. 243.

doubling of the *servicia* to give the numbers for the *augmentum*, but this argument is tenuous. Haskins only gives five examples of the decimalization pattern in ecclesiastical fees, and appears to ignore completely the fourteen other church properties in the *Catalogus* that list knight fees. While it may seem unnecessary to criticize a piece of historical work that is almost a hundred years old, the influence of Haskins' paper still seeps into modern scholarship. It seems the veiled purpose of Loud's paper on the ecclesiastical military obligations was to find an excuse for the missing decimal patterns of their enfeoffments.¹⁰⁸ Loud did indeed find the system whereby the laity was performing the churches' service and was recorded under them rather than the church, but the mask this presents does not prove that there was a decimal pattern in southern Italy, just that whatever pattern may have been present cannot be seen. Cahen at least agrees with a lack of a decimal pattern, and counters Haskins' assertion that the patterns are hard to see because of the few recorded churches, with the statement that few ecclesiastical fees were created before the introduction of military service.¹⁰⁹ Loud presented a theory for the lack of churches recorded in the *Catalogus* similar to that used by Chibnall explaining the lack of owed service in Normandy: the churches that owed service gained these obligations from newly acquired land that was already enfeoffed. Failing this, the only other explanation Loud could see was that the large and important churches such as the archbishoprics and the wealthy monastery of Cava were simply left out by one of the scribes making a copy of the *Catalogus*.¹¹⁰

The case of southern Italy is certainly much different from that of England in terms of the 'Norman' origins. In England, there was a swift takeover by the Normans, and a quick military hold could have been established. Southern Italy and

¹⁰⁸ See Loud, 'Church, Warfare, Military Obligation.'

¹⁰⁹ *Le Régime Féodal*, 69.

¹¹⁰ Loud, *The Latin Church*, 347, 349, 352.

Sicily were much different, as the Normans slowly infiltrated the lands before finally seizing power and converting the area into a kingdom under Roger II. It is possible that the Normans in Italy were unable or did not desire to change the feudal structure of their new kingdom. With a slow infiltration, the Normans accomplished the task of taking the country over from the inside, rather than as a huge invading force. This means alliances would have been created in the territories, and marriages would have gained land, rather than possessions taken through sheer military might. With a slow infiltration, there was not such a large land redistribution as occurred with England, and probably even fewer men to give land to anyway. In this instance, land could not be doled out to the conquering victors, but the established fees and service, if any, would have to continue.

An indication of the fact that the Normans did not have complete control of the region of southern Italy, and that concessions must have been made to local custom, comes from the fact that the regions of Naples and Amalfi kept their local dynasties as the rulers of their areas for a long while into the Norman period.¹¹¹ Southern Italy before the Normans was not an ethnic, cultural or political whole as England mostly was before 1066. The region was populated by indigenous Lombards, Greeks and Muslims, and was ruled by local princes, Arabs, and the Byzantine Empire.¹¹² The Normans were known to take over local customs and administrations, such as the *dīwān* in Sicily, so a certain amount of continuity of pre-Norman practices could be seen in the Norman period. Some of the obligations from the pre-Norman period were very similar to those that existed under the Normans. The Byzantine portion of Apulia, while mostly populated by Lombards, had the obligation of repairing the fortifications of the town, much like the service of works;

¹¹¹ Loud, *The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest*, (Harlow, 2000), 47.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

but other obligations, such as *restor* for replacing a horse lost while serving, were implemented by the Normans.¹¹³ Another example would be the act of fealty, which was still practiced by the Lombards in the Norman period, and only began to be displaced by homage around 1120.¹¹⁴

Before the Normans came to Capua, there are records of land grants as rewards for military service, but these lacked the personal obligations necessary for an owed or 'feudal' service.¹¹⁵ For the lands conquered by Roger II in Africa, the only typically Norman attribute found were the types of cavalry charges used.¹¹⁶ There is no evidence of any type of infeudation process set up, but this could also be due to the short duration of Norman control in Africa as much as a lack of an attempt to enfeoff knights there.

Just when infeudation practices came into play in southern Italy has caused much debate amongst historians, and has led to the theory of the 'Great Court of Ariano.' The theory is that two years after the Assizes of Ariano were established in 1140, Roger II held a great court in the forest of Silva Marca near Ariano, which was to establish the military obligations of tenants and the reorganization of the counties. That this event occurred is based on a dated document which has since been found to be a forgery, and an entry in the *Catalogus* stating that a man received his fee at Silva Marca.¹¹⁷ Concerning the man who received his fee at Silva Marca, there

¹¹³ Although *restor* was only implemented in certain areas and not others. Ibid., 37 ; Loud, 'How 'Norman' was the Norman Conquest?' 26 ; *Le Régime Féodal*, 63-4.

¹¹⁴ Loud, 'How 'Norman' was the Norman Conquest?' 26.

¹¹⁵ Patricia Skinner, 'When was Southern Italy 'Feudal'?' *Il Feudalesimo Nell'Alto Medioevo* (Spoleto, 2000), 322.

¹¹⁶ David Abulafia, 'The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean,' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 7 (1984), 47.

¹¹⁷ *Catalogus*, ¶509; Loud, *The Latin Church*, 346; Houben, *Roger II*, 136-7, Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 15-17 Although Jamison was here stating that it was at Silva Marca that the *augmentum* was established, not the whole of the owed service of southern Italy; Jamison, 'Norman Administration,' 257-8. Houben also cites Ortensio Zecchino and Erico Cuozzo as accepting the theory of the Court of Ariano. Ortensio Zecchino, *Le Assise di Ruggero II. Problemi di storia delle fontie e di diritto penale* (Naples, 1980), 63-72; Errico Cuozzo, 'Quei maledetti normanni'. *Cavalieri e organizzazione militare nel Mezzogiorno normanno* (Naples, 1989), 105-9.

seems to be some misreading of this entry. This record is set up in just the same way as the rest of the *Catalogus*, with the exception of adding this place name instead of the term *augmento*. To illustrate, here is the previous entry, then that pertaining to Silva Marca:

¶508 *Raul filius Lamberti dixit quod tenet villanos sexdecim, et hereditagium suum feudi unius militis et cum augmento obtulit | militem unum.*

¶509 *Guillelmus de Sirino tenet villanos tres, et dimidium feudi militis de Giuffrido Avenabili; obtulit apud Silvam Mortam militem | unum.*

By knowing the layout of the *Catalogus*, it can be seen that William does not say he *received* his fee at Silva Marca, but that he obtains one knight *at* Silva Marca. If any significance can then be attributed to this one statement, it is that Silva Marca was where the *magna expeditio* gathered in the particular instance when this entry was recorded, and probably for the very reasons Jamison found this spot to be significant: it was easily accessible from the Via Traiana and the Via Appia to anyone coming from Campania, Apulia and the Abruzzo.¹¹⁸

It is possible to see some arbitrary assignments of military service through the *Catalogus*, however, which suggests the *idea* of decimalization was at least in practice in southern Italy. The arbitrary assignments in this case are in the form of the serjeants provided for the *magna expeditio*. Aside from the counts who provide the largest number of knights in service, the majority of the counts owe serjeants in numbers which clearly conform to the decimal pattern. The same holds as well for the ecclesiastics: five of the seven bishoprics who owe serjeants do so in an even decimal number, and half of the abbeys who owe serjeants do so in a decimal pattern,

¹¹⁸ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 16.

including a further one which could conform to a quintuple pattern. No doubt one of the earliest times the number of serjeants was established was during the recording of the *Catalogus*. In the one instance of a return for the *Catalogus* surviving outside of the document, no mention is made at all for what the Bishop of Aprutium owed in terms of the *augmentum* knights or serjeants.¹¹⁹ His entry in the *Catalogus* does, however, show that he owed 24 *augmentum* knights, and 40 serjeants.¹²⁰ This, in addition to the fact that the serjeants are such round numbers would suggest that in establishing the number of serjeants owed for the *magna expeditio* in the *Catalogus*, the Normans of southern Italy still looked to conforming to a decimalized pattern.

The serjeants, however, are not the only arbitrary assignment of service in southern Italy. The inclusion of *augmentum* knights also gives the appearance of being arbitrarily assigned when the *Catalogus* was being written. In the instance of the original return by the Bishop of Aprutium, much like the serjeants, the Bishop's *augmentum* knights were not recorded in that document, only in the *Catalogus*. However, unlike the serjeants, the *augmentum* knights do not follow a decimal pattern; their arbitrary assignment follows a different pattern. Throughout the *Catalogus*, the knights owed for the *augmentum* are almost consistently doubled that of the knights owed in service. In addition, there is one instance in the *Catalogus* where a baron's *augmentum* is specifically mentioned as being *in duplo*.¹²¹ This doubling can easily be seen in several of the knights of the bishoprics and the abbeys given above. The counts appear not to follow this pattern in the above chart because many of their demesnes did not provide *augmentum* knights, only their tenants, and in the cases where they did provide *augmentum* knights, the numbers are roughly equal to what they owed in service, not doubled. When looking at the specific cases

¹¹⁹ *Catulario Teramana*, 66-7.

¹²⁰ *Catalogus*, ¶1221

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, ¶141.

of the sub-tenants, the pattern of doubling the *servicium debitum* to establish the *augmentum* returns:¹²²

These are the Barons of (Count Richard of Aquila)

¶809 John de Baios holds the fee of 1 knight and with the *augmentum* obtains 2 knights.

¶810 Hector de Thora holds the fee of 2 knights and with the *augmentum* obtains 4 knights.

¶811 William Guaius holds the fee of 1 knight and with the *augmentum* obtains 2 knights.

¶812 Marinus de Capua holds the fee of 2 knights and with the *augmentum* obtains 4 knights.

... etc.

This establishes at least that the Normans in southern Italy were not entirely constrained to the traditions that preceded them in the cases of military service; they were changing it to fit their needs.

This idea of the Normans making limited reforms if needed may account for why there is no decimal pattern to be established in southern Italy. It has been suggested by Jamison that sometime during Roger's reign, the king instituted a new means by categorizing fiefs, and accordingly also military service, which was to come under the name of *feuda quaternata* or *feuda in baronia*.¹²³ These categorizations were in essence determining who would owe service to the king, including those who were sub-enfeoffed. The tenants-in-chief who held *in capite* of the king were still responsible for seeing that these men served when called upon, if one of them should be their sub-tenant. The fees that were not quaternated would only owe service to their immediate lord, and not the king. The quaternation of fees would thus force

¹²² Ibid., 149.

¹²³ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 16.

increased military service from the ecclesiastics, who previously enjoyed freedom of service. In this case, the monasteries and churches initially held military fees *in capite* of the king with no service due; in certain instances the church's fees became quaternated, thus owing service to the king; these fees were then recorded separately in the *Catalogus* under the names of the laymen who performed the service for them.¹²⁴ An example of this is recorded in the *Chronicon Casauriense* where the Abbot of St. Clemente, Oldrius, complained that Count Bohemond of Manopello was "encouraging us to take up secular arms and demanding that we provide cavalry and infantry and large sums of money."¹²⁵ To which the count replied "...the Lord king has many people who pray in his kingdom, but he does not have many to defend it."¹²⁶ King Roger later relieved the monastery of San Clemente in Piscaria from this service, according to the author of the *Chronicon Casauriense*, but it is still listed in the *Catalogus* as owing 7 knights, 14 *augmentum* knights, and 19 serjeants.¹²⁷ This exemption is perhaps an indication of relieving the direct service of the monastery to the king, and moving that service to a member of the laity per Loud's argument. It must be remembered that this change was only in regard to the military service from the monasteries: they were still required to perform any other service that was due.¹²⁸ The incident shows that King Roger was indeed changing the military structure of service from what it was previously (at least in the Abruzzi). The fact that a further change was needed in order to obtain the service for military fees held by

¹²⁴ Ibid., ' 19-20. A document from Antioch makes the distinction of a knight's service to his king and the service to his lord which indicates there was a similar question pertaining to their circumstances around the same time. *Le Régime Féodal*, 70.

¹²⁵ "*provocat ad arma secularia, exigit ut equites, pedites, et expensas immoderatas praebeamus*" Iohannes Bernardi, *Chronicon Casauriense*, L. A. Muratori (ed.), *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 2, part 2 (Milan, 1726), 892. Translation by Graham Loud.

¹²⁶ "*Domnus Rex ... habet plures oratores in regno suo, sed non habet plures defensores*" Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid. ; *Catalogus*, ¶1217. In addition, Jamison claims that two more lands that belong to this monastery are listed under Count Robert of Apulia, specifically entries ¶1063 and ¶1068. Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 19.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 20.

ecclesiastics is just additional proof that the Normans in southern Italy were changing the military system to fit their needs; they just simply did not overhaul it into the decimal-like pattern that is seen in England and Normandy.

The lack of a decimalization pattern in southern Italy has caused some historians to discount the *comestabulia* identified by Jamison.¹²⁹ However it must be remembered that these *comestabulia* are not analogous to the *constabularia* suggested by Round for England. Instead of being a unit of ten knights, these *comestabulia* are actually administrative districts, which can partly be seen in the *Catalogus*. While these decimal patterns cannot be seen in the enfeoffments, it does not necessarily rule out that the men were fighting in groups of ten like Round's *constabularia*. As shown in the tables above, the enfeoffed knights of the counts do not appear to follow these decimal units, but Tancred, father of Roger I and Robert Guiscard, was said to have served with ten men in Normandy.¹³⁰ There are also a few references in Geoffrey of Malaterra to the number of knights joining the early Norman invaders that are in decimal numbers.¹³¹ These numbers are few enough to where they may be credible, but should still be taken as suspect, as there are just as many inclusions in the chronicles of groups that conform to a decimal pattern as there are groups that do not.¹³²

Without a decimal pattern, is it worth suggesting that these fees were set up according to the value of the land on which they were enfeoffed? Cahen did not believe that a knight's fee was a unit of value (i.e. an area of land), but simply a unit

¹²⁹ Matthew Bennett, 'The Normans in the Mediterranean,' *A Companion to the Anglo-Norman World*, C. Harper-Bill (ed.) (Woodbridge, 2002), 101 ; Donald Matthew, *Norman Kingdom of Sicily*, (Cambridge, 2007), 233.

¹³⁰ Malaterra (eng.), I.40, 78 ; Malaterra (lat.), 25 ; *Le Régime Féodal*, 69. This reference however, cannot be supported by any Norman chroniclers or court documents. R.H.C. Davis, *The Normans*, 92.

¹³¹ Usually 60, sometimes 160. Malaterra (eng.), I.28, 71; II.1, 86; II.4, 87; II.32, 106 ; Malaterra (lat.), 22, 29, 30, 42.

¹³² Just as Serlo is seen in one chapter leading 30 men, in the next he is seen to be in command of 36 men, amongst other incidences of non-decimal numbers. Malaterra (eng.), II.32, 106; II.33, 108 ; Malaterra (lat.), 42-3.

of service.¹³³ While the fee may not be an area of land, there is still evidence that in Italy, certain accoutrements of value were attached to the fief. A privilege in 1128, by Count Nicolas of the Principate of Salerno to his men, states that his soldiers were to “receive food, money, horses, and arms as was the custom, as well as fiefs (*feudora*).”¹³⁴ Knights in Naples were given five *modia* of land and five *villani* to work the land.¹³⁵ While these two examples seem to indicate a value attached to the fief, they do not indicate a fixed value that would equate the fief to a certain value. Additionally, neither the Principate of Salerno nor Naples are included in the *Catalogus*, and the reason for their exclusion may have some bearing on whether they followed the same practices of the Norman areas of Apulia and Capua that were included. The *Catalogus* does give some indication that value of land was important to fees, but only to the *augmentum*. Poor fees tended to be exempt from providing men for the *augmentum* except for the tenant-in-chief, but it is the fact that some fiefs are attributed as poor while others are not that indicates there was no fixed value to the southern Italian fief.

The Constabularies and the Conroi

There has been some thought that these decimalized numbers, which are prevalent in England and Normandy, may be a product of the knights’ training for the *conroi*. The argument is that knights would have trained in small groups in tight formation and would have practiced their skills at tournaments and on the battlefield. William Marshal is said to have taught Henry the Young King the tactic of the close-

¹³³ *Le Régime Féodal*, 68.

¹³⁴ Valerie Ramseyer, ‘Territorial Lordships in the Principality of Salerno, 1050-1150,’ *The Haskins Society Journal*, Lewis, C.P. (ed.), 9 (1997), 92.

¹³⁵ Bennett, ‘Normans in the Mediterranean,’ 101.

formation, ‘serried’ ranks at French tournaments against superior numbers.¹³⁶ The number of men who made up the *conroi* however, could vary depending on the lord’s strength and could range from 10 to 40 warriors, and possibly more.¹³⁷ Round held a similar theory that the men in England and Normandy trained in groups of ten, which made up a *constabularia* and are thus reflected in the decimalized fees as shown by the *Cartae Baronum* and the Pipe Rolls. The term ‘constable’ was applicable to any man in a position to lead other men militarily. In southern Italy, the major distinctions of military groupings in the *Catalogus Baronum* are broken up into areas called constabularies, and there is even a chronicled incident where the king, upon putting a certain man in charge of his personal retinue of knights, gave him the title of ‘constable.’¹³⁸ It is clear from the above evidence, that the Italian constabularies do not follow the strict decimal pattern that Round found in England.

A survey was held in England in 1205 to determine the number of men under each constable, which suggests that the unit of *constabularia* was amorphous even there, and not the unit of ten that Round suggests is shown in the enfeoffments of England and hinted at by the evidence of Bury.¹³⁹ What may have occurred in medieval England is perhaps a little more simplistic than men being enfeoffed for the purpose of training in a *constabularia*. This idea does not account for the fees that did not conform to the decimal pattern, and there are many. The decimal fees were created by William the Conqueror as a quick measure to raise a military force shortly after the conquest, and decimals are the natural tendency of the human mind, a

¹³⁶ J. F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*, Sumner Willard and R. W. Southern (trans.), Second Edition (Woodbridge, 1997), 36.

¹³⁷ J. F. Verbruggen, ‘La Tactique Militaire des Armées de Chevaliers,’ *Revue de Nord*, 29, nos. 163-4 (1947), 164, 168.

¹³⁸ Falcandus (eng.), 120. ; ‘*comestabulum*,’ Falcandus (lat.), 69.

¹³⁹ Poole, *Obligations of Society*, 50 ; *Feudal England*, 206. The evidence from Bury comes from Jocelin of Brakelond’s chronicle, where he states that there were 40 knights who owed ward at Norwich Castle organized into four constabularies, and a fifth constabulary of 10 knights who aided them. Jocelin of Brakelond, *The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond*, H. E. Butler (trans.) (London, 1949), 66-8.

consequence of man being born with ten fingers. It is likely that men who had ten enfeoffments or more would have trained their knights together in the ‘serried’ ranks, but when it came to bringing the knights to war, they would have been organized in groups of twenty or more under a banneret.¹⁴⁰

What then of the knight fees of less than ten men and those that do not follow the decimal pattern? If the idea was to enfeoff in decimal patterns so that men could train in a *constabularia*, then these left-over men would be useless. More likely, these men would also have been organized under a banneret, but would not have been as effective as those who had trained together. A militarily powerful lord would have provided not only a large contingent of troops, but probably better trained knights, since they could train in a large contingent. The ‘left-over’ knights may have been regarded as useless, which could be indicated in Henry II’s calling of a scutage for the expedition to Toulouse, and which Robert de Torigni says was done so as not to “vex the country knights.”¹⁴¹ However, if these knights performed in person instead of commuting via scutage, they would presumably have been incorporated into the army in constabularies formed for a particular campaign.

It could be seen that the patterns of enfeoffment in the areas of Norman control worked in such a way that initially the ecclesiastics were exempt from service. Through a complicated history of the loss of lands that became secularized and the regaining of them, some ecclesiastical houses then owed a small amount of service. Bishoprics seem to have had service imposed at some point, for they do tend

¹⁴⁰ Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, 76-7. Verbruggen mentions that some men in Edward I’s time, although past the Norman period, had less than 20 men under their banneret, but made this up with an abundance of foot soldiers. The biography of William the Marshal shows that Tancarville had 40 knights under his banner, and William Marshal had 50 when he was serving King Henry II. *History of William Marshal*, A. J. Holden and D. Crouch (eds.), S. Gregory (trans.), 1, Anglo-Norman Text Society No. 4 (London, 2002), 68-9, ln. 1315; 451-3, lns. 8893-8898.

¹⁴¹ Robert de Torigni, 202.

to owe a large amount of service, however in the case of southern Italy, this service is hidden from us by a laity who were performing the service and recorded as owing it. The case of England is the peculiarity in this, as both bishoprics and monastic houses owe substantial service, but in the way the Normans took the country of England, it may not be such a far stretch to consider that they imposed service on both the secular and monastic arms of the church for the real need of defense against a conquered and restless population. Additionally, the fact that many of the heads of these churches were brought in from Normandy to control their bishopric or abbey could explain why the new ecclesiastical lords would not object to the secular service that they gained with their new position. The thought of ecclesiastic freedom from military service must still have been prevalent in England, however, since none of the bishoprics or monasteries created after the conquest held their land by military tenure.¹⁴²

¹⁴² *Military Organization*, 55 ; Chew, *Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief*, 10.

Part II

Cost

Chapter 3

Commutation

The infeudation methods hinted at through the knight surveys of England, Normandy and southern Italy reveal only the beginnings of the complex feudal-military structure as practiced by the Normans. While it is understood that once a knight was enfeoffed he must provide service, it was not necessarily the case that he would do this in person. The idea of commuting one's service, or paying a money rent instead of serving with knights, began its development in the middle ages and is known primarily in England as scutage. The records of these payments allow more to be learned about owed service than it would appear possible at first glance, so a detailed account of these payments from their earliest records and the rates that they were charged per knight fee is necessary.

The English Scutage

The concept of scutage is distinctly English, and is also the aspect of military obligation that is best recorded. Scutage was a commutation of service; if the king called on his knights to serve, and a particular knight or baron decided, for whatever reason, not to join the army, he had the right to forgo that service and instead render a money payment. This is not to be confused with a fine for failure to perform one's service: such a fine in Anglo-Saxon times was called *fyrðwite*, but no such equivalent can be seen in Henry II's time period when records of scutage become complete enough to examine the institution at length; it is only until the late twelfth century

when men who failed to show were fined *pro servicio*.¹ Before the conquest, tenants would have to provide 4 or 5 shillings for each hide of land to their lord to support a soldier in the host.² When these hides would be combined into the five hide unit, which was the basis of providing service in the Anglo-Saxon *fyrð*, a lord could expect to receive up to £1 for his knight.³ This amount is reflected in one of the traditional scutage rates seen later in the twelfth century. This money was meant for support, and so can not necessarily be equated with a commutation; however some towns listed in *Domesday* do specifically say they charged their duty on the five hide unit.⁴

The majority of sources in the late twelfth century confirm that the traditional amount levied for a scutage was at a rate of either £1 or 1 mark per knight fee. Richard fitz Nigel, the head of the exchequer in the 1180s (and therefore an ‘official’ on the subject) acknowledges this rate, as do some of the returns in the *Cartae Baronum*.⁵ Going back to Stephen’s reign, these same figures exist in a charter issued by Earl Gilbert of Pembroke granting land free of every service with the exception of scutage. The new owner was to give scutage “in such manner that when it shall happen that a knight gives twenty shillings, the land shall give two shillings, and if a knight gives one mark, it shall give sixteen pence.”⁶ In this instance, the amount of scutage actually owed is unimportant, only that the owed scutage was

¹ *Military Organization*, 192, 214.

² Hollings, ‘Survival of the Five Hide Unit,’ 476.

³ 4 shillings if the full five hides were assessed, or perhaps 5 shillings if the 4 hide fiscal assessment supposed by Hollings was used. The only evidence for this comes from the Berkshire *Domesday Book* entry, and it has been assumed that this was the standard. *Select Charters*, 107 ; *Domesday Book*, 136.

⁴ This is in addition to ward-penny sometimes being paid in lieu of common-ward duty in Edward the Confessor’s reign. *Military Organization*, 193-4. The primary military taxation of the Anglo-Saxons however, was *danegeld*, and this was charged on the hide.

⁵ *Dialogus*, 78-9, ‘*marcam scilicet uel libram unam*.’ Emphasis added ; *RBE*, 193. In the return of William de Abbrincis, he states that when the king receives an aid of 20 shillings, his knights pay only 12, and when the king receives a mark, his knights will only pay 8 shillings.

⁶ *Military Organization*, 199.

based on either the collection of £1 or 1 mark. To go back further, Stenton suggested that scutage was more arbitrarily assigned during Henry I's reign than the imposition of a certain rate on each knight during Henry II's reign. The main evidence for scutage in Henry I's reign is from two charters, which appear to show a rate of 30s. per fee, but the calculations for these rates are not clean.⁷ Even then, Keefe found an example in the *auxilium militum* of the knights of Durham in 1130 that corresponds to a £1 rate, and another example in the Welsh honor of Carmarthen that corresponds to a 1 mark rate.⁸ This rate also holds with an evaluation of the scutage payments throughout Henry II's reign: a charge of £1 in 1156, 1172, and 1187, and 1 mark in 1162, 1165, and 1168. Only two scutage payments were made at a rate of 2 marks, and that was in 1159 and 1161.⁹

The reason a 2 mark rate stands out to historians goes back to the work by J. H. Round. In his paper on the introduction of knight service to England, Round used the knowledge of a knight's daily wage in the twelfth century (8d. per day) and multiplied it against the traditional service period of 40 days to come up with the amount 26s. 8d. or 2 marks. If this then was the amount a knight was to be paid for the traditional period of service, it would only make sense that a scutage payment, meant to hire a mercenary as a replacement, would equal that same amount. According to Round it did, but that was only because the source he used to check his work was one of the two years this rate actually occurred.¹⁰ This rate of 2 marks on the fee can only be found in calculating the rates in the Pipe Rolls of Henry II; all other outside sources from this time and before point to the £1 or 1 mark rate. If these scutage payments were meant to be for a mercenary replacement at the rate of

⁷ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 181-2.

⁸ *Feudal Assessments*, 36-7.

⁹ See Tables 1 and 2 above.

¹⁰ *Feudal England*, 215-16.

8d. per day, then the majority of the time Henry was assessing a scutage, he was not receiving sufficient funds for an equivalent mercenary force. This could easily be explained by the daily wage of a knight-mercenary being lower earlier in Henry's and his predecessors' reigns, and through inflation and improved arms a knight's wage would rise; and so consequently must the scutage. However, this does not account for the high scutage rate of 2 marks early in Henry's reign, and the subsequent drop back to the 'normal standard' of either £1 or 1 mark.¹¹ This means that the scutage rates must have been fixed at a time long before a knight's daily wage was 8d., and if one thing is known about medieval people, it is that they tenaciously held on to tradition, particularly when it meant that they would be paying lower rents.

Therefore, if it has been established that the prevailing scutage rate of Henry II's reign was either £1 or 1 mark, how does one explain what looks to be a charge of 2 marks in the years 1159 and 1161? Analysis of the scutage payments and the military events that created them may show a pattern and provide an explanation. Scutage payments may have been a distinctly English characteristic, but because the records of these payments are so numerous in Henry II's time, the study of them can provide information about other aspects of military obligation. Henry II's scutage policy seems to be at the middle of the dispute occurring in 1165-6 with Henry's failed expedition to Wales and the subsequent creation of the *Cartae Baronum*. This scutage is particularly strange as it also veers from the traditional £1 or 1 mark rate by requiring a 'scutage' of 15s. 3d. or 15s. 2d. for serjeants, and this seems to have had a poor effect on Henry's military endeavours.

¹¹ *Military Organization.*, 206-8. Hollister's assertion of a 'fluctuating' rate is, however, unsatisfactory since he maintains Round's theory of wages equalling scutage rates in this period, and suggests that the 1 mark scutages were to be used to pay mounted serjeants as replacement for knights. He ignores the scutage of 1165 to pay for serjeants which does not equate to a 4d. daily wage, despite a one-horse serjeant earning this amount in later years.

If it is to be taken that the 1165 scutage payment and the following survey of 1166 are a changing point in the success or failure in Henry II's military recruitment strategies, then further analysis of other military campaigns involving the English is necessary. The military payments analyzed here are almost all that occur during Henry II's reign, including the years 1159, 1161, 1162, 1165, 1168-9, 1172 and 1187. One other payment during Henry's reign has not been included: the scutage for 1156 because the records for this payment are so poor that it is of little use.

The 1159 scutage for the expedition to Toulouse is the first major scutage that is recorded in the Pipe Rolls, and is one of the scutages at the two mark rate.¹² This scutage is also peculiar because it contains an extra large military *dona*, or gift, provided by the ecclesiastics. Henry launched the campaign because he believed the lands of Toulouse should have been his by right of inheritance through his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine.¹³ Henry had much success in collecting the payments from this expedition, with a full 91% of all the scutages paid on what was probably the largest collected during his reign. It is known that Thomas Becket was responsible for the negotiations with the ecclesiastics to provide the large *dona* that came with this scutage, and so may have also been responsible for the success of collecting the scutage. There is however an oddity in the year 1159, for which there is evidence in the *Brut Y Tywysogyon*. The *Brut* says that there was also an expedition to Wales in this same year, which may also account for the scale of this scutage, but will be discussed later.¹⁴

¹² *P.R. 5 Henry II*, passim.

¹³ Warren, *Henry II*, 85. There does not appear to have been any outcry over the barons because of this campaign. In subsequent years, service outside of England, Normandy or Brittany was usually met with obstinance. See Abbot Samson's response to Richard demanding service against the King of France in Jocelin of Brakelond, 85-6, and the attempts by the barons to include a provision against foreign service in the predecessor to Magna Carta, the 'Unknown' Charter, in Holt, *Magna Carta*, 427, cap. 7.

¹⁴ *Brut Y Tywysogyon*, Thomas Jones (trans.) (Cardiff, 1955), 141.

The 1161 scutage¹⁵ has a few peculiarities about it that make it an interesting study. It is another example of a scutage at the two mark rate, and like 1159, there was also a military *dona* that was taken from the cities, moneyers, and the ecclesiastics. This scutage was taken up in preparation for a defensive war against the king of France that never occurred.¹⁶ Because of this, there is a large proportion of pardons for the scutage raised, many of which are listed as *cancell*, which is probably an indication of Henry forgiving the payment since the knights were not needed. On the other hand, if this was common practice, it would then be difficult to explain why payments that were not received were marked as being owed and were expected to be paid. In addition to the pardons, there are scutage payments made that are specifically denoted as being for service in castles, which is another indication of this being a defensive campaign.

The 1162 scutage is an example of a scutage at the normal one mark rate before 1165. While no military campaign occurred in 1162, it seems that this payment was for the campaign to Wales in January 1163. In 1162, Rhys ap Gruffydd went into revolt in southern Wales and supposedly seized the castle of Llandovery.¹⁷ Henry was still on the continent at this time, and in 1162 after the death of Archbishop Theobald, he sent Thomas Becket back to the country to receive the archbishopric, but also to deal with a problem being caused by the Welsh.¹⁸ This occurred sometime after the archbishop's death in April, and it is most likely the point when the scutage was raised for Henry's use when he returned in 1163. Since Easter in this year was on the eighth of April, it is fairly certain Becket did not return

¹⁵ *P.R. 7 Henry II*, passim.

¹⁶ Warren, *Henry II*, 91.

¹⁷ J. E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales: From the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest*, 2, Second edition (London, 1912), 511

¹⁸ Herbert de Bosham, *Vita Sancti Thomae, Materials for the History of Thomas Becket*, 3, James Craigie Robertson (ed.), Roll Series, lxxvii (London, 1877), 180.

to the country until after the Easter exchequer session, which explains why none of the scutage payments are listed as paid by tally.¹⁹ Further evidence for this scutage being to finance a war with Wales is due to the relatively low amounts received in counties near to Wales. Two of the counties bordering Wales whose records still exist show that no scutage was collected, which suggests that all the knights owing service in those counties served.

The 1165 scutage has already been discussed at length, but there are several peculiarities about this payment that make it stand out. Again, Round is responsible for pointing out a different rate, this time a *dona* at the rate of 15s. 3d. for a mysterious quantity, which the Pipe Rolls of later years explain as being for the cost of a serjeant.²⁰ The rate is in no way connected to the number of knight fees a baron or tenant-in-chief owed, but showed that the number of serjeants provided were much larger than the number of knight fees: sometimes hundreds more.

That serjeants would have a higher commutation or value than a knight paying 1 mark ($\frac{2}{3}$ of £1 or 13s. 4d.) is fairly strange and deserves closer attention. Round asserted that the pay for serjeants was at 1d. per day in a 364 day year, as demonstrated in the Pipe Rolls.²¹ The entry of particular interest is from the Pipe Roll for 8 Henry II, which gives the cost of 20 serjeants *de toto anno* as £30 6s. 8d., and this confirms Round's assertion of 1d. per day for serjeants.²² The figure can then be looked at in conjunction with the scutages at the rate of 15s. 3d., which is that of a serjeant in the Welsh war in 1165. Keefe has shown that there was actually a variant in this figure, which was not wholly 15s. 3d., but on occasion was in

¹⁹ *P. R. 8 Henry II*, passim.

²⁰ *Feudal England*, 223.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 215.

²² *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 53. It does not, however, work out so cleanly for knights. This same passage records £80, 18s. 8d. *de toto anno* for seven knights. Using Round's same equation, the number *does* not work out to 8d. per day as asserted, but rather 7.6d. per day: an impossible rate of pay.

increments of 15s. 2d.²³ Using the rate of 1d. per day, one could see these as payments for 182 or 183 days; or exactly half a year ($365 \div 2 = 182.5$). Another problem is presented in this figure, however. In the Pipe Roll for 11 Henry II, which recorded the year 1165 with the scutages for the Welsh War, Hugh Bigod paid “£227 10s. *de Mil(es) et suigentibus exercitus Walie .de. quarta parte anni.*”²⁴ By this statement, these serjeants are only to be for a fourth of the year (91 days), not half. This would mean Hugh would have been providing for 600 serjeants at 1d. per day.

It is difficult to say whether Hugh was the one exception for providing for only a quarter of the year, or if he was in fact the norm. Six hundred serjeants seems an excessive number of troops, and it is possible that the scutage assessment was at a rate that would provide for a payment of 2d. per day. It is known that under Richard I, foot serjeants were paid 2d. per day, so it is possible that earlier, their pay was also 2d. (assuming these were foot serjeants; it is not known if they were mounted or not).²⁵ Another possibility to consider is that the *payment* of a serjeant would have been for 1d. per day, but the *commutation* of this service was at a rate of 2d. per day. There would have, after all, been a need for some incentive to provide the service, and not simply commute it every time the serjeants were called to serve, but a scutage granted. This of course is working under the assumption that the barons provided the serjeants, rather than Henry hiring them with this arbitrarily collected fee. Perhaps the problem lies in the service period. Knights owed forty days of service, but if they continued to stay in the army after this time period, they were

²³ *Feudal Assessments*, 29. The assessment at the rate of 15s. 2d. only occurs in the counties of Northumberland and Yorkshire which suggests this was a regional variance. Keefe included Earl Hugh Bigod in Norfolk as one who also paid at the 15s. 2d. rate, but his entry in the Pipe Roll states that his payment was for both knights and serjeants, so the whole of his payment cannot be taken as being at a searjentry rate. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

²⁵ Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages* (New Haven, 1996), 17 ; ‘*Et item in liberatione iij seruientum peditum xxx s. de xlvii diebus cuique in die ij d. per idem breve.*’ *P.R.* 5 *Richard I*, 132.

usually paid a wage by the king. If a serjeant had no owed period of service but was expected by the king to serve, perhaps the commutation was at a rate that covered the whole campaign.

We cannot be certain that the payment of serjeants remained stagnant throughout the twelfth century. The Pipe Roll for Henry I gives some indication of pay in the 1130s, where a listing of four castles along with payment are entered. Three of these castles provided a janitor and watchman for 30*s. 5d.*, or 365*d.*, being the pay of $\frac{1}{2}d.$ each if it can be assumed this was a full year's pay. This provides a control to gauge the remaining entry, which consists of one knight, ten serjeants, and the familiar janitor and watchman who were paid £21 5*s. 10d.* Determining the payment at this castle (Burton in Lonsdale) depends on how one interprets the status of the janitor and watchman. If these men are equal to serjeants (or even military serjeants at that), then serjeants at this time were being paid at $\frac{1}{2}d.$ per day, and the remaining knights were paid 8*d.* per day. However, if one were to keep the payment of 1*d.* per day for the serjeants under Henry II, then the knight only received 3*d.* per day.²⁶ These figures still change slightly in 1168 where an entry of one knight, two porters, and two watchmen are paid £18 5*s.*, or the knight at 8*d.* per day, and the porters and watchmen are each paid 1*d.* per day.²⁷ The numbers do not fit quite so easily when considering the serjeants of Oswestry in the same year. The 20 remaining after 23 July can easily be calculated at 1*d.* per day, but the 40 that serve until 29 July received 7*d.* less than they would have if paid at 1*d.* per day.²⁸ While slightly off, it would be reasonable to say that in this instance the serjeants were paid at 1*d.* per day.

²⁶ *P.R. 31 Henry I*, 137-8.

²⁷ *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 124; J.O. Prestwich, 'Anglo-Norman Feudalism and the Problem of Continuity,' *Past & Present*, 26 (1963), 46.

²⁸ *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 124.

The situation with knight service commutation had been stunted by a tradition of paying only £1 or 1 mark per fief, leaving it to be inadequate for providing a replacement knight at 8*d.* a day. The equation of *length of service x rate of pay = scutage*, as formulated by Round, does however appear to work in the case of serjeants. Another example comes from the previously mentioned *dona* in the scutage for Toulouse. In many *dona* that was explicitly expressed as for the military, the money owed is divisible by a service period of forty days.²⁹ If these were for serjeants, at the rate of 1*d.* per day, then the money collected would have paid for 337, 160, 55, and 20 serjeants; all of which are compatible with the numbers given for the Welsh campaign of 1165. In light of the payments of serjeants as shown above, one would notice that payments were given in terms of a full, half or quarter of a year. Perhaps another distinction needs to be made in the forty day assessment; that this was the time period used to calculate the commutation of service, but not the actual time period in which the soldier (be he knight or serjeant) served.

In 1168-9, Henry collected an aid for the marriage of his daughter Matilda.³⁰ While this aid, or *auxilium*, was not actually a payment used for any military campaign, it does prove to be one of the most interesting payments because, in theory, every knight fee should have paid this aid and thus been recorded (normal scutages would not reflect every fee in England as service would have been performed for some fees). Scutages and aids were essentially taxes that were only levied on knight fees, but there was a distinct difference between the two. A scutage was merely a payment in lieu of military service, or a commutation.³¹ An *auxilium*, or aid, was also levied on the knight's fee, but was not connected to military service. The best understanding for why an aid was levied comes from Magna Carta, which

²⁹ *P.R. 5 Henry II*, 19, 21, 22, 56.

³⁰ *P.R. 14 Henry II*, passim ; *P.R. 15 Henry II*, passim.

³¹ *Dialogus*, 80-1.

states that there were only three instances in which a scutage or aid could be levied solely at the king's discretion, and these were to ransom the king, for the knighting of his eldest son or for the marriage of his eldest daughter.³²

The aid of 1168 was collected in two parts and over two years. Firstly, the knight fees paid 1 mark for each fee in 1168, and Henry tried to collect a mark payment on each of the new fees found in the *Cartae Baronum* survey. These new fees are entirely unpaid and listed as owed.³³ Secondly, an aid was collected from many of the towns and vills in the country over the two year period, as well as on the moneyers. The payments from the vills are almost consistently half of what they actually owe, leaving the other half of their payment still in debt, to be paid the following year.

The 1172 scutage for the expedition to Ireland is a straight forward and normal scutage at the £1 rate after the scutage and knight survey of 1165-6 (Henry again tried to collect on the new fees). The only other scutage after that in Henry II's reign occurs in 1187, also at a £1 rate. In 1186, an incident occurred where Galloway was attacked to keep it from being inherited by a ward of King Henry.³⁴ Henry marched up to Carlisle where he met the man responsible for attacking Galloway, and the two made peace. This is the expedition that called for a scutage in 1187. It is a fairly light scutage, particularly since many of the fees making

³² Holt, *Magna Carta*, 454-5, cap. 12. There is a charter from before 1215 (1183-4) which explains when an *auxilium* can be taken by a tenant-in-chief from his knights, and it appears to follow the same guidelines as *Magna Carta*. Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 173-4. Even before then, Henry I charged a *danegeld* at 3s. a hide for Maud's marriage to the Emperor. This shows that this *auxilium* payment was connected to a military taxation, be it via scutage/knight fees or *danegeld*. *Military Organization*, 194. The Norman Kings of Sicily were able to call an aid on these exact three incidents as well, in addition to also being able to call an aid for the lodging of the King or his son. *Le Régime Féodal*, 77.

³³ New fees were listed as non-recognized fees by the ecclesiastics.

³⁴ The attacker, Roland, was the son of Uchtred. Uchtred was killed by his brother Gilbert. Gilbert's son, Duncan, was to inherit Galloway and it was he who was Henry II's ward. Gilbert was forced by King William of Scotland to make peace with Henry and pay him £1000. £838 of this was still owed to Henry by the time of Gilbert's death in 1185. *P.R. 32 Henry II*, xviii; *Gesta Henrici Secundi*, vol. 1, 339-40, 348-9; Roger de Hoveden, *Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, W. Stubbs (ed.), 2, Rolls Series, li (Lonson, 1869), 309.

payments are listed as being in the king's hand (either as ward or escheat), and it is only these possessions that pay for the newly enfeoffed fees. There is also a tallage taken this year on the lands in the king's hand. For what purpose Henry had a tallage is unclear, but it was almost certainly not to supplement the scutage for Galloway. The scutage in 1187 states clearly that these were for knights who did not go to Galloway with the king, establishing that the payment was for an event that already occurred. In previous years when an extra amount was levied for campaigns (the *dona*), this amount was agreed upon before the campaign, and paid in by a tally. This is not occurring at all with this tallage, nor is the tallage being collected by the ecclesiastics and burghers like the *dona* in years past, but upon lands in the king's hand as already mentioned.

It is interesting that all the scutage payments after 1165 (1168 was an aid) were then assessed at the £1 rate, and in fact the £1 rate seems to be the standard all the way through Richard I's reign.³⁵ Henry attempted to collect on the new knight fees for the 1172 scutage, much like the aid of 1168, but similarly failed to do so (although at least some in this year paid as opposed to none in 1168). He appears to have given up on collecting for many of the new fees in 1187, excepting those that were already in his hand. This he would have had a right to do, since he was acting as the baron while he held the fees.

The 2 mark scutage rate that occurs in 1159 and 1161, in addition to the strange scutage of 1165 have similarities that make them stand out from the regular £1 or 1 mark scutage rate that would be expected for this period. In each of these campaigns, Henry was fighting what he believed to be a defensive war to maintain the rights of his territories. In 1159 the lands of Toulouse were Henry's by right of

³⁵ See Table 2.

inheritance and he was being deprived of them, 1161 saw a possible invasion from the king of France, and in 1165 Henry was finally trying to put down the Welsh rebellion in the midst of a possible Franco-Welsh alliance. As well as these being times of crisis, each year sees a military *dona* raised in addition to the scutage, where no such payment is done in other scutage years. These *dona* were paid primarily by the ecclesiastics and the major towns in the realms. 1165 also saw a large army of serjeants being paid for via scutage; a type of military service that was not usually recorded as serving in the field at this time. Each of these elements could be an indication of the existence of the *arrière-ban* in England.

The *arrière-ban* in Normandy was a type of universal service in times of great need or defence; southern Italy had an equivalent service known as the *magna expeditio*.³⁶ The service required for the Italian version is recorded in the *Catalogus Baronum*, which records a larger number of knights who must serve, but more importantly for this argument, a large and arbitrary number of serjeants must also have served. Finally, there is evidence from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, which worked similarly to the Norman crusader state of Antioch. Here, in times of emergency, serjeants would be raised by the ecclesiastics and the urban communities, rather than be supplied by the barons. This could be seen as similar to the English *dona* that was also paid by the ecclesiastics and the burghers and in the one instance of 1165, this *dona* was used to pay for serjeants; rather than gathering forces as in Antioch, the English were raising money to buy an army.³⁷ These similarities to the payments recorded in England could point to the existence of the *arrière-ban* in England, either as something that traditionally existed, or was implemented by Henry II. These same services do not appear after the 1165 dividing line and may be due to

³⁶ For more on these, see Chapter 5.

³⁷ R. C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193*, Second Edition (Cambridge, 1995), 90-1.

the baronial dispute and the *Cartae Baronum*, which would indicate this was something that was Henry's invention and not traditional. In addition to this, Henry did institute the *Assize of Arms* in 1181 which saw the arming of every freeman.³⁸ These years, when the *arrière-ban* may have been called, may account for the scutages being at a higher rate than normal; the rules were probably different in a time of need, and the higher rate would encourage more men to serve than to commute (and those that did commute could actually pay for a replacement at the rate established by Round).

That the £1 or 1 mark rate was an established tradition, and the 2 mark rate occurred in times of emergency can be seen in some of the scutages raised by Henry II's sons. During Richard's time as king, the scutage collected was usually at the traditional £1 levy.³⁹ Of any time one would expect a levy to be higher than the standard, it would be during this period, as Richard was known to squeeze as much money as he could for the financing of the Crusade; never mind that even the aid levied for his ransom in 1194 was also at the £1 rate. However, Richard also had a treaty with Philip Augustus for most of his reign, thus eliminating one of the primary external threats to England. By John's reign, the scutage appears to have jumped back to the 2 mark rate. From the year 1199 until 1205, almost every year held a scutage at the 2 mark rate.⁴⁰ This would seem to be the indication that scutage rates

³⁸ *Select Charters*, 183-4. Of course, the *Assize of Arms* may have been a means to establish a militia to uphold the law, rather than act as a military force. Another theory is that Henry established the *Assize* in reaction to the crowning of Phillip Augustus as the King of France. J. Boussard, 'Les mercenaires au XIIe siècle: Henri II Plantagenet et les origines de l'armée métier,' *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 106, no. 2 (1946), 212.

³⁹ See Table 2. There is however an anomalous levy of 10s. in the year 1190. This obviously looks like a scutage at half the normal rate of £1, or possibly of $\frac{3}{4}$ of one mark. Perhaps what happened is not that Richard asked for a smaller amount, but that he only called into service half or one fourth of the knights to serve, and the others commuted their service. It is known that Richard had called such a fractional amount of service before from an example recorded by Jocelin of Brakelond, where Richard only called one tenth of the knights to serve overseas. Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle*, 85-6.

⁴⁰ See Table 2. The one exception in this case is in 1204 with a rate of 33s. 4d. This is either at a rate of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ marks or £1 and 1 mark. Why such a strange scutage was asked is unknown, but in 1204, John was making the financial preparations for a campaign to recover Normandy. Ralph V. Turner, *King*

Table 12
Percentages for Henry II's Scutages

Year	Rate	Total Due ⁴¹	Percentage Paid	Percentage Pardoned	Percentage Owed
1159	2 marks	£8960, 7s. 3d.	91%	5%	5%
1161	2 marks	£4699, 15s. 5d.	78%	15%	8%
1162	1 mark	£1035, 5s. 11d.	87%	8%	5%
1165	1 mark	£5430, 19s. 5d.	66%	13%	21%
1168	1 mark	£7289, 12s. 11d.	63%	4%	33%
					(1% From New)
1169	1 mark	£4482	56%	6%	37%
					(3% From New)
1172	£1	£3584, 12s. 6d.	68%	2%	30%
					(9% From New)
1187	£1	£2782, 9s. 7d.	74%	12%	15%
					(Including New)

had finally been raised, except that John was struggling to maintain his hold on Normandy. For almost the exact same years, 1198 to 1204, John had called the *arrière-ban* in Normandy, meaning that at the same time he was levying the English scutage believed to be representative of an *arrière-ban* in England, he was calling into force its French equivalent, no doubt to hold off Phillip Augustus.⁴²

Whether or not the 2 mark scutages and levying of the serjeants implies the calling of an English *arrière-ban*, there seems to be a clear break with the 1165 scutage payments in how successful Henry was in receiving the money owed. In 1159, one of the largest scutages, 91% of all the money owed was collected, and in 1162, 87% was collected, which is only slightly worse than 1159 because a larger percent of the 1162 scutage was pardoned. 1161 was worse than these two by only

John (London, 1994), 98. Perhaps these were two separate scutages then added together when recorded. It is really impossible to say, as the scutage rate is so unusual.

⁴¹ The variances in amount due are of course from both the changing rates that scutages were collected, and that these amounts were not collected on every knight fee each year. The decision of whether a knight provided his service or paid the scutage would depend on how much was then owed each year. The situation in England was slightly unique in that each man owed an allegiance to the king, not just his own lord who then owed fealty to the king. Because of this, each knight was considered responsible for his own scutage, and if that scutage was paid to his lord, but his lord failed to pay the king, the knight was not punished, only the lord. Similarly, if both failed to pay, both would lose their chattels to the amount owed. *Dialogus*, 166-9.

⁴² F.M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy, 1189-1204: Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire* (Manchester, 1913), 312.

collecting 78% of the money due, but again this was due to the aborted campaign and many of these payments being pardoned. In 1165 there is an obvious decline in collection success with only 66% paid in that year; 1168-9 becomes even worse with the percentage paid at 63% and 56% respectively, and the 1172 scutage which improves only slightly with 68% of the amount due collected. 1187 improves further, but again many of the lands that paid scutage were being held by the king in ward or escheat. Pardons seem to play a very small role in these collection numbers with the exception of 1161. This year has the highest percentage of pardoned scutage at 15%, but again was from an exceptional circumstance. Aside from 1161, the next highest percentage pardoned came in 1165 at 13%, but aside from these two instances, all the others are at 8% or below. It is clear then that the failure to collect the money in the later years is not due to the king simply giving up his rights.

It would appear that the events of 1165 did in fact create a change in Henry's successes in his scutage policy by his inability to collect as fully as he did in previous years. However, it has to be remembered that Henry and his barons' attitudes toward him were not the sole factors in the collection process. How successful the sheriffs were in collecting the payments certainly played some role in these numbers as well. Perhaps even the chancellor played an important role in getting the money required from the barons, as Thomas Becket was credited with the success of the 1159 scutage payment. Keeping in mind that the two 'successful' payments here recorded occurred when Becket was the chancellor, and the remainder after he succeeded to the archbishopric could point to his having an influence as well. It is most likely that all three of these factors (the barons' attitudes, the sheriffs' work ethic and the role of the chancellor) came into play when scutage payments were collected.

There does not appear to be a clear pattern of any one particular county being more or less proficient in collecting its scutages than others.⁴³ Instead most of the counties seem to follow the general trend for the whole country: much success before 1165, but then a decline in the amounts paid after this date. In at least one instance, the scutage for 1172, the amounts paid at first glance appear good throughout most of the counties, with many accounting for 80% to mid-90% of their payments, but the overall figures are driven lower by the neglect of Earl Reginald of Cornwall who failed to pay the £215 6s. 8d. he owed.⁴⁴ Even without this, there are plenty of counties only collecting 60-70% (and even Dorset, which only collected 50%) that one could not justify calling 1172 a success in payments.

In some cases the success or failure of payments is due merely to the amount that is owed in that county. In many cases the richer counties such as Yorkshire and the combined counties of Norfolk and Suffolk do a very poor job in collecting the amount they owe, whereas some of the areas that owe less, such as Berkshire or Northumberland, tend to pay a greater percent. This can be taken not as a sign of neglect on the sheriff's part for collecting scutage or as neglect on the tenant-in-chief's part, but rather as a reflection of a normal economic situation: the more one owes, the more difficult it is to pay it.

It cannot be reckoned that payments made in one county are an exact reflection of the knights who owe service in that county. The payments being made are done so by earls, barons and other tenants-in-chief, some of whom owe knights in many different counties. The records that are presented here are merely which county received the payment for these knights. William, Earl of Gloucester is a useful example of this when his payments were recorded for the 1168 aid.

⁴³ For a breakdown of scutage payments by county, see Appendix 2.

⁴⁴ *P.R. 18 Henry II*, 102.

According to the *Cartae Baronum*, William had a total of 22 and $\frac{5}{6}$ knight fees recorded in the county of Kent, and all his other fees were recorded in a separate return in the *Cartae*. In the 1168 Pipe Roll, the earl has nothing recorded under the county of Kent, but has 266 and $\frac{1}{2}$ marks paid on old fees in Gloucestershire. As the rate for the aid was a 1 mark per knight fee, this should then total 266 and $\frac{1}{2}$ knight fees, but William's return for his fees outside of Kent only total 255 fees. Due to the discrepancy, some of the Kent fees must have been paid for in Gloucestershire (266.5 knights paid in Gloucestershire – 255 knights outside of Kent = 11.5 knights presumably recorded in Kent in 1166, but paid for in Gloucestershire in 1168).⁴⁵ Additionally, the practice of paying for a fee in different counties can be seen by comparing the owed amounts for the new fees created when recorded in 1168 and 1169. Between these two Pipe Rolls, the only counties to contain the exact same amount owed for new fees in 1169 as in 1168 are Northumberland, Hampshire, Berkshire, Oxfordshire and Kent, which shows that some of the new fees must have been recorded in a different county in 1169 than 1168. Some of the Pipe Rolls record the occurrence of fees being paid in different counties. One such example comes from the 1161 Pipe Roll where 33*s.* 4*d.* are recorded in Warwickshire & Leicestershire as being *remanent* in Staffordshire, and indeed if one looks at the Staffordshire roll there is a separate recording of 33*s.* 4*d.*⁴⁶

The ability to pay for fees in different counties other than the county to which the fee belonged means that one cannot ascertain where exactly a campaign took place based on how large a scutage that county paid. Perhaps analyzing how *little* a

⁴⁵ Some of William's fees are unaccounted for, and this is either due to their being paid in another region than those described, or perhaps there were payment concessions made to some of these knights. William's 13 and $\frac{1}{2}$ new fees appear to be unaccounted for here, but again could have been paid for in another county. *RBE*, 189-90, 288-92 ; *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 39.

⁴⁶ *P.R. 7 Henry II*, 46 for Warwickshire & Leicestershire, 41 for Staffordshire. In this case the amount being paid elsewhere is for a military *dona*, and not a regular scutage, but the principle is the same.

county pays would be appropriate (as verified by the many expeditions to Wales where the bordering counties pay little to no scutage at all), but to say that the reason the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk commuted so *much* of their service into scutage was because Wales was too far away for the knights to make the journey is inappropriate. After all, if this were the case then we should expect to see a very large scutage in these counties in 1172, as Ireland is arguably much further than Wales when starting in East Anglia (although perhaps easier to access since they would be forced to go by sea anyway), but this is the year Norfolk and Suffolk pay one of their lowest scutages at £121.⁴⁷

It is through scutage payments that one can see how a tenant-in-chief could find over-enfeoffing his *servicia debita* to be financially expedient. If the king asked for a scutage, the baron or tenant-in-chief could then collect this scutage on all of his enfeoffed knights, and only pay to the king the scutage for his *servicia debita*. At times this practice was challenged, and a very good example comes from Bury St. Edmunds. In the late twelfth century, the knights of Bury expressed their displeasure at having to provide their full scutage when the abbot had over-enfeoffed his *servicium debitum* by 12 ½ knight fees. The knights felt the scutage should be spread equally among them, so that they would not have to pay the full scutage, nor would the abbot be able to pocket the difference. In this instance, the knights of Bury failed in their objective, but the practice of equally spreading a scutage payment amongst all the enfeoffed knights was adopted in Normandy.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Norfolk and Suffolk did pay an even lower scutage of £66 in 1162 for the expedition to Wales in 1163, which further illustrates the point that the distance from a campaign does not necessarily equate a higher commutation.

⁴⁸ *Military Organization*, 202, n. 3 ; Jocelin of Brakelond, 66-7.

Normandy and the Italian Adohamentum

Since few Pipe Rolls survive for Normandy, other sources must be looked at to gain an idea of how the commutation of service worked there. Unfortunately, there are few documents that provide this, aside from the odd charter saying knights can serve by making a money payment.⁴⁹ However, the 1133 survey of the Bayeux knights does give a specific mention to the commutation of service (although it is not called scutage by name). For the ten best knights to serve the king of France, their commutation was 20 *sous* of the money of Rouen. The knights that serve the duke however pay 40 *sous* of the money of Rouen, and these are not expected to be his 'best knights' as are those given to the king.⁵⁰ There is evidence that for a period of time after the Bayeux survey and before the *Infeudationes Militum* of 1172 that the money of Rouen could be exchanged with the English pound sterling at the rate of 40 *sous* to a single pound.⁵¹ If this rate is similar and had not fluctuated since the time of the Bayeux survey, then the bishop would have been able to commute his knights' service to the duke at one of the same 'traditional' rates as used in England: £1.⁵²

The differences in what the bishop pays the duke and what he pays the king appears to be a peculiar arrangement. It is a little difficult to understand why the king, who is expected to have the bishop's 'best knights' would expect less of a commutation than the duke; particularly at half the rate. If the bishop were not serving the king directly, but only providing men or commuting service through the

⁴⁹ *Military Organization*, 202.

⁵⁰ *RBE*, 646-7.

⁵¹ Peter Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange*, (London, 1986), 206.

⁵² This, however, does not coincide with the lone entry in the Henry I Pipe Roll of 1130 which shows a scutage payment being at a rate of 30s. (as determined through calculations of the fees of Ely). *P.R. 31 Henry I*, 44. However, this payment in the Pipe Roll could have been for a longer service period than the traditional 40 days. Hollister suggests that this was for a two month service period, which would then make the two payments equal if based on time period: 10s. for every 20 days would mean £1 for a forty day period for the knights of Bayeux (or 40 *sous* of Rouen as the case may be) and 30s. for a two month or 60 day period for the knights in England. *Military Organization*, 93 and Hollister, 'Significance of Scutage Rates,' 582-3. Hollister's argument is based on the misunderstanding of a document showing a 60 day service period, and so should be taken with caution.

duke, this could have interesting implications for the relationship between service via sub-infeudation practices; i.e. the duke collects twice as much from commutation than he pays to the king. This however is not the case since the survey is stating that the bishops owe both the king and the duke, not the king through the duke.

For the *regno* of southern Italy, there was no scutage as practiced in England, but there was something similar that was called *adohamentum*. This military payment was not a commutation of service as scutage was, instead it was a levy on knight fees when service was *not* called, in effect making it more synonymous with an *auxilium* rather than a scutage.⁵³ Frederick II eventually began asking for the payment on a yearly basis when he did not levy his armies because no military service was requested.⁵⁴ Essentially, the king could ask for money instead of service, but a knight could not offer a money payment instead of serving. One exception may be the tenants who did not contribute any feudal service under normal circumstances, but only contributed to the *magna expeditio*. In this case, those who did not provide regular knight service are said to contribute to the *auxilium magne expeditionis* as opposed to the feudal tenants who obtained knights *pro augmento*.⁵⁵ A case in point is the Abbot of Montecasino who obtained 40 knights and 200 serjeants for the *magna expeditio*, but nothing is said of the *augmento* which is the usual wording.⁵⁶ This may suggest that while the abbot is charged for these soldiers, he is not actually providing them since they are not listed as *augmentum* knights and serjeants. Others include the Bishop of Capaccio and the Elector Muro Lucano,⁵⁷ however there are

⁵³ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 6. *Adohamentum* was not in regular practice during the mid twelfth century, however there is one instance of a pecuniary feudal aid levied in Sicily in 1159. Ibid., 37-8, n. 3. In a recent work, Loud twice offhandedly accepts that scutage existed in southern Italy, providing no proof other than its practice in England. Loud, *The Latin Church*, 347, 354-5.

⁵⁴ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 37.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 10.

⁵⁶ *Catalogus*, 150, ¶823.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 93, ¶491, ¶490 respectively.

generous examples of tenants-in-chief who only list villeins, but still obtain at least one knight for the *augmento*.⁵⁸

Most of the evidence for the existence of *adohamentum* comes from Frederick II's time. The term appears twice in Norman sources; the first is actually in the *Catalogus Baronum*. In this instance, *adohamentum* was likely a mistake by the Angevin scribe who put it in the regular place of the word *augmento*.⁵⁹ The second comes from the acts of the monastery of Cava, and according to Cahen is of questionable authenticity.⁶⁰ Without a reliable appearance of the term *adohamentum* in the early Norman period of control, it is hard to argue that such an institution as a tax in lieu of service existed, but there is at least one hint to such a thing in the records of the church of San Maria di Messina. In an 1159 settlement between Robert Brittum and Gisulf de Siclis concerning the ownership of certain villeins, a small sense of their service is shown. In this settlement, Robert is to make a payment of '*exfortium*' whenever the other barons go to court to pay their own *exfortium*. Robert's payment is "*bisantios duos, septem taren(orum) per bisantium*" and he is to pay another two '*bisantium*' if the barons' *exfortium* is doubled, but if their *exfortium* is to be less, his is to be less by the same reckoning.⁶¹ The term *exfortium* has no clear definition, but it appears to be a payment for service, and the inclusion of 'the other barons' having to make this same payment implies it is of a military nature. That the circumstances under which Robert is to pay is based on a normal rate, and then more if that rate for the barons is doubled, could suggest this being an indication of a type of commutation for the *augmentum* since those numbers are so clearly

⁵⁸ A case in point would be for the three tenants-in-chief in Palomonte (Salerno), *Catalogus*, 113, ¶627-9.

⁵⁹ Ibid., ¶822 ; Jamison, 'Additional Work' 38.

⁶⁰ *Le Régime Féodal*, 75.

⁶¹ *Les Actes Latins de S. Maria di Messina (1103-1250)*, Léon-Robert Ménager (ed.), Instituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neollenici, Testi e Monumenti, Testi 9 (Palermo, 1963), cap. 7, 92-3.

double the normal service owed. However, the *augmentum* knights are obtained in addition to the normal owed service, so for this payment to be parallel, it would probably have to be triple the normal rate, rather than double. It must also be taken into account that in the settlement, the case of the barons having to pay a fraction of the base rate also suggests that this was not a payment to replace a man's service with a mercenary at equal pay, as a scutage in England was supposed to be. The indication is that this payment was more arbitrarily assigned based on the king's whim, but does have a traditional base that can either be doubled or reduced at will.

The wording in the settlement seems to suggest that a single incident of this payment was to occur which is when Robert was to make his payment. However, since the judges of the case had the foresight to establish conditions for Robert's payment based on a changing rate, suggests that this was either a regular payment of sorts, or it was a payment that had occurred with enough frequency to plan for the somewhat arbitrariness of it. Since the language concerning the other barons is unclear as to how many other barons, it is difficult to determine if the *exfortium* payment is actually analogous to *adohamentum* (where all the barons would pay), or if it was more like *scutage*, and the 'other barons' were those that simply could not serve.

There must have been some institution in place to accommodate those who could not serve for the reasons of sickness, old age, or if the lord of the fee held it in his minority or was a woman, and it is most likely that *adohamentum* covered these eventualities as well.⁶² The *Catalogus* provides instances where there are women who held fees, as well as men who have recently inherited (but whose minority status

⁶² *Le Régime Féodal*, 76.

is unknown).⁶³ In Frederick II's reign, there is specific mention of men being too old or sick to perform their service being allowed to pay *adohamentum* (by that name) and a widow who was also allowed to pay *adohamentum* instead of serving.⁶⁴ It is likely this was the same case in the twelfth century under the Normans, but there is no hard evidence for it. In one of Frederick II's attempts to reorganize feudal service, he gave instructions that poor feudatories of less than 10 villeins (but not knight fees), would also pay *adohamentum*.⁶⁵ This could be the case in the Norman period since many of the poor fees listed in the *Catalogus* say that the tenant-in-chief will personally serve in the *magna expeditio*, but since such references to normal feudal service are not provided, it is difficult to tell whether he would serve regularly or pay *adohamentum*.⁶⁶

In addition to *adohamentum*, there were conditions in the 13th century where aids or *auxilium* could be extracted from the knights. The *Liber Augustalis* lays out under what conditions lords may take aids from their subjects. These first four cases were established in the time of either King William I or William II of Sicily, and include raising money to ransom the king/emperor, knighting one's son, buying land for the service of the king's army, and hosting the king.⁶⁷ To these, Frederick II added that an aid could be taken for knighting one's brother, and that any younger brother may demand to be knighted by his older brother.⁶⁸ The first two of these are obviously similar to the aids that may be taken in England, but the latter three appear to be strictly Italian. It must be remembered, that the basis for the aids established in

⁶³ *Catalogus*, ¶71, ¶104. In this case, a note is entered saying Rahul has taken over for his father, instead of Rahul attesting to the lands himself, which suggests that he may have been in his minority.

⁶⁴ *Acta Imperii Inedita Seculi XIII. Urkunden und briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Königreichs Sicilien in den Jahren 1198 bis 1273*, Eduard Winkelmann (ed.) (Innsbruck, 1880), 610-11, no. 775; 677, no. 891.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 701, no. 924.

⁶⁶ *Catalogus*, ¶106, ¶123, ¶858, ¶870, ¶884, ¶887, ¶936, ¶¶939-45, ¶¶948-50, ¶¶952-3, ¶¶975-7, ¶990.

⁶⁷ *Liber Augustalis*, Bk 3, title xx, 116.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Bk 3, title xxi, 116-17.

England survive chiefly from Magna Carta, and that there was a difference in objectives between these two documents. Magna Carta was establishing what the king could and could not do, whereas the *Liber Augustalis* is a collection of laws directed towards the king's subjects. Evidence of these latter reasons for collecting aids given in the *Liber Augustalis* do not exist in England so it cannot be said that aids were called by lords to cover these events, but it is not unreasonable to think that this was a possibility.

While the Italian *adohamentum* does not appear to be similar to the scutage of England, there are other feudal payments that are. As already stated, the *auxilium* occasions listed in the *Liber Augustalis* bear a striking resemblance to the occasions given in Magna Carta. The mysterious *exfortium* of San Maria di Messina, if a commutation of service similar to scutage, gives an example of a different Norman area able to specifically double a commutation, similar to the 2 mark scutages of England. Though Italy and Normandy have little to offer in the discussion of commutation, the information gathered from English scutage payments are invaluable for determining many other military factors for England. The success of the monarchy in collecting these payments has already been used as a gauge to measure baronial content and discontent in Henry II's reign. Scutage payments will later be used to determine the number of enfeoffed knights serving in the king's army, but first a discussion is needed on how the collected money was actually used.

Chapter 4

Knights' Pay and Wages

Money Payments

While scutage payments show one means that the rulers of England could gain an income from military exploits, how this and other monies were spent is perhaps a more important indication of the military realities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. A statement by Richard fitz Nigel has been quoted many times in conjunction with scutage: that the king collects a scutage to pay knights, “for the prince prefers to expose mercenaries (*stipendarios*), rather than his own people (*domesticos*), to the hazards of war.”¹ It is difficult to see direct evidence of this practice happening in twelfth-century England, mostly because of the lack of records for the expenditures of the royal household. The collecting of scutage is widely recorded in the Pipe Rolls, but the payment of *stipendarios* is not as prolific. When scutages were collected they were always recorded as being paid into the treasury and never stated as being used for a certain purpose. This is usually the case with most income entries in the Pipe Rolls, but when an occasional large project occurs, payments of fines can be stated as being sent towards that project (such as the building of Dover Castle in the 1180s). While it is assumed that the majority of payments for knights came from the account of the royal household, the Pipe Rolls in England do offer many instances of payments doled out to knights and serjeants and for other military purposes.

¹ *Dialogus*, 80-81.

What has been attempted here is a survey of all the military expenditures recorded in the counties of Shropshire and Kent from the earliest Pipe Roll records, until the end of the reign of King John.² While fitz Nigel's statement has been translated many times as being a payments for mercenaries, the argument of what makes a mercenary, whether he be simply a knight who served for wages, or if he be a foreign knight (as suggested by fitz Nigel by distinguishing the *stipendarios* from the *domesticos*), or any other of a number of permutations, holds little bearing on the current investigation. What is important here, is that money was being spent on knights and serjeants, along with many other types of soldiers and building projects of a military nature. Wages for knights and serjeants have been calculated when enough evidence is available or reasonable suppositions can be made,³ as this can also help with determining the amount of time soldiers served if that has not been given, and can be used to compare the amount being paid to knights versus the amount raised by scutage payments. The time period covered allows a chance for patterns in payments to emerge, and to see if there is any trend of a growing use of paid soldiers, which may suggest a decrease in the use of enfeoffed knights in war.

To begin this survey of expenditures, it is perhaps best to start with the soldiers who have the most consistent pay throughout the time period in question, and that is the porters and watchmen employed in castles. To begin in Shropshire, the porter for Bridgenorth received payments of £1 10s. 5d. This payment is so regular and consistent, that it is safe to assume that it was for a year long term. The amount comes to 365d., or the payment of 1d. a day. The porter and watchman for

² See Appendix 3. To have done a survey of the whole of the kingdom would have been beyond the scope of the present exercise. The focus on two border counties has been pursued in the thought that they would be more likely to have records of military expenditure due to their proximity to areas of conflict.

³ See Appendix 4.

Table 13
Payments in Kent for Porters and Watchmen

Year	Payment	Daily Wage	Number of Men	Service Period
1160-61	£2 10s. 10d.	(1d.)	1 Watchman, 1 Porter	(305 days)
1161-62	£6 1s. 4d.	(> 1d.)	2 Watchmen, 1 Porter	(365 days)
1162-63	£6 8d.	(2d.)	3 Watchmen, 1 Porter	174 days
1164-65 through 1215	£6 1s. 8d.	(1d.)	(4)	(365 days)
1181-82	£1 12s. 6d.	(>1d.)	1 Watchman, 1 Porter	Half a year

Shrewsbury castle are also consistently paid £3 10d. every year, or double the amount from Bridgenorth, which suggests they were both equally paid 1d. a day.

A regular payment for porters and watchmen does not occur in the county of Kent until the exchequer year of 1164-65. Beginning this year, there is a payment of £6 1s. 8d. that lasts through John's reign. The number of men serving in these capacities is not given, but if the examples of Bridgenorth and Shrewsbury are followed, the amount at Dover does divide evenly into four men being paid 1d. a day for a whole year. Before 1164-65, there are three instances in which the number of watchmen and porters are given. 1160-61 has £2 10s. 10d. paid to just 1 watchman and 1 porter. If the 1d. a day wage were retained, these men would have only served 305 days, or if they did serve a full year, they were only paid 0.84d. a day, which would have been a troublesome amount to cut out of a single penny. In 1161-62, 2 watchmen and 1 porter were paid £6 1s. 4d. which comes to each man receiving 485 $\frac{1}{3}$ d., or more than a penny a day.⁴ In 1162-63, £6 8d. was then paid to 3 watchmen

⁴ If the amount paid were used at a rate of 1d. a day and the number of men serving ignored, it comes to only 4d. short of providing for 4 men. If such a fraction of a penny were possible to spend, this could be an indication that the number of men serving as watchmen and porters at Dover were also 2 watchmen and 1 porter, since these two payments are so similar. As it is, there is no indication in this year that the 2 watchmen and 1 porter listed were serving at Dover, and there seems to be no way to reconcile the numbers.

and 1 porter, but this was only for a term of 174 days (or essentially half a year).⁵ The only other indication of a service period for these men is also for half a year, occurring in 1181-82. Both a watchman and a porter were added to the guard of Dover castle, and paid a total of £1 12s. 6d., meaning each man received 195d.; slightly more than 1d. a day.

In any case, while there may be some strong indications that the porters and watchmen were being paid at a rate of 1d. a day, they are all based on an assumption of one kind or another. The only hard evidence of a rate of pay comes from the lone entry in Dover that gives the exact number of men serving, and the period that they served: 3 watchmen and 1 porter, serving 174 days at the cost of £6 8d. for a wage of 2d. a day. Many times, the wages of the watchmen and porters are included in a total sum with knights and serjeants, so if some rate of pay can be established by these regular and consistently made payments, then perhaps a similar rate can be found for knights and serjeants.

There is actually little evidence of payments to knights in the county records of the Pipe Rolls when compared to the amount of evidence that is provided for serjeants. The number of entries for serjeants in these two counties is almost double the number of entries for knights, giving a much clearer picture of the way serjeants were used and paid. This leaning of entries towards serjeants is due mostly to the very large numbers presented in Shropshire, and this is no doubt a further indication of their usefulness in campaigns into Wales as utilized by Henry II in his great expedition of 1165. In Kent, the entries for knights actually outnumber those of serjeants, but there are so few compared to the numbers provided by Shropshire, that

⁵ The roll specifically says that these four men were to serve the same time as 7 knights, who were to serve from the nearest Tuesday after the feast of St. Michael through Easter day. The dates for these would have been 2 October 1162 until 24 March 1163, or 174 days. The calculations do not come together cleanly, but it seems the gist of the entry is that these men were actually being paid 2d. a day for about half a year.

they make little difference statistically. Regardless, the evidence for serjeants presents a form of hierarchy in payment for them, which knights' pay also fits in a rather uniform way.

It is difficult to say for certain what type of hierarchy existed in the early twelfth century or even earlier based on the pay soldiers received, but there seems to be a clear pattern by the later twelfth century, and certainly during the reign of Richard I. At this time, knights are almost consistently paid at 1*s.* a day, or to ease the comparison, at 12*d.* per day. Serjeants in the thirteenth century were usually considered to be equivalent to half a knight, and this is reflected here with mounted serjeants who owned 2 horses being paid at a rate of 6*d.* per day. There are then serjeants who only owned 1 horse who were paid at a rate of 4*d.* per day, and those who were specifically mentioned as foot serjeants or as being on foot, who received a wage of 2*d.* per day. There is one mention of captains of serjeants who received the pay of 10*d.* per day, and thus fit nicely in the hierarchy. There is also another wage that is a little more difficult to discern. There are many instances where the term 'serjeant' is used without any indication of being on foot or mounted. These serjeants appear to be paid at less than a penny a day, but no fixed rate can be discerned, and it could be these men were a body of soldiers who simply agreed to serve for a predetermined lump-sum payment, and not for a daily wage.⁶

⁶ A similar hierarchical pattern can be seen to continue into the fourteenth century. Round calculated that at the siege of Calais, archers were paid 3*d.* a day, horse archers 6*d.*, squires 1*s.*, knights 2*s.* and bannerets 4*s.* Round, 'Castle Guard,' 148.

Table 14

Hierarchy of Pay for Knights and Serjeants in the Reign of Richard I

Wages per Day	Rank	Fractional Value
12d.	Knight	1
10d.	Serjeants' Captain	$\frac{5}{6}$
6d.	Serjeant with 2 Horses	$\frac{1}{2}$
4d.	Serjeant with 1 Horse	$\frac{1}{3}$
2d.	Foot Serjeant	$\frac{1}{6}$
< 1d.	Serjeant	< $\frac{1}{12}$

There are several indications from earlier in Henry II's reign that knights were paid at a rate of 8d. a day, and serjeants at just 1d. a day. The year 1161-62 gives an example of both these rates in the county of Kent, with £84 18s. 8d. being paid to 7 'paid knights' for the whole year, and £30 6s. 8d. paid to 20 serjeants for the whole year.⁷ If the year is calculated at 364 days, then the knights each received 8d. a day and the serjeants received 1d. Starting in 1169-70, 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry were paid £36 10s. for two years service, and £18 5s. each year for another four years. Since this equals a consistent pay of £18 5s. for 6 years, it is safe to assume this is payment for a whole year. Once the watchmen and porters pay are taken out (£6 1s. 8d. for four men at 1d. a day for 365 days), the amount left for the knight is £12 3s. 4d. or 8d. a day for 365 days. Oswestry also had a regular payment for 20 serjeants in this same time period. They were paid £30 8s. 4d. a year at a rate of 1d. a day.

The rate of 8d. a day for a knight and 1d. a day for a serjeant may not be the only pay rates in the mid twelfth century. There is a payment for 7 knights in Kent from the Tuesday after the Feast of St. Michael through to Easter day (174 days) in 1162-63.⁸ In this entry, the knights were paid a total of £29 17s. 4d. or £4 5s. 4d. each at a rate of 6d. a day. There is no indication that these knights were somehow inferior to the other knights who were paid at 8d. a day, as is the case with the clear

⁷ *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 53.

⁸ *P.R. 9 Henry II*, 69.

hierarchy in Richard's reign. There is one instance outside Shropshire or Kent where 60 knights appear to have been paid 12*d.* a day in Henry's 1165 expedition to Wales, and several indications that knights were also paid 12*d.* a day in 1173-74.⁹ There were also 20 serjeants who served this same 174 day period who were paid less than the usual 1*d.* a day. Unlike the knights, these serjeants appear to have received a pay of 1 mark apiece, which suggests that rather than their pay being calculated on a daily basis, they simply agreed to work for the pay of a mark.

The porter and watchmen at Bridgenorth and Shrewsbury castles maintain the same rate of pay (1*d.* per day) from Henry II's reign all the way through John's.¹⁰ It appears, however, that the rate of pay for knights and serjeants increases. The example of Oswestry would indicate that knights in the mid twelfth century were being paid at a rate of 8*d.* a day, whereas in the later twelfth century, they were clearly stated as being paid at a rate of 12*d.* a day. This increase in payment has been connected to the English inflation in the late twelfth century that surrounds the increase in the price of crops and other goods.¹¹

⁹ Paul Latimer, 'Wages in Late Twelfth- and Early Thirteenth Century England,' *Haskins Society Journal*, C.P. Lewis (ed.), 9 (Woodbridge, 1997), 203; *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 2. The entry for 1165 should be considered exceptional not only because of the major military effort they were a part of, but that the 60 men and 300 serjeants were serving with Earl Reginald of Cornwall, the uncle of Henry II. Reginald had a tendency of getting preferential treatment from Henry, and this looks to be a similar situation. Reginald paid a very small amount of scutage when compared to the other men of his station which suggests he was serving, and the knights paid here by the king may very well represent the Earl's own *servicium debitum*. His return in the Red Book of the Exchequer says that he has 215 fees. If the 60 knights paid here are taken out, that leaves Reginald with 155 fees left to serve, which may be accounted for with the 300 serjeants. If a serjeant were considered half a knight at this time as in later times, the 155 knights left would need 310 serjeants to make up for their absence. The numbers Reginald provided are not exact, but curiously close. It should be noted that this entry is appended to the *combustiones* of the roll, which is an indication that this payment came from the king's treasury (as well as it being stated on the roll). *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 2, 79; *RBE*, 261-2; *Feudal Assessment*, 28. The knights paid 12*d.* a day in 1173-4 can be found in Round, 'Castle Guard,' 148; *P.R. 20 Henry II*, 34, 63, 67, 96, 125, 138.

¹⁰ There is a point in John's reign where the Pipe Roll begins listing Bridgenorth castle as paying both a porter and watchmen with the same amount of money they were previously using just to pay a porter. This is either an oversight on the entries, or the amount of money being paid was no longer a reflection of what it was being spent on at the castle, and had simply become tradition.

¹¹ P.D.A. Harvey, 'The English Inflation of 1180-1220,' *Past & Present*, 61 (1973), 13-14, 16-17.

In P.D.A. Harvey's article on the late twelfth century inflation, he states that knights' wages tripled, from 8*d.* a day to 24*d.* a day, in line with the same rate of increase for the price of corn, livestock, and 'other goods.'¹² Harvey was careful enough to acknowledge that the increase in soldiers' wages may be a product of more expensive equipment necessary for a soldier, and that they had the ability to negotiate a higher pay for themselves to accommodate for the rising cost of living.¹³ This concept of negotiating the price is key. If knights were not negotiating price, then their pay would have either remained constant due to tradition and would have been unaffected by the devaluation of the bullion (as suggested by Latimer),¹⁴ or it would have grown incrementally if there was a devaluation of coin due to an influx of silver (as Harvey speculated).¹⁵ As it is, there appears to be a jump from 8*d.* a day to 12*d.*, then a doubling of that to 24*d.*: a rise in wages, but a non-incremental one. It is difficult to attribute mere inflation for the cause of rising pay rates, due to the fact that the pay for porters and watchmen appear to remain constant from Henry II's reign all the way through John's.¹⁶ The watchmen and porters are, of course, a regular payment made by the king and may not have been as subject to pay negotiations as the other paid soldiers. However, if payment were subject solely to negotiation, then surely these patterns of wages could not be seen, and the remunerations that are recorded would be a jumble; a reflection of the paid soldiers fighting to receive whatever amount they could haggle for. Other forces may be

¹² Ibid., 3-4, 13-14. The wage of 24*d.* a day has not been revealed in this study of just the counties of Shropshire and Kent, but it was found by Latimer, 'Wages,' 203. Latimer's sources appear to be for the final year of John's reign, suggesting that the pay rate had just doubled at the end.

¹³ Harvey, 'The English Inflation,' 16.

¹⁴ Paul Latimer, 'The English Inflation of 1180-1220 Reconsidered,' *Past & Present*, 171 (2001), 14.

¹⁵ Harvey, 'The English Inflation,' 27-9.

¹⁶ It is only in the 1220s when porters and watchmen receive an increase, in most cases to 2*d.* a day. Latimer, 'Wages,' 193.

responsible, and it is hard to ignore that an increase in pay may simply be at the whim of the king.¹⁷

When exactly the increase in payments occurs is difficult to pinpoint. The rate of 8*d.* a day for a knight seems to only occur in Henry II's reign, whereas the rate of 1*s.* a day is found in Richard's reign. From this two county sample of Shropshire and Kent, there are only three indications of pay associated with a number of men and a service period to give an indication of pay rates in John's reign. In the very first exchequer year of John's reign, £2 10*s.* was paid to 10 horse serjeants in Kent for 15 days.¹⁸ These men would have been paid 4*d.* a day, suggesting they only had one horse each according to the hierarchy established for Richard's reign. In this case, there seems to be no indication of a change with a new ruler, but Richard died halfway through the exchequer year, so this could still be an indication of the workings of his reign. The other two entries where a rate of pay is possible to discern occur in Shropshire in 1211-12. In this year, £7 17*s.* 6*d.* was paid to 300 serjeants for 3 days, and £8 8*s.* was paid to 120 serjeants for 8 days.¹⁹ Both of these payments are written down as these exact sums, and should thus reflect the payment of individuals, and not necessarily a rounded sum, which could indicate a negotiated contract. If the numbers provided are to be believed, these men were being paid a little over 2*d.* a day: 2.1 to be exact. Since 2.1*d.* a day was not a possible amount to pay, then perhaps the very even number of serjeants serving can be questioned. Should those numbers be ignored and the amount calculated at 2*d.* a day (as in Richard's reign), the £7 17*s.* 6*d.* for 3 days would actually cover 315 foot serjeants (instead of 300), and the £8 8*s.* for 8 days would cover 126 foot serjeants

¹⁷ There is evidence that John's court made the decision in 1216 that a serjeant's pay was to be 3*d.* a day, showing that the king did have a hand in dictating pay. Latimer, 'Wages,' 199; *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, Thomas Duffus Hardy (ed.), 1 (1833), 250.

¹⁸ *P.R. 1 John*, 60.

¹⁹ *P.R. 14 John*, 87-8.

(instead of 120). Both these numbers of men are a possibility, but are again based on an assumption from the explicit rates given in Richard's reign. While it is difficult to conclude from the Pipe Rolls of Shropshire and Kent that there was any rate increase in John's reign, there does appear to be a decision made late in his reign to raise a foot serjeants pay from 2*d.* a day to 3*d.*, but this has not been revealed in these counties.²⁰

While there are clear increases at some point in the reigns of Richard and John, there is also a wage increase shown in the 1170s in Henry II's reign. In 1172-73, £4 was paid to 80 foot serjeants for 6 days, giving a rate of pay of 2*d.* a day, much like the table above. This payment occurs at the same time the 20 serjeants serving at Oswestry were being paid 1*d.* a day, meaning either this is the first indication of the foot serjeants being a separate distinction from a plain serjeant, or raising pay rates cannot be viewed as a universal occurrence, but was something that happened in individual instances. To back up the latter suggestion, these serjeants who were paid at a rate of 2*d.* a day were sent across the sea to serve the king, no doubt in the expedition to Ireland, whereas the other serjeants recorded at this time have always been associated with a castle: different circumstances, possibly indicating a different pay.²¹ This same year also has a payment of £9 13*s.* 8*d.* for

²⁰ *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, vol. 1, 250.

²¹ *P.R. 19 Henry II*, 108. Latimer attempts to explain these serjeants' higher wage by suggesting they were mounted, but there is no indication of this given in this entry. He does find an instance in the same year that specifically mentioned mounted serjeants, and while he figures their rate to be 2*d.* a day, the calculation comes out to being slightly more than that at an uneven number in both instances, and even includes examples where the pay may have been at 2 ½*d.* or 3*d.* a day. Latimer, 'Wages,' 199-200; *P.R. 19 Henry II*, 97, 101-2. The next chronological reference in this survey where serjeants fall into the hierarchy of pay table given above occurs in 1186-87. In this year, all the men were also recorded as travelling somewhere to serve the king, and not simply being stationed in a castle. *P.R. 33 Henry II*, 63. In between the two times, there are several records of serjeants both stationed at castles, and travelling, but no indication of pay rates are given, so whether these men are actually being paid more to serve abroad or on the move rather than those who are stationary is impossible to prove. The payments of 2*d.* a day for foot serjeants in 1172-73 could potentially be the first indication of a pay raise. Latimer does not believe that there is the possibility of serjeants still being paid 1*d.* a day by 1184-5 by two entries found in the county of Glamorgan. In the first entry, 26 serjeants with a horse and 220 foot serjeants are paid £32 15*s.* 10*d.* for 25 days of service. If the foot serjeants alone were

330 serjeants for 8 days (less than a penny a day). On top of this, the same 330 serjeants plus an additional 100 serjeants received the pay of £24 10s. for another 15 days.²² Of those 100 extra serjeants, four of them are listed as being equipped with a leather cuirass. The numbers of the serjeants do not work out to any even or sensible result for daily wages, but the fact that the four men who were equipped with a leather cuirass is mentioned, indicate that they were being considered for a different amount of pay, most likely above that which the other lesser equipped serjeants were earning.

While a demographic explanation has been ruled out as a force behind the inflation of the late twelfth century, it may still have some affect on the rise of soldier's wages at the same time.²³ Contrary to the demographic argument of an influx of people causing a rise in prices of goods, perhaps a lack of soldiers was causing a rise in wages. Latimer found evidence of knights being paid at 12*d.* a day during the revolt of Henry the Young King, and this may be another indication that rates were rising at this time.²⁴ The event of a rebellion would certainly have caused a decline in fighting men available since the king was fighting his own, he would not be able to call upon the full force of his men, and must look for outside help. The serjeants mentioned above receiving a 2*d.* rate may also have been the beneficiaries of a lack of fighting men available. The expedition to Ireland saw lower service levels by those who owed knights to the king than for previous expeditions in 1161

paid 2*d.* a day, they would command a higher price than that paid. The numbers do not add up cleanly and evenly in any way, but the irregular sum does not suggest that it is a lump-sum payment. The other entry does not contain the necessary elements to calculate a wage (there are two possible entries, both give the amount paid, but one gives the number of men serving but not the service period, the other entry the service period, but not the number of men paid). Latimer, 'Wages,' 199 ; *P.R. 31 Henry II*, 5, 7.

²² *P.R. 19 Henry II*, 107.

²³ Latimer, 'The English Inflation Reconsidered,' 9-10.

²⁴ Latimer, 'Wages,' 203. There were few instances before the 1170s where knights were paid 12*d.* a day, and those are the knights who served with Earl Reginald mentioned above, and also in *P.R. 19 Henry II*, 20.

and 1162: about 1,400 men fewer.²⁵ If these serjeants were in fact serving in Ireland as suggested by their Pipe Roll entry, their higher pay may be from Henry's inability to muster as many knights as previous expeditions, and having to agree to pay higher wages in order to get the force he deemed necessary to travel to Ireland. This may also explain why there are other serjeants in this year who are still being paid the 1*d.* a day rate.

The 1180s have more of these rates in line with the hierarchy. 1186-87 saw more men being paid at a higher rate than previously in Henry's reign. 250 foot serjeants were paid £16 13*s.* 4*d.* for 8 days, at a rate of 2*d.* a day; 38 serjeants with horses were paid £7 12*s.* for 8 days at a rate of 6*d.* a day; and the three captains of the serjeants were paid £1 for the same 8 days at a rate of 10*d.* a day.²⁶ These men also happen to be serving the king across the sea, and the short period of 8 days may simply indicate that they were only being paid for the time it took to travel.

In 1181-82, there is a record of £1 13*s.* 4*d.* being paid to 100 serjeants for one day, as they went from Shrewsbury to Hereford.²⁷ These men would have been paid 4*d.* each for this one day, which would mean these men each had a horse if the payment here were equivalent to the chart. Perhaps there is another thing to consider; there is a record of these men for the one day they travel between Shrewsbury and Hereford, but there is no record of them at either place. They are not recorded in the roll for Herefordshire either in the exchequer year 1181-82, nor in the following year. The one time they appear to have received a payment could show that these men had received some sort of travelling allowance, or they were

²⁵ See Chapter 5, Table 15.

²⁶ *P.R. 33 Henry II*, 63. Outside of Shropshire, there were also 13 archers being paid at 6*d.* a day. *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁷ *P.R. 28 Henry II*, 21.

being paid at both Shrewsbury and Hereford by a means that was not recorded in the Pipe Rolls, such as from the account of the royal household.

Provisions

From an earlier period, the *Constitutio Domus Regis* records the allowances of the members of the royal household closest to the king.²⁸ This document has little bearing on the present argument, but it does show that men serving the king (albeit, in a non-military fashion) were receiving compensation for their work, and in many instances in a non-monetary fashion. For a couple of examples, under the office of the marshal, the ushers who were knights received a money payment of 3 halfpence a day for each of their men, but they also were to receive eight candle pieces and were to dine with the household.²⁹ The watchmen received “double rations, and 3 halfpence a day for their men and four candles, and in addition to this, in the morning each one has two loaves, and one cooked dish, and one gallon of ale.”³⁰ The allowances received in addition to the money payments makes the watchman’s job appear to be much more lucrative than the 1*d.* a day wages represented in the Pipe Rolls (but again, these watchmen were a part of the king’s personal household, and were no doubt receiving more allowances than the average watchman). The point here, is that the men serving in castles may have been receiving more in compensation than strictly the money recorded in the Pipe Rolls, or could have been receiving an allowance of a non-monetary nature, and thus avoid being recorded in the Pipe Rolls at all (such as the 100 serjeants mentioned above). What these allowances may have been is up for debate, but it seems reasonable that they were

²⁸ For dating the *Constitutio Domus Regis*, see S.D. Church, ‘Introduction to the *Constitutio Domus Regis*,’ in *Dialogus*, xxxviii-xliv. It is, for the most part, from the reign of Henry I, and so is still reflective of the workings of a Norman household.

²⁹ *Constitutio Domus Regis*, 210-11.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

necessities of one type or another, such as food, clothes, or equipment (as established in the *Constitutio Domus Regis*). There are some records of these in the Pipe Rolls, particularly of food gathered to provision certain castles.

Records for provisioning castles do not occur in every year, but when they are present, there is rarely a record of pay for knights or serjeants in that same castle. It stands to reason, that if provisions are being bought for a castle, there must be men within that castle to consume them.³¹ Specifics on the amount of provisions paid for are few in Henry II's reign, particularly in the early years, but there are records in the civil war of 1173-74 that give detailed amounts. Specifically in Shropshire, Bridgenorth castle had purchased 92 measures of wheat, 120 bacons, 120 cheese, 20 measures of salt and two handmills, and Shrewsbury castle had purchased 60 measures of wheat, 102 bacons and 40 cheeses.³² By Richard's reign, details of provisions are more prominent. Ludlow Castle had 100 dry measures of wheat, 100 measures of oats, 20 bacons and two tuns of wine one year, and the following year, 200 measures of wheat, 100 barley and 100 bacon for Dover castle, plus 100 measures of wheat, 100 rye, 50 oats, 100 boar and 40 cows bought for either Dover or Rochester castle.³³ While these castle provisions were no doubt for the consumption of the castle's inhabitants, it is unlikely that they were an exact substitute for knights' or serjeants' pay. The rounded numbers of the provisions recorded suggest that they were bought as a lump quantity, and not carefully

³¹ Castles could have a 'dead store' to supplement supplies in case of a siege, but the provisions for this store were unlikely to have shown up in the Pipe Rolls. Supplies for the dead store would probably have come from the estates attached to the castle (if any).

³² *P.R. 20 Henry II*, 110. There is no mention at this time what exactly a measure, or *summus* is, but it is likely to be a quarter, or 8 bushels. Michael Prestwich, 'The Victualling of Castles,' *Soldiers, Nobles, and Gentlemen*, P. Cross and C Tyerman (ed.) (Woodbridge, 2009), 172, n. 20. There are only a few examples where the Pipe Rolls in these two counties are any more specific than just a measure: in 1173-74 wheat of the Dover measure was bought in Kent, dry measures of wheat were bought in Shropshire in 1189-90, and oats of the Kentish measure were bought in Kent in 1201-02. *P.R. 20 Henry II*, 2 ; *P.R. 2 Richard I*, 124 ; *P.R. 4 John*, 211.

³³ *P.R. 2 Richard I*, 124; *P.R. 3 Richard I*, 141-2.

calculated to provide a certain amount for each man garrisoning a castle. The amount of money paid looks like specific amounts and not rounded numbers, but this cannot be used to equate it with exact amounts allocated to each man for pay, since it was being used to buy the rounded provisions.

There is only one example from this survey where provisions are recorded for a specific castle that also has a record of paid knights or serjeants in that same castle. In the early years of Henry II's reign, £3 14s. were spent for an unknown amount of provisions for Carreghofa castle, which also had £25 19s. 9d. recorded as being paid to 1 knight, 20 serjeants, a watchman and a porter.³⁴ Two years later, also at Carreghofa, the amount paid for provisions was raised to £5, but the amount paid to the knights and serjeants was lowered to £24 3s.³⁵ With the amounts of pay and provisions added together, they come to roughly the same number: £29 13s. 9d. in 1159-60, and £29 3s. in 1161-62 (keeping in mind that the pay for a porter and watchman in 1161-62 was not recorded). Using the earlier rate of 8d. a day for a knight and 1d. a day for the serjeants, this would account for the pay of about two thirds of a year. It is very possible that the provisions in this case were being used to make up the amount owed to the knight and serjeants in pay. Again, while the provisions purchased for Carreghofa are unknown, they were probably bought as a block amount, and so are unlikely to match the soldiers' pay exactly.

There are also two examples where money was spent specifically for the provisions of the knights guarding a castle, and not used as their pay. During the major building project on Dover castle towards the end of Henry II's reign, £6 14s. 3 ½d. was spent on unspecified provisions (*warnisone*) for the knights guarding the

³⁴ *P.R. 6 Henry II*, 26.

³⁵ *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 15. In the previous year, there was another knight, 20 serjeants, watchman and porter, who were paid even less than the knights of Carreghofa: £22 17s. 8d. Unfortunately, it is unclear if provisions were bought for these men in that year, due to imperfections in the roll, nor was it recorded that these are the same men at Carreghofa. *P.R. 7 Henry II*, 38.

works on the castle keep.³⁶ These men do not receive any other payment as recorded in the Pipe Roll, and this is the only record in this source of their presence. In 1194-95 in Shropshire, £11 10s. was paid to purchase 70 dry measures of wheat (£7) and 50 bacons (£4 10s.) which are expressly purchased to make the payment to the constable for guarding Carrehhofa castle.³⁷ There is no mention of money going directly to the constable of Carrehhofa, but there was £2 paid directly to serjeants who stayed with him to guard the castle.

It should be expected that castles would be stocked with provisions in preparation for a military conflict. In general, provisions for the counties of Kent and Shropshire are recorded in the Pipe Rolls around the same years scutages were collected. It may simply be coincidental, but the castles in Kent appear to receive provisions the year previous to a scutage being collected, while the castles of Shropshire receive provisions the same year scutages were collected. At times when there were no military conflicts, such as most of the 1180s, there are neither provisions bought for the castles nor scutages collected. There are, of course, a few exceptions to this observation, but they all come with qualifying events in those years. There was no scutage collected in the exchequer year 1173-74, but large amounts were paid to purchase provisions in these two counties: over £58 in Kent and £37 in Shropshire. This was during the uprising of Henry the Young King, so one should not expect a scutage to be raised during a civil war. There is also a long stretch in John's reign where scutages were being raised for the protection of Normandy, but no provisions were collected for castles in Shropshire. This is to be expected since the major military battles were taking place on the continent and there was little focus on the march. Provisions were being gathered in Kent early in John's

³⁶ *P.R. 31 Henry II*, 224.

³⁷ *P.R. 7 Richard I*, 244.

reign, supposedly for the defence of England, but even then there are years where the provisions collected in Kent were shipped to Rouen instead of being used to fortify Dover or Rochester.³⁸

While provisions did for the most part stay in the county in which they were raised, it was always possible for these supplies to have been raised and recorded in one county, but then sent to another county for use. While the examples of provisions from Kent being sent to Rouen above are a later example, this same practice still occurred in Henry II's reign. In the exchequer year 1170-71, 286 bacons were sent from Shrewsbury to Gloucester, spending £19 4s. 4d. for the bacons and 7s. 8d. for its transport.³⁹ 400 bacons were also sent to Ireland from Shropshire during the Irish expedition of 1172, costing the crown £31 15s. 2d. for the bacons themselves, but no mention of the cost of transport (it presumably went with the troops).⁴⁰ In 1168-69, 4 marks were spent on grain sent to Dover from Shropshire.⁴¹ Even with this grain being sent from a different county, there were still no paid knights or serjeants listed in Kent in this year, which maintains the pattern of provisions only being purchased in years castles did not have paid soldiers present. While the one instance of 1169 may uphold this pattern, it should be remembered that only two counties have been examined here, and with the possibility of provisions being shared amongst counties, the pattern of provisions to paid knights may not be an absolute.⁴²

³⁸ *P.R. 2 John*, 209; *P.R. 3 John*, 283.

³⁹ *P.R. 17 Henry II*, 32.

⁴⁰ *P.R. 18 Henry II*, 110.

⁴¹ *P.R. 15 Henry II*, 111.

⁴² For more on provisioning castles, see M. Prestwich, 'Victualling of Castles,' 169-82. The article focuses mostly on the latter 13th and 14th centuries, but is able to provide many more specifics than is possible for the twelfth century, including an indication of daily rations for knights and the amount of provisions needed on a per-man basis (which is tempting to apply here, but has been avoided due to the different periods concerned).

There are also occasions where equipment and clothes are purchased and recorded in the Pipe Rolls, which were clearly used for a military purpose, but it is unclear if they were to be a type of compensation for the soldiers. In the exchequer year 1203-04, the extraordinary amount of £33 was paid to purchase 3 scarlet robes, 3 green robes, 2 brocades, a quilt, and other necessities, all to make a single knight.⁴³ From this year on, the rolls for the county of Kent record many robes purchased and the people who received them, but aside from this first record, it is unclear if they were meant for the military class.⁴⁴ In 1166-67, 200 pikes were purchased for Richard de Luci for £1 3s. 9d, and later 400 lances were bought in Shropshire for £11 6d.⁴⁵ In some instances, men received money directly, but they were for the express purpose of buying provisions for themselves and not meant as payment. In 1194-95, 6 *esclauis* received £21 to serve for 560 days, but they also received £6 16s. which was to pay for their vestments.⁴⁶ Similarly, a year later, Casselwalano fitz Oeni, who was in charge of guarding Church Stretton castle in Shropshire, received 13 marks for purchasing his vestments.⁴⁷

While these provision are not an exact substitute for a daily wage, they were a means to pay soldiers. It must be remembered that money was just a means by which goods and services are exchanged, and while necessary in the modern economy, in the medieval economy it was merely a convenience. Payment was often made in terms of provisions since this is what the soldiers would have been buying with their wages anyway.

⁴³ *P.R. 6 John*, 213.

⁴⁴ There is one other purchase of robes specifically mentioned for making knights (note, more than one knight this time), at the cost of £21. 10s. 2d. *P.R. 11 John*, 10.

⁴⁵ *P.R. 13 Henry II*, 197; *P.R. 16 John*, 119.

⁴⁶ *P.R. 7 Richard I*, 2.

⁴⁷ *C.R. 8 Richard I*, 42.

Crossbows and Foreigners

The focus on military obligation, and in the case of the current discussion, will inevitably be on knighthood. It has previously been shown that in discussing the payment of knights, the payments of serjeants actually serves to produce more information, and so a discussion of more specialized soldiers may also prove to be useful. While knights and serjeants appear to be easily categorized by pay scale, it is a little more difficult ascertaining where other specialized soldiers fit. In the exchequer year 1157-58, a certain crossbowman named Bertumer appears in the Shropshire rolls receiving payment for three years straight. This first year, he received a payment of £1 10s. 5*d.*, which is the equivalent of 365*d.*; enough of a coincidence to suggest he was being paid 1*d.* a day.⁴⁸ Unfortunately there is no way to confirm this, as the amount of time Bertumer served was not recorded, and his pay did not remain consistent for the three years he appears in the rolls. In 1158-59, he received £1 3s. 4 ½*d.*, or 280 ½*d.* and in 1159-60, he received only 15s. 2 ½*d.*, or 182 ½*d.*⁴⁹ At a later time, in 1173, there is a record for archers that includes the number of men paid and the service period. 10 archers in Shropshire were paid £1 6s. 10*d.* for 15 days, which, if calculated evenly, would mean each man received 2.15*d.* a day.⁵⁰ Of course, 0.15*d.* was not a denomination in use, so these archers could not have been sharing their pay evenly. In the same year, another 10 archers at Whittington also served 15 days, but only received the pay of 11s. 8*d.*⁵¹ For this amount, each man would have received less than 1*d.* a day if distributed evenly. The only way to make this payment work evenly is if all the men served for the first 10 days, but only 9 men served the final 5 days at the rate of 1*d.* a day. Regardless of

⁴⁸ *P.R. 4 Henry II*, 170.

⁴⁹ *P.R. 5 Henry II*, 62; *P.R. 6 Henry II*, 25.

⁵⁰ *P.R. 19 Henry II*, 107.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

how the pay was distributed, there is no explanation of why these two contingents of archers should appear to be receiving a widely differing amount of pay, and the only distinguishing characteristic between the two is that one group is specifically mentioned as being in a castle.

Crossbowmen do not make a significant appearance in the rolls for these two counties again until the reign of King John. In 1208-09 in Shropshire, 10 crossbowmen received the pay of £18 10s. for the period of 40 days.⁵² If their pay was evenly distributed, each man would have been paid 11.1*d.* a day: another impossible figure. Another group of 5 crossbowmen in Kent were paid an even £10 for the same period of service, suggesting they each were receiving 1*s.* a day.⁵³ If this rate of a shilling a day were applied to the 10 crossbowmen in Shropshire, their smaller amount could be explained by the loss of one of their men after 10 days of service, and the remaining 30 days only being served by 9 men. Regardless of how the numbers are manipulated, it is striking how much these men were being paid. At this later date, it is easy to equate these men with the knights who are being paid a shilling a day according the chart given above; a huge difference from the possible penny a day rate commanded by Bertumer in the 1150s. It is tempting to explain this high rate by saying this is the cost of building large ballistas rather than a payment to men, except that the language of the roll makes it clear that this money is meant as allowances and not for the cost of construction.⁵⁴

Crossbowmen may have been considered an elite force to command such a price for their services. Latimer has collected a substantial number of references

⁵² *P.R. 11 John*, 146.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10. These same 5 crossbowmen also received an additional 10 marks for an unspecified reason. If this were to be calculated into their pay, they would actually have been paid 1*s.* 8*d.* a day. As it is recorded, it seems to be an indication of a gift rather than wages.

⁵⁴ The term used in the Pipe Rolls is *balistariis* in the plural dative, which would be crossbowmen if the singular nominative were *balistarius* but could equally be a ballista if it were *balistarium*. In this case, it is likely to be crossbowmen and *balistarius*.

referring to crossbowmen on foot receiving 3*d.* a day, or a penny more than a normal foot soldier in the early thirteenth century.⁵⁵ While this, combined with the 12*d.* a day wages of the crossbowmen in 1208-09, would suggest a higher standing for these men than a regular serjeant, there is some evidence to the contrary. While there is a good fifty years of separation, the example of Bertumer from 1157-1160 commanding what appears to be a 1*d.* daily wage does put him on level with serjeants in that time period. While Latimer also may have found enough evidence to suggest a 3*d.* wage for crossbowmen on foot in the early 13th century, it was specifically mentioned in 1216 that the reason the wage of a foot serjeant should be raised to 3*d.* a day is because crossbowmen earned this same wage, showing the two were considered equal.⁵⁶ The instance of the crossbowmen earning a shilling a day in 1208-09 may possibly be explained by the soldiers being mounted, although they are not specifically mentioned as being so.⁵⁷

It is strange that Bertumer is the only crossbowman with a detailed record who appears in the rolls for all the counties in Henry II's reign. Only one other entry comes close (and is perhaps more useful) and that is for the crossbowman Turpino recorded in Berkshire in 1183-84. Turpino received two payments, one of 10*s.* for 20 days of service, and another of 20*s.* for 40 days of service, giving him a daily wage of 6*d.* for each payment.⁵⁸ If we were to assume this 6*d.* a day wage was paid to Bertumer 24 years earlier, he would have served 60.8 days in 1157-58, 46.75 days in 1158-59, and 30.42 days in 1159-60. As can easily be seen, the numbers do not

⁵⁵ Latimer, 'Wages,' 202, n. 89.

⁵⁶ *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, vol. 1, 250.

⁵⁷ Latimer includes these men with his evidence for the wages of mounted crossbowmen based solely on their daily wage. He has found evidence that mounted crossbowmen were receiving wages of 7 ½*d.*, 12*d.* or 15*d.* a day dependant on whether they had one, two or three horses respectively. These wages he claims are actually the equivalent of what horse serjeants were earning in John's reign, also dependant on whether they owned one, two, or three horses. These wages do not appear from the survey of Shropshire and Kent, but this is probably due to the complete lack of payments to horse serjeants in these counties in the reign of King John. Latimer, 'Wages,' 202.

⁵⁸ *P.R. 30 Henry II*, 53.

add up cleanly and still suggest Bertumer was only receiving a penny a day. Aside from Bertumer and Turpino, the only other crossbowmen to receive pay in Henry II's reign were 8 crossbowmen who received £8 16s. in Kent in 1161-62,⁵⁹ and 2 crossbowmen who received £5 14s. 8d. in Kent in 1162-63.⁶⁰ There are mentions of other crossbowmen in the Pipe Rolls, showing that they were at least in the country at Henry's time, but their appearances are still very few.⁶¹

Crossbowmen only appear once in Richard's reign in these two counties, and that is for William the Crossbowman who received a gift and payment of £4 in 1190-91.⁶² There have been many instances where it has been recorded that Richard used crossbowmen quite widely, so the dearth of information from Kent and Shropshire during his reign should not indicate a lack of use. His use of crossbowmen at the battle of Jaffa in 1192 and being credited by contemporaries as being the man to "first bring the use of the crossbow to the French" clearly indicate that it was a weapon in use by Richard, and even one that he preferred to have in his armies.⁶³

The only other mention of a crossbowman for these counties comes in 1203-04 in Kent where Roger the crossbowmen received £1 in payment, and another 5s. for carrying his necessities to Nottingham. In a second entry, this same Roger

⁵⁹ *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 53. These men received £1 2s. each, meaning they served 264 days at Bertumer's rate, or 44 days at Turpino's rate.

⁶⁰ *P.R. 9 Henry II*, 69. These men must have received more than 1d. a day wages, as they received enough money for a 2d. daily wage to last almost the whole year (359 days). If they did happen to receive the 6d. a day Turpino was later paid, then they would have served for about 120 days. It is conceivable, considering how few crossbowmen are recorded at this time, and that these men are paid the following year in the same county as other crossbowmen previously were, that the payments are somehow connected, and may account for why these two men received such a substantial amount. What that connection may be could only be determined by pure speculation.

⁶¹ Crossbowmen in Henry II's Pipe Rolls are denoted as *arbalasterii*, and aside from those mentioned above, there are only 4 or 5 other references to them in Henry II's reign. Two crossbowmen owed a fine in 1164-65, *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 11. Radulfus de Burc, a crossbowman owed a fine in 1183-84, and William the Crossbowman received alms in the same year, *P.R. 30 Henry II*, 3, 85. Radulfus again owed a fine in Norfolk and Suffolk in 1185-86, plus Radulfus owed another fine in Lincolnshire (but he is not specifically mentioned as a crossbowman here, and may be another person), *P.R. 32 Henry II*, 59, 75.

⁶² *P.R. 3 Richard I*, 141.

⁶³ David Bachrach, 'Origins of the Crossbow Industry in England,' *The Journal of Medieval Military History*, 2 (Woodbridge, 2004), 76, 79.

received another £4 18s. 8d. for his payment and again for carrying his necessities, this time to ‘many places.’⁶⁴ The time period Roger was serving is not listed in the roll, so it would be impossible to determine what he was earning as a daily wage, but it certainly appears to be substantial. The indications in the Pipe Rolls for Roger is that he was actually a craftsman making crossbows, since he received payment not only for the crossbows, but for the timber and other necessities to make them. Indeed, Roger here has been linked to an initiative by John to manufacture crossbows in England, rather than purchasing them from Genoa.⁶⁵ With the establishment of tradesmen creating crossbows in England, it appears the English had committed to it as a weapon by the late twelfth century and early thirteenth century. It was known to be used by Flemings hired by Henry II, but otherwise was uncommon. Perhaps the outlawing of crossbows for use against Christians at the Second Lateran Council in 1139 was still recent enough to not be lightly ignored, or perhaps the cost of creating a crossbow earlier was prohibitive, and it was simply easier to hire mercenaries from the Low Countries.⁶⁶

While the nationality of paid soldiers holds little bearing on the logistics of wages and value of knights and serjeants, it is somewhat surprising that there are so few explicit records of foreign soldiers in the Pipe Rolls for these counties. In Henry II’s reign, there were only three payments to the *Coteraux*, or mercenaries from the Low Countries, in the counties of Shropshire and Kent.⁶⁷ In Richard’s reign, only two references in these counties occur: £2 for Flemings in 1193, and £14 for 210

⁶⁴ *P.R. 6 John*, 213. Both entries for Roger have portions that are illegible. The 5s. Roger received for carriage to Nottingham was interlineated at the portion speaking of his carriage, hence why it has been interpreted here as a payment specifically to cover his carriage.

⁶⁵ Bachrach, ‘Crossbow Industry,’ 83-4.

⁶⁶ This assumes they would have been paid from some agency other than the exchequer, since there is no evidence from this source. For the Second Lateran Council, see *Ibid.* and *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, Norman P. Tanner (ed.), 1 (London, 1990), 203, cannon 29.

⁶⁷ £15 5s. for an unspecified number in 1159 in Shropshire, and 16s. 4d. in 1165 and 1s. 6d. in 1167 in Kent, both of which were simply for collecting the arms for these men. *P.R. 5 Henry II*, 62; *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 102; *P.R. 13 Henry II*, 196-7.

Welshmen, plus an additional 8s. for their master Robert de Bolliers who may have been French.⁶⁸ Likewise under John there are only two mentions of foreign knights: £87 10s. paid to Theobald de Candos and other knights from Flanders in 1211, and £50 13s. 5d. to 41 knights on horse from Flanders and Hainault in 1212.⁶⁹ This is not to suggest that the other knights and serjeants listed in the Pipe Rolls were all from England; these are only the men who are specifically mentioned as being from a country other than England.

The suggestion that English men were receiving pay when serving the English king is perhaps slightly strange considering most fighting men would have had some sort of military obligation to the king already. Even if a man capable of fighting did not owe knights or have a *servicium debitum*, provisions were made to obtain their service if needed, such as Henry II's Assize of Arms, or the *arriere-ban* and *magna expeditio* of Normandy and southern Italy. But this still does not preclude the possibility of pay. In the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* there is one instance where a knight is specifically mentioned as serving at the king's cost (*ad custum vestrum*).⁷⁰ There are also two instances of the king paying for service mentioned in the 1172 *Infeudationes Militum*, but each of these are for service after the traditional 40 day period.⁷¹

⁶⁸ *P.R. 5 Richard I*, 166; £13 6s. 8d. were spent on 200 Welshmen on foot who went to Normandy for 8 days at 2d. a day. The roll then says 500 Welshmen were also paid 2d. a day for 8 days, but only 1 mark came out of the treasury for this payment. For the time period, rate of pay and the amount actually paid given, this would only cover the wages of 10 men, not 500, and so has been listed as such. Robert de Bolliers is listed as Phillip's knight, which may be a reference to Phillip Augustus, but it is unclear. *CR. 8 Richard I*, 41, 42.

⁶⁹ *P.R. 13 John*, 236; *P.R. 14 John*, 12.

⁷⁰ *RBE*, 277; *Select Charters*, 174; Michael Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,' *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, Alfred Haverkamp and Hannah Vollrath (eds.) (Oxford, 1996), 133.

⁷¹ *Robertus de Capella, I militem per XL dies de garda, et post ad custamentum regis. Recueil des Historiens*, 697; *RBE*, 639; *De honore comitis Moretonii, per Ricardum Silvanum XXIX milite et dimidium et octavam partem militis ad servicium regis per manum comitis, ad marchiam, per XL dies ad constamentum eorum, deinceps ad constamentum regis vel comitis, et comiti serviebant prout debebant. Recueil des Historiens*, 698; *RBE*, 643.

The fact that so few foreign soldiers are mentioned in the Pipe Rolls may even be an indication of a preference for the service of native soldiers. Certainly some of the chronicle sources give an impression of foreign mercenaries being unreliable. There are several indications that these foreign troops were the first to flee in certain battles such as William of Ypres and his Flemish mercenaries at the battle of Lincoln in 1141.⁷² The case of Henry II while fighting Stephen in 1147 also illustrates this, as he came to England with a band of troops he had promised to pay but was unable to immediately, so these mercenaries fought slovenly and eventually left Henry's employ.⁷³ In 1102, a group of mercenaries hired by Robert of Bellême were permitted to leave a town that insisted on surrendering to Henry I so that they could protect their own reputation, rather than act on the town's wishes.⁷⁴ While there may have been a sense of preference for paying English knights rather than foreign knights to serve, there are these few indications that, at least from the Pipe Rolls, the kings of England did employ foreign knights both at home and abroad. However, this should not totally exclude the fact that there were foreign soldiers in the English kings' employ, and the example of the mercenary captains Mercadier and Martin Algais employed by Richard and John respectively attest to this fact.⁷⁵

The lack of evidence for foreign soldiers in the Pipe Rolls should not be too surprising during the reign of Henry II. Soon after Henry gained the throne, he expelled all the Flemish mercenaries from England and renounced their use in the

⁷² *Military Organization*, 186.

⁷³ M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 152; *Gesta Stephani*, K.R. Potter (ed. and trans.), Oxford Medieval texts (Oxford, 1976), 204-7.

⁷⁴ M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 152: *Orderic Vitalis*, vi, 28. It should be noted that these men were willing to risk the threat of hanging, which the captains of the castle were not; leading to their release.

⁷⁵ M. Prestwich, 'Money and Mercenaries,' 138-9.

country.⁷⁶ Flemish mercenaries would not return to England during his reign, but for a few occasions. As previously mentioned, there were two instances where equipment was purchased for the *Coteraux* in Kent in 1165 and 1167, and one instance in 1159 where an amount was paid to the *Coteraux* to serve at Carreghofa from the Shropshire Pipe Roll. The civil war of 1173-74 is the only other time where foreign mercenaries play a role in England during Henry's reign, with estimates ranging between 3,000 and 6,000 Brabançons brought into the country by the king.⁷⁷ Henry was not the only person to bring in foreign mercenaries, however, as some of the rebelling barons, such as the Earl of Leicester, also made use of foreigners (in this case, the *Coteraux*) in England, but not to the scale Henry did.⁷⁸

The event of the Young King's rebellion in 1173-74 may have been the only time Henry brought foreign mercenaries into England after gaining the throne, but it was far from the only time he employed the *Coteraux* (or Brabançons). Henry made use of mercenaries in these same wars in the regions of Brittany and Anjou, as well as in numerous campaigns on the continent before 1173.⁷⁹ Most of the evidence for Henry's use of mercenaries comes from the chronicle sources, and it is therefore difficult to know just how extensively they were used. While the occasional mention crops up in the Pipe Rolls, the pay for these men was clearly coming from a source other than the exchequer. In all likelihood, the payments for these men came directly from the central treasury.

While not necessarily foreigners by definition, the household knights of the king could sometimes contain foreign troops. S.D. Church had found there to be at

⁷⁶ Warren, *Henry II*, 59 ; Boussard, 'Les mercenaires,' 194.

⁷⁷ Boussard, 'Les mercenaires,' 220. However, Boussard based his estimate on the number of men that could fit in 37 ships crossing the channel. Prestwich argues that he likely over-estimated this amount, which should be revised down to 1000 men. M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 149.

⁷⁸ Warren, *Henry II*, 131 ; Boussard, 'Les mercenaires,' 208.

⁷⁹ Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, Michael Jones (trans.) (Oxford, 1984), 245 ; Boussard, 'Les mercenaires,' 201-7.

least 24 foreign men serving as household knights in John's reign, the total number of household knights being about 100.⁸⁰ It has long been supposed that these household knights, whether foreign or domestic, received pay or wages for their service to the king.⁸¹ This argument has usually been based on evidence for the household knights of Edward I's reign, supplemented with evidence from earlier time periods. More recently, Church argued that in the reign of King John, the household knights were receiving rewards rather than payment for their services. Being a household knight could open the door of opportunity to receiving a post as sheriff or constable, or gain control of escheated lands. While occasionally men would receive a money-fief, these were usually temporary until land of an equivalent value could be granted to them.⁸² As for the situation in Henry's reign, little is known about his household knights due to the scant record of them. From the survey done of military payments in Kent and Shropshire, only once do household knights appear in the rolls: five household knights received a payment of £26 16s. in 1162-3.⁸³ Aside from these five knights, there are the famous four knights responsible for the murder of Thomas Becket, but otherwise there is little evidence of how Henry used his household knights to determine their rewards or pay.

Southern Italy and the Trends in England

Such a widespread analysis of payment rates is not possible with the records that survive for southern Italy. Because of this, certain assumptions must be made on the basis of the evidence available to make any determination concerning the pay of knights. It is known that the Normans first came into southern Italy as paid

⁸⁰ S.D. Church, *The Household Knights of King John* (Cambridge, 1999), 34.

⁸¹ See the article by J.O. Prestwich, 'The Military Household of the Norman Kings,' *English Historical Review*, 378 (1981), 1-35.

⁸² Church, *Household Knights*, 80, 86.

⁸³ *P.R. 9 Henry II*, 69.

soldiers.⁸⁴ Since the Norman entry was not a wide-spread invasion, but a trickling in of individuals and groups, the sources for their first appearances are varied and non-uniform. There are many stories and theories of what the Normans were doing in southern Italy in the first place, ranging from returning from pilgrimage, to even being directed there by the Pope.⁸⁵ Regardless of how they first arrived in the region, the reason for their stay is simple: they were being paid. How much the tradition of paying soldiers as mercenaries, or even those who owe service to the king, remains with the Normans after they establish themselves is difficult to say. Some historians have thought that at the time of the *Catalogus*, the political situation in southern Italy (with the constant threat of external invasion and internal rebellion) made it impossible for the Norman kings to hire mercenaries from abroad.⁸⁶ Yet this would seem to be an ideal circumstance for the hiring of outside knights.

There is some evidence provided by the chronicles that indicates the knights serving in southern Italy and Sicily were being paid wages, but rarely do these chronicles indicate whether these men were enfeoffed knights or mercenaries. Hugo Falcandus relates that William I had troops staying in Africa who received pay, but again it is unclear if these men were mercenaries or not.⁸⁷ Falcandus also tells us that Admiral Maio saw it as a good policy to raise the pay for knights to prevent them from deserting, and not only were monetary increases considered, but also ‘gifts and promises’ of unknown degrees.⁸⁸ Again, the language makes it impossible to discern whether there were enfeoffed knights or not. An earlier chronicler, Geoffrey of Malaterra only gives one reference that indicates a hiring of outside knights,

⁸⁴ Malaterra (eng.), I.6., 54-5 ; Malaterra (lat.), 10.

⁸⁵ For a good analysis of the primary sources, and the theory of Pope Benedict’s involvement, see John France, ‘The Occasion of the coming of the Normans to Southern Italy,’ *Journal of Medieval History*, 17 (1991), 185-205.

⁸⁶ Jamison, ‘Additional Work,’ 6.

⁸⁷ Falcandus (eng.), 80 ; Falcandus (lat.), 27.

⁸⁸ Falcandus (eng.), 85 ; Falcandus (lat.), 31.


informing us that Roger I garrisoned Petralia with both his knights and mercenaries (*stipendiarii*).⁸⁹ Before the establishment of the Kingdom, the Prince of Capua, in 1128, lost his army to desertion because he failed pay its wages.⁹⁰ This is just a small sampling of the references to pay in the southern-Italian literature, but none of it is comprehensive enough to establish any definitive idea of how the payment of soldiers worked. It can be determined that knights *were* being paid, but what these knight's relationship to the crown was cannot be determined. Suffice to say, there is insufficient evidence to produce a viable comparison.

The lack of information in southern Italy makes it necessary to rely solely on English sources to determine payment patterns and wage rates. That soldiers were being paid in southern Italy may suggest that they worked similarly to England, but that information does not further our understanding of England. It remains then to return to the survey of Shropshire and Kent to determine if the overall payment amounts can show any viable trend in the use of paid soldiers.

With the more extensive information available for the knights paid in Richard I's and John's reigns, it is tempting to suggest that there was a trend towards using more paid knights under these two kings rather than during their father's reign. The total military expenditures in the counties of Shropshire and Kent, as viewed from Henry II's reign through John's, do not appear to produce any significant trend. Only the £189 John spent in Kent in 1201-02 rivals any of the amounts spent by his father, and even then it was only by £30. While there may not be any trends, there are some patterns. There seems to be a clear regional pattern, as one would expect. During the early years of Henry II's reign, Shropshire is clearly receiving more money than Kent, as Henry was focusing on the Welsh wars, whereas by John's

⁸⁹ Malaterra (eng.), II.20, 95 ; Malaterra (lat.), 35.

⁹⁰ Loud, *The Latin Church*, 347.



The £1600 collected from the exchange in Kent in 1191 has been taken out since it skews the chart. The years in John's reign where Shropshire recorded its expenditures in one year for multiple years has been evened out to more accurately reflect the amounts spent. So, the £32 spent in 1209 for both 1209 and 1208 has been changed to £16 in each year; the £343 spent in 1212 for 1210, 1211, and 1212 has been changed to £114 in each year, and the £28 spent in 1214 for 1213 and 1214 has been changed to £14 each.

reign, most of the money was going to Kent as John was fighting to keep Normandy. There is a period from about 1170 until the death of Henry where very little money was spent, and that which was tended to be at a regular amount, particularly in Kent. The amount of money spent in Shropshire remained higher in 1172 due to the expedition to Ireland, and Kent had a large amount spent on provisioning castles, no doubt from the looming threat of the rebellion of the Young King. Shropshire had an increase in expenditure in 1174 as a result of the rebellion, and Kent still spent a large amount, though not as much as before. Soon after they both fall to a minimal amount spent for several years and continue at this rate until 1187 when the campaign to Carlisle begins, but this only affects Shropshire's spending, whereas Kent continues its regular amount.

In many instances, the year that the king collected a scutage, the amount of money spent in either of these two counties is higher than previous years. There are the occasional exceptions, such as the aid in 1168 for the marriage of Matilda, but this of course was not being collected for a military purpose. Surprisingly, the large scutage for the expedition to Wales in 1165 shows a rather small amount of money being spent, particularly since the amount from Shropshire had dropped since previous years. Some of the spikes in expenditures in non-scutage years are also a little surprising. The £62 spent on serjeants serving in the march in 1166 is probably a defensive ploy after the failed expedition to Wales in the previous year, but the £100 spent in Kent the following year on knights for coast guard seems quite unusual. Early in Richard's reign, a large amount was spent on provisioning Dover castle which caused a spike in expenditures in 1191 (this does not even include the amounts spent to maintain the exchange and to 'pay knights' this year, which reached £1600). 1193 also saw a spike in Kent with 15 knights, 20 horse serjeants,

and 40 foot serjeants receiving pay. John's reign tends to see the amount being paid during scutage years go down, but John collected scutage almost every year of his reign, to where the comparison between that spent and that collected via scutage almost loses meaning.

In terms of what was collected via scutages, and paid via wages, there are some surprising differences between serjeants and knights. Knights were clearly paid more than what was collected via scutage, particularly in Henry's reign. With scutage being sustained at a rate of either £1 or 1 mark, the wages paid to knights could not have been made up with scutage payments.⁹¹ Serjeants appear to be paid considerably less than what was collected for them in scutage, particularly at the rates of a penny a day when the 15s. 2 or 3d. scutage on serjeants was collected in 1165. Regardless of how much was being collected in scutage, the wages for both serjeants and knights were clearly rising during this period. The cause of this rise is perhaps a result of both a negotiation process of the men receiving the pay, and the king simply declaring that there was a set amount he would pay for these services. This combined approach to looking at wages may explain the strange unaccountable numbers, but also the clearly defined and regular patterns of payment.

The importance of payments is, of course, to provide knights a means to sustain themselves while on campaign. Those who owed a service would have to pay for themselves over a certain service period (usually 40 days), but would then be paid for by the king if they stayed in the army past this owed period. The army, serving in the field, would have been made up of paid and non-paid knights and serjeants alike. The medieval theory was that the army was to consist of those who owed their service to the king, but the reality was that these men could pay a scutage

⁹¹ Although John appears to have tried to rectify that with collecting scutages at the rate of 2 or even 3 marks. *P.R. 1 John*, passim; *P.R. 16 John*, passim.

to excuse themselves. The collected money could then be used to buy the services of a replacement, but the amount collected was often not enough to do this on a one to one ratio since the scutage was cheaper than the daily wage of a knight in the late twelfth century. So it must be asked, if it was cheaper to commute than to serve, did any of the English knights bother to serve in the army?

Part III

Service

Chapter 5

Service Levels

The English Campaigns

The lack of muster rolls in England before the reign of John makes it impossible to determine the exact number of men who performed their owed service in the army. It was expected that men would owe and thus perform their service to the king, but since a knight could commute via scutage, this would not always be the case. Evidence for the early Norman period is scarce, but by the time of Henry II it has been shown that the daily wage of a knight, or the amount it was thought a knight needed to sustain himself on campaign, was much more than the amount he would have paid in scutage. If it was economically expedient to commute, one would expect low service levels from the English knights. Again, in Henry II's reign, the sources begin to be prolific enough to explore the number of men serving in a campaign, without relying on muster rolls.

It is possible to calculate roughly the number of knights who were providing their service in Henry II's time by using the 1168 *auxilium* as a reference point. Since in 1168 Henry collected an aid, every knight fee in the kingdom would have been expected to pay the tax (1 mark in this instance). This would not have been the case with a scutage, since those who served in the army would not have paid, but in this case, no one served. The total amount owed in 1168 (£3415 4s. 1d. of the old fees, £377 9s. 1d. of the new) is, in theory, equal to all the money Henry could expect from his knight fees if each fee paid a mark. With this knowledge, it should

be possible to subtract the scutage payments from campaign years to get a sense of the number of knights who served. This has been done by taking the total amount owed in scutage for a campaign year (that which was paid, owed and pardoned), converting it into its one mark equivalent (e.g. divide by $\frac{1}{3}$ if the scutage rate is £1, or divide by 2 if the rate is 2 marks), subtract this from the old fees paid in 1168 (none of the knights owed their new fees before 1168), then divide the whole by 1 mark (or 160*d.* since this is the rate of the 1168 aid) to get the number of knights who served. To ease the understanding, all equations will be written out, and will roughly follow the formula given above, written out thus:

$$(1168 \text{ aid} - \text{owed scutage}) \div 1 \text{ mark} = \text{knights who served}$$

Since the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* is essentially a record of all the fees of England, one might expect this to be the basis for calculating service levels in England, rather than the *auxilium* of 1168. The reason the aid is the better source is because the record of those who did *not* serve (i.e. scutage payments) is in a monetary form, whereas the *Cartae* is the record of fiefs (and not always a record of the *servicium debitum*). The two were not always equal, as a scutage payment of £1 or 1 mark was the norm, it was not universally adhered to by all the fees. In some instances, Henry or his predecessors granted certain tenants-in-chief concessions to pay a lower sum of scutage than the rate per knight fee collected elsewhere in the country. The example of Earl Gilbert of Pembroke is an illustration of this where, on the land he granted, he only collected 2 shillings when scutage was called at a £1 rate, and 16 pence when called at the 1 mark rate. In this instance, it is more a matter of sub-infeudation since the amounts shown merely reflect what the earl was receiving from his tenants, and not what he was actually paying to his king (he could

have been paying the king for his fees at the full rate), but there are examples provided in the *Cartae Baronum* that reflect this same practice between the king and his tenants-in-chief. One article of note is the return of William of Abbrincis. In his return, he states that when the king receives an aid of 20 shillings, his knights from outside of Kent only pay 12 shillings, and likewise if the king receives a mark, his knights will only pay 8 shillings.¹ William Fitz-Alan is another case in the *Cartae Baronum*, but in his case it is a matter of claiming he does not owe all the knights he has enfeoffed, and so would most likely not pay for them during an aid or scutage.²

Using the record of the amounts paid by the knights in 1168, certain observations about the amount of service provided by Henry's enfeoffed knights can be made. Exact numbers of troop levels and participation will never be known as the payments for the knights in Shropshire were not recorded and payments could have been made at the Normandy exchequer.³ These are also tenuous numbers since this is essentially an argument of silence in the sources (scutage payments are a record of those who did *not* serve, not a record of those who *did*), but it is still possible to get something close.

Henry was expecting to receive a large scutage from England in 1159 for the expedition to Toulouse, not only from the extra *dona* levied, but because Henry thought the distance for his knights to travel was too far, and they would not want to serve.⁴ This could be taken to mean Henry expected a full commutation of his English knights. Therefore, if the total of old fees is taken from 1168 (new fees were not being charged), which was £3415 4s. 1d., and the amount doubled to reflect the 2 mark rate of 1159, the amount due from all of England in 1159 should still be in

¹ *RBE*, 193.

² *Ibid.*, 271-4.

³ *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 95.

⁴ Robert de Torigni, 202. Henry was 'not wishing to vex the country knights with the length and difficulty of the journey.'

excess of the 1168 amount because of the extra money collected from the *dona* (i.e. the numbers should not be exactly the same, but the 1159 scutage should be more than the 1168 aid due to the combination of the scutage and the *dona*; this is also working under the assumption that 100% of the knights commuted their service in 1159: an assumption that is undoubtedly false, but presented by Robert de Torigni). To present the figures:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 \text{£}3415\ 4s.\ 1d.\ (\text{old fees in 1168}) \\
 \hline
 \quad \times 2\ (\text{2 marc rate in 1159}) \\
 \hline
 \text{£}6830\ 8s.\ 2d.\ < \text{£}8960\ 7s.\ 3d.\ (\text{total due in 1159})
 \end{array}$$

This shows that the amount collected in 1159 was more than that of the 1168 aid if the two payments were at an equivalent rate, thus showing a universal commutation in this year was possible, but this is very unlikely due to the high amount of the *dona*.

Some interesting observations can be made about the 1159 scutage if this same idea is applied on a county by county basis, instead of just looking at the country as a whole. Again, this cannot be taken as perfect because of the ability to pay for fees in counties other than that which the knights held their fees, but could yield some interesting results. Using the same basic theory as for the entire country, the county payments should reflect an amount in 1159 of either double or more than the amount collected on the old fees in 1168 since the scutage was at twice the rate. This is true for all of the counties with the exception of Essex & Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire, Warwickshire & Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, Staffordshire, Devonshire, Herefordshire, Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire, Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire, and Sussex, or ten of twenty nine counties recorded. So with these counties providing less than a full scutage, it is to be presumed that the knights were providing their service in some capacity.

Some of this may be explained by the expedition to Wales that occurred in this same year. The *Brut Y Tywysogyon* said that an expedition was led into Wales by Earl Reginald of Cornwall (who records his fees in Devonshire), and that the Earl of Bristol (Gloucester), the Earl of Clare and two other earls accompanied him.⁵ So if these earls were involved in Wales and campaigning with their own knights, then the low numbers in the counties of Devonshire, Gloucestershire, and Essex and Hertfordshire (de Clare) can be accounted for by these men serving in Wales as an alternative to going to Toulouse. The other two earls, in addition to Cornwall, Gloucester and Pembroke (de Clare), are believed to be the earls of Hertford and Salisbury.⁶ The counties of Staffordshire and Herefordshire regularly participated in the Welsh wars and so it seems reasonable to attribute their low numbers to the skirmish in Wales. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire actually come very close to meeting the 1159 scutage when the 1168 aid is doubled. These two counties are only short by a couple of pounds, and so could be considered to have paid the full scutage of 1159, but with some of the knight fees paid in different counties. This leaves Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, Warwickshire and Leicestershire, and Sussex that are short of commuting their whole service in 1159 as compared to 1168. The former two counties lack an explanation, but Sussex may be a county that was providing service for the campaign to Toulouse. Since Sussex is one of the closer counties to the continent, it would not be unreasonable to suspect that some of the knights here opted to make the voyage, but still unlikely since foreign service was not usually expected.

⁵ *Brut Y Tywysogyon*, 141.

⁶ Latimer, 'Henry II's Campaign,' 529 ; Lloyd, *A History of Wales*, 510-11.

Unfortunately, the Pipe Roll for the 1159 records every payment for the expedition to Toulouse as a *dona*, so it is difficult to perfectly distinguish the commutation of the knights from the actual *dona*. In many cases, the *dona* is recognizable when it is denoted as coming from the Jews or the moneyers, but when it comes from the ecclesiastics or the towns there is more confusion. In many instances, there will be a separate record that is recorded as the knights of a certain bishop, abbot, or town, and it is these payments that Round asserted was the actual knights' commutation.⁷ If the amount delineated specifically as being for knights, or if it is specifically called a 'scutage,' then the total collected is merely £2075 13s. 4d. or 1556 $\frac{3}{4}$ knights who commuted their service (since this scutage is at a 2 mark rate). If this amount were to be taken from the old fees of 1168, then the number of knights who actually served in Toulouse could be calculated to be 3566 men. The equations are given below:

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \text{1.} & & \text{(Old Fees in 1168) = } £3415 \text{ } 4s. \text{ } 1d. \\
 £2075 \text{ } 13s. \text{ } 4d. & \div & 2 & = & - £1037 \text{ } 16s. \text{ } 8d. \\
 \text{(1159 due @ 2 Mark rate)} & \text{(equate to 1m. Rate)} & & & \underline{£2377 \text{ } 7s. \text{ } 4d.} \\
 \\
 \text{2. } £2377 \text{ } 7s. \text{ } 4d. & \div & 13s. \text{ } 4d. & = & 3566 \text{ and } 1/20 \\
 \text{(difference)} & & \text{(1 mark)} & & \text{(Knights to Toulouse)}
 \end{array}$$

If these amounts recorded specifically as the *dona* of knights are in fact the only payments of scutage in this year, then it would appear that a significant portion of Henry II's knights actually performed their *servicium debitum* overseas in Toulouse than we are led by Robert de Torigni to believe.⁸ However, there are still some peculiarities in the Pipe Rolls. Several of the larger *dona* that are attributed to knights are listed as having been paid by tally. Henry's forces gathered in Poitiers in

⁷ *Feudal England*, 219-222.

⁸ These numbers do differ from what Round calculated, but Round was only looking at the ecclesiastical knights, and not those who are listed as the knights of the counties or towns. *Ibid.*, 222.

the summer of 1159, and the tenants-in-chief were therefore unlikely to have paid their scutage before the expedition at the time of the Easter exchequer session.⁹ This might be further evidence for an expedition to Wales at some point in this year, but without specific mention of Wales in the rolls, this is unlikely.

While in the 1159 assessment it is difficult to separate the *dona* from the actual scutage paid, it is not so difficult to do so with the 1161 scutage. In this Pipe Roll, the *dona* contributed by the cities and moneyers are clearly marked, and so can be taken out from the total to get a sense of how many knights served. To do this, the *dona* (£2602 13s. or *D*) must first be removed from the total amount due from the country (*t*). That number must then be divided by two as a reflection of 1161's scutage being at a two mark rate. This number is then subtracted from the old fees recorded in 1168 (*o*), and then the new sum divided by one mark (*m*) to total the number of knights who served. The equation then becomes thus:

$$(o - ((t - D) \div 2)) \div m$$

Including the numbers¹⁰ (all converted to pence for ease of calculating), the equation becomes:

$$(819649 - ((1127945 - 624636) \div 2)) \div 160$$

which equals 3549.9656 or 3550 knights who served in 1161. These numbers are by no means perfect, due to many of the rolls for 1161 being damaged or faded, thus preventing a perfect calculation, but certainly provide an estimate of service levels.

⁹ Warren, *Henry II*, 85. It would not be unreasonable to expect an actual *dona* to be paid and planned for before an expedition, but for a knight to plan to commute his service several months in advance seems strange.

¹⁰ Provided in Appendix 2, 1161 Scutage.

The 1162 scutage was assessed at a rate equal to that of the aid of 1168, and so should easily represent the number of knights who served. The amount due in 1162 was £1035 5s. 11d. With this subtracted from the old fees recorded in 1168, the amount *not* commuted would have been roughly £2379 8s. When this number is divided by 1 mark, which was the assessment rate, the amount calculated is 3569.1 or about 3569 knights who possibly served. This number is going to be larger than the reality due to the absence of Shropshire in 1168 and the damage to the 1162 rolls for London and Gloucestershire that prevent their scutage payments from being known.

The scutage payments for 1165 present many of the same problems as the payment for 1159, particularly with the large *dona*; this time to pay for serjeants. Regardless, with such a large campaign and considering that going to Wales was not considered a foreign expedition, service numbers were likely to be high. Determining exactly how many knights served via the method of comparing the scutage payments to 1168 would mean differentiating between which payments were for knight fees and which were for serjeants, which in many cases can be done depending on the rate of payment recorded: if payments are in divisions of 1 mark, then the payment was for knights, but if payments are in divisions of 15s. 3d. or 15s. 2d., then the payment was for serjeants. Even then, things are not as clear cut as this, as there are a couple of examples where the payment is listed as being for both knights and serjeants, and there are numerous payments made by the burghers of certain towns, which, when denoted, are clearly a *donum* of sorts, but often follow a 1 mark or £1 rate, making these *dona* appear to be a knight's scutage. These *dona* are not always well delineated, nor are the large payments that may be for both knights and serjeants, thus any attempts to apply the method already used to

determine troop levels to the campaign of 1165 will likely be more inaccurate than for other years.

Nonetheless, since 1165 appears to be a critical year in Henry's reign in terms of his influence over the baronage, an attempt will be made to gain some semblance of troop levels. To do this, all payments made at a 1 mark or £1 rate will be compared against the 1168 *auxilium* in the manner already described. Payments that are specifically recorded as being by the burghers will be excluded, but any payment recorded as being specifically for knights, even if the payment does not follow the 1 mark rate, will be included. Some additional payments will also be included that do not calculate as being a 1 mark rate, but can be seen through common sense to be for the payment of a knight.¹¹ Taking these guidelines into consideration, the amount owed in scutage for knights in 1165 was £1640 6s. 1d. This would then be calculated into service numbers following this equation:

$$\begin{array}{rclcl} (£3415\ 4s.\ 1d. - & £1640\ 6s.\ 1d.) & \div & 1\ \text{mark} \\ 1168\ \text{Old Fees} & 1165\ 1\ \text{Mark Payments} & & \text{Rate} \\ \\ (819649d. & - & 39371d.) & \div & 160d. \end{array}$$

which equals approximately 4876 $\frac{3}{4}$ knights. This is an extraordinarily high number, particularly when it should be considered that some of the payments included were undoubtedly *dona* instead of scutage, which would make this total higher. However, as previously said, there were payments for both knights and serjeants that were not included in this calculation, as there was no way to distinguish between how much of the payment was for each type of service.¹²

¹¹ An example would be the numerous payments that are of fractions of 1 mark which likely represent fractional fees.

¹² An example being that of Hugh Bigod who paid £227 10d.; some for knights, some for serjeants, but the entry is not clear as to what proportions. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 7.

The scutage for serjeants this year, at the rate of 15s. 3d. and 15s. 2d., equals a total amount due of £3304 12s. 10d. This amount would pay for roughly 537 serjeants at the 15s. 2d. rate, and 3800 serjeants at the 15s. 3d. rate, meaning Henry II likely purchased the services of 4337 serjeants. In addition to these serjeants, a pardon for the payment of a further 7 serjeants is listed in the Pipe Roll without the amount owed recorded, bringing the total serjeants possibly purchased to 4344.¹³ Whether Henry actually purchased the services of this many serjeants is unknown, but the amount due to him in the year 1165 would have allowed him to do so. Considering the fact that many of the nobility pay an extraordinary amount of scutage at the rate of a serjeant, it is likely that this payment for sergeants was in lieu of the scutage for their knights, at least partially. If these payments for serjeants were to be equated to the commutation of knights, then perhaps the knights' service levels for this year need to be adjusted down from the number calculated above.

In the thirteenth century, the serjeant was considered to be half a knight, so if the serjeant numbers were halved, this could be thought of as the equivalent of a number of knights commuting. Halving the serjeants numbers brings the total to 2172 possible knights who did not serve, which, taken from the service level given above would bring the service level for the 1165 campaign down to 2704 $\frac{3}{4}$ knights. This is probably too low an estimate, particularly since the status of a serjeant was likely not equivalent to half a knight as the fully equipped and mounted serjeants of the thirteenth century were. By analyzing twelfth-century payments in the Pipe Rolls, it appears that a serjeant is more likely to be $\frac{1}{8}$ of a knights in terms of payment.¹⁴ Knights were paid a daily wage of 8d., whereas a serjeant was paid a daily wage of 1d. Instead of halving the serjeants' numbers to get a number of

¹³ Ibid., 71, 75.

¹⁴ See above, Chapter 4, Table 14.

commuted knights, dividing the serjeants' numbers by 8 would bring a closer twelfth century equivalent. This amount then, is 543 knights commuted via a serjeantry payment, bringing the number of knights serving in 1165 down to $4333 \frac{3}{4}$ knights. This still appears to be too high a number, but another small adjustment can be made. The rate of the serjeantry payments in 1165 at 15s. 2 or 3d. would pay for a serjeant to serve for half a year being paid 1d. a day. There is, however, one reference in the Pipe Rolls that states that the payment for serjeants was to cover a quarter of a year, not half: meaning this payment, if we are to believe Hugh Bigod's statement, would cover the serjeants for a quarter of the year, being paid at 2d. a day.¹⁵ If this daily wage is to be believed, then the serjeants were being considered to be the equivalent of $\frac{1}{4}$ of a knight, or possibly covering the commutation of 1086 knights. If this many knights were taken from the service level figured above, then the adjusted level would be $3790 \frac{3}{4}$ knights serving. This is much more in line with other years: not so many more to be suspicious, but more than other years as a reflection of the vastness of the campaign.

While the adjustments to knight service levels in 1165 using the serjeantry payments makes their amount a little more palatable, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that any of these numbers are correct. Keefe has shown without a doubt that the commutation amounts for serjeantry in 1165 were in no way connected to the baron's *servicium debitum*.¹⁶ The only way these numbers can be acknowledged is by accepting that the scutage payment rates for knights had been stunted by tradition to be lower than that necessary to pay their daily wages, the scutage for serjeants was at the equivalent of their daily wages, the wages of serjeants and knights remain at a constant fractional difference that can be

¹⁵ *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 7.

¹⁶ *Feudal Assessments*, 26-9.

determined by mathematical means, and that those who paid a ‘scutage’ for serjeants did this instead of sending their knights to serve. In other words, the acceptance of these equations must be based on theory and postulation, rather than fact. We have no way of knowing what the arrangement between Henry and his barons was for this expedition, and how this would have an effect on service levels in 1165. What has been attempted here is to show a possible range of service levels, somewhere between 2704 $\frac{3}{4}$ knights and 4876 $\frac{3}{4}$ knights who owed service to the king provided this service bodily in 1165. But even with this range, nothing can be said about this year for certain due to the complicated record in the Pipe Roll which leaves little explanation for its numbers.

For the expedition to Ireland in 1172, commutation would most likely be high compared to the Welsh wars as this was a campaign conducted overseas. To compare the 1172 numbers to 1168, the total for 1172 must first eliminate $\frac{1}{3}$ of the amount due to equate its £1 rate to the 1 mark rate of 1168, thus making comparison possible. This brings the total from £3584 12s. 6d. to £2389 15s. This number then needs to be subtracted from the total of old *and* new fees in 1168 since the new fees were assessed in 1172, which then gives the total of £1402 18s. Dividing the total by 1 mark should then give a reasonable approximation of how many enfeoffed knights actually served in Ireland: 2104. For clarification’s sake, the equations are written out below:

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \text{1.} & & \\
 \begin{array}{l} \text{£3584 12s. 6d.} \\ \text{(1172 due @ £1 rate)} \end{array} & \times & \begin{array}{l} \text{(old \& new fees in 1168)} \\ \frac{2}{3} \\ \text{(equate to 1m. rate)} \end{array} = \begin{array}{l} \text{£3792 13s.} \\ - \text{£2389 15s.} \\ \hline \text{£1402 18s.} \end{array} \\
 \text{2. £1402 18s.} & \div & 13s. 4d. = 2104 \text{ and } \frac{7}{20} \\
 \text{(difference)} & & \text{(1 mark)} \quad \quad \quad \text{(Knights to Ireland)}
 \end{array}$$

These numbers of course do not include any mercenaries Henry may have hired for the expedition, or any household knights involved, so the number of knights accompanying him could be much larger. The equations for this scutage are more likely to be closer to reality than some of the other campaigns as the portion of the Pipe Roll recording the scutages in Shropshire is blank.

This method can be applied to Henry's campaign to Galloway in 1187 as well, but there are a few peculiarities to this scutage record that make it less likely to be accurate. By 1187, Henry no longer appears to be attempting to collect scutage payment from the new fees, so the record of the old fees from 1168 can be used as the base. However, there were many fiefs that the king held in wardship this year, and these are usually recorded as paying for the new fees, much as the baron or tenant-in-chief would collect from the new fees when a scutage was called. Since it is sometimes difficult to discern when this was occurring, these figures have been included in the calculations, effectively raising the number of men who commuted, which would in turn lower the number of men who served. This scutage also took place almost twenty years after the aid of 1168, and it is possible there were enough changes or agreements made to enfeoffments or individual scutage payments that the comparison between the two payments may no longer be relevant. Suffice to say, this is a less accurate reflection of service numbers than in the other years, but here are the numbers nonetheless:

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \text{1.} & & \text{(Old Fees in 1168) = } £3415 \text{ } 4s. \text{ } 1d. \\
 £2782 \text{ } 9s. \text{ } 7d. & \times & \frac{2}{3} = \text{ } \\
 \text{(1187 due @ } £1 \text{ rate)} & & \text{(equate to 1m. Rate)} \\
 & & \underline{- £1854 \text{ } 19s. \text{ } 8d.} \\
 & & \text{£1560 } 4s. \text{ } 5d.
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 \text{2. } £1560 \text{ } 4s. \text{ } 5d. & \div & 13s. \text{ } 4d. = 2340 \text{ and } \frac{1}{3} \\
 \text{(difference)} & & \text{(1 mark)} \quad \quad \quad \text{(Knights to Galloway)}
 \end{array}$$

Despite the fact that the numbers of those commuted are inflated for the reasons mentioned, there is still a strong turnout for those who served: roughly half. One would probably expect to see more men serving, but again the information given skews this payment towards showing more who paid a scutage than actually owed service to begin with.

These numbers can conversely be used to calculate how many men commuted their service, and from there how many men in total were accounted for in these years. The record of men who paid scutage is much easier to ascertain than those who did not, as the step of comparison with the 1168 aid can be left out. All that needs to be done is divide the total collected from the knights by the rate. So, in 1161 the *dona* collected must be subtracted from the total (£2602 13s. *dona* from £4699 15s. 5d. total). This gives the amount of £2097 2s. 5d. which can then be divided by the rate of 2 marks to total the number of men who commuted: 1572.84 or 1573 men. In 1162, the total amount due, £1037 5s. 11d., is simply divided by the rate of 1 mark which equals 1553 men who commuted their service. 1172 is much easier to ascertain, since the rate is at £1, the amount collected in pounds essentially equals the number of men who commuted: 3584 and 5/8ths. The total number of men recorded is then determined by adding the number of men who commuted and served together, but this is a trick of the math, as this is simply reflective of the number of men recorded in the 1168 *auxilium*. If the whole premise is subtracting the number who commute from this payment of 1168 to get the number of men who served, then adding them back in will simply give the number that we began with. In this case, it is in the low five thousands (Table 15), which is roughly equal to the number of men believed to be enfeoffed during Henry II's reign.¹⁷

¹⁷ For most of Keefe's work, he argues that there are 7525 knight fees in England, but pays little attention to the distinction between the number of knight fees, and the actual *servicia debita*. The

Table 15
*The Number of Knights Serving or Commuting in Henry II's Reign*¹⁸

Year	Served	Commuted	Total
1159	(3566 $\frac{1}{20}$)	(1556 $\frac{3}{4}$)	(5122 $\frac{4}{5}$)
1161	3550	1573	5123
1162	3569	1553	5122
1165	(2704 $\frac{3}{4}$ - 4876 $\frac{3}{4}$)	-	-
1172	2104 $\frac{7}{20}$	3584 $\frac{5}{8}$	5689 (312 from new fees)
1187	(2340 $\frac{1}{3}$)	(2782 $\frac{1}{2}$)	(5122 $\frac{5}{6}$)

The numbers of men calculated here cannot reflect exactly the number of men serving during Henry II's campaigns, but these equations do show that many men were in fact providing their *servicium debitum*, and not merely commuting it. With the knowledge that a knight's wages were higher than the amount he paid in scutage, it is strange to see such a large number of men who served compared to the number of knights who commuted. The number of men actually serving shows that they were not doing so because there was an economic advantage (unless of course they intended on making up for their expenses in plunder and winning the king's favour). So if there was no economic advantage to serving, and the option of commuting one's service was available, a large proportion of knights during Henry's reign must have still had a personal sense of obligation to serve.

It is impossible to say if this personal sense of obligation was directed at the crown in general, or at Henry II specifically. It is probably due to the specific king, since the numbers of those serving in the Ireland expedition drop compared to previous expeditions, and it has already been shown that Henry's influence over the barons was diminished after the failed expedition to Wales in 1165. Men were

number of men assessed in the 1168 *auxilium* may not be the actual *servicia debita*, but it is a reflection of what the crown/exchequer was aware of, and it is this that would have been assessed in any case. In the thirteenth century, the *servicia debita* looks to be around 7000 knights, and Keefe is right that an addition of about 2000 knights to the *servicia* seems unlikely. It must also be remembered that the constant calling of scutage under King John was turning scutage payments more into a tax than a commutation: 2000 more knights paying a low scutage is not as difficult to obtain as 2000 knights in the field. *Feudal Assessments*, 58-9, 86.

¹⁸ The amounts listed in parenthesis are questionable due to varying factors surrounding the Pipe Rolls in which they were recorded. For further information, see the appropriate section concerning these years written above.

obliged to serve the king, but whether they did so bodily was certainly dependent on their own personal loyalties to the king.

The Various Services of Southern Italy

An attempt at determining an estimated number of those who actually served in southern Italy would be impossible, since this area lacks the sources available to England. Occasionally there are glimpses into how often the army was called into being, such as at the end of the rebellion following William I's coronation, the rebellious Robert of Loritello continued to harass the Abruzzi, which caused William to keep a standing army in the north.¹⁹ But this information hardly tells us the number of men involved like what can be surmised for England. However, Norman Italy does have records of other services not regularly seen in England, particularly in the *Catalogus Baronum*. The other services listed in the *Catalogus* are those of *balistas*, *pedites armati*, and coast guard. The *pedites armati*, or 'armed foot,' are listed in the *Catalogus* exactly as the serjeants are, and in one occasion is simply the word used for the obtained serjeants in the *summa* section of the entry.²⁰ This could indicate that the serjeants were in fact foot soldiers, particularly as there is no other equivalent term. As it is, one could say with certainty that some of the serjeants were foot soldiers, but it is impossible to say that all were. The *Gesta Tancredi* does not mention serjeants being a part of the armies that followed Tancred and Bohemond to the Holy Land, but does mention foot soldiers; although their appearance is described as being 'rustic.'²¹

¹⁹ Falcandus (eng.), 77 ; Falcandus (lat.), 24.

²⁰ *Catalogus*, ¶291, ¶438, ¶445 ; for the *summa* example, ¶871.

²¹ *Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen: A History of the Normans on the First Crusade*, Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach (trans.) (Aldershot, 2005), 33 ; *Gesta Tancredi in expeditione Hierosolymitana, auctore Radulfo Cadomensi, ejus familiari*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, 3 (Paris, 1866), 613.

In addition to the serjeants included in the *augmentum*, some barons owed *balistas*, or crossbowmen. The numbers of crossbowmen included are extremely small, being only twenty in total. Of that twenty, half were provided by Raynaldus Musca, who incidentally is the only person listed as providing *vavassores*.²² The remaining crossbowmen are given in either ones or twos.²³ The lack of crossbowmen in the *Catalogus* seems even more striking when one considers Caid Peter's personal guard during William II's minority, which contained a large number of archers.²⁴ Perhaps the other bowmen, be they archers or crossbowmen, were simply included in the lists of serjeants throughout the *Catalogus*, and only these few rare cases received specific mention of their specialized arms.

There are also references to many *villani* in the survey. It is unclear why these *villani* would be mentioned, as they are listed similar to how the knights are owed for a fee. They are obviously not here inserted as an alternate for knights, as the two appear side by side, and in the case of Ripa Candida, the *summa* section only counts the knights obtained in *augmento*, but says nothing of the eight *villani* listed in that region.²⁵ These *villani* are not simply a term used instead of the name of a tenant, such as the case of a fractional fee, because they are listed as being held themselves by a certain tenant-in-chief. There is some indication that the number of *villani* a tenant-in-chief holds is somehow associated with the number of knight fees he owes, but the numbers simply do not correlate. There are two examples, entered near one another in the *Catalogus* where both tenants-in-chief hold 26 *villani*; one has a fee of 2 knights, and the other does not have a fee, but obtains 1 knight in the

²² *Catalogus*, ¶839.

²³ *Ibid.*, ¶864, ¶982 for single crossbowman ; ¶344, ¶382*, ¶806-7 for two.

²⁴ Falcandus (eng.), 147 ; Falcandus (lat.), 98.

²⁵ *Catalogus*, ¶278-90.

augmentum.²⁶ This in no way suggests that these *villani* were anything more than simple villeins as were commonly known in the middle ages, but their inclusion in the military survey is strange, particularly when there seems to be no connection between them and either the knight fees owed, or those obtained in the *augmentum*. Jamison saw these 'patrimonial' fiefs as non-military fiefs that simply provided men for the *augmento* or an aid for the *magna expeditio*, but as many of these villeins are said to make up fiefs, there appears to be little basis for her argument.²⁷

While for most cases in southern Italy the church did not have a *servicium debitum* other than to provide for the *magna expeditio*, there was the occasional exception. At some time in the reign of Roger II (probably in the later part of his reign) a dispute arose between the Abbot of Montecassino and John de Boccio over the rights of a certain area of land. This land owed military service, and the final pronouncement where the service from this land is concerned came to be that the two men's vassals would share the service of one knight to the king.²⁸ Graham Loud found that the churches in the Byzantine areas of southern Italy provided aids for the army, but not men, and that the churches in the Lombard regions provided actual service, but not on a tenure basis.²⁹

On perhaps an unrelated note, in the Constitutions of Melfi, a law promulgated by either William I or William II states that on the death of a Bishop or Archbishop, the ecclesiastical lands would no longer be held by the king until the vacancy was filled, but rather held jointly by the three 'better, more faithful, and also wiser' members of the church.³⁰ This is certainly not the case of how England handled vacant Ecclesiastical properties, and while it was a law added after the

²⁶ Ibid., ¶473, ¶476.

²⁷ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 10.

²⁸ Jamison, 'Norman Administration,' 432-3, cap. 37.

²⁹ Loud, *The Latin Church*, 344-5.

³⁰ *Liber Augustalis*, Bk. 3, title. xxxi, 122.

Norman *regno* was established in southern Italy, it is perhaps indicative of the greater freedoms the church enjoyed under the southern Normans. With these freedoms, of course, was the lack of owed military service.

The Magna Expeditio

While these various services listed in the *Catalogus* receive little mention in England, they were still known to exist. It has previously been stated that the purpose of the *Catalogus Baronum*'s existence was to establish the extra/*augmentum* knights obtained for the *magna expeditio*. This service, the *magna expeditio*, is not specifically mentioned as existing in England, but it has been argued previously that there is some evidence for this being the case. An explanation of just what this service was and how it applied in southern Italy is then necessary.

The *magna expeditio* was a summons, by the king, for all able men to serve; normally for the emergency protection of the kingdom. It is in actuality very similar to the Norman concept of *arrière-ban* (*retrobannus*). Keefe believed that because of the *arrière-ban*, the number of knight owing service was lower in Normandy than in England, because the English did not have this emergency call to service.³¹ The *Catalogus* is very similar in this respect, in that the knight fees tend to be rather small, few ever owe above four knights. The knights obtained for the *magna expeditio* are recorded in the *Catalogus* in those knights listed as being *cum augmento*.³² When the *augmentum* is recorded, the number of knights obtained is almost always double that of the owed fee, and it can be seen from the *summa* at the

³¹ The Norman survey (the *Infeudationes militum*) did not record this extra service, only what was the owed service. *Feudal Assessments*, 74.

³² A typical entry of the *Catalogus* would read "*Aliduca Marrune dixit quod tenet in Morcona feudum unius militis et cum augmento obtulit milites duos.*" *Catalogus*, ¶369. Compare this to the few scattered entries that keep the same form, but change *augmento* to *magne expeditionis* and it is clear these are meant to be similar. An example would be *Catalogus*, ¶491 "*Episcopus Capuacci pro eo quod tenet de Regalibus obtulit pro auxilio magne expeditionis milites octo et servientes viginti.*"

end of some sections that this *augmentum* is in addition to the owed fees, not inclusive, therefore creating a large army at the Sicilian king's disposal. The doubling in the *augmentum* is so consistent that it would be unreasonable to compare it to the recording of new enfeoffments, as is the case in England; it is obviously a number that has been determined by the king as a reflection of each tenant-in-chief's ability to provide men for his army.³³

There is nothing in the *Catalogus Baronum* to suggest that personal service was a requirement for the *magna expeditio*, but considering this was to be the calling of all able-bodied free men to serve, it was probably expected.³⁴ There are however many poor tenants-in-chief who offer only their own personal service for the *magna expeditio* and nothing else (not even regular service). This may be an indication that personal service for all of these tenants-in-chief was not a requirement, for both the *magna expeditio* and regular service, just that they provide the number of knights stipulated.³⁵

The term *augmentum*, while already liberally used throughout, deserves some explanation and definition. Unfortunately, a true definition of the word *augmentum* cannot be given since it only occurs in the *Catalogus Baronum*. To judge based on its context, the word appears to mean an addition, and may simply be a cognate of the word 'augment.' On the few occasions when the term is not used in the *Catalogus*, the entries state that the tenant-in-chief in question is obtaining men for the *magna expeditio*. The entries containing the term *augmentum* usually do not include mention of this military expedition, they just merely denote an addition.

³³ Cahen chose to see the *magna expeditio* as calling upon the extra enfeoffed knights in the kingdom, but if this were actually the case, the numbers of the *augmentum* could not possibly be such a consistent doubling of the *servicium debitum*. *Le Régime Féodal*, 70. To further back the emergency nature of this service, there are rare occasions where service beyond the *augmentum* is agreed to, such as the Count of Albe who said '*si necessitas fuerit in marchia et in provincial illa habebit universam gentem suam.*' *Catalogus*, ¶1112.

³⁴ Jamison, 'Additional Work,' 5-6.

³⁵ *Le Régime Féodal*, 72.

After all, the phrase is specifically '*et cum augmento obtulit*' or 'with the *augmentum* he obtains.' Since it is fairly clear that this *augmentum* is for the *magna expeditio*, it could be that the term '*augmentum*' has a specific military connotation, and may be the reason why it is not found outside the *Catalogus*.

It is also worth considering the phrasing of the ecclesiastical entries that do not contain the term *augmentum*. These are typically phrased as '*obtulit pro auxilio magne expeditionis*' or 'he obtains for the aid of the great expedition.' Should the term *augmentum* have a specific military meaning, this phrase by the ecclesiastics, stating that they provide men for the *aid* of the expedition, may mean that their knights and serjeants may not have been fighting men at all, or where not meant to engage in combat. It has already been shown through the infeudation process that the Normans in southern Italy felt strongly that the church was not going to provide fighting men, so why would this be different for the *magna expeditio* (aside from the fact that these were called in a case of emergency)? Perhaps an inappropriate analogy, but if *auxilium* is the term to denote a non-military scutage, then why not *auxilium* for a non-fighting man? There is no certainty of this due to the peculiarities and uncertainties surrounding the term *augmentum*, but knowing the place of the church in terms of its military obligations, it is a possibility.

Naval Service

Another service that receives attention in the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy but is rarely mentioned in England is the *custodia maritime*, or coast guard. The coast guard service of southern Italy is uniquely offered in the province of Taranto in the constabulary of Roger Fleming according to the *Catalogus*.³⁶ A

³⁶ Although this constabulary is not named as such in the *Catalogus*.

common coast guard entry reads: ‘Sarolus de Mottola holds in Mottola the fee of half a knight and with the *augmentum* he offers himself to coast guard.’³⁷ None of the coast guard entries are of a full knight or more, and the tenant-in-chief always offers himself to coast guard in the *augmentum*. The offering of one’s self to service in the *augmentum* is common amongst the poor fees, and it is possible that coast guard service was an option to the poorer fee holders. However, only one coast guard fee is listed as being poor, and his service is included in the sum of the knights at the end of the section, suggesting that other coast guard services may have been extant throughout the areas recorded by the *Catalogus*, but did not receive special indication as it did in Roger Fleming’s constabulary.³⁸

As for serving in a Norman navy, the *Catalogus* provides no information. The evidence that the Normans in Italy were a sea power to reckon with is evident by their expeditions across the Mediterranean to Majorca, Tunisia, Malta, and the Balkans, not to mention the necessity of a naval power in taking Palermo in the first place.³⁹ It is known from Arabic sources that William II of Sicily sent a large and well equipped fleet against Alexandria in 1174, with “30,000 men on one fleet of 600 ships.”⁴⁰ This is, of course, an exaggeration of numbers, particularly since this expedition ended in a Norman defeat, but it illustrates the belief that the Normans were a strong naval power.

³⁷ *Sarolus de Mutula tenet in Mutula feudum dimidii militis et cum augmento obtulit se ipsam ad custodiam maritime. Catalogus*, ¶199.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ¶235. Cahen did not see coast guard as a service for the ‘urban’ knights, but for that of the ‘bourgeois’ or town knights, and even then the poor knights. This is not reflected in the *Catalogus*, because again, only in Taranto are these services listed, and only one of the knights is mentioned as being poor. *Le Régime Féodal*, 73. A charter by Frederick II in the 1240s actually outlines the equipment that a knight serving coast guard was to possess, which included one horse, shield, *panzeria* (‘cloth’) or tunic, cap and lance: certainly modest equipment, but not necessarily easily obtainable by a poor man. *Acta Imperii Inedita*, 701, no. 924. There is likewise little record of this service in England, but there are occasionally knights who are paid in the Pipe Rolls to act as a coast guard. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 102; *P.R. 13 Henry II*, 201.

³⁹ For an overview of the Norman’s activities in the Mediterranean, see Abulafia, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Africa.’

⁴⁰ Imad-ad-din, *Le Livre des Deux Jardins*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Orientaux*, 4 (Paris, 1898), 167 ; Abulafia, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Africa,’ 45, n.107.

The Normans of Italy must have come a long way from when they first arrived in the area, as there are some early references to the Normans' ignorance of naval warfare. Amatus of Montecassino recounts a story where Roger I and Robert Guiscard were failing in a siege of Palermo because the inhabitants were able to get supplies from the sea; only after Robert attacked another city and seized a fleet of ships to form a blockade were they able to finally take Palermo, but they moved on to take Bari with this tactic instead.⁴¹ Perhaps even more damning than this is a statement by William of Apulia of Roger's defeat of the Byzantines by sea, where he notes that Robert "greatly rejoiced at the novelty of the victory, hoping in consequence that he and the Normans might in the future engage in battle at sea with more hope of success."⁴² William also claimed during his account of the siege of Bari, that "The Norman race had up to this point known nothing of naval warfare."⁴³

Just who was serving on these ships, since they do not appear to be enfeoffed knights, remains a mystery.⁴⁴ It certainly appears that the initial tactic of Norman naval warfare was to simply use ships as transportation devices, in which case anyone who was a part of the called army may have been performing his service and manning ships at the same time: making the Norman navy an afterthought to the *expeditio*. As shown in the story of the siege of Palermo above, the early Norman

⁴¹ Amatus of Montecassino, *The History of the Normans*, Prescott N. Dunbar (trans.) (Woodbridge, 2004), V.26, 143; Charles D. Stanton, 'The Use of Naval Power in the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily,' *The Haskins Society Journal*, Stephen Morillo and William North (eds.), 19 (2007), 125.

⁴² "multum simul et novitiate triumphi / Aequei gaudet, securius unde subire / Iam cum Normannis navalia proelia sperat." Guillaume de Pouille, *La Geste de Robert Guiscard*, Marguerite Mathieu (ed. and trans.) (Palermo, 1961), 136-8, bk. 3, lns. 136-8, English translation by Graham Loud ; Stanton, 'The Use of Naval Power,' 126.

⁴³ "Gens Normannorum navalis nescia belli" Ibid., 170, bk 3, ln. 132. English translation by Graham Loud ; Stanton, 'The Use of Naval Power,' 135.

⁴⁴ There is however a little evidence towards some churches owing men to serve in the fleets. The see of Lipari was freed from an obligation to provide 20 sailors in 1177, but there is no evidence that these men were enfeoffed. Likewise, a court in 1197 determined that the men of St. Nicholas in Bari had always been free of Naval Service, but whether this service was previously expected by St. Nicholas because of its ecclesiastic stature or because of its proximity to the sea is unknown. Loud, *The Latin Church*, 359-60.

tactic for gaining sea vessels was to appropriate them from the cities they conquered, and this may mean they conscripted the owners and inhabitants of port towns to operate the vessels, rather than have a particular obligation in place that served via tenure.⁴⁵ Charles Stanton, noting the large number of Muslims who made up Roger I's armies, thought that these men were providing the naval service that the Normans needed.⁴⁶ If it could be proved that Roger was sailing from siege to siege, then perhaps this thought would have more merit, but as there seems to be little evidence of the exact composition of a Norman vessel, nothing can be said for certain. Geoffrey of Malaterra does state that one of the Norman ships was able to sail amongst Saracen ships in the dark, and were undetected because the crew were fluent in Arabic and Greek.⁴⁷ This does not necessarily attest to the crew's race, but may indicate that at least their vessels looked similar to the Saracen ships.

The fact that Muslims made up a large portion of the Norman armies is an element of continuity between the period of the early Norman invasions of Sicily, and the later established kingdom. Hugo Falcandus provides a short passage that describes the make-up of William I's army as both Christian and Muslim during an expedition against Roger Sclavus.⁴⁸ After taking the town of Piazza Armerina, the Christian and Muslim forces of the army began rioting against one another, and many of the Muslims were killed. Somewhat surprisingly, when William sent help to stop the infighting, he sent the aid to the Muslims in his army, and not the Christians. Muslims therefore were an equal and important part of the southern Norman army, but there is no indication of whether they were equally enfeoffed as knights or not. Malaterra uses the term 'Sicilian' (*Sicilienses*) as almost a synonym

⁴⁵ Stanton, 'The Use of Naval Power,' 127-9, 133.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 133.

⁴⁷ Malaterra (eng.), IV.2, 178 ; Malaterra (lat.), 86.

⁴⁸ Falcandus (eng.), 124 ; Falcandus (lat.), 73

with 'Muslim' and has stated that Roger used 'Sicilian' knights whom he enfeoffed on conquered lands, but he also says that Roger summoned many Saracens in additions to knights at a later time, which may suggest the opposite (or that the Muslims may have been enfeoffed, just not considered knights).⁴⁹

The necessity of a navy in southern Italy and Sicily also led to the creation of the office of admiral. The admiral has its origins in Arabic Sicily, where the *emir* was the governor of Palermo. Under the Normans, the position of the admiral would be entrusted to those working in the treasury or the Arabic *dîwân*, and was always appointed to a Greek from the Norman controlled regions: most from the family of one of the earliest Greek admirals, Eugenius.⁵⁰ There were multiple admirals in early Norman Italy serving at the same time, but the first to be considered the leading admiral was George of Antioch who first gained the title *amiratus amiratorum*. George was a superb and successful naval leader and tactician, and it is thought by some historians that it was during his admiralty that the position became associated with naval leadership.⁵¹ Later, an admiral named Philip of Mahdia was thought to be a secret Muslim and was accused of being an apostate. This caused his removal from the admiralty and his replacement by Maio: a Latin who subsequently removed all the other Greek admirals to replace them with his own Latin relatives.⁵² Maio was eventually murdered in 1160, and the office of admiral essentially went by the wayside until it was revived in late 1170s with Walter of Moac. By this time, the

⁴⁹ Malaterra (eng.), III.20, 150; IV.17, 194; IV.22, 200 ; Malaterra (lat.), 69, 96, 100.

⁵⁰ Evelyn Jamison, *Admiral Eugenius of Sicily: His Life and Work and the Authorship of the Epistola ad Petrum and the Historia Hugonis Falcandi Siculi*, (London, 1957), 33-4. The Eugenius mentioned here is the first Eugenius, whereas the main subject of Jamison's book is the second Eugenius, grandson of the first.

⁵¹ Léon-Robert Menager, *Amiratus – Ἀμειράς: L'Émirat et les Origines de l'Amirauté (XI^e – XIII^e siècles)* (Paris, 1960), 49.

⁵² Jamison, *Admiral Eugenius*, 42-3.

office was seen to be solely a naval one, but Walter still retained the separate title of *magister regie* of both the *duane baronum* and the *duane de secretis*.⁵³

While the office of admiral eventually becomes that of a military naval commander, it is its initial phases as an administrative officer that has gained the attention of most historians. This is probably due to necessity from the sources, as the names of these great men can be traced through the many administrative documents pertaining to grants and other documents that contain their names. For their duties in the military, we are much more reliant upon what chronicles can tell us, as the major military survey of the *Catalogus Baronum* is only created towards the end of the first phase of the admiralty. The Norman chroniclers were at pains to stress the military prowess of the Normans, yet it is clear from the evidence above that they had little experience with fighting at sea using Mediterranean tactics. This is probably why the office was always appointed to a Greek, as they would have had the experience, and being Christian were probably thought to be more trustworthy than a Muslim. Whether the office had its origins in a naval capacity becomes difficult to say, as the chroniclers were probably not eager to represent the military successes of the Greeks, and many victories were attributed to the appropriate Norman king or commander anyway.

The naval situation in England is possibly even more mysterious. Ships were of course used for transportation to and from England, and examples could include the 1172 expedition to Ireland, the various ferry crossings from Dover mentioned in the Pipe Rolls or even the numerous ships built by William I for the invasion of England as depicted in the Bayeux Tapestry. A discussion of the military navy of the Anglo-Normans should start with the Cinque Ports. These five ports, consisting

⁵³ Ibid., 45, 54.

chiefly of Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich (others were included later) were a recognized collection of towns in the south east with certain privileges granted or confirmed by the crown. These privileges are thought to date back before the Conquest, to at least 1051. Included in these privileges was an annual ship-service due from some of the ports, which, in later years, consisted of 20 ships with 21 men each serving for a 15 day period.⁵⁴ Theories behind the purpose of these owed ships range from providing transport, to forming the core of the king's naval forces, but each of these theories have problems. For transport, the ports are in the wrong part of the country to be of much use to kings who were constantly travelling back and forth between Normandy and England; as N.A.M. Rodger pointed out, the position of the Cinque Ports were in a better position to sail to Flanders than Normandy.⁵⁵ Also the numerous accounts of ferry service between Dover and the continent contained in the Pipe Rolls could be considered proof that this was not an owed service, since it was being paid (unless of course, these are records of service that was paid for beyond the owed 15 days – a regular owed service just would not have been recorded in the same way). The 15 day service period would have been too short for any serious naval expedition, which hurts the theory of these actually being of a military application, but again the king could pay for service beyond the 15 days.

The actual naval power of Anglo-Norman England is difficult to define as there appears to be contradictory evidence. While the Anglo-Saxons were known to have a powerful navy with fleets established around London and Sandwich, the service of the *fyrd* available at sea when calling a *scipfyrd*, and the hiring of Danish mercenaries under kings Cnut and Harthacnut, the Normans appear to have let these

⁵⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, 'The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports,' *The English Historical Review*, 111 (1996), 641.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 648-9.

powerful naval forces go once they obtained power. William the Conqueror had no real navy to speak of before 1066, and had to build his fleet for the invasion; an event depicted in the Bayeux Tapestry and mentioned by William of Poitiers.⁵⁶ William then faced subsequent problems with Danish invaders in England because he was unable to stop the Danish fleets with his own.⁵⁷ Henry II also had difficulties in his Welsh campaigns with ships he had hired from the Irish to support him, but there is no mention of his own ships being used.⁵⁸

There are, however, some indications of naval strength with the Normans. With Henry I's agreement in 1101 with Count Robert II of Flanders, Henry would pay £500 annually in exchange for the service of 1000 mounted soldiers (*equites*).⁵⁹ As a part of this agreement, Henry was to provide the necessary ships to transport not only the 1000 men from Flanders to England, but also three horses for each man (or 3000 horses).⁶⁰ This indicates that Henry either was capable, or he simply *thought* he was capable of amassing a fleet large enough for these men and their horses (although there is the stipulation that the king must provide the transport within one month, allowing leeway for multiple cross-channel trips). William of Malmesbury states that this 'treaty' was actually reinstating an agreement established between William I and Baldwin V of Flanders, making the ability for a large fleet date even earlier, but perhaps William was capable of assembling a large transport fleet by using the boats already created for the 1066 invasion.⁶¹

⁵⁶ William of Poitiers, *The Gesta Guillelmi*, R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (eds. and trans.), Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1998), 102, 108 ; The Bayeux Tapestry, in *English Historical Documents*, 2, David C. Douglas and George W. Greenway (eds.) (London, 1961), 257-8, plates xxxvii-xxxix.

⁵⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain*, 1 (London, 1997), 38.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 40-1.

⁵⁹ 'The Anglo-Flemish Treaty of 1101,' Elisabeth Van Houts (trans.) *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 21, (1999), 170, no. 2, 173, no. 18.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 170, no. 2.

⁶¹ Renée Nip, 'The Political Relations Between England and Flanders (1066-1128),' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 21 (1999), 159.

As for William's assembled fleet, there is the evidence of a vast amount of ship building from the Bayeux Tapestry, but also a twelfth century record of ships purported to be those owed to the Conqueror for the invasion of England.⁶² This lists fourteen of the duke's major barons as promising a total of 776 ships for the channel crossing which, if accurate, demonstrates that the knowledge of ship building and usage was alive and well in Normandy, despite the fact they seem to have no desire to engage in naval battles. With such a large fleet, William probably outnumbered the ships Harold had collected to defend the island, but that William waited until Harold moved to the north and the Anglo-Saxon fleet returned to London and Sandwich before he made his crossing indicates that William did not wish to engage in a naval battle, despite probable superior numbers. The Norman mindset concerning ships appears to be what the Anglo-Saxon mindset was towards horses: they were a means of transportation, not a weapon of war. Not until Richard I came back from the third crusade and witnessed the applications of ships in the Mediterranean did the Normans in England use ships for anything but transport, much like the Normans in southern Italy during their formative years.⁶³

⁶² For a copy of this text and a discussion of its validity, see Elisabeth Van Houts, 'The Ship List of William the Conqueror,' *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 10 (1988), 159-183.

⁶³ Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, 46.

Chapter 6

Castles and Castle Guard

While much of the discussion so far has focused on service in the field, an equally important topic that deserves attention is service within castles, or castle guard. The term ‘castle guard,’ or ‘ward service,’ is a literal description of what it actually was: performing a military service to guard a castle. More specifically it is describing men who owed this service to their lord, and not someone who was being paid to provide the service. Sadly, there are few documents from the eleventh and twelfth centuries that specifically cover castle guard service, so we must look instead to the thirteenth century, and try to work backwards.

There are a few surveys collected in the *Red Book of the Exchequer* that list various tenants who owed knights to perform guard duty at different castles in the realm of England. There are both baronial and royal castles interspersed amongst other surveys, and while baronial castles can sometimes provide interesting anecdotes and facts, this study is concentrating on the arrangements made by the crown. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any uniformity in the way men were provided for castle guard; not in numbers, service period, or commutation rates. Of the royal castles that have records from the thirteenth century, it can be seen in Table 16 that there is very little these castles have in common when it comes to the details of their service.

Table 16.
Royal Castle Guard

Royal Castle	Number of Baronies Serving	Service Period	Commutation Rate	Size of Permanent Garrison
Devises ¹	-	40 days	20s.	-
Dover ²	9	30 days	10s.	(24)
Norwich ³	7	90 days	-	(50)
Rochester ⁴	5	-	12s.	-
Rockingham ⁵	4	40 days	4-6s.	(13-14)
Windsor ⁶	4	40 days	20s.	(8)

There are royal castles other than those listed in Table 16 for which there is little or no record of owed service. It is known that 16 baronies had fees owing service at Newcastle that were the responsibility of the Sheriff of Northumberland and the Bishop of Durham, two early thirteenth-century documents show that York castle had a couple of tenants responsible for paying for crossbowmen to serve for 40 days (an unusual owed service not found in any other castle), and Salisbury had at least three barons owing service, possibly more.⁷ Northampton likewise had a castle guard that may have been set up similar to Rockingham, but paid a 10s. commutation on each fee.⁸ Lincoln also had some form of castle guard, but the details are fragmentary.⁹ Otherwise, there appears to be no record for other royal castles such

¹ *Rotuli Hundredorum temp. Hen. III & Edw. I*, W. Illingworth (ed.), 2 (London, 1818), 236.

² *RBE*, 706-11.

³ Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' 452-3; Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle*, 66-8.

⁴ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 158-9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 149-50; Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' 453.

⁶ *RBE*, 716-17; Round, 'Castle Guard,' 151.

⁷ For Newcastle: *RBE*, 606. There are 16 baronies listed owing fees, but the *summa* says that 48 $\frac{1}{3}$ fees are the responsibility of the Sheriff of Northumberland, and 10 fees are the responsibility of the Bishop of Durham. These 58 $\frac{1}{3}$ fees are close to the 56 $\frac{1}{3}$ total gained by adding the fees of the 16 baronies together, and must be representative of the same set. For York: *The Victoria history of the county of York, The City of York*, W. Page, and P.M. Tillott (eds.) (London, 1961), 521. For Salisbury: *RBE*, 236, 239-40, 242.

⁸ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 213; 11 $\frac{2}{3}$ fees are recorded as owing castle guard at Northampton, or of paying a 10s. commutation per fee in 1252. *Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery)*, 1 (London, 1916), 52-3, no. 149.

⁹ In addition to the fees that the Bishop of Lincoln was known to owe, there is a record of tenants from La Haye, the city of Lincoln, and Stouwe recorded in 1331, as well as two small inquests performed in 1335 where it was known castle guard was owed, but the jurors admitted to knowing little else. *The Registrum Antiquissimum of the Cathedral Church of Lincoln*, C. W. Foster (ed.), 1 (Hereford, 1931); *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum 1066-1154*, H.W.C. Davis, C. Johnson, H.A. Cronne (eds.), 2

as Cambridge, Carlisle, Colchester, Canterbury, Nottingham, Pevensey, The Tower of London, or Winchester.

The English Example of Dover

The most complete record of castle guard is that for Dover Castle, and while it appears to be an unusual case, it is the best place to begin. It must be remembered though, that this information is seen through documents from the thirteenth century, and therefore gives an unclear image of how castle guard was initially formed. The *Red Book of the Exchequer* has three different surveys for castle guard service at Dover, all recorded in the mid-thirteenth century, which will here be referred to simply as List 1, List 2 and List 3 in the order in which they appear in the *Red Book*.¹⁰ List 1 and List 3 appear to be the same, one copied from the other. They record the nine names of the barons owing service at Dover (or the traditional names associated with these obligations). These names are the Constable, Abrincis, Robert of Dover, Arsic, Peverel, Mamenot, Port, Crevequer, and Adam fitz William.¹¹ An

(Oxford, 1956), 268, no. 1791 ; *Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem and other Analogous Documents*, 7 (London, 1909), 223, no. 300, 465-6, no. 681.

¹⁰ *RBE*, 613-18, 706-11, 717-22. The first of these was figured to be dated around 1211-12 by Hall, but he says in a footnote that it was written in a later hand.

¹¹ Any discrepancies between List 1 and List 3 are thus:

The constable is exactly alike aside from spelling.

Abrincis: List 3 makes clear that 3 men who serve a total of 29 days count as one fee, whereas List 1 does not, but the total given as the *summa* is the same in both.

Robert de Dover: Same in both.

Arsic: List 3 adds *Feodum Svindone* (Swindon, Wilts.), *j militem* / *Feodum Kersintone* (Cassington Oxon.), *j militem*, but gives the *summa* of 15 knights when the actual count is 18. List 1, which is missing these two names, gives the *summa* of 18 (the amount actually recorded in List 3), but has an actual listing of 16 knights (a reflection of the two fees of *Svindone* and *Kersintone* missing).

Peverhelle: In List 3, a quarter fee is recorded as *Dei Inimicus* (The Enemy of God) but is left out of the *summa* and not recorded in List 1.

Maminot: List 1 leaves out the record of one fee for *Hugo de Chastillons* and the three fees for *Thumingam* which are recorded in List 3.

de Port: Essentially the same between the two lists.

Crevequer: List 1 is missing the 20 days of service by *Badlesmere* for Crevequer recorded in List 3. The *summa* for both is for 5 knights, and likely what occurred is the scribe for List 1 took that number literally for the names, whereas List 3 has three men serving a total of 60 days counting as 2 knights (there are other instances in these records where one knight serves a 30 day period, essentially making them equivalent).

examination gives the impression that List 1 is a copy of List 3, so the information in these two records should be set against List 2, which contains much more information about the fees; including the amount their service was worth, and how many times a year they served. The value of fees is consistent throughout: one fief's service has the value of 10 shillings. If a certain person owed three fees once a year, then his service would be at the value of 30 shillings. Also, if a single fee owed service three times a year, it also was worth 30 shillings. It seems clear from List 2, that there were not variable service periods, but a single period that could be served multiple times. The list of thirteen groupings under the constable spells out that these men each serve for one month, suggesting a 30 day period. Most other fees do not specify what time period they serve, but do explicitly state that they do their ward once, twice or three times a year. If these multiple service periods are broken down to represent the theoretical number of knights provided by each barony, there is some surprising regularity.¹² The numbers are not the clean 39 fees from 5 baronies, 39 fees from 3 combined baronies and the 56 fees from the constable that Sidney Painter presented, but they are very close.¹³ This means there were about 288 service periods (or theoretical knights) that were used to provide the guard at Dover castle, which would have been split amongst the constable and the various baronies in some fashion (but the total does conveniently divide into 24 knights a month over the course of a year).

Adam FitzWilliam: Only three fees are recorded in List 3, with a *summa* of 6 knights. List 1 manages to find these extra 3 knights to match the *summa* by writing out the same three fees a second time, not even trying to collaborate on his own spelling (*de Dene* becomes *de la Done* and *Gravelega* becomes *Gravele*, but he at least recreates *Hertangre* the same both times).

Crevequer and Adam fitz William are placed at the ends of both List 2 and List 3, but have been moved to just after the Constable's record in List 1.

¹² See Table 17. For clarity's sake, using the barony of *Arsyke*, 15 knights serve twice and 3 knights serve three times. This makes for a total of 18 *real* knights, but 39 *theoretical* knights ((15 x 2) + (3 x 3) = 39).

¹³ Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' 452.

Table 17
Baronies and Fees Serving at Dover Castle

Names (Barony)	Fees Once	Serving Value	Fees Twice	Serving Value	Fees Thrice	Serving Value	Theoretical Knights
Constable	56 ¹ / ₁₀	£28. 1s. ¹					56 ¹ / ₁₀
Haughley)							
Averenge	2 ³ / ₄	£1. 7s.	18 ¹ / ₄	£16. 5s.			39 ¹ / ₄
Folkestone)							
Foubert			6	£6	9	£13. 10s.	39
(Chilham)							
Arsyke			15	£15	3	£4. 10s. ²	39
Cogges)							
Peveler			6	£6	8 ¹ / ₄	£12. 7s. 6d.	36 ³ / ₄
(Wrinstead)							
Wamenot	9	£4. 10s.	15	£15			39
West							
Greenwich)							
Port			10	£10	2	£3	26
Basing)							
Crevequer			3 fees, 1 tenant for 20 days	£3. 13s. 4d.	2 tenants, 1 for 18 days, 1 for 20 days	£2	11 ¹ / ₃
(Chatham)							
Certain Wards	1 for 15 days	10s.	2 for 15 days	£2			2 ¹ / ₂
Adam William)	fitz						

¹ The two fees in Welles are recorded as being worth only 10s. instead of the 20s. one would expect. However, the *summa denariorum* for the constable appears to count this as being worth 20s. It is the *summa* which has been recorded here. *RBE*, 707.

² The actual amount recorded is £4, but again one of the fees serving thrice per year is valued at only 20s. rather than the 30s. one would expect, and this extra 10s. is included in the *summa*. However, the *summa* does say there are only 17 ¹/₂ fees, whereas 18 fees are recorded. *RBE*, 709.

While castle guard at Dover was provided by these barons named above, the more important information of the names of their baronies was not provided. When these are determined, the baronies serving at Dover are in some surprising places. Abrincis was, in actuality, William II d'Avranches, the Baron of Folkestone and the man whose barony was in closest proximity to Dover castle. His great grandfather, Rualon d'Avranches gained the lands by marrying Maud, grand-daughter of William de Arques who originally held the barony from Odo of Bayeux.¹⁴ William's daughter would eventually be the sole heir, and would marry Hamo II de Crevequer of Chatham. Robert Arsic held the Barony of Cogges, which was originally made up of the lands held by Wadard of Odo of Bayeux in Oxfordshire.¹⁵ The honor of Peverel was probably the Barony of Wrinstead and had fallen into the crown's hand since 1148.¹⁶ Maminot was actually the Barony of West Greenwich held by Geoffrey de Say, but gets the name from Gilbert de Maminot who originally held the honor from Odo of Bayeux.¹⁷ Crevequer was the barony of Chatham held by Hamo II de Crevequer at the time of the survey. The lands were originally held by Robert le Latin from Odo in *Domesday*, but passed to Hamo I de Crevequer, great grandfather to Hamo II, sometime in William II's reign.¹⁸ Robert de Dover is also listed as the Barony of Fouberd in List 2. This name used for the barony is likely a reference to Fulbert I de Dover who held the Barony of Chilham from Odo of Bayeux up until the 1120s.¹⁹ At the time castle guard was recorded, the barony was held by Rose, daughter of Fulbert II, and great-great granddaughter to Fulbert I.

¹⁴ Sanders, *English Baronies*, 45.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 97-8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 111. The connection between many of the baronies serving castle guard at Dover and the names on the Bayeux inquest of 1133 lead Round to suggest that this Robert de Dover was actually Robert de Douvres, Baron of Fouberd in the Bessin, east of Bayeux and North of Caen. This, however, is an unlikely connection. Round, *Family Origins*, 213.

Table 18
The Inheritance of Dover Castle Guard by Barony¹

	Folkestone	Cogges	Wrinstead	West Greenwich	Chatham	Chilham	Basing	Haughley
Time of the Survey	William II 1230	Robert 1230	In Escheat	Alice Geoffrey de Say 1230	Hamo m. 1263	II Rose	William de St. John 1239	In Escheat
Fifth Generation	Simon 1203	Alexander 1202		Walkeline II 1190	Robert (1216)	II Fulbert 1205	Adam 1213	Thomas, Count of Perche (1217)
Fourth Generation	William (1177)	I Manasser II 1171-2	William II 1147-8	Walkeline I 1145-57	Daniel 1177	John 1194		Geoffrey, Count of Perche 1202
Third Generation	Maud 1130-4	Robert (<i>ante</i> 1161)	William Peverel (1133)	Hugh fitz Gilbert (<i>ante</i> 1131)	Robert 1154-5	I Hugh 1171-2	John 1167	Henry of Essex (1163 deposed)
Second Generation	Emma	Mannasier I (1110)			Hamo I de Crevequer (<i>ante</i> 1119)		Henry (1153)	Alice (<i>post</i> 1142)
First Generation	William de Arques (1090)	Wadard	In Escheat	Bilbert de Maminot 1101	Robert le Latin	Fulbert 1121-30	Hugh de Port (lands in Kent) 1096	Hugh II 1100
Original Holder	Odo	Odo	Odo	Odo	Odo	Odo	Odo	Hugh I de Montfort

¹ Dates provided are the years the various barons died. Dates in parenthesis indicate that the actual year of death is unknown, but this is last known year of activity for that particular baron.

Three of the listed baronies serving castle guard at Dover are more difficult to place, as there is no determined head of these baronies. The Honour of Port derives its name from Adam de Port, Lord of Basing in Hampshire. His great grandfather, Hugh de Port, held land from Odo of Bayeux in Kent as recorded in *Domesday Book*, and it is these areas that may have been responsible for the castle guard owed by Port.²⁰ In *Domesday*, Hugh de Port held twelve different manors from Odo, which is an intriguing similarity to the twelve knights that Adam de Port would eventually owe in castle guard to Dover.²¹ Interestingly, in the 1166 *Cartae Baronum*, Manasser II de Arsic, lord of Cogges, accounted for one of de Port's knight fees in Hampshire.²² It has been suggested by Round that the lands of the Constable are the barony of Haughley in Suffolk, presumably because the lords of Haughley were at one time the king's constable.²³ The honour was in escheat during 1166, and so has no return in the *Cartae Baronum*, but it is known to have owed four knights to the Archbishop of Canterbury as recorded in the *Domesday Monachorum*.²⁴ This at least shows that a barony in Suffolk could be serving a lord in Kent militarily. The 'certain wards' belonging to Adam fitz William are even more difficult to locate than those belonging to Port. Of the three lands belonging to fitz William, named *Herthangre*, *Gravenel*, and *de la Dune*, only *Gravenel* can be identified with some certainty as being Graveney which was held by one of the Archbishop's knights named Richard in *Domesday Book*.²⁵ *Herthangre* may possibly be 'Hartanger' in *Domesday* which is now called Barfreton. This was held by a man named Ralph

²⁰ Sanders, *English Baronies*, 9, 105.

²¹ *Domesday Book*, 14, 17, 19, 22, 24-6.

²² *RBE*, 209.

²³ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 152 ; Sanders, *English Baronies*, 120 n. 5.

²⁴ Sanders, *English Baronies*, 121; *Domesday Monachorum*, 105. During the time of the *Domesday Monachorum*, the Barony of Haughley was held by Hugh de Montfort, whose name appears on that document.

²⁵ *Domesday Book*, 10.

fitz Robert of the Bishop of Bayeux.²⁶ *De la Dune* may tenuously be associated with Luddesdown, which in *Domesday* was held of the Bishop of Bayeux by Ralph fitz Turolde.²⁷

One thing that becomes clear, is that all of these services have their origins somehow connected to Bishop Odo of Bayeux, and because of this cannot be considered a standard castle guard system. That Odo played a key role in organizing Dover should not be surprising since William the Conqueror granted the whole of Kent to Odo, and that he was one of the primary forces behind the building of castles in England when William was not in the country.²⁸ Why the castle guard should then be split into service by different baronies rather than defined by individual knights is probably due to the circumstances surrounding Odo. If castle guard were to follow similar rules to infeudation, then Odo perhaps had a set number of knights he wanted to serve at the castle (the theoretical knights above), and required his Constable and six or seven barons to provide the men. This arbitrariness may be reflected in some of the returns in the *Cartae Baronum* compared to the owed castle guard. Abbrincis held 15 ½ old knight fees, and a further 6 ½ fees that paid less than £1 or 1 mark when an aid was called: enough knights to account for the 21 fees serving castle guard, but not enough to account for the 39 theoretical knights (hence why some fees would serve twice).²⁹ Maminot likewise had 27 fees in 1166, enough to cover his 24 fees for castle guard, but not the 39 theoretical knights.³⁰ Crevequer however does have enough enfeoffed knights according to the *Cartae Baronum* to cover the theoretical number to be expected of him. He has five fees for castle guard in the

²⁶ Ibid., 28.

²⁷ Ibid., 18.

²⁸ *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Dorothy Whitelock, David C. Douglas, Susie I. Tucker (eds. and trans.) (New Brunswick, 1961). 145; Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 2, 196-7.

²⁹ *RBE*, 192-3.

³⁰ Ibid., 194.

Dover list, but theoretically owes $11 \frac{1}{3}$ knights. Arsic has $19 \frac{1}{3}$ fees in Oxfordshire to cover his 18 fees for castle guard in Dover, but would be short of the 39 theoretical fees.³¹ The number of fees he has recorded in 1166 is 11 old enfeoffments, plus an additional 3 fees on his demesne, and another two that are held by the king.³²

The service period at Dover, as mentioned above, is labelled in the Constable's return as being for 30 days. There are other entries in the Dover lists that record different service periods, but they can all be seen to somehow add up to 30 days. Crevequer had 2 men serving 20 days, one man serving twice and the other three times, and a single man serving 18 days three times. This comes to 154 days, or essentially 5 months.³³ If one were to take the evidence from List 3, these knights each serve 20 days, for a total of 60 days, equalling 2 fees (as reflected in the *summa* of 5 rather than 6). *Abbrinchis*, in List 3, has 3 men serving a total of 29 days being the equivalent of 1 knight, and the 'certain wards' of Adam fitz William are listed as 15 day periods, but two of the fees serve twice, essentially making them 30 day periods. Hollister attempted to portray these fees of Adam as being 'conclusive' evidence of a 15 day service period, whereas they are only 3 (not 5) fees of a peculiar nature out of more than 280 other fees.³⁴ Even then, the only peculiar thing about Adam's fees is that they pay 10s. for a 15 day period, rather than the 5s. one would expect. While providing evidence for his disregarding of the Crevequer tenements, Hollister also ignores their being treated as the equivalent of knights in List 3, and likewise ignores a similar situation of 3 men serving 29 days being treated as a single

³¹ Ibid., 302-4.

³² Ibid., 190-1.

³³ This assumes the men served one after another and not congruently. If so, it would be exactly 5 months if the service covered 4 months at 31 days and 2 months at 30 days. This would only be possible if the period covered the whole of March through August, or May through October.

³⁴ There is additional evidence from John's reign where the commutation at Dover was fixed at 10s. for a 30 day period other than that recorded in the *Red Book*. *Feudal Assessment*, 39 ; F Hardman, 'Castle Guard Service at Dover Castle,' in *Archaeologia Cantiana*, vol. 49 (1937), 103.

knight in the record of *Abbrinchis*.³⁵ Hollister does argue the payment of £25 to 5 knights for 150 days in 1165 as evidence of the 15 day period, since this amount would be equal to £1 for every 30 days instead of 10s. However, what is recorded in the Pipe Rolls is a *payment* for service at Dover and not a commutation from one of the knights of Dover. It is the commutation that is valued at 10s., not the pay for a replacement knight, which, it has been shown, was higher than the commutation of the service these men are hired to replace.³⁶

Keeping in mind the low commutation amount for castle-guard at Dover and the high amount to hire a replacement knight, it must be asked if the knights were actually serving their guard duties. Unlike scutage payments for field service, there is no across the board record of commutations for castle guard. Many of the baronial castles do not have surviving records of their service, and the evidence of the payments for soldiers at Dover appended to the *combustiones* in the Pipe Roll of 11 Henry II suggests that payments were made from and received by the central treasury, and did not usually go through the sheriffs.³⁷ With this lack of definitive evidence, other sources must come into play.

An aspect to consider when debating the service numbers of castle guard is the distance between the fees that owed ward and the castle at which it was performed. Taking the example of Dover again, one of the baronies that owed service, Cogges held by Robert Arsic, is situated far away in Oxfordshire. The

³⁵ *Military Organization*, 158, n. 1-3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 157-9 ; *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.* ; Round, *Feudal England*, 216. The *combustiones* is a record, usually appended to the Chancellor's record of the Pipe Rolls (The Chancellor's Roll), recording the amount of money each county fell short of its payments after testing the fineness of its coinage (i.e. if a county paid in £100, but the fineness of the coins paid in was shown to be only 80% of that required, the county was then considered only to have paid £80, and the difference of £20 would be recorded in the *combustiones*). Since this is a record of the Chancellor's, and a document that could only have been drawn up after the whole of the exchequer meeting was completed, the appending of three records from various counties showing payments in 1165 to knights suggests these were not payments made by the sheriffs, but came from the central treasury via the Chancellor.

distance from the manor house of Cogges to Dover Castle is about 150 miles following modern roads on the most direct route: a very far distance to cover to perform one's service. Likewise, West Greenwich is about 73 miles away, and Chatham 47 miles.³⁸ Of the manors that are within a day's journey, Wrinstead was 33 miles away, Chilham is 20, and Folkestone, the closest, is 7 ½ miles away. Aside from Folkestone, there are very few baronies that are within an easy walking distance to justify serving a short 30 day castle guard service that could easily be commuted for 10 shillings.

Frederick Suppe noted a distinction between castles that had fees nearby that owed service (a compact castlery) that could provide men at the castle quickly for emergencies, and those whose service was within a day's ride (a dispersed castlery).³⁹ Suppe's definition of a dispersed castlery is perhaps a bit too restricted, as it would not take into account these royal castles whose fees that owed castle guard were much further than a day's ride from the castle. Dover is again an excellent example of this. As it has been shown, the barons who provided service at Dover came from far-away places such as Cogges in Oxfordshire, Greenwich, Basing in Hampshire, and Haughley in Suffolk. Even within these baronies, the men that actually serve at Dover came from diverse places, such as the fee of Hartwell which is in Northamptonshire but owes its service through Maminot in Greenwich, and Swindon in Wiltshire which owes its service through Arsic in Cogges.⁴⁰ Windsor likewise shows castle guard as being owed from diverse areas such as Henry de Pinkeny's barony which was in Northamptonshire and Matthew de

³⁸ If the Constable's barony can safely be attached to Haughley in Suffolk, and the honor of Port was providing men from the main manor of the barony in Basing in Hampshire, then these two baronies would be traveling from 157 miles (on land) and 119 miles away, respectively.

³⁹ Frederick Suppe, 'The Persistence of Castle-Guard in the Welsh Marches and Wales,' *The Normans and their Adversaries at War*, Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach (eds.) (Woodbridge, 2001), 206.

⁴⁰ *RBE*, 709-10 ; Round, 'Castle Guard,' 147.

Louvain's in Essex.⁴¹ While the compact castleries appear to be mostly baronial and along the frontier, these dispersed castleries appear to be more inland.⁴² In fact, it seems many of the royal castles could fit into this 'dispersed' category, particularly if its definition were widened to include fees that could not reach the castle within a day's ride. In the situation of fees that were more than a day's ride away, it is likely that they rarely served, but simply paid their commutation, and if the need arose, allowed the constable to hire the necessary replacements.

There was no uniform system of service at castles, royal or otherwise, and as such, there are irregular cases within various systems. There is evidence at York that a few who owed service were not expected to perform this service themselves. Here, tenants owing castle guard to one of the royal castles were to provide crossbowmen to serve 40 days a year at their own cost in times of war.⁴³ Usually the owed service is knights, so these obligations of crossbowmen are likely to be a later imposition than other castle guard services. Like York, Devizes has later evidence that shows those who owed service had to perform in a time of war, but must commute in a time of peace.⁴⁴ The record of the fees at Windsor are separated either by service period or commutation payment period, which were either forty days or three or four terms.⁴⁵ The commutation rates at Rockingham also deviate from any regularity, with three different rates of either four, five or six shillings on a fee.⁴⁶ These all serve to illustrate further the differences in castle guard service from host service.

⁴¹ *RBE*, 716-17 ; Saunders, 94, 130

⁴² Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 194-5.

⁴³ *VCH*, City of York, 521; *RBE*, 492 (c. 1210-12) ; *The Book of Fees Commonly Called Testa de Nevill*, 2 (London, 1923), 1354 (c. 1231). The statement in the *Book of Fees* says that the crossbowmen owed service the whole year, but after 40 days served at the king's cost.

⁴⁴ Not only were there men listed as commuting in a time of peace and serving in a time of war, but also 12 fees which were required to serve in both peace and war. *Rotuli Hundredorum*, vol. 2, 236 ; Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' 458. This is also the case with the knights of Peterborough who served at Rockingham. *Military Organization*, 145 n. 5 ; *Cartae Antiquae, Rolls 1-10*, Lionel Landon (ed.), Pipe Roll Society, New Series, 17 (London, 1939), 106, no. 214.

⁴⁵ *RBE*, 716-17.

⁴⁶ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 149-50 ; *Military Organization*, 159.

Service in the host was very uniform, with a forty day service period, an infeudation pattern in increments of ten, and a scutage of either £1 or 1 mark. The uniformity of host service is clear evidence of royal imposition across the board, so therefore the lack of uniformity in castle guard must be due to the lack of royal attention. Many of these irregularities in castle guard service can be put down to the commutation rates, and how these were determined deserves some attention.

Round looked at castle guard through the lens of his theory on scutage rates and knights' wages. The 8*d.* a day wage and the simple idea that the commutation of service was equal to the pay of a replacement knight led Round to find so many coincidences that he stated "it sounds like a theory on the Great Pyramid or the number of the Beast."⁴⁷ At Rockingham, he seemed to miss the commutation rates other than the 5*s.* rate, and for Windsor, he simply guessed that there was a thirty day period of service rather than forty to suit his theory. Painter proposed a more likely theory; that these commutations were set up on an individual basis through bargains to determine the maximum each baron was willing to pay before they would decide simply to serve. This was based on the relatively low commutation rates of castle guard when compared to scutages, the relative safety of castle guard compared to field service, and the evidence of Richmond (a baronial castle) that showed those living outside Yorkshire paid a higher commutation than those who lived closer to the castle.⁴⁸ While Painter's theory is more reasonable, it does not appear to be the case for the above sample of Dover Castle. Except for the fees of Adam Fitz William, all of the barons paid a 10*s.* commutation, regardless of distance. Cogges in Oxfordshire, and Haughley in Suffolk were paying just as much as Folkestone. Hollister attempted to account for this by combining both Round's and Painter's

⁴⁷ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 151.

⁴⁸ Painter, 'Castle-Guard,' 208-9.

theories to where some castles set up commutation as a means to pay for replacement knights, and some were set up on individual bargains.⁴⁹ Hollister did this by following Round's belief that the Dover castle guard served for fifteen days instead of thirty, and had an 8*d.* a day pay rate. Perhaps Hollister's theory was right, but needs a slight adjustment to account for Dover's service period being thirty days. If, at Dover, the commutation was originally set up to pay for a replacement knight, then it would have been established at a time when 4*d.* was the daily wage, and the commutation rate would have stayed stagnant and traditional, much like the scutage rate. There is no evidence that knights were once paid at a rate of 4*d.* a day, but it is interesting that one of Richard fitz Nigel's recognized scutage rates of one mark pays exactly 4*d.* a day for the 40 day service period in the field. As tempting as this may be, it is insufficient evidence to prove the Great Pyramid, but a theory worth considering nonetheless.

This is not to assume castle guard was always being commuted. While on the surface, it does look like the baronies owing guard at Dover had a large distance to travel to perform a short period of service, these periods are actually longer than 30 days in many cases, depending on how many times the fee served. To take Cogges, the furthest from Dover, as an example: 15 fees served twice for an actual 60 day period or a commutation of £1 instead of 10*s.* Three more fees served thrice for 90 days or a £1 10*s.* commutation; a more considerable amount than 10*s.* It appears that many of the fees that owed service actually stayed longer than the 30 days, excepting the constable whose 56 fees all served only once. Greenwich, likewise had a high number of men who served only once a year (9 served for a single 30 day period), but still have the majority of its fees, 15, serving twice for 60 days.

⁴⁹ *Military Organization*, 457.

When considering the service levels for castle guard, the relevant passage in Magna Carta needs to be considered. It states:

No constable is to compel any knight to give money for castle guard, if he is willing to perform that guard in his own person or by another reliable man, if for some good reason he is unable to do it himself; and if we take or send him on military service, he shall be excused the guard in proportion to the period of his service.”⁵⁰

This passage provides two differing and contradictory angles towards actual performance of castle guard. It suggests that it was common practice for constables to request the money for castle guard instead of the service, which would indicate a commutation was preferable. However, by saying there was a practice of asking for the commutation by compulsion also indicates a desire on the part of the tenants not to pay a commutation, but to perform their service bodily. This is the complete opposite situation one might expect to find when looking at this from a purely economic standpoint, wherein one would expect tenants to be commuting because it was cheaper than service, and constables looking for the owed service because it was cheaper than hiring a replacement. Much like scutage payments and field service, it appears the exact opposite, in some cases, is occurring with castle guard.

If it is to be taken as given, that hiring a replacement knight for a tenant who commuted his service is more expensive for the constable, then it must be asked why the constables preferred the commutation, as suggested by Magna Carta. It could be, much like field service, that the hired knights were more professional soldiers, better trained, and better equipped than the men they were to replace. The matter of to

⁵⁰ *Nullus constabularius distringat aliquem militem ad dandum denarius pro custodia castri, si facere voluerit custodiam illam in propria persona sua, vel per alium probum hominem, si ipse eam facere non possit propter rationabilem causam; et si nos duxerimus vel miserimus eum in exercitum, erit quietus de custodia, secundum quantitatem temporis quo per nos fuerit in exercitu.* Holt, *Magna Carta*, 458-9, cap. 29.

whom the money for these commutations was going may also play a role. Unlike a scutage called for field service, the money paid to commute one's castle guard is not recorded in the Pipe Rolls. The phrase from Magna Carta, that it was the constables using compulsion to receive a money payment, may suggest they were keeping the money themselves, but this may have been at the insistence of the king or the owner of a baronial castle. After all, most castles would not have needed a garrison in a time of peace, and it would be more desirable to have the payment, whereas a knight may prefer to serve in a time of peace to save himself the money at little risk to his life. That castle guard eventually becomes nothing more than a commuted service can be argued from the service quota adjustment of 1245: when quotas were lowered for service in the field, the service in the castle remained at the same levels.⁵¹

Since there appears to be evidence that payments for replacement knights for castle guard could come straight from the treasury and not through the sheriffs, the Pipe Rolls will provide little direct evidence. Only two entries in the Pipe Rolls from the reign of Henry II through John are listed as specifically going to knights serving at Dover (there are however, a couple of payments to knights for guarding the building works at Dover). In 1167-68, £5 was paid to 5 knights as prests, or wages on an advance of their owed service that they would later pay back.⁵² 1188-89 has a payment of 60 marks going to an unknown number of knights at Dover castle, but this was for their sustenance, and again, not their wages.⁵³ So at least 5 knights served at Dover castle in 1167-68, and an unknown number were there in 1188-89. Additional years when men are sure to have served can be determined by the years in

⁵¹ Michael Prestwich, 'The Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles,' *The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister*, Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach (eds.) (Woodbridge, 2001), 193.

⁵² *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 210.

⁵³ *P.R. 1 Richard I*, 232.

which provisions were purchased for castles.⁵⁴ Dover received some sort of provisions in the exchequer years 1159-60, 1160-61, 1166-67, 1172-73, 1173-74, 1174-75, 1190-91, 1192-93, 1195-96, 1198-99, 1199-1200, 1201-02, and 1202-03. In addition to the two years mentioned earlier and the payment in 1165 written on the *combustiones*, there are only sixteen years of a sixty year period that can be said as certain that knights were serving at Dover castle.⁵⁵ The value of the service for the men at Dover in a single year was £140 16s. 10d. if all of the knights commuted. If, in the unlikely event this amount was commuted in all the years but those listed, then the crown or the constable would have had £6197 8d. paid in total. This is obviously a very high sum which illustrates to the extreme why constables were trying to force the payment for castle guard, even though the individual sums for Dover appear to be small.

Just how the commutation for castle guard was paid to the constables is unknown, since there is a lack of evidence describing the method. There is an entry in Domesday Book where the men from Litlington had to pay their wardpenny to the sheriff or perform their ward.⁵⁶ If a payment to the sheriff were required in the Norman period, then surely these payments would appear in the Pipe Rolls, much like the scutage payments. While these distinct commutations are not recorded in the Pipe Rolls, they are not completely silent on the subject of knights serving in castles either. Many times when a knight is listed as being paid, it is for serving at some castle. Shropshire has several payments listed as going to the castellans in that county, and it is tempting to think that this may be the commutation payments being sent from the tenants, through the sheriffs to the castellan.⁵⁷ However, in each of

⁵⁴ See Chapter 4. The years may be determined, but the number of knights serving is still a mystery.

⁵⁵ This number includes the single Pipe Roll of Henry I, and excludes the missing roll of 15 John.

⁵⁶ *Domesday Book*, 521 ; *Military Organization*, 154.

⁵⁷ *P.R. 7 Henry II*, 40 ; *P.R. 8 Henry II*, 16 ; *P.R. 9 Henry II*, 4 ; *P.R. 10 Henry II*, 9.

these cases, the castles are a baronial castle in the lands of William fitz Alan, while the king held them during the minority of fitz Alan's son. The amount paid, £54 15s. amongst three castles, divides easily into 1s. a day per castle for 365 days; a clear indication that this was a payment of wages, and not the payment of commutations (which would have been less uniform).

Jocelin of Brakelond gives a short account of how the knights of Abbot Samson of Bury St. Edmunds paid their commutation for castle ward at Norwich, saying that it was the marshal who collected the money.⁵⁸ The knights of St. Edmunds were split into five different constabularies of ten knights each, with four of them actually providing the service (or commuting it, in this case), and the fifth constabulary giving a money payment to ease the cost to the other constabularies. Perhaps if this model is similar to the other royal castles, the meaning of Magna Carta is not that the constable is receiving payment for his own gain, but that he would compel the knights in his constabulary to commute because *he* did not wish to serve, or if one knight from a constabulary wished to serve, the remaining knights would also be forced to serve: a type of 'all or nothing' for commuting one's ward service. This would at least take the money component out of the constable's hands, as the money had to be going through the Abbot to the Marshal, since it was Samson's attempts to profit by an apparent over-enfeoffment that caused the argument to occur between himself and his knights which caused Jocelin to record it for our memory. If the money were going to the king's marshal, it is also further proof that this money was kept out of the sheriff's hands, and likely being delivered straight to the treasury. Either way, since there was so much thought being put into

⁵⁸ Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle*, 67.

just how the knights of St. Edmunds were commuting only further illustrates how this service was simply becoming a money payment.

The commutation rates of castle guard were not as regular as the scutage for field service. The difference no doubt comes from castles acting on an individual basis, whereas scutage was meant to apply to the whole land. It has already been shown that the fees at Dover commuted at a rate of 10s. for every 30 day period of service. Windsor, another royal castle, appears to have a commutation of 20s. for each fee a year, but the payments are broken up into different pay periods.⁵⁹ At Rochester, tenants owing castle guard were commuting their service at a rate of 12s. a fee, and it has already been shown that there was a dispute arising between Abbot Samson and his knights concerning just how they perform their castle guard at Norwich.⁶⁰ If commutations were being assigned on a balance of getting the most money from a tenant possible, but still kept low enough to discourage personal service, this would account for the varying rates at different castles. This would be expected at baronial castles, but one would expect more continuity throughout royal castles, unless the decision on how to collect commutations were simply left to the castellen who then worked out their own rate.

Service Period and the Origins of Castle Guard

In looking at the various arrangements for castle guard, it would be negligent to ignore the subject of the service period, not only for castle guard but for field service as well. While it is evident from the above survey that service periods for castle guard can vary, it has long been established that service in the field in both

⁵⁹ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 151 ; *RBE*, 716-17.

⁶⁰ Round, 'Castle Guard,' 149, 158-9 ; Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle*, 66-8.

England and Normandy consisted of a period of forty days, unpaid service (for those with a *servicium debitum*).

To begin with Normandy, the evidence of a forty day period can be found in the 1172 *Infeudationes Militum* in the few listings that show peculiarities over who would pay for some of the knights to serve. When these peculiarities of cost arose, the common arrangement was that the tenant-in-chief would provide for the cost of his knight for one day and then successively would be at the cost of his lord: be he the king, or count or whomever.⁶¹ This phrasing also arises in some situations regarding the cost of a man if retained past the regular 40 day service period. In two instances it is mentioned that certain men who served past the 40 day period would then continue to serve at the king or other lord's cost.⁶² This could mean that these men were only obliged to provide their knights for a single day. It surely would have been expected for the knights to serve for longer, hence the statement regarding payment, and most likely to perform their service for the full 40 day period at least. This may also have been an occurrence in England since there is the inclusion in Magna Carta a demand that no man perform more service for his fee than he is due.⁶³

Although there may be individual peculiarities, the evidence suggests that the 40 day service period was still the norm in 1172. There are two instances where knights were to serve in a certain area for three forty day periods.⁶⁴ Robert de Campellis provides a knight for guard service for forty days, and the Count of Mortain has to pay for knights serving for forty days within the march.⁶⁵ There has been the suggestion that the order of service was not fixed before the Norman

⁶¹ The three instances in which this occurs is for the knights of Jordan de Barneville, Oliver de Tracieio, and Hugh Carbonel. *RBE*, 635, 640. Jocelin Crispinus also provides a single knight which performs for 15 days at the cost of the fee of Neufmarché. *Ibid.*, 637.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 639, 643.

⁶³ Holt, *Magna Carta*, 454-5, cap. 16. Though this was more likely from forcing men to serve past the 40 day period.

⁶⁴ *RBE*, 636-7.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 639, 643.

conquest of England, but that only after this event and the solidifying of obligations in England did William then impose the same regulations in Normandy.⁶⁶ Service period was probably not something that was established in Normandy in the aftermath of conquering England due to the fact that the same amount of service time was owed to the king of France as was to the Duke of Normandy as shown by the Bayeux survey of 1133.⁶⁷

Further evidence that the forty day service period was an ordinary Norman construct and not something established after the conquest of England come from the Normans in southern Italy also following a forty day period. A document from the cartulary of Mont St. Michel points to a 40 day service period in Normandy, but there is also a similar act in southern Italy that states that after 40 days of service, a knight would be paid by the *curia*.⁶⁸ Roger II made an agreement with the Savonese to have a galley serve for 40 days between *Numidia* and Tripoli, and while the Savonese were not Norman, it shows Roger was thinking in the forty day period.⁶⁹ Bishop Rainulf of Chieti, purchased a *castellum* for which he was to provide the service of one knight for forty days, plus restor.⁷⁰ At a time when Roger I was rebelling against Robert Guiscard, Geoffrey of Malaterra says that Roger “still respected his legal obligations to him [Robert] and abstained for forty days from causing injury to his brother.”⁷¹

The forty day period was not always held precisely. There is one example in Italy of a serjeant owing castle guard at S. Adiutore (owned by the Monastery of

⁶⁶ Jean Yver, ‘Les premières insitutions du duché de Normandie,’ *I Normanni e la loro espansione in Europa nell’alto medioevo*, Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 16 (Spoleto, 1969), 334-7 as cited by: Chibnall, ‘Military Service in Normandy,’ 66.

⁶⁷ *RBE*, 646-7.

⁶⁸ *Le Régime Féodal*, 63. The document from Mont St. Michel is reproduced in Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 21.

⁶⁹ Abulafia, ‘The Norman Kingdom of Africa,’ 31.

⁷⁰ Loud, *The Latin Church*, 343.

⁷¹ Malaterra (eng.), II.21, 96 ; ‘*legalitatem tamen suam servans, per quadraginta dies a fratris injuria abstinuit*,’ Malaterra (lat.), 36.

Cava) who served for only one month out of the year.⁷² A charter in England has caused confusion among historians as to the service period there, as the charter asked a knight to serve for two months in time of war, but only 40 days in time of peace.⁷³ Stenton said this can be given ‘official’ weight since John fitz Gilbert who issued the charter served as the Marshal for Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II.⁷⁴ However, this document is likely referring to the ‘time of war’ as the anarchy of Stephen’s reign and the ‘time of peace’ the reign of Henry II during which the document was written, meaning that the service period does not change depending on whether the king is mustering the army or not, rather that it was 60 days in Stephen’s time, and 40 days in Henry’s.⁷⁵

The survey of the Pipe Rolls given above shows that the service period of 40 days is indicated at times in the counties of Shropshire and Kent, but there are other periods where men appear to be serving militarily. Of those recorded in the Pipe Rolls, the periods range from 1 day, 3 days, 6 (twice), 8 (12x), 15 (4x), 20, 40 (6x), 50 (5x), 63, 164, 174 (3x), 207, 364 (twice), 365 (3x), 560, and 730 days (twice). Of those that can be determined through calculation, there are additional periods of 10 days, 14, 24 (twice), 40 (twice), 50, 56, 80, 88, 161, 208 (twice), 216, and 273 ¼ (twice).⁷⁶ These various numbers are not representative of a service period that a knight or serjeant were obliged to serve as part of their *servicium debitum*; since they appear in the Pipe Rolls, these are periods where men were paid. In terms of the owed service period, it seems that generally they adhered to the forty day period, but of course there were a few exceptions, normally found in those performing castle guard (Dover being a prime example).

⁷² Loud, *The Latin Church*, 358, n. 72.

⁷³ A.L. Poole, *Obligations of Society*, 39.

⁷⁴ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 177-8.

⁷⁵ J.O. Prestwich, ‘Anglo-Norman Feudalism,’ 46.

⁷⁶ See Appendix 4.

What is now difficult to explain is the existence of the royal castles that have no service recorded. These could simply have been built as administrative centres, but this seems like an excessive effort for just that use, particularly since William the Conqueror's three original stone castles of The Tower, Colchester, and Pevensey are included in the list of those with no record of service. Since it seems plausible that in many years, a garrison of owed men was unnecessary, it may be that no men were ever assigned to perform ward at these castles. After all, even in the castles that have a record of their service, there is evidence of at least one porter and one watchman being paid to serve throughout the year, meaning the castle would not have been completely undefended.⁷⁷ This also brings up the point that the guarding of royal castles may have been primarily a serjeantry service, and not a knightly one, which would account for its absence in many of the surveys that tended to focus on knight service.⁷⁸ This certainly seems to be the case in Normandy, where castle guard was usually an obligation of the *vavassores*, and not the knights themselves.⁷⁹

It also seems clear that in the case of Dover, the castle was originally under the command of Bishop Odo, and he may have set up the castle guard system before being imprisoned by his brother William. If such instances of these royal castles with castle guard service could be shown to have at one time been baronial castles or,

⁷⁷ To take just one year, 1168 provides three examples. *P.R. 14 Henry II*, 50 (Rockingham), 110 (Worcester), 209 (Dover).

⁷⁸ Stenton, *English Feudalism*, 206-7. There are several mentions of castle serjeanties through a service called *castlemanni* in *Boldon Book*. *Boldon Buke*, William Greenwell (ed.), Surtees Society, 25 (Durham, 1852), 20, 22-3, 35-7 [translation, 57-9, 69-71]. There are 8, $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$ castlemen listed in *Boldon Book*, with no mention of where they perform their service or for how much it was commuted when recorded in 1183. This number is short of the 10 knights that the Bishop of Durham is said to have owed at Newcastle, so it seems unlikely that they are serving there (nor are they the equivalent of knights). In all probability, these men served at the Bishop's castle in Durham. The knight fees listed in *Boldon Book* are for $\frac{1}{12}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{20}$, $\frac{1}{10}$, and two half fees: well below the 10 needed for Newcastle. *Ibid.*, 22, 27, 33-4, 41 [translation, 58, 63, 67-8, 74].

⁷⁹ *Military Organization*, 140. This thought may have been brought to England as well, since a writ of Henry I's, demanding the castle guard service owed at Rockingham is addressed to all his barons *and vavassors* who perform that service. Stenton, *English Feudalism*, Appendix, no. 44 ; *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum*, vol. 2, 17, no. 563. A similar writ exempting the Abbey of Tavistock of the ward for its one knight was written to Geoffrey Mandeville and the serjeants of Exeter castle. *Ibid.*, 33, no. 649.

like Dover, to have been in the command of a single baron or earl, it could be argued that the barons were the ones responsible for setting up a system of castle guard service, and that the king simply provided men to perform ward from those who owed him field service. This, however, cannot be the case, as some of the royal castles, such as Norwich, had been royal castles since their founding, until at least the thirteen century.⁸⁰ Even then, some castles that were temporarily held by someone other than the king, such as Rochester, have evidence of a castle guard system dating to a time before they left the king's hand.⁸¹

Of the writs surviving from the early Norman period of England, the majority that mention castle guard are usually those exempting ecclesiastical holdings from performing certain duties.⁸² In addition to exemptions, there are several that show men were being exempted from serving in royal castles so that they could serve in baronial castles.⁸³ However, these exemptions were primarily for the ecclesiastics, and any secular barons serving, which one would expect to see in the records, have not been accounted for via the existence of an exemption (nor have many of the castles without a record of service). There are likewise exemptions in thirteenth

⁸⁰ However, Norwich was taken during a rebellion and then taken back a short time later. This event may have triggered a system of castle guard to prevent further rebellion; there were some three hundred men garrisoned there after retaking the castle. *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum*, vol. 1, 21, nos. 81-2. Of the other royal castles mentioned, many that have a known castle guard service did fall into non-royal hands at some point in their history, but many times these were brief periods, or occurred during Stephen's reign and immediately rectified upon Henry taking the throne. Many of the royal castles without a known service were primarily in royal hands for their history, but even these had short periods outside of royal control. See H.M. Colvin (ed.), *A History of the King's Works*, 2, (London, 1963), passim.

⁸¹ *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum*, vol. 2, 203, no. 1475; 231, no. 1606.

⁸² There is only one example that specifically mentions castle guard by saying the cannons of Holy Trinity, London, were exempt from charges of expeditions and wards, but the authenticity is suspect. *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum*, vol. 2, 170, no. 1316. There are many more examples that simply speak of military service or castle building, which may or may not have included castle guard.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 241, no. 1656; 268, no. 1791; vol. 3, 174, no. 465; 279, no. 757. This last writ, for the knights of Bury St. Edmunds to forgo their service at Norwich during Stephen's reign, was not recognized by Henry II.

century southern Italy under Frederick II, and while these do generally exempt the recipients from service in the army (*exercitu*), there is no mention of castle guard.⁸⁴

Many of the medieval surveys considered castle guard to be a completely different service from that owed in the field. The few references to castle guard in the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* make it to be a distinct service, against simple field service (*expeditiones*) and *chevalchia* / *chevauchée* (an enigmatic service that some have considered to be 'horse duty' or an escort service).⁸⁵ The three records in the *Cartae* showing castle guard for Salisbury each denote it as a separate amount owed from their regular service. Earl Patrick owed the Bishop of Salisbury 2 knights and a third to do ward at the castle, Earl Patrick's own return lists his 20 knights at Salisbury castle to be in addition to his fees on the demesne, old and new, and Walter Waleram denoted his castle guard at a separate section at the end of his return.⁸⁶ Geoffrey Ridel has a confusing return that indicates his fees were not called fees, but they still performed field service, castle guard and other services.⁸⁷ The lack of recording castle guard in 1166 is also an indication of how the services were considered separate. While a few exceptions have already been cited, the majority of baronies known to owe ward at royal castles say nothing of this service in their returns.⁸⁸ Baronial castles likewise have no service recorded, but this should be expected considering the surveys were of a royal nature.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ *Acta Imperii*, 174, no. 196; 230, nos. 250-1; 232, no. 254; 237, no. 260.

⁸⁵ *Military Organization*, 148.

⁸⁶ *RBE*, 236, 240, 242.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 329.

⁸⁸ Dover's baronies of Crevequer, Abrincis, and Mamignot in 1166 are just a few examples: *RBE*, 190-5

⁸⁹ There are one or two exceptions of course. One of Richard de Chandos' men owed half a fee to royal service, but to Richard he owed a 'full' service of host duty, *chevauchée*, and castle guard. *RBE*, 285 ; *Military Organization*, 142. Likewise the return of William fitz Alan, at the time in the king's hand, states his fees only owed 10 knights in Shropshire, and 5 outside, but they were not to perform ward anywhere except at Oswestry. *RBE*, 274. These exceptions still further illustrate that castle guard was considered a separate service to that in the host.

The passage cited above from Magna Carta shows a change in this thought: that those who owed castle guard service could do a portion of their service by performing host duty instead. Whether this is a new thought from the early thirteenth century, or a right that the barons were attempting to re-establish with King John is unknown, but those who owed castle guard still clearly owed service in the field; just not vice-versa.⁹⁰ This may actually indicate the real problem, in terms of castle guard, discussed in Magna Carta. If a knight were to serve 40 days in the field and be in the belief he no longer owed castle guard because he performed in the host, he was liable to be quite upset to return home and find the constable asking for the commutation of his service. In his mind, he had just performed his service in the field, and therefore owed no money. This is perhaps what is meant by performing the service in person rather than actually at the castle.⁹¹ It seems that by the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the important aspect of castle guard was not the service, but the money it supplied via commutation. After all, with all the evidence from the Pipe Rolls of knights and serjeants being hired to serve in castles, it is clear the obligation of castle ward was not adequate to meet the king's needs. Money, on the other hand, is a medium that can be used to fulfil any need (of a worldly nature, of course).

⁹⁰ This has sometimes been reflected in the sources, particularly that of Hugh Balliol who owed five knights in the host, but thirty to the guard of Newcastle, recorded in the latter part of John's reign, but an obligation dating back to William Rufus. *RBE*, 563. There is one instance in the *Cartae Baronum*, where the Abbot of Cerne states that his knights did ward at the king's command at the castle of Corfe one month a year, but if the king wanted the knights to serve in the field, and *not* perform ward, then the fees each provides two knights instead of one: doubling the field service from castle guard. *Ibid.*, 212.

⁹¹ Although there is evidence that knights were still serving in castles even up to John's reign, but as Holt observed, "there is no indication apart from the Charter of any serious attempt to maintain this." Holt, *Magna Carta*, 316 ; *Curia Regis Rolls of the Reigns of Richard I and John*, 4 (London 1929), 13, 30.

Keefe found evidence in the Abingdon chronicle of an order from William I to Abbot Athelhelm of Abingdon to provide a guard service for Windsor castle.⁹² The passage quoted also refers to William commanding the annals to record how many knights the abbots and bishops should provide for the defence of the realm. This lone reference would seem to indicate that royal castle guard was an early imposition by the king, but details are seriously lacking. The veracity of this account comes into question since the chronicle was written in the late twelfth, early thirteenth century: a hundred years after the events it is describing. The chronicle faithfully provides much documentary evidence for the years previous to William I, but by his reign onwards it is predominantly commentary, leaving it susceptible to error. However, the author no doubt was recording what had been traditionally believed by the monastery and cannot be easily dismissed. It is likely something of this nature occurred, but for whatever reason, certain castles were missed, or that the service in them was provided by someone other than a knight.

To say whether castle guard was established before knight quotas is then difficult to assert; castles were certainly a part of the landscape early in the Norman era to aid in the conquest, and these buildings would have needed a garrison. However, since some of the earliest castles have no record of their having an owed service, it seems likely that this was not something implemented early, but was a later institution that was established in the castles that needed it the most.⁹³ If castle guard were a later institution, it could explain why many of its characteristics follow

⁹² *Feudal Assessments*, 77; *Chronicon Monasterii de Abingdon*, J. Stevenson (ed.), 2 Rolls Series, ii (London, 1858), 3.

⁹³ There is a charter of William I, likely a fake, which exempts a church from castle guard and host service. While of much more use if it could be proven genuine, it nonetheless shows that both of these services were thought to be of an early date, but no indication of which was established first. *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum*, vol. 1, 37-8, no. 141.

that of field service (such as period of service and commutation), but this could also apply to field service, thus giving us the paradox of the chicken and the egg.

Southern Castles and Serjeants

Castles were an important symbol of power for the Normans in southern Italy, and there are several examples of their significance. When Roger I first joined his brother William in the Principate, William bestowed him a castle.⁹⁴ Roger also took good care of his castles by adding towers and ramparts, garrisons, and stocks of supplies, and even one of the cities conquered by the Normans were fearful that they would build a castle in their town.⁹⁵ The abbey church San Clemente a Casauria has a pair of bronze doors built by Abbot Leonate (1152) which depicts all the castles that were within the monastery's possession, showing just how valuable the castles were regarded.

The practice of *incastellamento*⁹⁶ does not appear to have a single overarching reason. Historians have claimed that many of the castles created in southern Italy have been the work of the Normans, but there is very little evidence of a widespread policy of castle building by the Normans.⁹⁷ Still, the Normans do seem to be responsible for building castles in the country, as per one further example by Geoffrey of Malaterra, who said that when the Normans were first carving out their territory, they were without any fortification in Apulia, so decided to build one in

⁹⁴ Malaterra (eng.), I.24, 68-9 ; Malaterra (lat.), 20.

⁹⁵ Malaterra (eng.), I.20, 67, II.26, 101. Other examples of Normans building fortresses in Malaterra are II.27, 101; II.29, 103; II.38, 116; III.1, 134; III.3, 135; III.5, 136; III.15, 146; III.27, 158 (near Durazzo); III.32, 162; and IV.17, 195 ; Malaterra (lat.), 19, 38-40, 48, 57-9, 66, 74, 77, 97.

⁹⁶ This is the process of by which a proliferation of *castra* were created in Italy. The term *castrum/castra* is essentially the equivalent of a castle in English, but can be viewed as more than just a fortress; it could be a fortified village, a tower, or simply a noble residence. For our purposes, the term 'castle' will be sufficient. Ramseyer, 'Territorial Lordships,' 83.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 84, n. 17.



Fig. 1. The Bronze Doors of San Clemente a Casauria. Created in 1152 by Abbot Leonate but placed in 1191 under the direction of Abbot Gioele, these doors represent the properties of the abbey depicted as castles in the outside tiles. Picture obtained from the website: <http://www.sanclementeacasauria.beniculturali.it/index.php?it/91/il-portale>

Melfi.⁹⁸ The numerous references to castle building in the chronicles make these buildings go hand in hand with warfare.

As for the type of castles the southern Normans built, it must be remembered that the Normans who arrived in Italy left Normandy before many of the architectural innovations that shaped the 'Norman style' occurred. In terms of castles, the quintessential Norman 'Motte and Bailey' type developed via the conquest of England. The Normans needed a quick and easy means to erect a defensive fortification, and constructing a pile of earth surrounded by a wooden wall was the simplest means to do this.⁹⁹ Very few definitive mottes have been identified in southern Italy. In the early 1970s, Arnold J. Taylor was able to identify one motte on the island of Sicily in the castle of Petralia Soprana, one that is known from sources to have been built by Robert Guiscard and Roger I.¹⁰⁰ Most castles took advantage of the rocky outcroppings of southern Italy and the abundance of stone: attributes which were both lacking in England. Likewise, the castles the Normans created while on crusade lacked the motte and bailey feature, with again only one motte so far being identified.¹⁰¹

While the role of building castles does not seem to be directed by the kings of Sicily as it was the kings of England, the idea that this was the king's role eventually becomes a part of the society. Much like the Norman inquest of Robert Curthose and William Rufus which states that the Dukes of Normandy could confiscate a castle

⁹⁸ Malaterra (eng.), I.9, 57 ; Malaterra (lat.), 12.

⁹⁹ R.H.C. Davis, *The Normans*, 100, 111.

¹⁰⁰ Arnold J. Taylor, 'Three Early Castle Sites in Sicily: Motta Camastra, Sperlinga, and Petralia Soprana,' *Château Gaillard*, 7 (Caen, 1975), 209. While the picture provided by Taylor does look like a motte, other modern pictures of the castle lack this feature.

¹⁰¹ This castle was the Land Castle (Qal'at al-Mu'azzam) in the city of Sidon. The feature that defined the motte was uncovered in 1939, but has since been removed in order to show the roman remains underneath. Denys Pringle, 'A Castle in the Sand: Mottes in the Crusader East,' *Château Gaillard*, 18 (Caen, 1998), 187.

built in Normandy without a licence, similar laws appeared in southern Italy.¹⁰² Frederick II established such a law much later: not that he could confiscate unlicensed castles, but that towers were not permitted to be built without a licence.¹⁰³ Frederick II also ordered all fortifications built between the time of William II and his reign to be destroyed, which brings to mind the similar order of Henry II upon gaining the throne of England after the wars of Stephen's reign.¹⁰⁴ It must be remembered that Frederick was not solely the King of Sicily, but also Emperor of Germany. However, since his birth occurred and his youth was spent in southern Italy, and that his mother was the daughter of Roger II, it is safe to assume he possessed a full understanding of the south's culture, and many of his actions were keeping in the southern Norman tradition.

While the creation of castles is important, the real interest here is the owed service in these castles. There is no indication that there was a system of castle guard in southern Italy like that implemented in different castles in England, but there are some indications as to the make-up of the garrisons in these castles. Malaterra states that in 1093, Bohemond seized all of the fortifications of Roger Borsa, believing Borsa to be dead, so that Bohemond could acquire the loyalty of the garrisons.¹⁰⁵ This suggests that there was some type of permanent garrisoning in place in southern Italy, or at least in the fortresses controlled by the Duke of Apulia. In the lands Roger II controlled in Africa, garrisons were usually kept under the command of Normans, and while those they commanded were not necessarily of Frankish stock,

¹⁰² *Regesta Regum Anglonormannorum*, vol. 1, 82, no. 316.

¹⁰³ *Liber Augustalis*, Bk 3, title xxxiii, 123.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk 3, title xxxii, 123.

¹⁰⁵ Malaterra (eng.), IV.20, 198 ; Malaterra (lat.), 99.

the commanders at least were and they must have kept a permanent presence in such a distant land under their control.¹⁰⁶

It is not entirely clear who guarded the *castra* of southern Italy, but there are numerous mentions of castellans being involved. At the Palace in Palermo, the castellan had 300 *iuvenes*, or young men free from responsibilities, to guard the palace.¹⁰⁷ Such a large number would have been necessary, for the castle at Palermo is also described as having a “long circuit” that needed many men to defend.¹⁰⁸ The castellan also had a subordinate called a *gavarettus* who did the exact same job as the castellan, but was also in charge of the dungeons and prisoners.¹⁰⁹ The Constitutions of Melfi also show castellans, in addition to serjeants, being in charge of prisoners in laws promulgated by both Frederick II and either William I or William II.¹¹⁰ Throughout the Constitutions of Melfi, castellans and serjeants are mentioned in tandem, with both being given the right to bear arms in public, and serving in *castra*, with the serjeant being a clear inferior who must ask the castellan’s permission to leave a *castrum*.¹¹¹ Later in 1230/31, Frederick II commissioned a man named Agneo Matuscio to survey the king’s castles and to record the number of watchmen and serjeants, and reduce their number if there were too many.¹¹²

The Monastery of Cava likewise had serjeants owing castle guard at their fortress of S. Adiutore.¹¹³ This, in addition to the evidence mentioned above, makes some of the evidence for serjeants in other Norman areas appear to have more significance. Hollister had shown evidence that in Normandy, the *vavassores* usually

¹⁰⁶ Abulafia, ‘The Normand Kingdom of Africa,’ 38.

¹⁰⁷ Falcandus (eng.), 106 ; Falcandus (lat.), 52.

¹⁰⁸ Falcandus (eng.), 112 ; Falcandus (lat.), 59.

¹⁰⁹ Falcandus (eng.), 106 ; Falcandus (lat.), 53.

¹¹⁰ *Liber Augustalis*, Bk 1, title xci, 41.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Bk 1, title xv, 18 ; title xcii, pg. 42.

¹¹² *Acta Imperii*, 606-7, no. 764.

¹¹³ Loud, *The Latin Church*, 358.

performed castle guard.¹¹⁴ In England, a hired knight oversaw the hired garrison of 10 serjeants at the castle of Burton in England in 1130.¹¹⁵ In addition to this, the numerous evidence presented above for the serjeants serving in Shropshire lends credence to the thought that serjeants were the primary force behind castle garrisons.

The emphasis on serjeants in castles instead of knights should not be surprising. One must remember the main distinction between the two at this time: a knight fought on horseback and a serjeant was most likely on foot. Because of the relatively confined spaces within a castle, a soldier on horseback would have been of little use in defending a castle unless the garrison were to perform a sally. It does not seem that the knight had a significant role in guarding castles in southern Italy.¹¹⁶ This somewhat diminishes the role of the knight when one remembers that the majority of fighting in the middle ages consisted of sieges, rather than battles in the field. However, this is looking at the role of castle guard from the perspective of defending castles; knights would still have played a role in the offensive side of war, which was much more prestigious through the conquering of territory and the taking of booty. Knights may still have an advantage over serjeants within the castle due to their superior equipment, but this probably meant little in the realities of a siege when the best armour available was already being inside the castle walls.

While claims can be made for the superior role of the serjeant in castle guard over a knight in southern Italy, it is clear from the evidence above that the English knights were in fact obliged to serve in this capacity. The evidence from the Pipe Rolls suggests more serjeants were paid to fill a garrison than knights, but when it comes to the actual obligation of castle guard it was clearly a knightly responsibility for the places with existent records. Why England differed from what appears to be

¹¹⁴ *Military Organization*, 140 ; *Recueil des Historiens*, vol. 23, 701, 704.

¹¹⁵ *Mowbray Charters*, xxxiv.

¹¹⁶ But it should be noted that this may be an impression given by lack of surviving evidence.

the practices of Normandy and southern Italy is probably due to at least two factors. Firstly, the relatively rapid conquest of England meant there would be a need for a quick response in case of internal rebellion. With the knight serving on horseback, he would be able to reach the castle where he owed his service more quickly in the case of emergencies, and as shown by the dispersion of owed fees to Dover, these distances could be quite far.¹¹⁷ Secondly, England had a working system of commutation in place earlier than the other two regions that would have enabled the obligation of a knight serving in a castle to survive longer than it might otherwise would have. If a serjeant were just as useful as a knight to serve in a castle, it stands to reason that the cheaper unit (the serjeant) should be left to this task whereas the more expensive unit (the knight) should be employed where his talents were more useful. However, with commutation, and with permanent garrisons becoming unnecessary in later years, it was more beneficial to have a knight owing service, as the king or lord could charge more money for commuting his service, and the knight would be more able and likely to pay.

¹¹⁷ This is not to say serjeants were traveling or serving solely on foot. There are the references to mounted serjeants in the Pipe Rolls, along with the *muntatores* of Shropshire which show the possibility. The *muntatores* acted as a rapid response unit for certain castles along the Welsh borders, and it is in a similar capacity for knights that is being suggested here. Knights may not be the only units capable of arriving quickly on horseback, but the wealth of the knight probably insured the ability to arrive quickly by horse better than the serjeant. For the *muntatores*, see chapter 3 of Frederick C. Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, A.D. 1066-1300* (Woodbridge, 1994).

Conclusion

Warfare was an essential element in medieval society. To ensure that Norman lords had the ability to muster the number of men needed to continue their military campaigns, they enfeoffed men onto their newly acquired lands, so that they would owe an amount of service not only to their immediate lord, but to the king as well. This was the *servicium debitum* and it was this quota of owed service to the king that many of the changes brought by the Normans can be seen. However, it is not until the twelfth century that sufficient records exist to study the *servicium debitum* and other related obligations such as scutage payments. It is from the records of knight surveys and the Pipe Rolls in England that the system of military obligation as practiced by the Normans is revealed.

It is certainly remarkable that in both England and southern Italy (and in addition Normandy) rulers each conducted a survey into the knight fees in their realms at roughly the same time: 1166 for England, 1150/1167 for southern Italy, and 1172 for Normandy. These surveys were not the product of a direct influence from one of these areas of Norman control over the other, excepting perhaps the 1172 *Infeudationes Militum* which, like the 1166 *Cartae Baronum* was authorized by Henry II. The *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy was unrelated to the English and Norman surveys, and was the product of the immediate circumstances in which it was produced.

England in 1166 had just been engaged in a large offensive against Wales that turned into a failed expedition. The scutage assessed, along with a large *dona* on

ecclesiastics and others to pay for serjeants, and the large scutages of previous campaigns most likely angered the barons who called for the record of their owed services to be made. There may be evidence of this in the dispute between the Earl of Arundel and Henry II which is mentioned in the Earl's return, but the fact that all the barons seem to present their returns willingly may be evidence in and of itself. Henry likely then used this to record all the fees, old and new, and would later attempt to collect service and payments from all of these fees, rather than from their *servicium debitum*. Henry collected this survey by simply having all the barons write out their own return and send it to him in Wiltshire, but he would later have all of his barons in Normandy gather together at Caen to perform a similar survey there in 1172. This survey was conducted in such a way as to show Henry clearly instigated it. As for its purpose, it was most likely conducted because Henry thought he was not receiving enough of the service owed to him.

At the time the Norman kingdom of Sicily prepared the first version of the *Catalogus Baronum*, the Regno was facing attacks from all sides and needed to prepare for war against the Pope, the German Emperor, the Byzantine Emperor, and deal with an internal rebellion. The survey was then arranged after assessing the owed number of knights from each county and constabulary in Apulia and Capua and assigning extra *augmentum* knights and serjeants to serve in the *magna expeditio*. It is unknown if the other regions of Sicily and Calabria had similar surveys performed, or if those surveys have simply not survived to the present day.

These surveys then reveal a great deal about infeudation practices in these regions. There is a clear decimal pattern of enfeoffed knights in both England and Normandy: evidence of a 'recently' imposed arbitrary assignment of owed service. Southern Italy does not conform to this pattern. Despite mention in older

historiography of this same decimal pattern being evidence of a Norman tradition, there are too few examples to support this view. There is evidence to suggest the Church was exempt from service in southern Italy and that laymen both performed and were recorded with any service the Church owed. This evidence, however, is not sufficient to explain away the lack of a decimal pattern, nor is it sufficient to suggest that without this ambiguity in the ecclesiastical records a decimal pattern would be seen. What there is evidence for is a Norman manipulation of service by arbitrarily doubling the knights who owed service to calculate the *augmentum* knights, and the assignment of a large number of serjeants that *does* conform to the decimal pattern. The decimal pattern, therefore, is not necessarily a hallmark of Norman creation; it is the arbitrary nature of how the knight fees were arranged. This would be decimals in England and Normandy, and a doubling of fees and decimal pattern for serjeants in southern Italy.

If the English king was unable to receive the military service he was owed from a vassal, then that man would have to pay a commutation to forgo his service, called a scutage. Scutage payments were well documented in England, and serve primarily to inform historians about other aspects of knighthood and service, but there are some interesting details about the payments themselves. The scutage payments were meant to be at a rate high enough to hire a replacement mercenary according to the *Dialogus de Scaccario*, but while in Henry II's time a rate of 2 marks would have been needed to collect the wages for a knight at 8*d.* a day for 40 days, the scutages were usually levied at £1 or 1 mark. There were two scutages collected at the rate of 2 marks, both being in instances of a national emergency and additionally had a collection of a large *dona* from the ecclesiastics and burghers. Additionally, the scutage of 1165, collected at the traditional 1 mark rate, also saw a

large *dona* collected that was known to be for the paying of serjeants. These three years may be an example of an English *arrière-ban* since the higher rates of 1159 and 1161 would have forced more men to serve, or a suitable number of replacements could have been hired at a correlating rate. That serjeants were being paid in large numbers correlates to the similar service of the *magna expeditio* in southern Italy, and even Norman influenced Antioch which was known to collect money from ecclesiastics and urban centres to pay for serjeants during times of emergencies.

Southern Italy's *adohamentum* represents a tax similar to scutage, but by no means identical. *Adohamentum* was charged on fees in years when there was no service called, whereas scutage was a payment to forgo service. While *adohamentum* is not recorded with any reliability before the thirteenth century, an earlier little known payment called *exfortium* may have been similar to the English scutage. While *exfortium* has a few attributes that appear similar to scutage, there is too little known about it to make any serious comparison. What southern Italy does offer as a comparison is the collecting of *auxilia* which were done so for the marriage of a daughter, the knighting of a son and for the ransoming of one's lord. These three occasions were similarly used for collecting aids in England, but the Norman Italians were known to have a few more.

While aids were collected from knights for non-military uses, the collection of scutages were meant to be used for war. An essential payment in war was the wages of the knights and serjeants who were serving, but not performing their *servicium debitum*. A survey of the counties of Kent and Shropshire through the reigns of Henry II, Richard I and John show wages rising, not in increments equal to the inflation of goods in the time period, but rather jumping up in seemingly arbitrary

amounts. While wages rise, a clear hierarchy of pay can be seen between the knights and serjeants of differing ranks, depending on how the serjeants were equipped. Crossbowmen likely fitted into this pay scale as well, usually being considered the equal of a serjeant when it came to wages. Looking at the overall amount of money being paid to knights and serjeants through these three reigns, there does not appear to be any trend towards using paid soldiers rather than owed knights from one time to another. However, the known use of the *Cotereaux* and other mercenary forces on the continent during Henry II's reign would not be reflected in the Pipe Roll payments for England.

Comparing the scutage payments against the *auxilium* of 1168 gives an estimate to the number of knights serving during Henry II's campaigns, which was roughly 3500 knights for the 1161 and 1162 campaigns (and possibly in 1159 and 1165), and about 2000 for the 1172 expedition to Ireland and the 1187 expedition to Galloway. This means that more than half the men who owed service to the king chose to serve in the army. They chose not to pay a scutage that would have been less of a burden economically since the scutage amounts were not equal to a knight's wages (or the amount the knight needed to sustain himself during his *servicium debitum*). That knights chose to serve, rather than commute, shows that there was a definite sense of obligation either to the crown or Henry II, and that the knights would fulfil this obligation despite the economic disadvantage (but there was always the possibility of plunder to make up for the economic loss). These knights, however, were unlikely to be serving at sea, as there seems to be a general impression through both the English and Italian sources that, despite their origins, the Normans did not make use of naval forces. Ships were meant for transport, and while there were

mechanisms in place for areas to owe ships to the king, knights rarely owed service on these ships.

Besides serving in the field, many knights in England owed service in castles. In southern Italy, the predominant soldiers who appear to be serving in castles are serjeants, and indeed there appear to be more serjeants being paid in the English Pipe Rolls to serve in castles than there were knights. It would make sense if serjeants were the main force behind the defence of castles since the extra armour and mount of a knight would have been useless behind the castle walls. That serjeants may be the more important soldier than knights may account for why many royal castles in England do not account for any knights owing castle guard. There is not necessarily any evidence showing serjeants owed castle guard, but they tended to be ignored in feudal surveys, whereas knights tended to receive the official attention of the crown. That knights do owe service in England may be due to various royal castles being held by earls and other barons at some point in their history (such as Dover), or to the evolving nature a knight, initially being a soldier suitable for castle guard but eventually moving to primary service in the field.

The Normans were resourceful and opportunistic. How they employed military obligation in both England and southern Italy shows that they were willing to use institutions that benefited them, but also willing to impose their own customs. The fact that England and Normandy share similar traditions of military obligation that varies from that established in Italy, shows that historians cannot think in terms of a 'Norman way' of serving militarily; be it infeudation practices, commutation of service, or castle guard. Patricia Skinner believed that the differences arising between England and southern Italy after their subsequent Norman invasions was due to a larger 'intellectual' class involved in England, but a larger 'warrior' class

involved in Italy. Since the sons of Tancred and others were more men of action than men of reason, the Normans in southern Italy were more likely to adopt the local customs, rather than impose their own.¹ However, it is more likely that the similarities between England and Normandy are due to a shared ruler for many of their formative years and the two being able to influence one another. As for the Norman's influence on outside areas, there are some similarities in certain practices, and evidence that there was manipulation of the pre-Norman established institutions, but since they did not create the exact same structure in each area shows that the 'Norman way' is an anachronism.

The Normans played a role in the development of feudal practices in other areas as well, particularly in Antioch and the Crusader States. John of Ibelin, writing in the thirteenth century, recorded what the *servicium debitum* for the Kingdom of Jerusalem was in the twelfth century: about 675 knights, with the three largest baronies owing 100 knights each.² If these numbers are accurate, this would not only be similar to England in terms of the majority of knights being provided by a small number of baronies, but also the decimal pattern noticed by Round, at least in the case of these three largest baronies. Prince Roger of Antioch's chancellor, Roger, wrote that in a battle in 1119, the prince's soldiers numbered some 700 knights and 3000 foot soldiers, which would suggest John of Ibelin was not far off on his numbers.³ In addition to this, the Crusader States were known to demand service from all free men in times of emergency, much like the *arrière-ban*, and that during these times the ecclesiastic and urban communities would provide serjeants, showing

¹ Skinner, 'When was Southern Italy 'Feudal'?' 329-30.

² Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 89 ; *Feudal Assessments*, 68 ; *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Peter W. Edbury (ed.) (Woodbridge, 1997), 118-126, 193-200.

³ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 90.

parallels to both Normandy, southern Italy, and possibly England as well.⁴ However, Antioch and the other Crusader States would differ greatly from other Norman areas due to the availability and their reliance on Military Orders such as the Hospitallers and the Templars, as well as being able to swell their troop levels with pilgrims from the west and at times crusading armies. Antioch is a prime example of Norman imposition, but also practical flexibility.

To assume the Normans were responsible for all aspects of an area's form of military obligation is also to ignore common practices found throughout Europe. A quick look at the Holy Roman Empire in the twelfth century finds that the traditional service period was very close to that of the Normans at six weeks or forty-two days, and that they similarly had a universal call to service much like the *arrière-ban*, for which the *Sachsenspiegel* provides evidence (although this was never used in the Hohenstaufen period).⁵ Likewise, Frederick Barbarossa implemented a means for knights to commute their service in 1158, but instead of paying a relatively small amount like in England, a knight would have to pay half the annual value of his fief.⁶ However, one of the most fundamental practices of military feudalism differed between the two cultures: rather than having a set *servicium debitum* quota as the Normans did, the German knights would simply appear with as many men as they deemed necessary to discharge their owed service.⁷ All areas of Europe hired mercenaries as well, and it was due to the availability of these troops that some such as the Normans and to a degree the Holy Roman Emperors were willing to take a commutation instead of their infeudated knights.

⁴ Ibid., 88, 90-1.

⁵ Karl-Friedrich Krieger, 'Obligatory Military Service and the Use of Mercenaries in Imperial Military Campaigns under the Hohenstaufen Emperors,' *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages*, Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath (eds.) (Oxford, 1996), 158, 162-3.

⁶ Ibid., 157.

⁷ Ibid., 157-8.

It must be stressed that in Norman England the purpose of military obligation was not to raise money through scutage, but to provide men. After William had successfully defeated Harold at the Battle of Hastings, he still had to secure the country. Implementing a wide network of infeudated knights under the leadership of earls and barons would not only ensure the loyalty of William's warrior class, but also provide men who could easily be mustered by region to put down any rebellion that may have arisen. The king needed men to serve in his army. Over time, this obligation to serve could be commuted via scutage, but there can be no doubt that when the king gathered his army, he expected his men to serve.

The earliest numbers available to show the extent of service in England come from Henry II's reign, via scutage payments. The cost of serving had grown more than the cost of commuting service, but despite this, there was still the tendency of English knights, barons and tenants-in-chief to provide their service militarily rather than commute. The numbers provided by Henry II's *auxilium* of 1168 for the marriage of his daughter, when compared to the scutages paid in campaign years provides a rough estimate of how many men served. In the years before 1166 there was a high turnout of service, roughly two-thirds of all those who owed still served. After 1166, this number becomes roughly half. Before the knight survey, Henry was capable of charging higher scutage rates than those established by tradition, so much so that he would have been capable of hiring a replacement knight as well as discourage his knights from commuting. Additionally, he had the capability of demanding large *dona* from the ecclesiastics and burghers which, in at least one case, were used to pay for additional serjeants to serve in his campaigns. After 1166, Henry was only able to charge upwards of £1 per knight's fee as a scutage, and service levels drop. This could be seen as the knights having less incentive to serve

due to the cheaper cost of scutage, but this is unlikely considering that one of the years he obtained the most amount of service from his men, 1162, also happened to be the year the least amount of scutage was asked for: 1 mark per fee, and no additional *dona*.

It is clear that a shift in baronial attitude towards Henry occurred sometime in 1165/66. That this stems from Henry's weakened condition after the loss of the Welsh campaign of 1165 is highly probable. Henry's excessive scutage policy compelled the barons to force Henry to conduct the survey of 1166 in an attempt to get their own owed service numbers on official record, and stem Henry's badgering for more and more troops. That the barons felt that they had the authority to press the issue of excessive scutage payments and troop demands is not too surprising, notwithstanding Henry's weakened position after 1165. This was not a period of inherited authority: while the theory of primogeniture and kingly authority from God was taking shape, the position of the king was not one held without question. That none of the previous kings of England gained their throne without some sort of succession dispute, coupled with the evidence that Henry I's chosen heir was rejected by many of the barons, and even Henry II's authority was challenged both by the Young King and later Richard, shows that the state of the king's authority was still subject to the mercy of the barons as a whole. Henry gained initial popularity and power by simply being the un-challenged king to succeed Stephen, and thus end the anarchy, as well as engaging in campaigns to keep the barons busy. But excessive campaigning after almost twenty years of civil war would take its toll, particularly after those campaigns stopped being successful. The barons were aggrieved with their king, but were able to settle their issues somewhat amicably; no civil war occurred, just a survey.

Henry was in a difficult position of re-establishing the power and authority of the monarchy after Stephen's reign. That he was able to do this without seriously upsetting the barons is somewhat remarkable, and is a testament to his strong personality and political acumen.⁸ The earls and barons gained much against the monarchy during Stephen's reign, and Henry was slowly able to get some of these concessions back. Henry walked a fine line, but in the case of military obligations, he pushed the barons a bit too far. Henry however, was enough of a statesman to rectify his mistake and appease the barons to an extent through the remainder of his reign (saving the rebellion of the Young King). This ability to press yet placate the baronage would be lost by his son John, which would eventually lead to the signing of Magna Carta in 1215. The events of 1166 are unlikely to have had a direct influence on this event, but are a part of the larger narrative of baronial versus royal power occurring in Norman England since the conquest.

⁸ An excellent article on Henry's relationship with the earls during this time is Thomas K. Keefe, 'King Henry II and the Earls: The Pipe Roll Evidence,' *Albion*, 13, no. 3 (1981), 191-222.

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Servicium Debitum and Scutage in Twelfth Century
England

With Comparisons to the *Regno* of Southern Italy

Two Volumes

Volume 2

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PhD
History
Durham University
2010

Table of Contents

Appendices

Appendix 1. List of Knight Fees as Recorded by Payment in the 1168 <i>auxilium</i>	254
Appendix 2. Scutage Payments by County in the Reign of Henry II	255
1159 <i>Scutage for the Expedition to Toulouse</i>	256
1161 <i>Scutage</i>	264
1162 <i>Scutage</i>	272
1165 <i>Scutage for the Expedition to Wales</i>	279
1168 <i>Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter</i>	286
1169 <i>Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter</i>	295
1172 <i>Scutage for the Expedition to Ireland</i>	304
1187 <i>Scutage for the Expedition to Galloway</i>	313
Appendix 3. Military Expenditures in the Counties of Shropshire and Kent	320
<i>Shropshire</i>	321
<i>Kent</i>	337
Appendix 4. Wages and Service Periods of Knights and Serjeants	353
Appendix 5. Dover Castle Guard as Recorded in the <i>Red Book of the Exchequer</i>	370

Appendix 1

List of Knights Fees as Recorded by Payment in the 1168 *auxilium*

County	Old Fees	New Fees	County Total
London & Middlesex	£13 6s. 8d.	£11 17s. 9d.	£25 4s. 5d.
Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire	£136 16s. 10d.	£7 3s. 4d.	£144 2d.
Norfolk & Suffolk	£407 11d.	£44 10s.	£451 10s. 11d.
Essex & Hertfordshire	£268 1s. 8d.	£7 14s. 8d.	£275 16s. 4d.
Northamptonshire	£72 5s. 7d.	£0	£72 5s. 7d.
Warwickshire & Leicestershire	£105 3s. 9d.	£29 2s. 1d.	£134 5s. 10d.
Lincolnshire	£232 7s. 11d.	£50 9s. 9d.	£282 17s. 8d.
Yorkshire	£304 2s. 4d.	£92 14s. 7d.	£396 16s. 11d.
Herefordshire	£116 15s. 10d.	£0	£116 15s. 10d.
Staffordshire	£84	£0	£84
Gloucestershire	£221 9s. 6d.	£0	£221 9s. 6d.
Devonshire	£426 11s. 7d.	£30 7d.	£456 12s. 2d.
Dorset & Somerset ¹	£273 1s. 3d.	£27 6s. 10d.	£300 8s. 1d.
Wiltshire	£36	£32	£68
Northumberland	£51 15s. 8d.	£4 4s. 9d.	£56 5d.
Hampshire	£91 10s.	£11	£102 10s.
Kent	£77 6s. 8d.	£4 2s. 8d.	£81 9s. 4d.
Surrey	£2	£0 13s. 4d.	£2 13s. 4d.
Sussex	£145 11s. 8d.	£3 14s. 10d.	£149 6s. 6s.
Berkshire	£24 13s. 5d.	£3 6s. 8d.	£28 1d.
Oxfordshire	£37 17s. 9d.	£1 8d.	£38 18s. 5d.
Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire	£153	£0	£153
Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire	£87 1s. 1d.	£10 16s. 8d.	£97 17s. 9d.
Worcestershire	£47 4s.	£5 9s. 9d.	£52 13s. 9d.
Totals:	£3415 4s. 1d.	£377 8s. 11d.	£3792 13s.

The aid this year was charged at a rate of 1 mark per knight fee.

Shropshire's knights were not included because the king found that they had already paid the aid.

Lancashire had no knight fees reported.

¹ The Archbishop of Canterbury's knight fees were paid in this county.

Appendix 2

Scutage Payments by County in the Reign of Henry II

1159 Scutage for the Expedition to Toulouse

<u>London</u>				<u>Northumberland</u>			
<i>Paid (86%):</i>	£913	2s.	1d.	<i>Paid (97%):</i>	£201	13s.	3d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (14%):</i>	£143	11s.	3d.	<i>Owed (3%):</i>	£5	6s.	8d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (14%):	£143	11s.	3d.	Not Collected (3%):	£5	6s.	8d.
Total due:	£1056	13s.	4d.	Total due:	£206	19s.	3d.
<u>Essex</u>				<u>Northamptonshire</u>			
<i>Paid (87%):</i>	£252	5s.	9d.	<i>Paid (65%):</i>	£125	1s.	
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£15	18s.	3d.	<i>Pardoned (24%):</i>	£45	5s.	5d.
<i>Owed (7%):</i>	£20	16s.		<i>Owed (11%):</i>	£21	3s.	4d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (12%):	£36	14s.	3d.	Not Collected (35%):	£66	8s.	9d.
Total due:	£288	19s.		Total due:	£191	9s.	9d.
<u>Hertfordshire</u>				<u>Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire</u>			
<i>Paid (80%):</i>	£87	11s.	4d.	<i>Paid (84%):</i>	£78	16s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£1	15s.		<i>Pardoned (16%):</i>	£14	10s.	
<i>Owed (18%):</i>	£20			<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (20%):	£21	15s.		Not Collected (16%):	£14	10s.	
Total due:	£109	6s.	4d.	Total due:	£93	6s.	8d.
<u>Norfolk and Suffolk</u>				<u>Somerset</u>			
<i>Paid (97%):</i>	£834	16s.	4d.	<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£447	2s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£35	13s.	4d.	<i>Pardoned (8%):</i>	£45	5s.	5d.
<i>Owed (2%):</i>	£16	16s.	8d.	<i>Owed (14%):</i>	£82	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (3%):	£52	10s.		Not Collected (22%):	£127	18s.	9d.
Total due:	£887	6s.	4d.	Total due:	£574	1s.	1d.

Worcestershire

<i>Paid (90%):</i>	£421	4s.	
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£10	9s.	4d.
<i>Owed (7%):</i>	£34	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (9%):	£45	2s.	8d.
Total due:	£466	6s.	8d.

Warwickshire

<i>Paid (65%):</i>	£63	4s.	2d.
<i>Pardoned (31%):</i>	£30	2s.	6d.
<i>Owed (4%):</i>	£4		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (35%):	£34	2s.	6d.
Total due:	£97	6s.	8d.

Gloucestershire

<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£187	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (0%):	£0		
Total due:	£187	13s.	4d.

Staffordshire

<i>Paid (97%):</i>	£98	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£3		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (3%):	£3		
Total due:	£101	13s.	4d.

Yorkshire

<i>Paid (97%):</i>	£975		
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£26	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (1%):</i>	£6	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (4%):	£33		
Total due:	£1008		

Carlisle

<i>Paid (71%):</i>	£105	14s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (19%):</i>	£28	2s.	8d.
<i>Owed (11%):</i>	£16		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (30%):	£44	2s.	8d.
Total due:	£149	17s.	4d.

Oxfordshire

<i>Paid (86%):</i>	£67	6s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£4		
<i>Owed (9%):</i>	£6	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (14%):	£10	13s.	4d.
Total due:	£78		

Berkshire

<i>Paid (95%):</i>	£117	9s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£6	10s.	4d.
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (5%):	£6	10s.	4d.
Total due:	£124		

Wiltshire

<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£73	6s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (0%):	£0		
Total due:	£73	6s.	8d.

Devonshire

<i>Paid (97%):</i>	£443	1s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£9	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (1%):</i>	£2		2d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (3%):	£11	13s.	6d.
Total due:	£454	15s.	2d.

Dorset

Paid (100%): £49
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £49

Hampshire

Paid (99%): £724 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (1%): £10 13s. 4d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (1%): £10 13s. 4d.

Total due: £735

Herefordshire

Paid (99%): £115 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (1%): £1 6s. 8d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (1%): £1 6s. 8d.

Total due: £116 13s. 4d.

Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire

Paid (66%): £160 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (12%): £30
Owed (21%): £52
Total of Monies
Not Collected (33%): £82

Total due: £242 13s. 4d.

Cambridgeshire

Paid (99%): £52 14s. 2d.
Pardoned (1%): £0 12s. 6d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (1%): £0 12s. 6d.

Total due: £53 6s. 8d.

Huntingdonshire

Paid (99%): £67 16s. 8d.
Pardoned (1%): £0 16s. 8d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (1%): £0 16s. 8d.

Total due: £68 13s. 4d.

Surrey

Paid (72%): £171 3s. 5d.
Pardoned (28%): £65 13s. 5d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (28%): £65 13s. 5d.

Total due: £236 16s. 10d.

Kent

Paid (99.6%): £390 1s. 10d.
Pardoned (0.3%): £1 6s.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (0.3%): £1 6s.

Total due: £391 7s. 10d.

Sussex

Paid (100%): £52 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £52 13s. 4d.

Shropshire


Paid (95%): £130 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (5%): £6 13s. 4d.
Owed (0%): £0
Total of Monies
Not Collected (5%): £6 13s. 4d.

Total due: £137


<u>Lincolnshire</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>			
<i>Paid (98%):</i>	£713	13s.	4d.	<i>Paid (91%):</i>	£8120	19s.	
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£13	6s.	8d.	<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£407		10d.
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Owed (5%):</i>	£432	7s.	5d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (2%):	£13	6s.	8d.	Not Collected (10%):	£839	8s.	3d.
Total due:	£727			Total due:	£8960	7s.	3d.

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.


1159 Scutage Totals Due (Rounded to Nearest £)




1159 Percentages Paid



1159 Percentages Pardoned



1159 Percentages Owed



1161 Scutage

Norfolk & Suffolk

<i>Paid (91%):</i>	£537	7s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£11	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (8%):</i>	£44	12s.	6d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (9%):	£55	19s.	2d.
Total due:	£593	6s.	8d.

Wiltshire

<i>Paid (94%):</i>	£101	10s.	
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£3	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (3%):</i>	£3	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (6%):	£7		
Total due:	£108	10s.	

Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire

<i>Paid (79%):</i>	£118	13s.	9d.
<i>Pardoned (16%):</i>	£24	12s.	11d.
<i>Owed (5%):</i>	£7	6s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (21%):	£31	19s.	7d.
Total due:	£150	13s.	4d.

Sussex

<i>Paid (51%):</i>	£18		
<i>Pardoned (49%):</i>	£17	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (49%):	£17	6s.	8d.
Total due:	£35	6s.	8d.

Lincolnshire

<i>Paid (75%):</i>	£345	6s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (10%):</i>	£46	10s.	4d.
<i>Owed (15%):</i>	£68	16s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (25%):	£115	7s.	
Total due:	£460	13s.	4d.

London¹

<i>Paid (80%):</i>	£526	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (19%):</i>	£122	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (1%):</i>	£5	6s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (20%):	£127	13s.	4d.
Total due:	£654	6s.	8d.

Herefordshire

<i>Paid (70%):</i>	£54	19s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (16%):</i>	£12	7s.	4d.
<i>Owed (14%):</i>	£10	13s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (30%):	£23		8d.
Total due:	£78		

¹ £52 6s. 8d. unaccounted for; the *Dona Civitatis* was listed at 1000 marks, £122 6s. 8d. of that was listed as pardoned and £492 was listed as paid which is short of the total 1000 marks by £52 6s. 8d.

Gloucestershire²

Paid (86%): £76 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (6%): £5 6s. 8d.
Owed (8%): £6 13s. 4d.

Total of Monies

Not Collected (14%): £12

Total due: £88 13s. 4d.

Northumberland

Paid (99%): £142 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (1%): £1 6s. 8d.
Owed (0%): £0

Total of Monies

Not Collected (1%): £1 6s. 8d.

Total due: £143 13s. 4d.

Oxfordshire

Paid (45%): £60 13s.
Pardoned (54%): £72
Owed (1%): £1 6s. 8d.

Total of Monies

Not Collected (55%): £73 6s. 8d.

Total due: £133 19s. 8d.

Devonshire

Paid (52%): £182
Pardoned (38%): £134 13s. 4d.
Owed (10%): £34 16s. 9d.

Total of Monies

Not Collected (48%): £169 1d.

Total due: £351 1d.

Notinghamshire & Derbyshire³

Paid (68%): £51 13s.
Pardoned (32%): £24 8d.
Owed (0%): £0

Total of Monies

Not Collected (32%): £24 8d.

Total due: £75 13s. 8d.

Northamptonshire

Paid (94%): £226 1s. 4d.
Pardoned (4%): £9 18s. 4d.
Owed (1%): £3 7s.

Total of Monies

Not Collected (6%): £13 5s. 4d.

Total due: £239 6s. 8d.

Shropshire

Paid (100%): £27 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0

Total of Monies

Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £27 13s. 4d.

Yorkshire

Paid (87%): £342 2s. 1d.
Pardoned (5%): £19 11s. 3d.
Owed (8%): £32 6s. 8d.

Total of Monies

Not Collected (13%): £51 17s. 11d.

Total due: £394

² This roll is damaged. All of the numbers included here are in the correct place (those in 'owed' are slightly questionable), but it is unclear how much is missing aside from £5 6s. 8d. of *dona* that is either owed or pardoned.

³ These entries are very faded and none are complete. They have been here placed in the categories based on their similar placement in the rolls compared to other entries.

Carlisle

Paid (45%): £16 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (55%): £20
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (55%): £20

Total due: £36 13s. 4d.

Staffordshire

Paid (80%): £43 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (6%): £3 6s. 8d.
Owed (13%): £7 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (20%): £10 13s. 4d.

Total due: £54 6s. 8d.

Surrey

Paid (100%): £19
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £19

Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire

Paid (90%): £68 14s. 8d.
Pardoned (3%): £2 12s.
Owed (7%): £5 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (10%): £7 18s. 8d.

Total due: £76 13s. 4d.

Warwickshire & Leicestershire

Paid (73%): £11
Pardoned (18%): £2 13s. 4d.
Owed (9%): £1 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (27%): £4

Total due: £15

Dorset

Paid (84%): £61 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (16%): £11 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (16%): £11 6s. 8d.

Total due: £72 13s. 4d.

Berkshire

Paid (73%): £55 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (25%): £19 6s. 8d.
Owed (2%): £1 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (27%): £20 13s. 4d.

Total due: £76

Somerset

Paid (62%): £151 8d.
Pardoned (3%): £6 6s.
Owed (35%): £85 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (38%): £91 12s. 8d.

Total due: £242 13s. 4d.

Worcestershire

Paid (91%): £45
Pardoned (2%): £1
Owed (7%): £3 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (9%): £4 6s. 8d.

Total due: £49 6s. 8d.

Hampshire

Paid (56%): £137 2s.
Pardoned (40%): £98
Owed (4%): £8 13s. 4d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (44%): £106 15s. 4d.


Total due: £243 15s. 4d.

<u>Kent</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>			
<i>Paid (86%):</i>	£139	13s.	4d.	<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£3647	2s.	9d.
<i>Pardoned (14%):</i>	£22			<i>Pardoned (15%):</i>	£692	11s.	
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Owed (8%):</i>	£360	1s.	8d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (14%):	£22			Not Collected (22%):	£1052	12s.	8d.
Total due:	£161	13s.	4d.	Total due:	£4699	15s.	5d.
<u>Essex & Hertforshire</u>							
<i>Paid (75%):</i>	£86	19s.	1d.				
<i>Pardoned (11%):</i>	£12	12s.	2d.				
<i>Owed (15%):</i>	£17	2s.	1d.				
Total of Monies							
Not Collected (25%):	£29	14s.	3d.				
Total due:	£116	13s.	4d.				


Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.

Some of the money was given for castle guard, and many of the pardons listed were denoted as *cancell(o)*.


1161 Scutage Totals Due (Rounded to the Nearest £)




1161 Percentages Paid



1161 Percentages Pardoned



1161 Percentages Owed



1162 Scutage

Leicestershire & Warwickshire

Paid (88%): £30 19s. 7d.
Pardoned (6%): £2 2s.
Owed (6%): £2
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (12%): £4 2s.

Total due: £35 1s. 7d.

Devonshire

Paid (82%): £77 2s. 6d.
Pardoned (16%): £15
Owed (2%): £2 4s. 2d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (18%): £17 4s. 2d.

Total due: £94 6s. 8d.

Northamptonshire

Paid (93%): £48 18s. 8d.
Pardoned (4%): £2
Owed (3%): £1 13s. 4d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (7%): £3 13s. 4d.

Total due: £52 13s.

Northumberland

Paid (75%): £49 15s. 7d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (25%): £13 6s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (25%): £13 6s. 8d.

Total due: £63 2s. 3d.

Wiltshire

Paid (86%): £44
Pardoned (2%): £1
Owed (12%): £6 5s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (14%): £7 5s.

Total due: £51 5s.

Lincolnshire

Paid (84%): £89 5s.
Pardoned (12%): £12 16s. 8d.
Owed (3%): £3 13s. 4d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (15%): £16 10s.

Total due: £105 15s.

Somerset

Paid (83%): £98 9s. 7d.
Pardoned (14%): £16 13s. 4d.
Owed (3%): £3 12s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (17%): £20 5s. 4d.

Total due: £118 14s. 11d.

Dorset

Paid (100%): £9 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £9 6s. 8d.

Oxfordshire

Paid (100%): £7 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £7 6s. 8d.

Sussex

Paid (100%): £7 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £7 6s. 8d.

Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire

Paid (76%): £50 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (6%): £4
Owed (18%): £12
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (24%): £16

Total due: £66 13s. 4d.

Hampshire

Paid (74%): £50 1s. 4d.
Pardoned (23%): £15 12s.
Owed (3%): £2
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (26%): £17 12s.

Total due: £67 13s. 4d.

Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire

Paid (85%): £74 4s. 4d.
Pardoned (6%): £5 12s. 4d.
Owed (9%): £7 13s. 4d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (15%): £13 5s. 8d.

Total due: £87 10s.

Surrey

Paid (98%): £31 16s. 6d.
Pardoned (2%): £0 13s. 4d.
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (2%): £0 13s. 4d.

Total due: £32 9s. 10d.

Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire

Paid (98%): £31 16s. 6d.
Pardoned (2%): £0 14s. 4d.
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (1%): £0 14s. 4d.

Total due: £32 10s. 10d.

Yorkshire

Paid (99%): £67 5s. 4d.
Pardoned (1%): £0 13s. 4d.
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (1%): £0 13s. 4d.

Total due: £67 18s. 8d.

Kent¹

Paid (100%): £18
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £18

¹ This roll was damaged. Not all of the numbers can be ascertained.

<u>Norfolk and Suffolk</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>			
<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£66	6s.	8d.	<i>Paid (87%):</i>	£896	15s.	11d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Pardoned (8%):</i>	£82	14s.	2d.
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Owed (5%):</i>	£55	15s.	10d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (0%): £0				Not Collected (13%): £138 10s.			
Total due:	£66	6s.	8d.	Total due:	£1035	5s.	11d.
<u>Essex and Hertfordshire</u>							
<i>Paid (91%):</i>	£79	17s.	6d.				
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£6	11s.	2d.				
<i>Owed (2%):</i>	£1	8s.					
Total of Monies							
Not Collected (9%): £7 19s. 2d.							
Total due:	£87	16s.	8d.				


Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.

Hereford, Berkshire, Carlisle, Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire had no scutages listed.


The rolls for the City of London, and Gloucestershire were damaged to where none of the figures could be ascertained.

[illegible]


1162 Percentages Paid



1162 Percentages Pardoned



1162 Percentages Owed



1165 Scutage for the Expedition to Wales

<u>Norfolk and Suffolk</u>				<u>Northumberland</u>			
<i>Paid (95%):</i>	£529	2s.	6d.	<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£187	10s.	10d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£4	8s.	2d.	<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (4%):</i>	£21	5s.		<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (5%):	£25	13s.	2d.	Not Collected (0%):	£0		
Total due:	£555	5s.	8d.	Total due:	£187	10s.	10d.
<u>Gloucestershire</u>				<u>London and Middlesex</u>			
<i>Paid (52%):</i>	£159		10d.	<i>Paid (75%):</i>	£270		
<i>Pardoned (36%):</i>	£108	16s.	8d.	<i>Pardoned (0.3%):</i>	£3	8s.	
<i>Owed (12%):</i>	£38	2s.	6d.	<i>Owed (25%):</i>	£86	12s.	
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (48%):	£146	19s.	2d.	Not Collected (25.3%):	£90		
Total due:	£306			Total due:	£360		
<u>Essex and Hertfordshire</u>				<u>Lincolnshire</u>			
<i>Paid (70%):</i>	£206	12s.	10d.	<i>Paid (84%):</i>	£325	18s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (28%):</i>	£84		2d.	<i>Pardoned (16%):</i>	£62	9s.	10d.
<i>Owed (2%):</i>	£6	13s.	4d.	<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (30%):	£90	13s.	6d.	Not Collected (16%):	£62	9s.	10d.
Total due:	£297	6s.	4d.	Total due:	£388	9s.	4d.
<u>Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire</u>				<u>Hampshire</u>			
<i>Paid (92%):</i>	£128	18s.		<i>Paid (37%):</i>	£178	18s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (8%):</i>	£11	2s.	11d.	<i>Pardoned (14%):</i>	£65		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Owed (49%):</i>	£234	12s.	6d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (8%):	£11	2s.	11d.	Not Collected (63%):	£299	12s.	6d.
Total due:	£140		11d.	Total due:	£478	11s.	2d.

Yorkshire

<i>Paid (65%):</i>	£573	6s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£24	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (32%):</i>	£285	1s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (35%):	£309	8s.	4d.
Total due:	£883	2s.	8d.

Wiltshire

<i>Paid (24%):</i>	£64	3s.	5d.
<i>Pardoned (31%):</i>	£82	18s.	4d.
<i>Owed (45%):</i>	£116	17s.	6d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (76%):	£199	15s.	10d.
Total due:	£263	19s.	3d.

Dorset and Somerset

<i>Paid (81%):</i>	£118	8s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (11%):</i>	£16	2s.	1d.
<i>Owed (8%):</i>	£11	16s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (19%):	£27	18s.	9d.
Total due:	£146	7s.	3d.

Berkshire

<i>Paid (85%):</i>	£94	1s.	5d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i> ¹	£3	1s.	
<i>Owed (12%):</i>	£13	6s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (15%):	£16	7s.	8d.
Total due:	£110	9s.	1d.

¹ 5 serjeants are listed as owed and pardoned, but no monetary value is attached. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 75.

Oxfordshire

<i>Paid (70%):</i>	£60	16s.	11d.
<i>Pardoned (30%):</i> ²	£29	10s.	5d.
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (30%):	£29	10s.	5d.
Total due:	£90	7s.	4d.

Devon

<i>Paid (50%):</i>	£118	3s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (19%):</i>	£45	18s.	2d.
<i>Owed (31%):</i>	£76	5s.	
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (50%):	£120	3s.	2d.
Total due:	£238	6s.	8d.

Warwickshire and Leicestershire

<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£111	10s.	7d.
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£9	5s.	4d.
<i>Paid (15%):</i>	£21	6s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (22%):	£30	12s.	
Total due:	£142	2s.	7d.

Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire

<i>Paid (93%):</i>	£81	16s.	11d.
<i>Pardoned (6%):</i>	£5	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (1%):</i>	£0	8s.	11d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (7%):	£6	2s.	3d.
Total due:	£87	19s.	2d.

² 2 serjeants are listed as owed and pardoned, but no monetary value is attached. *P.R. 11 Henry II*, 71.

<u>Sussex</u>				<u>Kent</u>			
<i>Paid (44%):</i>	£126	12s.	7d.	<i>Paid (63%):</i>	£199	9s.	9d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£4	13s.	4d.	<i>Pardoned (37%):</i>	£116	18s.	8d.
<i>Owed (54%):</i>	£154	19s.	2d.	<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£1	10s.	6d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (56%):	£159	12s.	6d.	Not Collected (37%):	£118	9s.	2d.
Total due:	£286	5s.	1d.	Total due:	£317	18s.	11d.
<u>Herefordshire</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>			
<i>Paid (5%):</i>	£5	6s.	8d.	<i>Paid (66%):</i>	£3583	18s.	3d.
<i>Pardoned (21%):</i>	£21	19s.	2d.	<i>Pardoned (13%):</i>	£699	12s.	3d.
<i>Owed (74%):</i>	£78	10s.	10d.	<i>Owed (21%):</i>	£1147	8s.	11d.
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (95%):	£100	10s.		Not Collected (34%):	£1847	1s.	2d.
Total due:	£105	16s.	8d.	Total due:	£5430	19s.	5d.

£930 6d. was paid by tally in the Easter session, paid in by 19 persons of note, and 8 cities.

The counties of Cumberland (listed only as Carlisle), Staffordshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire all have records for this year, but no scutage recorded. The counties of Northamptonshire, Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire have scutage numbers listed, but the records are damaged to where one is unable to discern whether the money was paid or still owed, and so have not been included in this chart.

1165-66 Pipe Roll:

Of the amounts owed, £151 2s. 9d. was paid, £112 6s. 2d. was pardoned, and £517 10s. 8d. was still owed. £366 9s. 4d. was unaccounted for.

1166-67 Pipe Roll:

Of the amounts still owed, £12 14s. 7d. was paid, £252 10s. was pardoned, and £375 0s. 6d. was still owed. Some of the amounts unaccounted for in the previous year were recorded again in this year.

1167-68 Pipe Roll:


Of the amounts still owed, none was paid, £177 17s. 6d. was pardoned, and £79 19s. 10d. was still owed. £118 17s. 2d. from the previous year was unaccounted for.

1168-69 Pipe Roll:


Of the amounts still owed, 16s. was paid, 18s. 4d. was pardoned, and £49 11s. 8d. was still owed. £28 13s. from the previous year was unaccounted for. No change on the owed amount occurred in the following year.

A map of the British Isles (Great Britain and Ireland) showing administrative regions and their populations in 1981. The regions are outlined with dashed lines and labeled with their population in millions (e.g., £188, £883, £388, £555, £142, £106, £306, £90, £140, £297, £110, £264, £146, £238, £18, £286, *£360). Some regions are marked as 'Illeg.' (illegal). A scale bar indicates 0 to 100 km.


1165 Percentages Paid



1165 Percentages Pardoned



1165 Percentages Owed



1168 Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter

<u>London and Middlesex</u>				<u>Essex and Hertfordshire</u>			
<i>Paid (79%):</i>	£575	6s.	8d.	<i>Paid (46%):</i>	£212	4s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£10			<i>Pardoned (16%):</i>	£73	11s.	1d.
<i>Owed (20%):</i>	£145	13s.	4d.	<i>Owed (38%):</i>	£175	19s.	9d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0			<i>From New Fees:</i>	£7	14s.	8d.
(0% / 0%)				(1% / 0%)			
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (21%):	£155	13s.	4d.	Not Collected (54%):	£249	10s.	10d.
Total due:	£711			Total due:	£461	15s.	2d.
<u>Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire</u>				<u>Northamptonshire</u>			
<i>Paid (37%):</i>	£40	5s.		<i>Paid (67%):</i>	£124	2s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0	1s.	4d.	<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (63%):</i>	£69	15s.	8d.	<i>Owed (32%):</i>	£59	5s.	3d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£2	16s.	10d.	<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(4% / 3%)				(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (63%):	£69	17s.		Not Collected (33%):	£59	18s.	7d.
Total due:	£110	2s.		Total due:	£184	1s.	3d.
<u>Norfolk and Suffolk</u>				<u>Warwickshire and Leicestershire</u>			
<i>Paid (52%):</i>	£642	19s.	4d.	<i>Paid (58%):</i>	£82	12s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£13	16s.	8d.	<i>Pardoned (4%):</i>	£6	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (47%):</i>	£572	5s.	5d.	<i>Owed (37%):</i>	£52	13s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£25	3s.	4d.	<i>From New Fees:</i>	£7	16s.	8d.
(4% / 2%)				(15% / 6%)			
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (48%):	£586	2s.	1d.	Not Collected (42%):	£58	19s.	10d.
Total due:	£1229	1s.	5d.	Total due:	£141	12s.	2d.

Lincolnshire

<i>Paid (64%):</i>	£273	18s.	2d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (36%):</i>	£152	3s.	6d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£22	9s.	9d.
(3% / 1%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (36%):	£152	3s.	6d.
Total due:	£436	1s.	8d.

Yorkshire

<i>Paid (71%):</i>	£304	17s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£10	14s.	4d.
<i>Owed (26%):</i>	£112	3s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£32	8s.	1d.
(29% / 8%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (29%):	£122	17s.	11d.
Total due:	£427	15s.	3d.

Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire

<i>Paid (55%):</i>	£75	10s.	7d.
<i>Pardoned (42%):</i>	£58	16s.	3d.
<i>Owed (3%):</i>	£4	13s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (45%):	£63	9s.	5d.
Total due:	£139		

Worcestershire

<i>Paid (37%):</i>	£33	4s.	
<i>Pardoned (22%):</i>	£19	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (41%):</i>	£36	16s.	5d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (63%):	£56	3s.	1d.
Total due:	£89	7s.	1d.

Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire

<i>Paid (64%):</i>	£191	19s.	3d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£3	11s.	7d.
<i>Owed (35%):</i>	£106		
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (36%):	£109	11s.	7d.
Total due:	£300	10s.	10d.

Herefordshire

<i>Paid (59%):</i>	£69	1s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£2		
<i>Owed (39%):</i>	£45	14s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (41%):	£47	14s.	2d.
Total due:	£116	15s.	10d.

Staffordshire

<i>Paid (74%):</i>	£95	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (10%):</i>	£13	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (16%):</i>	£20		
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (26%):	£33	6s.	8d.
Total due:	£129		

Gloucestershire

<i>Paid (73%):</i>	£181	14s.	2d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£12		
<i>Owed (22%):</i>	£56	2s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (27%):	£68	2s.	
Total due:	£249	16s.	2d.

Devon

<i>Paid (56%):</i>	£394	4s.	5d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£14	3s.	4d.
<i>Owed (42%):</i>	£300	4s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£17	14s.	5d.
(6% / 3%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (44%):	£314	7s.	4d.
Total due:	£708	11s.	9d.

Dorset

<i>Paid (71%):</i>	£242	14s.	3d.
<i>Pardoned (8%):</i>	£26	9s.	6d.
<i>Owed (22%):</i>	£75		
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£15	8s.	
(21% / 4%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (29%):	£101	17s.	6d.
Total due:	£444	11s.	9d.

Somerset

<i>Paid (94%):</i>	£255	7s.	10d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£6	17s.	8d.
<i>Owed (4%):</i>	£10		5d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (6%):	£16	18s.	1d.
Total due:	£272	5s.	11d.

Wiltshire

<i>Paid (47%):</i>	£73	18s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (21%):</i>	£34		
<i>Owed (33%):</i>	£54	1s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£13		
(24% / 8%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (53%):	£88	1s.	8d.
Total due:	£162		

Northumberland

<i>Paid (65%):</i>	£45	15s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (35%):</i>	£24	4s.	9d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£4	4s.	9d.
(17% / 6%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (35%):	£24	4s.	9d.
Total due:	£70		5d.

Hampshire

<i>Paid (73%):</i>	£210	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£1		
<i>Owed (27%):</i>	£77	12s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	6s.	8d.
(2% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (27%):	£78	12s.	
Total due:	£288	5s.	4d.

Sussex

<i>Paid (45%):</i>	£76		2d.
<i>Pardoned (10%):</i>	£16	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (45%):</i>	£76	1s.	6d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (55%):	£92	14s.	10d.
Total due:	£168	15s.	

Berkshire

<i>Paid (64%):</i>	£43	11s.	1d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£0	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (35%):</i>	£23	15s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	6s.	8d.
(6% / 2%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (36%):	£24	8s.	11d.
Total due:	£68		


<u>Oxfordshire</u>				<u>Surrey</u>			
<i>Paid (87%):</i>	£38			<i>Paid (76%):</i>	£40		8d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£1	6s.	8d.	<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (10%):</i>	£4	11s.	9d.	<i>Owed (24%):</i>	£12	13s.	4d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1		8d.	<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(23% / 2%)				(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (13%):	£5	18s.	5d.	Not Collected (24%):	£12	13s.	4d.
Total due:	£43	18s.	5d.	Total due:	£52	14s.	
<hr/>				<hr/>			
<u>Kent</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>			
<i>Paid (71%):</i>	£264	1s.	4d.	<i>Paid (63%):</i>	£4587	15s.	1d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0			<i>Pardoned (4%):</i>	£325	8s.	5d.
<i>Owed (29%):</i>	£108	19s.		<i>Owed (33%):</i>	£2376	9s.	5d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£4	2s.	8d.	<i>From New Fees:</i>	£156	13s.	2d.
(4% / 1%)				(3% / 1%)			
Total of Monies				Total of Monies			
Not Collected (29%):	£108	19s.		Not Collected (37%):	£2701	17s.	10d.
Total due:	£373		4d.	Total due:	£7289	12s.	11d.
<hr/>				<hr/>			

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy. The percentages following the New Fees are: % of amount still owed / % of total due. New Fees are inclusive to the amount owed.


The men of Shropshire had already paid an *auxilium* of some kind and so were exempted from paying this year. No *auxilium* was listed as paid in Lancaster.

In collecting the *auxilium*, there is a consistent pattern among the towns and vills where they only paid half of the amount they owed or promised. They also appear to be paying in some rate based on an even £1, rather than the 1 mark rate that is obviously used for the knight fees. The bishops also appear to be paying at some rate based on £1, rather than 1 mark, but this impression may be due to a trick of the math.


1168 Aid Totals Due (Rounded to the Nearest £)




1168 Percentages Paid




1168 Percentages Pardoned



1168 Percentages Owed



1168 Due From New Fees (Rounded to the Nearest £)



1169 Aid for the Marriage of the King's Daughter

Dorset and Somerset

<i>Paid (39%):</i>	£27	10s.	
<i>Pardoned (11%):</i>	£8		
<i>Owed (50%):</i>	£35	13s.	4d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£11	8s.	8d.
(32% / 16%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (61%):	£43	13s.	4d.
Total due:	£70	10s.	

Lincolnshire

<i>Paid (47%):</i>	£111	7s.	
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (53%):</i>	£126	12s.	9d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£22	8s.	9d.
(18% / 9%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (53%):	£126	12s.	9d.
Total due:	£133	19s.	9d.

Wiltshire

<i>Paid (38%):</i>	£37	6s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (23%):</i>	£22	8s.	
<i>Owed (39%):</i>	£37	13s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£6	6s.	8d.
(17% / 7%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (62%):	£60	1s.	8d.
Total due:	£97	8s.	4d.

Yorkshire¹

<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£779	1s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£54	6s.	7d.
<i>Owed (17%):</i>	£165	2s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£33	6s.	5d.
(20% / 3%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (22%):	£219	8s.	7d.
Total due:	£998	10s.	3d.

Warwickshire and Leicestershire

<i>Paid (51%):</i>	£27	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (49%):</i>	£27	1s.	5d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£4	16s.	8d.
(18% / 9%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (49%):	£27	1s.	5d.
Total due:	£54	14s.	9d.

Devonshire

<i>Paid (7%):</i>	£28	14s.	
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£27	1s.	8d.
<i>Owed (86%):</i>	£356	13s.	3d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£18	3s.	5d.
(5% / 4%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (93%):	£383	14s.	11d.
Total due:	£412	8s.	11d.

¹ A portion of this roll was damaged.

Sussex

<i>Paid (6%):</i>	£4	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (94%):</i>	£71	8s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (94%):	£71	8s.	2d.
Total due:	£76	1s.	6d.

Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire

<i>Paid (95%):</i>	£178	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£1	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (4%):</i>	£7	5s.	6d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (5%):	£8	12s.	2d.
Total due:	£187	5s.	6d.

Staffordshire

<i>Paid (94%):</i>	£82	16s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (6%):</i>	£4	16s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (6%):	£4	16s.	8d.
Total due:	£87	13s.	4d.

Northamptonshire

<i>Paid (80%):</i>	£97	18s.	
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£0	13s.	
<i>Owed (19%):</i>	£23	13s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (20%):	£24	6s.	7d.
Total due:	£122	4s.	1d.

Berkshire

<i>Paid (92%):</i>	£44	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (8%):</i>	£3	15s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	6s.	8d.
<i>(35% / 3%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (8%):	£3	15s.	7d.
Total due:	£48	8s.	11d.

Oxfordshire

<i>Paid (77%):</i>	£59	19s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (23%):</i>	£17	13s.	9d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	0s.	8d.
<i>(6% / 1%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (23%):	£17	13s.	9d.
Total due:	£77	13s.	5d.

Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire

<i>Paid (79%):</i>	£76	7s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (21%):</i>	£20	13s.	10d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£7	3s.	4d.
<i>(35% / 7%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (21%):	£20	13s.	10d.
Total due:	£97	1s.	6d.

Norfolk & Suffolk

<i>Paid (33%):</i>	£168	3s.	7d.
<i>Pardoned (9%):</i>	£46	13s.	4d.
<i>Owed (58%):</i>	£296	18s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£30	6s.	8d.
<i>(10% / 6%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (67%):	£343	11s.	11d.
Total due:	£511	15s.	6d.

Shropshire

Paid (100%): £30 3s. 4d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
From New Fees: £0
(0% / 0%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £30 3s. 4d.

Northumberland

Paid (98%): £176 6s. 8d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (2%): £4 4s. 9d.
From New Fees: £4 4s. 9d.
(100% / 2%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (2%): £4 4s. 9d.

Total due: £181 0s. 5d.

Gloucestershire

Paid (28%): £162 17s. 2d.
Pardoned (1%): £1 6s. 8d.
Owed (70%): £69 14s. 10d.
From New Fees: £0
(0% / 0%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (72%): £71 1s. 6d.

Total due: £233 18s. 8d.

Essex & Hertfordshire

Paid (12%): £19 4s. 4d.
Pardoned (42%): £65 16s. 8d.
Owed (46%): £72 4s. 4d.
From New Fees: £5 11s. 4d.
(8% / 4%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (88%): £138 1s.

Total due: £157 5s. 4d.

Lancashire

Paid (71%): £110 18s.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (29%): £44 15s.
From New Fees: £0
(0% / 0%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (29%): £44 15s.

Total due: £155 13s.

Worcestershire

Paid (60%): £39 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (40%): £26 13s. 8d.
Owed (0%): £0
From New Fees: £0
(0% / 0%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (40%): £26 13s. 8d.

Total due: £66 7s.

Herefordshire

Paid (42%): £44 18s. 6d.
Pardoned (4%): £4 13s. 4d.
Owed (54%): £56 15s. 8d.
From New Fees: £0
(0% / 0%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (58%): £61 9s.

Total due: £106 7s. 6d.

Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire

Paid (75%): £116 14s.
Pardoned (11%): £17
Owed (14%): £21 9s. 4d.
From New Fees: £1
(5% / 1%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (25%): £38 9s. 4d.

Total due: £155 3s. 4d.

Hampshire

<i>Paid (14%):</i>	£11	2s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (86%):</i>	£67	4s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	6s.	8d.
(2% / 2%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (86%):	£67	4s.	
Total due:	£78	6s.	8d.

Kent

<i>Paid (16%):</i>	£63	8s.	7d.
<i>Pardoned (9%):</i>	£6		
<i>Owed (75%):</i>	£49	10s.	10d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£4	2s.	8d.
(8% / 6%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (84%):	£55	10s.	10d.
Total due:	£118	19s.	5d.

Surrey

<i>Paid (68%):</i>	£8	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (32%):</i>	£4		
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (32%):	£4		
Total due:	£12	13s.	4d.

London & Middelsex

<i>Paid (17%):</i>	£13	6s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£1		
<i>Owed (82%):</i>	£65	1s.	1d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (83%):	£66	1s.	1d.
Total due:	£79	7s.	9d.


TOTALS

<i>Paid (56%):</i>	£2522	4s.	10d.
<i>Pardoned (6%):</i>	£282	19s.	7d.
<i>Owed (37%):</i>	£1676	15s.	7d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£152	13s.	4d.
(9% / 3%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (44%):	£1959	15s.	2d.
Total due:	£4482		


Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.
The percentages following the New Fees are: % of amount still owed / % of total due.
New Fees are inclusive to the amount owed.

No *auxilium* was listed as paid in Rutland.


1169 Aid Totals Due (Rounded to the Nearest £)




1169 Percentages Paid




1169 Percentages Pardoned



1169 Percentages Owed



1169 Due From New Fees (Rounded to the Nearest £)



1172 Scutage for the Expedition to Ireland

Herefordshire

<i>Paid (99%):</i>	£193	12s.	1d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (1%):</i>	£1	10s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (1%):	£1	10s.	
Total due:	£195	2s.	1d.

Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire¹

<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£99	13s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0	10s.	
<i>Owed (22%):</i>	£27	13s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (22%):	£28	3s.	
Total due:	£137	16s.	8d.

Oxfordshire

<i>Paid (93%):</i>	£70		
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (7%):</i>	£5	5s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
<i>(0% / 0%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (7%):	£5	5s.	
Total due:	£75	5s.	

Worcestershire

<i>Paid (75%):</i>	£48	12s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (25%):</i>	£16	10s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£8		
<i>(48% / 12%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (25%):	£16	10s.	8d.
Total due:	£65	3s.	4d.

Norfolk & Suffolk

<i>Paid (65%):</i>	£143	1s.	3d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0	16s.	
<i>Owed (30%):</i>	£67	5s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£26	14s.	
<i>(7% / 2%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (31%):	£68	1s.	8d.
Total due ² :	£121	2s.	11d.

Northamptonshire

<i>Paid (75%):</i>	£145	17s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£14	1s.	8d.
<i>Owed (18%):</i>	£35	9s.	4d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£7		
<i>(20% / 4%)</i>			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (25%):	£49	11s.	
Total due:	£195	8s.	4d.

¹ This includes the knights of Berkshire in this one year.

² £10 was listed, but not specifically as paid, owed, or pardoned.

Essex & Hertfordshire

<i>Paid (78%):</i>	£71	13s.	1d.
<i>Pardoned (2%):</i>	£2	5s.	
<i>Owed (20%):</i>	£18	5s.	6d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0	8s.	
(2% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (22%):	£20	10s.	6d.
Total due:	£92	3s.	7d.

Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire

<i>Paid (63%):</i>	£185	4s.	2d.
<i>Pardoned (6%):</i>	£17	1s.	3d.
<i>Owed (30%):</i>	£89	4s.	6d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£11	6s.	8d.
(13% / 4%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (36%):	£106	5s.	9d.
Total due ³ :	£293	4s.	11d.

Yorkshire

<i>Paid (58%):</i>	£288	9s.	9d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£5	10s.	
<i>Owed (40%):</i>	£199	6s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£116	17s.	10d.
(59% / 24%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (41%):	£204	16s.	2d.
Total due:	£493	5s.	11d.

Northumberland⁴

<i>Paid (85%):</i>	£66	13s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (15%):</i>	£11	15s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£7	9s.	
(63% / 9%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (15%):	£11	15s.	8d.
Total due:	£78	9s.	

Dorset & Somerset

<i>Paid (50%):</i>	£65	4s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (1%):</i>	£1	10s.	
<i>Owed (48%):</i>	£62	10s.	1d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£18	11s.	4d.
(30% / 14%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (49%):	£64		1d.
Total due:	£129	4s.	7d.

Hampshire

<i>Paid (60%):</i>	£82		
<i>Pardoned (4%):</i>	£5		
<i>Owed (37%):</i>	£50	10s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£21	10s.	
(43% / 16%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (40%):	£55	10s.	
Total due:	£137	10s.	

³ 35s. was listed, but not specifically as paid, owed, etc.

⁴ Bernard de Bailliol rendered a scutage, but there are no numbers provided in the Pipe Roll.

Lincolnshire

<i>Paid (68%):</i>	£128	11s.	9d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£9	7s.	1d.
<i>Owed (27%):</i>	£49	17s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees</i> ⁵ :	£17	17s.	2d.
(36% / 10%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (32%):	£59	4s.	3d.
Total due:	£187	15s.	

Devonshire

<i>Paid (12%):</i>	£35	10s.	
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (88%)</i> ⁶ :	£264	4s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£19	12s.	4d.
(7% / 7%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (88%):	£264	4s.	
Total due:	£299	14s.	

Staffordshire

<i>Paid (92%):</i>	£14	15s.	
<i>Pardoned (6%):</i>	£1		
<i>Owed (2%):</i>	£0	5s.	
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (8%):	£1	5s.	
Total due:	£16		

Warwickshire & Leicestershire

<i>Paid (96%)</i> ⁷ :	£180	12s.	10d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (4%):</i>	£8	4s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£0		
(0% / 0%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (4%):	£8	4s.	8d.
Total due:	£188	17s.	6d.

Canterbury & Huntingdonshire

<i>Paid (83%):</i>	£95	16s.	2d.
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£8	7s.	8d.
<i>Owed (10%):</i>	£11	6s.	2d.
<i>From New Fees</i> ⁸ :	£11	6s.	2d.
(100% / 10%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (17%):	£19	13s.	10d.
Total due:	£115	10s.	

Gloucestershire

<i>Paid (80%):</i>	£43	4s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (20%):</i>	£10	10s.	8d.
<i>From New Fees:</i>	£1	10s.	8d.
(15% / 3%)			
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (20%):	£10	10s.	8d.
Total due:	£53	15s.	

⁵ £12 9s. 9d. from paid scutages and the whole of pardons coming from new fees and are not listed here.

⁶ £215 6s. 8d. is owed from Earl Reginald of Cornwall

⁷ £4 of this is from new fees.

⁸ £19 2s. 10d. of new fees were paid, as were £3 1s. pardoned, and therefore not listed here.

Wiltshire

Paid (84%): £166
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (16%): £32 13s.
From New Fees: £13 7s.
(4% / 7%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (16%): £32 13s.

 Total due: £198 13s.

Sussex

Paid (82%): £169 10s.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (18%): £37 10s.
From New Fees: £8
(21% / 4%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (18%): £37 10s.

 Total due: £207

Kent

Paid (73%): £125 6d.
Pardoned (1%): £2
Owed (26%): £44 13s. 6d.
From New Fees: £3 14s.
(8% / 2%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (27%): £46 13s. 6d.

 Total due: £171 14s.

Surrey

Paid (75%): £3
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (25%): £1
From New Fees: £1
(100% / 25%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (25%): £1

 Total due: £4

London & Middlesex

Paid (53%): £20
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (47%): £17 16s. 8d.
From New Fees: £17 16s. 8d.
(100% / 47%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (47%): £17 16s. 8d.

 Total due: £37 16s. 8d.

TOTALS


Paid (68%): £2442 2s. 5d.
Pardoned (2%): £67 8s. 8d.
Owed (30%): £1063 6s. 5d.
From New Fees: £312 10d.
(29% / 9%)
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (32%): £1130 15s. 1d.

 Total due: £3584 12s. 6d.


Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.
 The percentages following the New Fees are: % of amount still owed / % of total due.
 New Fees are inclusive to the amount owed.

The portion where scutages would be listed in Shropshire is blank.


1172 Scutage Totals Due (Rounded to the Nearest £)




1172 Percentages Paid




1172 Percentages Pardoned



1172 Percentages Owed



1172 Due From New Fees (Rounded to the Nearest £)



1187 Scutage for the Expedition to Galloway

The Roll of Honours

<i>Paid (73%):</i>	£311	12s.	7d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£84	6s.	3d.
<i>Owed (7%):</i>	£28	16s.	4d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (10%):	£113	2s.	7d.
Total due ¹ :	£424	15s.	2d.

Buckinghamshire & Bedfordshire

<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£42	2s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (0%):	£0		
Total due:	£42	2s.	8d.

Oxfordshire

<i>Paid (100%):</i>	£7	9s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (0%):</i>	£0		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (0%):	£0		
Total due:	£7	9s.	4d.

Norfolk & Suffolk

<i>Paid (81%):</i>	£164	17s.	6d.
<i>Pardoned (7%):</i>	£14	10s.	
<i>Owed (12%):</i>	£23	15s.	6d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (19%):	£38	5s.	6d.
Total due:	£203	3s.	

Lincolnshire

<i>Paid (46%):</i>	£60	8s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (0%):</i>	£0		
<i>Owed (54%):</i>	£70		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (54%):	£70		
Total due:	£130	8s.	4d.

Cambridgeshire & Huntingdonshire

<i>Paid (88%):</i>	£64	14s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (3%):</i>	£2	5s.	
<i>Owed (9%):</i>	£6	10s.	8d.
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (12%):	£8	15s.	8d.
Total due:	£73	10s.	

Yorkshire

<i>Paid (88%):</i>	£115	14s.	4d.
<i>Pardoned (6%):</i>	£7	6s.	8d.
<i>Owed (6%):</i>	£8		
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (12%):	£15	6s.	8d.
Total due:	£131	1s.	

Northamptonshire

<i>Paid (90%):</i>	£75	17s.	8d.
<i>Pardoned (5%):</i>	£4		
<i>Owed (5%):</i>	£4	15s.	
Total of Monies			
Not Collected (10%):	£8	15s.	
Total due:	£84	12s.	8d.

¹ There is one entry which is unclear: 40 of some amount (possibly shillings) which was pardoned.

Sussex

Paid (60%): £118 3s.
Pardoned (10%): £20 14s.
Owed (30%): £58 13s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (40%): £79 7s.

Total due: £197 10s.

Rutland

Paid (100%): £1 10s.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £1 10s.

Warwickshire & Leicestershire

Paid (10%): £1 2s. 10d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (90%): £10
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (90%): £10

Total due: £11 2s. 10d.

Essex & Hertfordshire

Paid (79%): £125 19s. 2d.
Pardoned (1%): £2
Owed (20%): £32 2s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (21%): £34 2s.

Total due: £160 1s.

Herefordshire

Paid (69%): £70 3s. 4d.
Pardoned (22%): £22 10s.
Owed (9%): £8 13s. 8d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (31%): £31 3s. 8d.

Total due: £101 7s.

Gloucestershire

Paid (65%): £269 8s. 10d.
Pardoned (17%): £68 11s. 8d.
Owed (18%): £76 12s. 6d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (35%): £145 4s. 2d.

Total due: £414 13s.

Devonshire

Paid (56%): £89 10d.
Pardoned (41%): £64 18s.
Owed (4%): £6 5s. 4d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (44%): £71 3s. 4d.

Total due: £160 4s. 2d.

Staffordshire

Paid (94%): £15
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (6%): £1
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (6%): £1

Total due: £16

Cornwall

Paid (95%): £47 9s. 3d.
Pardoned (1%): £0 6s. 3d.
Owed (5%): £2 5s. 6d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (5%): £2 11s. 9d.

Total due: £50

Dorset & Somerset

Paid (57%): £97 4s. 2d.
Pardoned (6%): £9 10s.
Owed (37%): £63 10s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (43%): £73

Total due: £170 4s. 2d.

Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire

Paid (86%): £87 17s. 3d.
Pardoned (12%): £12 10s.
Owed (2%): £2
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (14%): £14 10s.

Total due: £102 7s. 3d.

Wiltshire

Paid (83%): £62 15s.
Pardoned (14%): £10 10s.
Owed (3%): £2
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (17%): £12 10s.

Total due: £75 5s.

Northumberland

Paid (100%): £42² 13s. 4d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £42 13s. 4d.

Berkshire

Paid (100%): £36 3s. 6d.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £36 3s. 6d.

Kent

Paid (100%): £62 7s.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £62 7s.

Surrey

Paid (100%): £3
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (0%): £0
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (0%): £0

Total due: £3

Worcestershire

Paid (93%): £75 6s.
Pardoned (0%): £0
Owed (7%): £5 10s.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (7%): £5 10s.

Total due: £80 16s.

TOTALS


Paid (74%): £2048 0s. 3d.
Pardoned (12%): £323 17s. 10d.
Owed (15%): £410 9s. 6d.
 Total of Monies
 Not Collected (26%): £734 7s. 4d.

Total due: £2782 9s. 7d.


Percentages have been rounded to the nearest full percent, hence the slight discrepancy.

² This £42 is the payment by the Bishop of Salisbury, but is recorded under Northumberland. However, there is reference to it being recorded later in the roll for Wiltshire.


1187 Scutage Totals Due (Rounded to the Nearest £)




1187 Percentages Paid



1187 Percentages Pardoned



1187 Percentages Owed



Appendix 3

Military Expenditures in the Counties of Shropshire and Kent

Military Expenditures in the County of Shropshire

	1129-30	1155-56	1156-57	1157-58
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Porter for Bridgnorth		£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury		£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle		£4	£4	£4
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.		£9 2s. 6d. ¹	£2 7s. ²	£1 10s. 5d. ³
Sub-Total		£17 13s. 9d.	£10 18s. 3d.	£10 1s. 8d.
Castle Works				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	No Record this Year	£17 13s. 9d.	£10 18s. 3d.	£10 1s. 8d.

¹ £9 2s. 6d. to pay 6 hostages and rebels.

² In paying of the king's archers in the army.

³ To Bertumer the Crossbowman.

	1158-59	1159-60	1160-61	1161-62
Paid Knights	£15 5s. ⁴			
Paid Serjeants		£42 1s. 5d. ⁵	£31 17s. 8d. ⁶	£40 3s. ⁷
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£4	£4
Castle Garrison		£16 3s. 4d. ⁸		
Castellans			£54 15s. ⁹	£47 15s. 8d. ¹⁰
Provisioning Castles	£25 4s. ¹¹	£3 14s. ¹²		£5 ¹³
Misc.	£1 3s. 4.5d. ¹⁴	15s. 2.5d. ¹⁵		
Sub-Total	£50 5s. 7.5d.	£71 5s. 2.5d.	£115 3s. 11d.	£100 9s. 11d.
Castle Works		3s. 4d. ¹⁶	£20 ¹⁷	
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£50 5s. 7.5d.	£74 8s. 6.5d.	£115 3s. 11d.	£100 9s. 11d.

⁴ In payment to the *Coteraux* (mercenaries from the Low Countries) for Carreghofa.

⁵ £25 19s. 9d. to pay for 1 knight, 20 serjeants, 1 porter and 1 watchman for Carreghofa; £8 6s. 8d. for serjeants of Whittington; £7 15s. for serjeants in the Castles of Clun, Ruffin, and Oswestry.

⁶ £22 17s. 8d. for 1 knight, 20 serjeants, 1 porter and 1 watchman ; £9 for 10 serjeants of Whittington (slight damage, could be more).

⁷ £24 3s. for knights and serjeants of Carreghofa; £8 13s. 4d. for 10 serjeants in Whittington; £7 6s. 8d. for 20 serjeants.

⁸ £12 to Roger de Powis for guarding the castle of Overtun; £4 3s. 4d. also to Roger for guarding Dernio Castle (Merioneth).

⁹ Clun, Ruthin and Oswestry.

¹⁰ £36 10s. for Clun and Ruthin; £11 5s. 8d. for Oswestry.

¹¹ £18 4s. to the castles of Wales; £7 to the Castle of Roger de Powis (Whittington).

¹² Carreghofa castle.

¹³ Carreghofa castle.

¹⁴ To Bertumer the Crossbowman.

¹⁵ To Bertumer the Crossbowman.

¹⁶ Repairing the gate of Carreghofa.

¹⁷ £20 for castle of Oswestry.

	1162-63	1163-64	1164-65	1165-66
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants	£89 7s. 3d. ¹⁸		£176 1s. ¹⁹	£62 1s. 4d. ²⁰
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 2s. 9d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchmen for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£2 5s. 7.5d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£3	£4
Castle Garrison			£6 19s. 8d. ²¹	£31 11d. ²²
Castellans	£54 15s. ²³	£54 15s. ²⁴	£1 6s. 8d. ²⁵	
Provisioning Castles			£5 3s. 9d. ²⁶	
Misc.	£3 1s. ²⁷		£12 18s. 1.5d. ²⁸	£1 ²⁹
Sub-Total	£125 14s. 7d.	£63 6s. 3d.	£48 17s. 7d.	£102 13s. 6d.
Castle Works			£17 13s. 5d. ³⁰	£9 14s. 1d. ³¹
Misc. Castle Works		£90 9s. 10d. ³²		
Totals	£125 14s. 7d.	£153 16s. 1d.	£66 11s.	£112 7s. 7d.

¹⁸ £17 6s. 8d. paid to the knights and serjeants of Carreghofa, these same knight also received £10 13s. 4d. as a gift; £8 13s. 4d. for 10 serjeants of Whittington; £52 13s. 11d. which the Sheriff owes for 1 knight and 310 serjeants.

¹⁹ £4 11s. 8d. for 110 serjeants; £62 7s. 5d. for 300 serjeants and £69 18s. 7d. for them after Easter; £6 for 60 serjeants at Shrawardine; £33 6s. 8d. for 200 serjeants at Oswestry and Clun before Pentacost; £5 16s. 8d. for 100 serjeants after Pentacost.

²⁰ For 100 serjeants of Shrawardine and of the March from the feast of St. Michael to the day before Easter.

²¹ Chirk.

²² Chirk castle, from feast of St. Michael until the week before Palm Sunday for 2 knights, 1 porter, 1 watchman and 19 serjeants.

²³ £36 10s. for Clun and Ruthin; £18. 5s. for Bridgnorth.

²⁴ Oswestry, Clun and Ruthin.

²⁵ To Roger de Powis to guard the keep of Shrewsbury.

²⁶ Oswestry.

²⁷ For 7 hostages, 4 at Bridgnorth and 3 at Shrewsbury.

²⁸ £4 1s. 3d. to pay 25 hostages of Bridgnorth; £4 12s. to pay for 25 hostages and £4 4s. 10.5d. for the same after Easter.

²⁹ Payment to Roger Muissun for leading horses.

³⁰ Shrewsbury castle.

³¹ Shrewsbury castle.

³² For serjeants and building works of the king. No specifics are mentioned.

	1166-67	1167-68	1168-69	1169-70
Paid Knights				£36 10s. ³³
Paid Serjeants				£60 16s. 8d. ³⁴
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£4	£4
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles		£2 ³⁵	£2 13s. 4d. ³⁶	
Misc.	£3 ³⁷	£4 ³⁸	£4 ³⁹	£4 10s. ⁴⁰
Sub-Total	£11 11s. 3d.	£14 11s. 3d.	£15 4s. 7d.	£110 7s. 11d.
Castle Works	£57 4s. 4d. ⁴¹	£23 17s. 11d. ⁴²	£143 17s. 5d. ⁴³	£4 19s. 1d. ⁴⁴
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£68 15s. 7d.	£38 9s. 2d.	£159 2s.	£115 7s.

³³ 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry for the past 2 years.

³⁴ For 20 serjeants remaining at Oswestry for the past 2 years.

³⁵ For grain for Overton Castle.

³⁶ For grain for Dover Castle.

³⁷ To Roger de Powis for his warhorse.

³⁸ Restor for the horse of Roger de Powis.

³⁹ Restor to Roger de Powis and his brother John.

⁴⁰ For neglecting Oswestry for war for 2 years.

⁴¹ Bridgnorth castle; all the money came from fines.

⁴² £9 12s. 5d. for works on Shrewsbury Castle; £14 5s. 6d. to the works on Bridgnorth castle. £3 5s. 4d. of this came from the *auxilium* for the marriage of Matilda.

⁴³ £26 6s. 4d. was paid in old rent, which presumably represents the numerous fines from the previous year which were being sent to pay for the work at Bridgnorth that were not paid in that year. £15 8s. 6d. for the keep of Bridgnorth; £89 10s. 1d. for works on the castle of Bridgnorth, and another £12 12s. 6d. spent in 1169.

⁴⁴ £2 5s. 9d. for Bridgnorth Castle; £2 13s. 4d. for works on one house in Oswestry Castle.

	1170-71	1171-72	1172-73	1173-74
Paid Knights	£18 5s. ⁴⁵	£18 5s. ⁴⁶	£18 5s. ⁴⁷	£18 5s. ⁴⁸
Paid Serjeants	£33 6s. 8d. ⁴⁹	£39 ⁵⁰	£84 8s. 4d. ⁵¹	£76 4s. 2d. ⁵²
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£4	£4
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles	£19 12s. ⁵³			£37 18s. 6d. ⁵⁴
Misc.		£31 15s. 2d. ⁵⁵	£5 5s. 10d. ⁵⁶	
Sub-Total	£79 14s. 11d.	£97 11s. 5d.	£116 10s. 5d.	£140 18s. 11d.
Castle Works	£31 14s. 3d. ⁵⁷	£30 8s. 10d. ⁵⁸	£30 ⁵⁹	£22 19s. 6d. ⁶⁰
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£111 9s. 2d.	£128 3d.	£146 10s. 5d.	£163 18s. 5d.

⁴⁵ 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry.

⁴⁶ 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry.

⁴⁷ 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry.

⁴⁸ 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry.

⁴⁹ £2 18s. 4d. in the Welsh Marches; £30 8s. 4d. for 20 serjeants remaining at Oswestry. 74s. of this was recalled and paid back into the treasury the following year. *P.R 18 Henry II*, 111.

⁵⁰ £8 11s. 8d. for serjeants of Shrawardine; £30 8s. 4d. for 20 remaining at Oswestry.

⁵¹ £9 13s. 8d. to pay 330 serjeants for 8 days which they walked in the army of Leicestershire; £24 10s. for the same serjeants and an additional 100 of who 4 were equipped with a leather cuirass for 15 days; £11 11d. for other serjeants for the Welsh war of 9 weeks; £40 2s. 5d. for other serjeants for the retinue of Shropshire while the sheriff was in the army of Leicestershire; £5 2s. to pay the serjeant of Reginald de Dagenot; £4 to pay 80 foot serjeants who were sent across the sea to the king for 6 days; £30 8s. 4d. for 20 serjeants remaining at Oswestry.

⁵² £45 15s. 10d. for serjeants in the Welsh March for the whole of this year; £30 8s. 4d. for 20 serjeants remaining at Oswestry.

⁵³ £19 4s. 4d. for 286 bacons and 7s. 8d. for its transport from Shrewsbury to Gloucester.

⁵⁴ For Bridgnorth castle: £9 6d. for 92 measures of wheat, £10 4s. for 120 bacons, £2 6s. 8d. for 120 cheeses, 10s. for 20 measures of salt, 4s. for 2 hand mills. For Shrewsbury Castle: £5 3s. 4d. for 60 measures of wheat, £10 for 102 bacons, 10s. for 40 cheeses.

⁵⁵ £31 15s. 2d. for 400 bacons sent to Ireland; 10s. 6d. for 40 axes.

⁵⁶ £1 6s. 10d. for 10 archers for 15 days; 11s. 8d. for 10 archers who had been at the castle of Roger de Powis (Whittington) for 15 days; £1 4s. to Blendien fitz Keneweret for 12 measures of wheat to sustain him in the service of the king; £2 3s. 4d. to Roger Muissun to cross the sea with the horses of the king.

⁵⁷ £15 14s. 4d. For the keep of Bridgnorth; £10 18s. 4d. for Shrewsbury Castle; £5 1s. 7d. from purprestures and escheats to Bridgnorth Castle.

⁵⁸ £25 2s. 2d. for Bridgnorth, £1 6s. 8d. for Shrawardine castle; £4 for Ellesmere Castle.

⁵⁹ £25 for Bridgnorth Castle; £5 for Shrewsbury Castle.

⁶⁰ £18 5s. 8d. for Bridgnorth Castle; £4 13s. 10d.

	1174-75	1175-76 ⁶¹	1176-77	1177-78
Paid Knights	£76 13s. 9d. ⁶²	£26 13s. 4d. ⁶³		
Paid Serjeants	£22 16s. 3d. ⁶⁴			
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£8 ⁶⁵	£20
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£108 1s. 3d.	£35 4s. 7d.	£12 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.
Castle Works				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£108 1s. 3d.	£35 4s. 7d.	£12 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.

⁶¹ Beginning in this year, Hugo Mortimer owes a fine of £100 for not sending knights to Henry, Hugo fails to pay the fine during his life, and the debt is taken over by his son Roger in the 1180-81 Pipe Roll.

⁶² £14 6s. 1d. in the old rents, to complete paying 10 knights who were with the Sheriff in the castles of Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth by the king's writ which had the rendering of £42; a further payment of £48 13s. 11d. by the same writ, of which the Sheriff owes £26 13s. 4d.; £13 13s. 9d. for 1 knight, 2 porters and 2 watchmen at Oswestry.

⁶³ Remainder of payments to the knights who were in castles of Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth.

⁶⁴ For serjeants remaining at Oswestry.

⁶⁵ Simon fitz Simon received £4 from 'Eggemendon' and Weldon for a quarter of the year for guarding Church Stretton castle. His payment (which in subsequent years is £16 to reflect a full year's pay) is in addition to the usual £4 spent on this castle.

	1178-79	1179-80	1180-81	1181-82
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				£8 13s. 4d. ⁶⁶
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£20	£20	£20	£20
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£24 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.	£33 4s. 7d.
Castle Works			£11 2s. 5d. ⁶⁷	£3 6s. 8d. ⁶⁸
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£24 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.	£35 13s. 8d.	£36 11s. 3d.

⁶⁶ £7 in payment for 21 serjeants who came from Shrewsbury through London to go in service of the king. £1 13s. 4d. payment to 100 serjeants who came by Shrewsbury to Hereford for 1 day.

⁶⁷ Repairs to Shrewsbury.

⁶⁸ Repairs to the keep of Bridgnorth Castle.

	1182-83	1183-84	1184-85	1185-86
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants		£2 ⁶⁹		
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£20	£20	£20	£20
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£24 11s. 3d.	£26 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.
Castle Works	£18 14s. 5d. ⁷⁰	£8 7s. 9d. ⁷¹	£5 8s. 8d. ⁷²	£5 12s. 6d. ⁷³
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£43 5s. 8d.	£34 19s.	£29 19s. 11d.	£30 3s. 9d.

⁶⁹ 20 serjeants who came to the court in service of the king.

⁷⁰ £8 7s. 2d. for repairs to Shrewsbury Castle; £10 7s. 3d. for repairs to Bridgnorth Castle.

⁷¹ £7 1s. 2d. for Bridgnorth Castle; £1 6s. 7d. for Shrewsbury Castle.

⁷² £1 16s. 9d. for Shrewsbury; £3 11s. 11d.

⁷³ £3 1s. for repairs to the house and castle of Bridgnorth; £2 11s. 6d. for repairs to the house and castle of Shrewsbury.

	1186-87	1187-1188	1188-89	1189-90
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants	£25 5s. 4d. ⁷⁴	£33 ⁷⁵		
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£20	£20	£20	£4
Castle Garrison				£5 ⁷⁶
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				£7 11s. 4d. ⁷⁷
Misc.				£2 10s. ⁷⁸
Sub-Total	£49 16s. 7d.	£57 11s. 3d.	£24 11s. 3d.	£23 12s. 7d.
Castle Works	£10 14s. 2d. ⁷⁹	13s. 4d. ⁸⁰	5s. 3d. ⁸¹	
Misc.				
Totals	£60 10s. 9d.	£58 4s. 7d.	£24 16s. 6d.	£23 12s. 7d.

⁷⁴ £16 13s. 4d. for 250 foot serjeants for 8 days who went to the king across the sea; £7 12s. for 38 serjeants with horses who similarly were sent across the sea for the same time; £1 for 3 captains of the aforesaid serjeants for the same time.

⁷⁵ £20 payment of 300 foot serjeants for 8 days who have come from London but had crossed the sea in the king's service; £13 payment for 150 foot serjeants and 15 mounted serjeants who similarly came from London, but had crossed the sea.

⁷⁶ To Gillebert de Essart for guarding Ludlow Castle.

⁷⁷ £2 18s. 4d. for 100 dry measures of wheat, £3 6s. 8d. for 100 measures of oats, £1 5s. 6d. for 20 bacons and £2 19s. 2d. for 2 tuns of wine to provision Ludlow Castle.

⁷⁸ In failing the renewing of Egmonton and Welinton which Simon fitz Simon held (for the guarding of Church Stretton Castle).

⁷⁹ £8 2s. 5d. for repairs to the king's house in Shrewsbury Castle; 19s. 1d. for improvements to the king's house in Shrawardine castle; £1 12s. 8d. for improvements of the king's home in Bridgnorth.

⁸⁰ Improvements to the king's home in Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth castles.

⁸¹ Improvements to the king's house in Bridgnorth castle.

	1190-91	1191-92	1192-93	1193-94
Paid Knights			£20 ⁸²	£28 2s. 5d. ⁸³
Paid Serjeants			£10 ⁸⁴	£25 8s. ⁸⁵
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£12 ⁸⁶	£20	£20
Castle Garrison	£16 13s. 4d. ⁸⁷			
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles	£6 18s. ⁸⁸			
Misc.	£2 17s. ⁸⁹	£1 5s. ⁹⁰		
Sub-Totals	£34 19s. 7d.	£17 16s. 3d.	£54 11s. 3d.	£78 1s. 8d.
Castle Works	£25 16s. 2d. ⁹¹		£32 8s. 5d. ⁹²	£20 4s. ⁹³
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£60 15s. 9d.	£17 16s. 3d.	£86 19s. 8d.	£98 5s. 8d.

⁸² Payment for 10 knights retained in the king's service for 40 days.

⁸³ Payment to knights and serjeants for guarding the mines of Carreghofa.

⁸⁴ Payment for 80 serjeants for 40 days.

⁸⁵ £20 to pay 20 serjeants with two horses for 40 days who were sent across the sea to the king; £5 8s. to Maurice fitz Roger and 6 serjeants with 2 horses and 60 foot serjeants for their payment for 8 days in service of the king in Normandy.

⁸⁶ £2 for half the year; £10 paid to William fitz Alan to guard half the year.

⁸⁷ To Hugh de Say for *wardum* of Norton Castle.

⁸⁸ For 60 bacons to Knighton castle and 40 bacons for Norton castle.

⁸⁹ £2 10s. in failing the renewing of Egmenton and Welinton which Simon fitz Simon held (for the guarding of Church Stretton Castle); 7s. to Ampy for inspecting shield, cudgel and armour and for making justice of the inspection.

⁹⁰ In failing the renewing of Egmenton and Welinton, William and Jacob, the sons of Simon fitz Simon received 25s. for half the year.

⁹¹ £13 6s. 8d. for improving Knighton castle; £12 9s. 6d. for repairs to the castles of Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury.

⁹² Repairing the Keep of Bridgnorth.

⁹³ 4s. for 20 trees/beams bought and sent to Carreghofa castle; £20 for the works of the curtain wall around Carreghofa.

	1194-95	1195-96	1196-97	1197-98
Paid Knights		8s. ⁹⁴		
Paid Serjeants	£25 17s. 11d. ⁹⁵	£14 8s. ⁹⁶		£28 3s. 4d. ⁹⁷
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchmen for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Church Stretton Castle Guard	£20	£20	£12 ⁹⁸	£10 13s. 4d. ⁹⁹
Castle Garrison	£14 5s. ¹⁰⁰	£18 ¹⁰¹		
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles	£5 ¹⁰²	£12 5s. 9d. ¹⁰³		
Misc.		£36 10s. 8d. ¹⁰⁴		£16 13s. 4d. ¹⁰⁵
Sub-Totals	£69 14s. 2d.	£106 3s. 8d.	£16 11s. 3d.	£60 1s. 3d.
Castle Works	£33 16s. 8d. ¹⁰⁶	12s. ¹⁰⁷	7s. ¹⁰⁸	£3 15s. ¹⁰⁹
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£103 10s. 10d.	£106 15s. 8d.	£16 18s. 3d.	£63 16s. 3d.

⁹⁴ To Robert de Bolliers master of the Welshmen 8s. for 8 days.

⁹⁵ £4 13s. 11d. for serjeants at Carreghofa to guard the 'minarie'; £12 to pay 12 horse serjeants for 40 days at 6d. a day; £8 4s. to Godefrido Ruffo and his serjeants with one horse for 164 days, 4d. a day and £1 as a gift.

⁹⁶ £13 6s. 8d. to pay for 200 Welshmen on foot transferred to Normandy in the service of the king for 8 days at 2d. a day; 1 mark to pay "quingentis" welshmen on foot transferred in the king's service for 8 days for 2d. a day (calculated, this payment should only cover 10 serjeants – the first calculation for 200 welshmen adds up correctly); 8s. for 2 horse serjeants for the same 8 days at 6d. a day.

⁹⁷ £13 6s. 8d. to Osberto de Rieboef to sustain 300 serjeants in the king's service in Wales; £14 16s. 8d. to William FitzWarin to sustain himself and 120 foot serjeants and 10 horse serjeants for 20 days.

⁹⁸ £10 to the sheriff for half the year; £2 to Cassewalano fitz Oeni to guard for half the year.

⁹⁹ £4 to Cassewalano fitz Oeni who performs this service until 14 John; 10 marks to Waltero de Miniton for 15 pounds of corn to pay Cassewalano to sustain him in the king's service.

¹⁰⁰ To Rudolfo Extraneo, £7 for 70 dry measures of wheat and £4 10s. for 50 bacons which will make his payment for guarding Carreghofa castle; £2 for serjeants retained to guard Carreghofa castle; 15s. to Godefrido Ruffo and 2 serjeants to pay for their residence of 15 days at Carreghofa.

¹⁰¹ £1 to Meurico de Powis who guards Castell Tinboeth (Radnorshire) for his vestments; £1 to Wioni fitz John who guards Castell Tinboeth (Radnorshire) for his vestments; 2 marks to Meurico and Wioni for their sustenance in guaring the castle; 10 marks to Bishop Bangornensi to his sustenance in guarding castle Castell Tinboeth (Radnorshire); £8 for foot-guards (*pedis castelli*) of Bridgnorth.

¹⁰² Provisioning Castell Tinboeth (Radnorshire).

¹⁰³ Provisioning castle Pole (Domen Castell, Mongomeryshire?).

¹⁰⁴ 20 marks to Cassewalano to his subsistence in the service of the king, 13 marks to his vestments, and 5 marks of gift; 10 marks of gift to Robert Corbet to his sustenance in the king's service in a part of Wales; £2 2s. to pay 14 'mineariis' who were at Castle de Pole; £1 of gift to 34 'mineariis' at the same castle; £1 2s. 8d. to pay 11 carpenters who were at the same castle; 2s. for 'petris' for the mangonel; 4s. for quarrels; £1 10s. for 1 hauberk and 1 habergeon (*j hauberco et j haubergello*) which the sheriff from those enclosing (*ab eis cepit*) to fortifying the castle of Pole.

¹⁰⁵ To Lewelino Bochan to sustain himself in the service of the king in the Welsh march.

¹⁰⁶ £20 for the curtain wall around Carreghofa; £4 to John Extraneo for making a pit in Carreghofa with "*muro et ruillio*"; 1s. to improve Shrawardine castle; £5 to improve pit and house of Bridgnorth castle; £3 6s. 8d. improvements to Church Stretton castle; £1 9s. improvements to Shrewsbury castle.

¹⁰⁷ Repairs to the gate of Shrewsbury castle.

¹⁰⁸ Improvements to the house in Bridgnorth castle.

¹⁰⁹ Improvements to the king's houses in Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury castles.

	1198-99	1199-1200	1200-01	1201-02
Paid Knights		£15 ¹¹⁰	£3 5s. ¹¹¹	
Paid Serjeants				£5 ¹¹²
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d.	£1 10s. 5d. ¹¹³	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.	£3 10d.	£3 10d. ¹¹³	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£27 6s. 8d. ¹¹⁴	£10 13s. 4d. ¹¹⁵	£4 ¹¹³	£4
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Totals	£31 17s. 11d.	£30 4s. 7d.	£11 16s. 3d.	£13 11s. 3d.
Castle Works	£20 18s. 6d. ¹¹⁶	£2 8s. ¹¹⁷	£4 12s. ¹¹⁸	
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£52 16s. 5d.	£32 12s. 7d.	£16 8s. 3d.	£13 11s. 3d.

¹¹⁰ No money collected from the old farm/rent this year, but was instead paid to the knights and serjeants in Bridgnorth castle.

¹¹¹ £1 5s. to Alan fitz Roger because he led "*brandinum*" knights to London; £2 to knights and serjeants coming to Worcester.

¹¹² To paying serjeants who helped beyond the sea.

¹¹³ This payment is spilt into half in two separate sections, almost as if the Easter session of the exchequer were recorded with the payments made, then the Michaelmas session.

¹¹⁴ £4 in Stretton to Caswallano to guard the castle; 15 marks to Caswallano to sustain him in the service of King Richard in Wales and the Welsh march; 10 marks to sustain Caswallano and his men; another 10 marks to Caswallano just to sustain him.

¹¹⁵ £4 to Caswallano to guard the castle; 10 marks to Caswallano to sustain him in the king's service.

¹¹⁶ 10 marks to William fitz Ranulf to repair and improve Oswestry castle; 20 marks to improve Shrewsbury castle; 18s. 6d. to improve Bridgnorth castle.

¹¹⁷ £1 1s. 4d. to repair the bridge at Shrewsbury castle; 2 marks to improve the house in Bridgnorth castle.

¹¹⁸ Improvements to the king's house in Bridgnorth castle.

	1202-03	1203-04	1204-05	1205-06
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Porter for Bridgnorth	15s. 2 ½d.		£1 10s. 5d. ¹¹⁹	£1 10s. 5d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	15s. 2 ½d. ¹²⁰		£3 10d.	£3 10d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4	£4	£4	£10 13s. 4d. ¹²¹
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.	£1 10s. 5d. ¹²²			
Sub-Totals	£7 10d.	£4	£8 11s. 3d.	£15 4s. 7d.
Castle Works	£15 ¹²³	£12 13s. 4d. ¹²⁴	£79 6s. 8d. ¹²⁵	£10 ¹²⁶
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£22 10d.	£16 13s. 4d.	£87 17s. 11d.	£25 4s. 7d.

¹¹⁹ This is listed as for both a porter and a watchman and is listed as such through the end of John's reign. The roll also seems to make a point that this payment, and the payment for the Porter and Watchman of Shrewsbury, are for "this year."

¹²⁰ This is only for a porter.

¹²¹ £4 to Caswalano to guard the castle; 10 marks of gift to Caswalano.

¹²² For 2 watchmen for half a year.

¹²³ £10 for repairs to Bridgnorth castle; £5 to improving the king's house in Shrewsbury castle.

¹²⁴ £6 13s. 4d. for improvements to Ellesmere Castle; £5 to repairs to Shrawardine castle; £1 to improve the pit in Bridgnorth castle.

¹²⁵ £25 6s. 8d. for repairs to Shrewsbury and Shrawardine castles; £24 for repairs to Ellesmere castle; £30 for repairs to Bridgnorth castle.

¹²⁶ £5 to repairs to the keep of Bridgnorth; another £5 to the many works of Bridgnorth castle.

	1206-07	1207-08	1208-09	1209-10
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Porter for Bridgnorth	£1 10s. 5d.		£3 10d. ¹²⁷	
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£3 10d.		£6 1s. 8d. ¹²⁸	
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£4		£4	
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.			£18 10s. ¹²⁹	
Sub-Totals	£8 11s. 3d.		£31 12s. 6d.	
Castle Works	£13 13s. 4d. ¹³⁰			
Misc. Castle Works			£10 ¹³¹	
Totals	£22 4s. 7d.	No Entry	£41 12s. 6d.	No Entry

¹²⁷ For two years.

¹²⁸ For two years.

¹²⁹ Payment for 10 balistarii for 40 days.

¹³⁰ £4 13s. 4d. for works on the keep of Bridgnorth castle; £2 13s. 4d. improvements to Montgomery castle while it was in the king's hand; £3 6s. 8d. for improvements to Shrawardine castle; £3 for improvements to Shrewsbury castle.

¹³¹ In the works of four castles.

	1210-11	1211-12 ¹³²	1212-13 ¹³³	1213-14
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants		£16 5s. 6d. ¹³⁴		
Porter for Bridgnorth		£4 11s. 3d.		£3 10d.
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury		£9 2s. 6d.		£6 1s. 8d.
Guard at Church Stretton Castle		£12 ¹³⁵		£8
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles		£303 18s. 6d. ¹³⁶		
Misc.		£6 14s. ¹³⁷		£11 6d. ¹³⁸
Sub-Totals		£342 11s. 9d.		£28 3s.
Castle Works		£55 13s. 4d. ¹³⁹		£21 ¹⁴⁰
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	No Entry	£398 5s. 1d.		£49 3s.

¹³² The rolls specifically says that this account is for the last 3 years.

¹³³ This roll does not survive, however the sheriff of Shropshire apparently did not render an account for this year, since the next year's account cover's both. *P.R. 16 John*, 119.

¹³⁴ £7 17s. 6d. for 300 serjeants for 3 days; £100 in payment of 1000 foot serjeants and 40 horse serjeants for 6 days and in '*custo posito*' at the rescue of "Haliwell" and Mathrafal Castles; £8 8s. in payment to 120 serjeants for 8 days.

¹³⁵ Hugh de Nevill has taken over for Caswalleno.

¹³⁶ 100 marks for 800 wheat bought for the works of the king; £72 for 780 oats; £54 for 270 bacons with carriage; £2 18s. 4d. for 1400 hens; £56 for 24 tuns of wine; £28 for 112 cows; £2 2s. for 84 oats; 17s. for 3 horses and 1 mule; £16 2s. for small expenses, namely wheat, bacon and other; £5 5s. 10d. for 2300 hens bought and sent by Tewkesbury with carriage.

¹³⁷ £6 14s. in '*custo posito*' on 24 horses of the king for 12 days; £2 10s. for expenses for 11 horses and their guard for 15 days.

¹³⁸ For 400 lances '*emptis ad opus galiarum R.*'

¹³⁹ £5 for a bretasche at Chirk castle; 13s. 4d. for works on the castles of Carreghofa and Mathrafal; £20 for works on the barbican, drawbridge and home in Bridgnorth castle; £10 on works of Shrawardine castle; £20 for works of the castle "*super Limam*" and to do justice and prisoner's ordeal by iron and improving the jail.

¹⁴⁰ Works on Shrewsbury, Bridgnorth and Shrawardine castles for 2 years.

	1214-15			
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Porter for Bridgnorth	15s. 2 ½d.			
Porter and Watchman for Shrewsbury	£1 10s. 5d.			
Guard at Church Stretton Castle	£3			
Castle Garrison				
Castellans				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Totals	£5 5s. 7 ½d.			
Castle Works				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£5 5s. 7 ½d.			

Military Expenditures in the County of Kent

	1129-30	1155-56	1156-57	1157-58
Paid Knights		£23 6s. 8d.		
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the <i>Cotereaux</i>				
Watchman and Porter				
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles			£23 11s. 5d. ¹	
Misc.				
Sub-Total		£23 6s. 8d.	£23 11s. 5d.	
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	No Military Payments ²	£23 6s. 8d.	£23 11s. 5d.	No Military Payments

¹ For 179 ½ measures of wheat and 1 measure of beans. This is an entry on its own, and does not specifically say it was for fortifying a castle.

² There is however a note that the Earl of Gloucester owes 100 marks for meeting someone in Normandy for the retinue. *P.R. 31 Henry I*, 65.

	1158-59	1159-60	1160-61	1161-62
Paid Knights	£4 11s. 6d. ³		£75 1s. 10d. ⁴	£84 18s. 8d. ⁵
Paid Serjeants				£30 6s. 8d. ⁶
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter			£2 10s. 10d. ⁷	£6 1s. 4d. ⁸
Siege weapons				£8 17s. ⁹
Provisioning Castles		£17 17s. 8d. ¹⁰	£5 11s. 8d. ¹¹	
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£4 11s. 6d.	£17 17s. 8d.	£83 4s. 4d.	£130 3s. 8d.
Castle Works			£6 1s. 3d. ¹²	£15 3s. ¹³
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£4 11s. 6d.	£17 17s. 8d.	£89 5s. 7d.	£145 6s. 8d.

³ This money is gained from the old farm/rent of the Bishop of Bayeux; presumably the sheriff paid the rent which was immediately given to the knights.

⁴ Also for serjeants in Dover.

⁵ 7 Knights "*Mil~ . Soldario*" for the whole year.

⁶ 20 serjeants for the whole year.

⁷ 1 watchman and 1 porter.

⁸ 2 watchmen and 1 porter.

⁹ For 8 large crossbows.

¹⁰ Dover Castle. £13 5s. 8d. for wheat, salt, bacon and cheese and £4 12s. for reparation for workmen on the castle.

¹¹ £3 8s. 10d. for Dover Castle, £2 2s. 10d. for an unspecified castle.

¹² £1 1s. 3d. on an unspecified castle, £5 for work on one tower or turret for an unspecified castle.

¹³ Unspecified Castle.

	1162-63	1163-64	1164-65	1165-66
Paid Knights	£56 13s. 4d. ¹⁴			
Paid Serjeants	£13 6s. 8d. ¹⁵			
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux			16s. 4d.	
Watchman and Porter	£6 8d. ¹⁶		£6 1s. 8d. ¹⁷	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons	£5 14s. 8d. ¹⁸			
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.			£35 6s. 8d. ¹⁹	
Sub-Total	£81 15s. 4d.		£42 4s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle			8s. 4d.	
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£81 15s. 4d.	No Military Payments	£43	£6 1s. 8d.

¹⁴ £26 16s. for 5 household knights; £29 17s. 4d. for 7 knights from the nearest Tuesday after the festival of St. Michael (29 Sept.) through to Easter day.

¹⁵ 20 serjeants from the nearest Tuesday after the festival of St. Michael (29 Sept.) through to Easter day.

¹⁶ 3 watchmen and 1 porter from the nearest Tuesday after the festival of St. Michael (29 Sept.) through to Easter day.

¹⁷ Watchmen and porter of Dover, as are all subsequent payments.

¹⁸ For 2 large crossbows.

¹⁹ For guarding and preparing 2 ships.

	1166-67	1167-68	1168-69	1169-70
Paid Knights	£100 ²⁰	£5 ²¹		
Paid Serjeants	£1 11s. 3d. ²²			
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux	1s. 6d.			
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£3 10d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles	£8 8d. ²³			
Misc.	£1 11s. 3d. ²⁴			
Sub-Total	£117 6s. 4d.	£8 10d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works	£8 6s. 9d. ²⁵			
Works on Dover Castle	19s. 5d. ²⁶		£34 5s. 4d.	£34 7s.
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£141 18s. 10d.	£8 10d.	£40 7s.	£40 8s. 8d.

²⁰ To pay knights for coast guard.

²¹ For 5 knights who stayed at Dover Castle. The entry gives the impression that this is a bonus or reward for superior service.

²² £1 3s. 9d. for 200 pikes for Richard de Luci; 7s. 6d. for transporting 100 lances/lancers to Dover

²³ For 50 measures of bacon and 40 measures of wheat.

²⁴ 14s. for ships; 17s. 3d. for "*heric claudendo*."

²⁵ £2 13s. 4d. on Rochester Castle; £5 10s. 5d. on Pevensey Castle; 3s. for 1 bretasche (possibly at Dover Castle? It is unclear.).

²⁶ For 1 crane and other small works.

	1170-71	1171-72	1172-73	1173-74
Paid Knights				* ²⁷
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles			£152 14s. 9d. ²⁸	£58 3s. 2d. ²⁹
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£158 16s. 5d.	£58 3s. 2d.
Castle Works	£100 ³⁰	£152 8s. ³¹	£79 16s. 2d. ³²	
Works on Dover Castle	£125 2s. 5d.		£162 4s. 1d.	
Misc. Castle Works		£2 ³³		
Totals	£231 4s. 1d.	£160 9s. 8d.	£400 16s. 8d.	£58 3s. 2d.

²⁷ The sheriff did not render an account for the rents of Kent, the land of the Bishop of Bayeux or for purprestures because the money went directly to the payment of knights and ships for “the making of the castle bailey (*Castellis Ballie*).” The unspecified amount appears to be for the garrison of a castle, but no mention is made as to which castle. *P.R. 20 Henry II*, 1.

²⁸ For provisioning Canterbury castle: 100 measures of wheat, £11 13s. 4d.; 60 bacons, £8; 20 measures of beans and peas, 33s. 4d.; 10 weights of cheese, 44s. 40 measures of coal, 10s. 12 sheaves of iron, 22s.; 40 measures of salt, 45s. 4d.; for leading 2 tuns of wine from Sandwich to Canterbury, 2s.; 4 hand mills, 5s. 4d. For provisioning Chilham castle: 128 measures of wheat, £4 11s. 8d.; 50 bacons, 10 marks; 10 weights of cheese, 48s.; 20 measures of salt, 20s.; 17 measures of beans and peas, 25s. 6d.; 20 sheeves of iron, 35s. 4d.; 40 measures of coal, 10s.; leading 6 tuns of wine from Sandwich to Chilham, 9s. 8d.; repairs to the casks of wine, 9s. 8d.; 3 hand mills, 4s.; 10 lances, 40d. For provisioning Dover castle: 400 measures of wheat, 80 marks; 200 bacons, 40 marks; 40 “solid~” and 30 weights of cheese, £9 12d.; 74 measures of oats, 74s.; 60 measures of salt, 72s. 5d.; 60 measures of coal, 30s.; 30 sheaves of iron and 125 measures of iron 64s.; 30 measures of first grade malt, 33s. 4d.; 27 measures of beans and peas, 44s. 3d.; 15 battle axes, 45d.; cost of leading 14 tuns of wine from Sandwich to Dover, 13s.; 2 hand mills, 3s. 2d.

²⁹ £14 9s. 6d. for wheat of the Dover measure for Dover Castle; £7 10s. 1d. for wheat, £4 3s. 4d. for bacon, £1 5s. for cheese, £30 15s. 3d. for wine for Canterbury Castle.

³⁰ Works on Chilham Castle.

³¹ Works on Chilham Castle.

³² Works on Rochester Castle.

³³ To Ralph the Mason, for 2 years service.

	1174-75	1175-76	1176-77	1177-78
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the <i>Cotereaux</i>				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles	£12 3s. 4d. ³⁴			
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£18 5s.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works	£15 ³⁵			
Works on Dover Castle	£3 6s. 8d. ³⁶			
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£36 11s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.

³⁴ For wheat and barley for Dover Castle.

³⁵ Works on Rochester Castle.

³⁶ Payment to two men whose houses were seized to build a bretasche at Dover castle.

	1178-79	1179-80	1180-81	1181-82
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£7 14s. 2d. ³⁷
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£7 14s. 2d.
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle		£260 5d. ³⁸	£231 14s. 3d.	£507 10s. ³⁹
Misc. Castle Works				£9 18s. 2d. ⁴⁰
Totals	£6 1s. 8d.	£266 2s. 1d.	£237 15s. 11d.	£525 2s. 4d.

³⁷ £1 12s. 6d. added to the guard of Dover castle for half a year. This is in addition to the usual £6 1s. 8d.

³⁸ This payment is listed specifically for the wall around Dover castle and marks the beginning of the major rebuilding project on Dover castle under Henry II.

³⁹ This is the amount listed in the total. However, the total states that it is the amount paid for the works from the sheriff's personal rents, the land of the Bishop of Bayeux, and purprestures. Dover is listed as receiving £300 from the treasury, and the rents from the lands of the bishop was £289 13s. 7d.: meaning these two totals alone account for more than what was listed in the total. Should the total be considered a separate entry of money paid but not otherwise recorded, the actual total spent could reach over £1100. Subsequent entries for the work on Dover castle will also only reflect the total given by the exchequer, but it must be remembered that payments could have exceeded this amount.

⁴⁰ £6 4s. 8d. for payment to Maurice the Engineer from Good Friday to the feast of St. Michael and £3 2d. for his bread; 13s. 4d. to Ralph the Mason.

	1182-83	1183-84	1184-85	1185-86
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle	£483 10s.	£680 ⁴¹	£1248 18s. 4d. ⁴²	£962 ⁴³
Misc. Castle Works		£12 8s. ⁴⁴	£32 13s. 3.5d. ⁴⁵	£44 10s. ⁴⁶
Totals	£489 11s. 8d.	£698 9s. 8d.	£1287 13s. 3.5d.	£1012 11s. 8d.

⁴¹ In addition, lead was sent for the roof from King's Lynn and timber cut in Essex was sent to Dover for the castle. *P.R. 30 Henry II*, xxiv, 2, 129, 135, 144.

⁴² It is interesting to note that many of the fines in the county this year were sent to the works on the castle, but rarely the whole amount of the fine; just a percentage. Murder fines in particular seemed to have contributed to the building.

⁴³ More timber was sent from Sussex for the work on the castle keep and curtain wall. *P.R. 32 Henry II*, xx, 180, 181.

⁴⁴ Payment of Maurice the Engineer from the close of the Passion through to the day after the festival of St. Lucie.

⁴⁵ £6 14s. 3.5d. for provisioning the knights guarding Dover Castle, £18 to pay the men working on Dover castle, and £7 19s. to pay Maurice the engineer from Good Friday to Michaelmas.

⁴⁶ Payment to Maurice the Engineer; 47s. for 47 days from the day after Saint Michael, £40 6s. for 226 days after that, and 37s. for 37 days from the feast of St. Michael of the year 1186.

	1186-87	1187-88	1188-89	1189-90
Paid Knights			£42 ⁴⁷	
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the <i>Cotereaux</i>				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£48 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle	£681 2s.	£185 9s. 4d.	£50	
Misc. Castle Works	£10 16s. ⁴⁸			
Totals	£697 19s. 8d.	£191 11s.	£98 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.

⁴⁷ 60 marks (£40) to sustain knights guarding Dover, these same knights received an additional £2 of gift.

⁴⁸ To Maurice the Engineer from the festival of Saint Tiburtius and Valerianus (14 April) to the first Sunday of the feast of St. Martin (10 or 12 Nov.).

	1190-91	1191-92	1192-93	1193-94
Paid Knights	£1600 ⁴⁹		£37 10s. ⁵⁰	
Paid Serjeants			£40 16s. 8d. ⁵¹	
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons	£4 ⁵²			
Provisioning Castles	£102 16s. 8d. ⁵³	£18 3s. 4d. ⁵⁴	£20 ⁵⁵	
Misc.			£26 ⁵⁶	£32 13s. 5d. ⁵⁷
Sub-Total	£1712 18s. 4d.	£24 5s.	£130 8s. 4d.	£38 15s. 1d.
Castle Works		£138 19s. 5d. ⁵⁸	£69 3s. ⁵⁹	£2 ⁶⁰
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£1712 18s. 4d.	£163 4s. 5d.	£199 11s. 4d.	£40 15s. 1d.

⁴⁹ An entry for the exchange is entered at the end of the roll for Kent and the account is rendered by Henry de Cornhill who was the sheriff of Kent in this year. This is all money received from the treasury to maintain the exchange and to pay knights. Many writs are mentioned with the amount of money given for knights, but the number of knights who received payment is never mentioned. In only one instance is there a number of men given who received payment, and that was 8s. given to Henry de Feruench and 36 of his serjeants.

⁵⁰ For 15 knights remaining at Canterbury Castle for 50 days and each receive 12d. a day.

⁵¹ £16 13s. 4d. (25 marks) for 20 horse serjeants with 1 mare for the same 50 days as the knights (see note 50) each receive 4d. a day; £16 13s. 4d. (25 marks) for 40 foot serjeants for the same 50 days at 2d. a day; 50s. to pay William Canuto and William de Mares for the same time at 6d. a day because they each had 2 mares; 100s. for two men and their partners for the same time at 6d. a day.

⁵² To William the Crossbowman as a gift and his payment.

⁵³ £55 for 200 measures of wheat, 100 barley and 100 bacons for provisioning Dover Castle; £47 16s. 8d. for 100 measures of wheat, 100 rye, 50 oats, 100 boars and 40 cows for "the aforesaid castle" (which may be Rochester castle, as it is mentioned before an illegible/damaged portion of the roll).

⁵⁴ £9 3s. 4d. for 100 measures of wheat to provision Canterbury Castle and £9 for 120 bacons to also provision Canterbury Castle.

⁵⁵ For Dover Castle.

⁵⁶ £14 for guarding Rochester Castle; £2 for Flemings who were in the service of the King; £8 to Earl William de Aumale for 80 bacons and £2 for 20 sheaves of iron for negotiations.

⁵⁷ £13 6s. 8d. for guarding Dover Castle; £19 6s. 9d. to pay for the ferry of serjeants who were sent across the sea to serve the king.

⁵⁸ £20 for fortifying and for works on Rochester Castle; £20 7s. for repairs to Chilham Castle; £98 12s. 5d. for Canturbury Castle.

⁵⁹ Works on the keep of Canterbury Castle.

⁶⁰ For 300 planks of oak for the works of Dover Castle.

	1194-95	1195-96 ⁶¹	1196-97	1197-98
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles		£66 13s. 4d. ⁶²		
Misc.	£27 16s. ⁶³			
Sub-Total	£33 17s. 8d.	£72 15s.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works	£5 ⁶⁴	£12 18s. ⁶⁵	£2 ⁶⁶	£3 10s. ⁶⁷
Works on Dover Castle		£76 3s. ⁶⁸		
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£38 17s. 8d.	£101 16s.	£8 1s. 8d.	£9 11s. 8d.

⁶¹ The Pipe Roll for this year is lost, but the Chancellor's Roll still exists.

⁶² Dover Castle.

⁶³ £21 to pay 6 "*esclavis*" for 560 days at 9d. a day and £6 16s. to pay for their vestments "*lineis et laneis et calciamentis*" This 9d. was for all 6 "*esclavis*," each actually receiving 1 ½d. a day.

⁶⁴ Repairs to the keep of Rochester.

⁶⁵ £5 18s. for works on the drawbridge of Rochester Castle; £5 for repairs to Chilham Castle; £2 for improvements to the king's house in Canterbury castle.

⁶⁶ Improvements to the king's house in Canterbury castle.

⁶⁷ Repairs to the king's house in Canterbury castle.

⁶⁸ To repair the wall.

	1198-99 - John	1199-1200	1200-01	1201-02
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants	£2 10s. ⁶⁹			
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles	£50 ⁷⁰	£118 16s. 2d. ⁷¹	£23 6s. 8d. ⁷²	£183 6s. 8d. ⁷³
Misc.	10d. ⁷⁴	£21 15s. 5d. ⁷⁵		
Sub-Total	£58 12s. 6d.	£146 13s. 3d.	£29 8s. 4d.	£189 8s. 4d.
Castle Works	£10 ⁷⁶	£13 ⁷⁷	£12 5s. 6d. ⁷⁸	£11 13s. 4d. ⁷⁹
Works on Dover Castle		£8 19s. 10d. ⁸⁰	£18 ⁸¹	
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£68 12s. 6d.	£168 13s. 1d.	£59 13s. 10d.	£201 1s. 8d.

⁶⁹ Payment for 10 horse serjeants for 15 days.

⁷⁰ For provisioning the castles of Dover, Hastings and Pevensey.

⁷¹ £20 for grain for Dover castle; £20 for 160 bacons for Dover castle; £78 6s. 8d. for purchasing 500 bacons and carting the same bacons with other bacon (160 bacons mentioned below) to Rouen; 9s. 6d. for leading 160 bacons by sailing from London to Dover.

⁷² For 200 measures of beans and 15 weights of cheese and for their transfer to Rouen.

⁷³ For provisioning Dover castle, £40 for 150 measures of wheat, 55 marks for 200 measures of barley, £9 3s. 4d. for 50 measures of oats by the Kentish measure, £4 for 20 measures of beans, £50 for 20 tuns of wine, £4 10s. for 10 weights of cheese, £4 for 10 weights of 'sepi' (onions or tallow?), £35 for 200 bacons.

⁷⁴ For carrying a prisoner from the Tower of London to Rochester castle.

⁷⁵ £10 for 100 sheaves of iron, 20 sheaves at Canterbury castle and 80 sheaves at Dover Castle; £10 for 10 hauberks; 2 marks for 2 habergeons; 5s. for leading iron, steel and arms from London to Dover; 1s. in purchasing 5000 quarrells (for crossbows); 2s. 9d. for a hutch to store arms (possibly in Dover castle, but it is unclear).

⁷⁶ Repairs to the gate, bridge and rampart of Chilham castle and repairs to the ramparts of Canterbury castle.

⁷⁷ £10 to the constable of Rochester Castle for repairs; £3 for repairing the house in Canterbury castle.

⁷⁸ Timber to repair the king's castles of Dover, Rochester and Southampton.

⁷⁹ £5 for works on Rochester Castle; 10 marks for repairs to the gate of Canterbury castle.

⁸⁰ 3s. 6d. for a pit cover; £8 16s. 4d. for purchasing timber and other necessities to repair the castle.

⁸¹ For improving the gate.

	1202-03	1203-04	1204-05	1205-06
Paid Knights			£10 10s. 7d. ⁸²	£17 6s. 8d. ⁸³
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons		£6 3s. 8d. ⁸⁴	£14 6s. 3d. ⁸⁵	£6 13s. 4d. ⁸⁶
Provisioning Castles	£146 8s. 4d. ⁸⁷			
Misc.		£33 ⁸⁸		£1 5s. ⁸⁹
Sub-Total	£152 10s.	£45 5s. 4d.	£30 18s. 6d.	£21 6s. 8d.
Castle Works	£5 ⁹⁰	£2 ⁹¹	£5 ⁹²	£115 5d. ⁹³
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£157 10s.	£47 5s. 4d.	£35 18s. 6d.	£136 7s. 1d.

⁸² Allowance to the knights who came to Poitou.

⁸³ To John and Brertram, knights of the king from Poitou with their three men and 5 horses for their expenses.

⁸⁴ £1 for Roger Balistario and 5s. for carrying his necessities to Nottingham; £4 18s. 8d. for Roger Balistario's payment and for carrying [his necessities] through many places. Both of the entries for Roger Balistario contain portions that are damaged or illegible on the roll.

⁸⁵ £13 6s. 3d. to the constable of Dover to pay the crossbowmen of Dover; £1 to Peter Januensi and Peter his servant for coming to the king with 'balistis' (crossbowmen?).

⁸⁶ For sling, and one stone (a weight? Possibly for ammunition) and 2 mangonells and rope, bought and sent to Dover.

⁸⁷ For provisioning Dover, £42 10s. for 100 measures of wheat, £30 for 100 measures of barley, £50 for 20 tuns of wine, £15. 18s. 4d. for 100 bacons; £9 for 20 pieces of cheese. This is possibly for Dover, but the entry comes after the money for improvements for Rochester castle and is said to be from the same writ, which could indicate it is for Rochester castle.

⁸⁸ For 3 robes of scarlet, 3 of green, 2 brocades, 1 quilt/mattress (culcitra) and other necessities to make 1 knight.

⁸⁹ (10s. is interlineated, so possibly this means 25s.?) for carrying armor; 10s. for leading one prisoner.

⁹⁰ £3 for improvements to Canterbury castle; £2 for improvements to Rochester Castle.

⁹¹ Improvements to Canterbury castle.

⁹² Improvements to the king's house in Canterbury castle.

⁹³ Repairs to the bridge, moat, house and keep of Rochester castle.

	1206-07	1207-08	1208-09	1209-10
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the <i>Cotereaux</i>				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	
Siege weapons			£16 13s. 4d. ⁹⁴	
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.			£21 10s. 2d. ⁹⁵	
Sub-Total	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£44 5s. 2d.	
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle			£60 ⁹⁶	
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.	£104 5s. 2d.	No Military Payments

⁹⁴ £10 for paying 5 crossbowmen for 40 days; the same 5 crossbowmen also received 10 marks.

⁹⁵ For 3 robes of silk, and 3 of green with fur, 3 trappings, 3 quilts, and 3 saddles with armour and 3 suitable linens and 3 suitable shirts and breeches and for other small implements for making knights.

⁹⁶ To the constable of Dover for the works.

	1210-11	1211-12	1212-13 ⁹⁷	1213-14
Paid Knights	£87 10s. ⁹⁸	£50 13s. 5d. ⁹⁹		
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the Cotereaux				
Watchman and Porter	£6 1s. 8d.	£6 1s. 8d.		£6 1s. 8d.
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total	£93 11s. 8d.	£56 15s. 1d.		£6 1s. 8d.
Castle Works				£10 ¹⁰⁰
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	£93 11s. 8d.			£16 1s. 8d.

⁹⁷ This roll does not survive.

⁹⁸ To Teobaldo de Candos and other knights from Flanders whose names are chronicled in the writ which is in the forel (case/box) of the Marshal £87 10s. for his fees. (*Et Teobaldo de Candos . et aliis militibus de Flandr' quorum nomina annotantur in breui quod est in forulo Marescalli quater xx et vij li. et x s. de feodis suis per breue R.*" P.R. 13 John, 236.

⁹⁹ Expenses of knights who came from Flanders and Hainault, namely 41 knights and on horse and saddle and harness and for these leading from Dover to York.

¹⁰⁰ Improvements to Canterbury and Rochester castles.

	1214-15			
Paid Knights				
Paid Serjeants				
Collecting arms of the <i>Cotereaux</i>				
Watchman and Porter				
Siege weapons				
Provisioning Castles				
Misc.				
Sub-Total				
Castle Works				
Works on Dover Castle				
Misc. Castle Works				
Totals	No Military Payments			

Appendix 4

Wages and Service Periods of Knights and Serjeants
For the counties of Shropshire and Kent, from the Reign of Henry II to John¹

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1159-60	£25 19s. 9d.	1 Knight, 20 Serjeants, 1 Porter, 1 Watchman	Unknown		Shropshire, Carreghofa castle. If the watchman and porter's payments are for a full year and are taken out, the knight and serjeants would have been paid £22 18s. 11d.
1160-61	£22 17s. 8d.	1 Knight, 20 Serjeants, 1 Porter, 1 Watchman	Unknown		Shropshire. If the watchman and porter's payments are for a full year and are taken out, the knight and serjeants would have been paid £19 16s. 10d. While the roll does not specify that these are the same men at Carreghofa as from before, the similar number suggests that they are.

¹ Service periods and wages given in parenthesis have been worked out via calculations using other information given in the rolls. Wages given in brackets are assumptions based on similar wages for the period. Numbers appearing without parenthesis or brackets are recorded as such in the Ripe Rolls.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1160-61	£9	10 Serjeants	(216 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /day]	Shropshire, Whittington castle. Each man would have been paid 18 <i>s.</i> and if they were paid 1 <i>d.</i> a day, would have served 216 days. The roll is missing some information at this point, and therefore this figure is not conclusive, but if the round figure of £9 is correction, this may have simply been a lump sum paid, and not an instance where daily wages were calculated.
1161-62	£24 3 <i>s.</i>	Unknown number of knights and serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire, Carreghofa castle. The roll does not specify the number of men, but it is likely the same knight and 20 serjeants from previous years. There is no mention of this including a watchman and porter as well.
	£8 13 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i>	10 serjeants	(208 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /day]	Shropshire, Whittington castle. Each man would have been paid 17 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> If they were paid 1 <i>d.</i> a day, would have served 208 days. While recorded as £8 13 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> in the roll, the sum is also exactly 13 marks, and may be an instance of a lump sum payment.
	£7 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	20 serjeants	(88 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /day]	Shropshire. Each man would have been paid 7 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> and if paid at 1 <i>d.</i> a day, would have served 88 days.
	£84 18 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	7 paid knights	364 days	(8 <i>d.</i> /day)	Kent. Each man received £12 2 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> for a rate of 8 <i>d.</i> a day.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1161-62	£30 6s. 8d.	20 serjeants	364 days	(1d./day)	Kent. Each man received £1 10s. 4d. for a rate of 1d. a day.
1162-63	£28	Unknown number of knights and serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire, Carreghofa castle. These men were paid £17 6s. 8d. but then received an extra £10 13s. 4d. as a gift. Both of these payments come to 26 marks of pay and 16 marks of gift, and therefore could be indicative of a lump sum payment. These men could be the same 1 knight and 20 serjeants from previous years in Carreghofa, but their numbers are not given in the Pipe Roll.
	£8 13s. 4d.	10 Serjeants	(208 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire, Whittington castle. This is the same amount paid for the same number of men as in the previous year.
	£52 13s. 11d.	1 Knight, 310 serjeants	(40 days)	[8d./day and 1d./day]	Shropshire. This amount is 10s. 7d. short of covering a 40 day service period for all the men if the knight was paid at 8d. a day, and the serjeants were each paid 1d. a day. This could be due to five serjeants missing half the service period and another 6 missing 27 days, or some other unknowable variation.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1162-63	£26 16s.	5 Household Knights	(161 days)	[8d./day]	Kent. If each man were paid equally, they would have received £5 7s. 2.4d. a piece which is an impossible amount. If the rate of 8d. a day were taken as a wage, then these men would have served for 161 days, with one of them only serving 157 days.
	£29 17s. 4d.	7 Knights	174 days	(6d./day)	Kent. The roll gives the time period as 'the Tuesday after the feast of St. Michael through to Easter day' which in this year was 174 days, but this may simply be an indication of half a year. The calculation is based on the precise 174 days since the roll mentions a specific date after the festival instead of. Each of these knights would have received £4 5s. 4d. if equally paid. The closest amount to a 'daily wage' is for each man to have received 6d. a day, but the amount paid is short of what this would come to (£30 9s.). The only way to reconcile the numbers in this way, is if one of the knights (or by some combination) did not serve for 23 and one third days, which is very unlikely. However, the amount paid is so precise, it seems unlikely to have been a simple lump-sum payment.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1162-63	£13 6s. 8d.	20 Serjeants	174 days		Kent. These knights were serving for the same time period as the knights listed above. Unlike the knights, these men almost certainly took a lump sum payment of 1 mark apiece. If this were calculated to a daily wage, it would be less than a penny a day.
	£6 8d.	3 Watchmen, 1 Porter	174 days		Kent. These men served for the same time period as the knights and serjeants above. Each of these men would have been paid £1 10s. 2d. for the total time period, which, if worked into daily wages is a little over 2d. a day (another impossible fraction).
1164-65	£4 11s. 8d.	110 Serjeants	(10 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire. Each man received 10d. and would have served for 10 days if paid at 1d. a day.
	£62 7s. 5d.	300 Serjeants	(50 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire. This payment is for a service period before Easter. If paid equally, each man would have received 4s. 2d., and if at a wage of 1d. a day, would have served 50 days.
	£69 18s. 7d.	300 Serjeants	(56 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire. This payment is for the same 300 serjeants paid after Easter. Each man would have received 4s. 8d. or 9s. in total. If paid at 1d. a day, the service period after Easter would have been 56 days, for 106 days in total.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1164-65	£6	60 Serjeants	(24 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /d ay]	Shropshire, Shrawardine. Each man would have received 2 <i>s.</i> if paid equally, and served for 24 days if at a penny a day wage.
	£33 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	200 Serjeants	(40 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /d ay]	Shropshire, castles of Oswestry and Clun. These men served before Pentacost, and would have each received 3 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> If paid at a rate of a penny a day, they would have served for 40 days.
	£5 16 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	100 Serjeants	(14 days)	[1 <i>d.</i> /d ay]	Shropshire. Supposedly at Oswestry and Clun, as these serjeants were paid for service after Pentacost. Each would have received 1 <i>s.</i> 2 <i>d.</i> and if paid at a rate of a penny a day, would have served for 14 days.
1165-66	£62 1 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i>	100 Serjeants	207 days		Shropshire, Shrawardine and the March. The time period recorded from the feast of St. Michael (29 September) to the day before Easter, (23 April). The amount is £24 3 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> short of providing a 1 <i>d.</i> daily wage for every man. Perhaps the time period is simply to give an indication that the men served before the Easter session of the exchequer, and is not meant to actually record the length of service.
1166-67	£100	Knights			Kent. To an unknown number of knights to provide coast guard.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1167-68	£5	5 Knights			Kent, Dover Castle. The entry gives the impression that this money was a bonus or reward for superior service and not a payment of wages.
1169-70	£36 10s.	1 Knight, 2 Porters, 2 Watchmen	2 years	[1d./day] W&P (8d./day) Knight	Shropshire, Oswestry. If the watchmen and porters were being paid at 1d. a day, they would have received £12 3s. 4d. for the two year period, meaning the one knight received £24 6s. 8d. for this same 2 year period. His payment works to a wage of 8d. a day.
	£60 16s. 8d.	20 Serjeants	2 years	(1d./day)	Shropshire, Oswestry. These serjeants would have been paid £3 10d. each, or £1 10s. 5d. a year for a wage of 1d. a day.
1170-71	£18 5s.	1 Knight, 2 Porters, 2 Watchmen	1 year	[1d./day] W&P (8d./day) Knight	Shropshire, Oswestry. This payment is similar to that of the knights, porters and watchmen from the previous year but covers only one year of payments instead of two. This same payment continues for a further three years, ending in 1173-74.
	£30 8s. 4d.	20 Serjeants	1 year	(1d./day)	Shropshire, Oswestry. This payment is similar to that of the serjeants from the previous year, but only covers one year of payments. This same payment continues for a further three years, ending in 1173-74.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1170-71	£2 18s. 4d.	Serjeants	Unkown		Shropshire, specifically in the Welsh Marches. Neither the number of men or period of service are specified.
1171-72	£8 11s. 8d.	Serjeants	Unkown		Shropshire, Shrawardine. Neither the number of men or period of service is specified.
1172-73	£9 13s. 8d.	330 Serjeants	8 days		Shropshire. These 330 serjeants were then paid, as a whole, 290 ½d. a day, or each individual less than a penny a day. They do not appear to have been paid in a lump sum, as the amount paid is 7s. more than 14 marks.
	£24 10s.	430 Serjeants	15 days		Shropshire. This is for the same 330 serjeants above, plus an additional 100 serjeants for the extra 15 days, 4 of which were equipped with a leather cuirass, suggest these 4 men commanded a higher wage. The amount paid is 10s. above 36 marks. If the two payments are added together, they still do not equal a sensible amount of payment for the service period given. If these serjeants were paid 1d. a day, the total amount needed for their pay would be £37 17s. 6d., about £3 3s. 10d. more than what was actually paid (and this does not take into account a different payment for the men with leather cuirasses).

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1172-73	£4	80 Foot Serjeants	6 days	(2 <i>d.</i> /d ay)	Shropshire. These men were sent across the sea in the service of the king.
	£11 11 <i>d.</i>	(42) Serjeants	9 weeks	[1 <i>d.</i> /d ay]	Shropshire. Serjeants for the Welsh war. This amount is 5 <i>d.</i> more than is necessary to pay for 42 men at the rate of 1 <i>d.</i> a day. This could mean that there was a 43 rd man who only served 5 days instead of the full 63, but it is impossible to tell.
	£40 2 <i>s.</i> 5 <i>d.</i>	Serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire. Specifics for number of men or period of service is unknown.
	£5 2 <i>s.</i>	1 Serjeant	Unkown		Shropshire. This is a single payment for the serjeant of Reginald de Daggenot. Why a single serjeant received this payment is unknown, but he certainly received more than the average serjeant in wages which may suggest this was a reward.
	£1 6 <i>s.</i> 10 <i>d.</i>	10 Archers	15 days		Shropshire. Their daily wage works out to 2.15 <i>d.</i> a day, indicating that their pay was not divided evenly.
	11 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	10 Archers	15 days	(1 <i>d.</i> /d ay)	Shropshire, Whittington. Their pay essentially works out to 1 <i>d.</i> a day, but one of the archers would have only served 5 of the 15 days. There is no explanation of why their pay was less than the other 10 archers.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1173-74	£45 15s. 10d.	(30) Serjeants	1 year	[1d./day]	Shropshire, the Welsh March. If the rate of a penny a day wages were paid, then this is enough to cover 30 serjeants for a whole year, plus an additional serjeant for another 40 days.
1174-75	£13 13s. 9d.	1 Knight, 2 Porters, 2 Watchmen	(¾ year)	[8d./day] K [1d./day] P&W	Shropshire, Oswestry. If the rates of 8d. a day for the knight and 1d. a day for the watchmen and porters, this amount comes to the payment for exactly ¾ of a year. However, this would mean the men served 273 and ¾ days, and were paid 6d. for the knight and ¾d. for each of the watchmen and porters for that three quarters of a day.
	£22 16s. 3d.	[20] Serjeants	(¾ year)	[1d./year]	Shropshire, Oswestry. Assuming these are the same 20 serjeants that have been continuously paid since 1170-71, this payment also covers exactly ¾ of a year much like the knight, watchmen and porters above, assuming the serjeants were paid 1d. a day.
1181-82	£1 13s. 4d.	100 Serjeants	1 day	(4d./day)	Shropshire, travelling from Shrewsbury to Hereford. This suggests these men were paid 4d. a day each for this one day. It could however, be a simple lump-sum payment of £1 and 1 mark, but was not recorded as such, just as 33s. 4d.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1181-82	£7	21 Serjeants	(80 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire, from Shrewsbury through London on service of the king. If these men were paid a penny a day, then the service period would have been 80 days.
1183-84	£2	20 Serjeants	(24 days)	[1d./day]	Shropshire. These serjeants came to the court in the service of the king. If paid at a penny a day, they served for 24 days.
1186-87	£16 13s. 4d.	250 Foot Serjeants	8 days	(2d./day)	Shropshire. These men travelled to the king
	£7 12s.	38 Serjeants with Horses	8 days	(6d./day)	Shropshire. These men travelled to the king.
	£1	3 Captains of Serjeants	8 days	(10d./day)	Shropshire. These men travelled to the king.
1187-88	£20	300 Serjeants	8 days	(2d./day)	Shropshire. Travelled in service of the king.
	£13	150 Foot Serjeants 15 Mounted Serjeants	8 days	(2d./day) FS (6d./day) MS	Shropshire. Travelled in service of the king.
1188-89	£40	Knights	Unknown		Kent, Dover Castle. This amount was paid as 60 marks, and was to go to their sustenance.
1192-93	£20	10 Knights	40 days	(1s./day)	Shropshire
	£10	80 Serjeants	40 days	(¾d./day)	Shropshire. The calculation does add up to ¾d. a day, but could very well be a lump payment considering the even number paid.
	£37 10s.	15 Knights	50 days	12d./day	Kent, Canterbury castle.
	£16 13s. 4d. (25 marks)	20 One Horse Serjeants	50 days	4d./day	Kent, Canterbury castle.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1192-93	£1 6s. 10d. (25 marks)	40 Foot Serjeants	50 days	2d./day	Kent, Canterbury castle.
	£2 10s.	2 Two Horse (Serjeants)	50 days	6d./day	Kent, Canterbury castle. The two men are named and specified that they have two horses, but are not labelled as serjeants. Considering serjeants without horses were paid 2d. a day and serjeants with one horse received an additional 2d. for 4d. a day, it stands to reason that men with two horses receiving an extra 2d. are also serjeants.
	£5	4 Two Horse (Serjeants)	50 days	6d./day	Kent, Canterbury castle. Same situation as the pair of two horse serjeants mentioned above.
1193-94	£20	20 Two Horse Serjeants	40 days	(6d./day)	Shropshire. These men travelled to serve the king.
	£5 8s.	Maurice fitz Roger 6 Two Horse Serjeants 60 Foot Serjeants	8 days	(6d./day) MfR [6d./day] THS [2d./day] FS	Shropshire. These men travelled to serve the king. Following the pattern of 2d. a day for foot serjeants (paid £4 total) and 6d. a day for two horse serjeants (paid £1. 4s. total), only 4s. would have been left for Maurice fitz Roger, for a daily pay of 6d., which would suggest he was a mounted serjeant with two horses.
	£28 2s. 5d.	Knights and Serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire, guarding the mines of Carreghofa.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1194-95	£12	12 (Two) Horse Serjeants	40 days	6d./day	Shropshire. The pay given suggests these mounted serjeants had two horses according to precedence, and the numbers add up correctly.
	£8 4s.	Godfri Ruffo and his serjeants with one horse	164 days	4d./day	Shropshire. This adds up to pay Godfrid and only 2 other men. These three men are then specifically said to be paid 15s. to stay at Carreghofa castle for 15 days earlier in the roll, which maintains the same rate of pay of 4d. per day. These men also received £1 of gift.
	£21	6 <i>Esclauis</i>	560 days	9d./day (1 ½d./day)	Kent. The 9d. a day wage is the payment for the men as a whole per day; each man would have received 1 ½ d. a day according to the calculation of men numbered and service period given. What exactly is an <i>esclauis</i> , is unclear, but they did receive a further £6 16s. for their vestments, so they are certainly a group of men (and the position of their entry in the roll suggests they perform some military purpose).
1195-96	8s.	1 Knight	8 days	(1s./day)	Shropshire. This knight is the leader of the Welshmen serving this year.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1195-96	£13 6s. 8d.	200 Welshmen on Foot	8 days	2d./day	Shropshire. These Welshmen were transferred to Normandy in the service of the king. The fact they are denoted as being on foot and paid at 2d. a day suggests they are equivalent to the foot serjeants seen previously.
	(13s. 4d.) 1 mark	500 Welshmen on Foot	8 days	2d./day	Shropshire. These men were transferred in the king's service. There is clearly an error either in the amount paid or the number of men serving, as 1 mark would only pay for 10 men at this rate and period. Regardless, this is another example of Welshmen on foot being equated via pay to foot serjeants.
	8s.	2 (Two) Horse Serjeants	8 days	6d./day	Shropshire. The daily wage suggests these men had 2 horses each.
1197-98	£13 6s. 8d.	300 Serjeants			Shropshire, Serving in Wales. No service period is given, but the amount is recorded as 20 marks, and is clearly a lump-sum payment (otherwise, each man would have been paid a total of 10 2/3d.)
	£14 16s. 8d.	William fitz Warin, 120 Foot Serjeants, 10 Horse Serjeants	20 days		Shropshire. This comes to an expenditure of 14s. 10d. a day on these men which does not fit any of the pay rates established elsewhere. The established rate of 2d. a day for a foot serjeant would alone cost more than the daily allowance of 14s. 10d.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1198-99	£2 10s.	10 (One) Horse Serjeants	15 days	(4d./day)	Kent.
1200-01	£2	Knights and Serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire. Unknown quantity of knights and serjeants going to Worcester.
1201-02	£5	Serjeants	Unknown		Shropshire. For an unknown quantity of serjeants who served beyond the sea.
1204-05	£10 10s. 7d.	Knights	Unknown		Kent. This is to pay for an unknown quantity of knights who came to Poitiers. Since the payment is not recorded in even shillings, the knights may not have received the shilling a day wage.
1205-06	£17 6s. 8d.	2 Knights, 3 of their 'men,' and 5 Horses	Unknown		Kent, but the men were serving King John in Poitiers. Their payment is actually 26 marks, and appears to be a lump sum, as the numbers do not add up evenly if the two knights are paid a shilling a day and the 3 'men' are assumed to be one horse serjeants (since there are only five horses to be shared among the five men).
1208-09	£10	5 Crossbow men	40 days	(1s./day)	Kent.
	£18 10s.	10 Crossbow men	40 days	(1s./day)	Shropshire. The daily wages, if evenly applied actually come to 11.1d. a day, but if the example from Kent in this same year is followed at a shilling a day, then one man was only paid for 10 days.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1210-11	£87 10s.	Teobaldo de Candos and Flemmish Knights	Unknown		Kent. The knights are not recorded in the Pipe Roll, but are said to be given by name in a writ held by the Marshal in a forel (case/box).
1211-12	£7 17s. 6d.	300 Serjeants	3 days		Shropshire. If this were divided evenly, then these men each received 2.1d. a day. If it were simply 2d. a day, then it would be safe to assume these men were foot serjeants. Since the payment and the service period are very specific, and the number of men serving is a large rounded number, perhaps there are more serjeants serving than recorded. If they were in fact foot serjeants earning 2d. a day, then there would be an extra 90d. left over, or 30d. for each day. This could translate into an extra 15 foot serjeants, or 5 two-horse serjeants, or maybe even 3 captains of serjeants if the example from 1186-87 is accurate.

Year	Payment	Number of Men	Period	Wages	Notes
1211-12	£100	1000 Foot Serjeants, 40 Horse Serjeants	6 days		Shropshire. In addition to the 6 days of service, these men also served some form of guard duty at the rescue of 'Haliwell' and Mathrafal castles. The even payment of £100 is probably indicative of a lump sum payment, but the amount is enough to cover the 6 day period if the foot serjeants are paid 2 <i>d.</i> a day and if the mounted serjeants had either one or two horses at 4 or 6 <i>d.</i> a day. Depending on the type of mounted serjeant, there is enough money left over for either 4 or 5 days as guards, but the figures do not work out evenly.
	£8 8 <i>s.</i>	120 Serjeants	8 days		Shropshire. If paid evenly, these serjeants also received 2.1 <i>d.</i> a day, much like the previous 300 serjeants. If one were to follow the same line of thought as before and dub these serjeants as foot serjeants at 2 <i>d.</i> a day, then there is 96 <i>d.</i> left over for additional troops, or an extra 12 <i>d.</i> a day. This may suggest there was also a knight leading this group, but if there is, he was not named.

Appendix 5
Dover Castle Guard as Recorded in the *Red Book of the Exchequer*¹

List 1			List 2			List 3		
Name	Fees	Actual Numbers	Name	Fees	Actual Numbers	Name	Fees	Actual Numbers
Constable	56 $\frac{1}{10}$	56 $\frac{1}{10}$	Constable	56 $\frac{1}{10}$	56 $\frac{1}{10}$	Constable	56 $\frac{1}{10}$	57 $\frac{1}{10}$
Abbrincis	21	20 knights, 3 tenants serving 29 days	Averenge	20 $\frac{3}{4}$	20 $\frac{3}{4}$	Abbrinchis	21	21
Robert de Dover	(15)	15	Fouberd	15	15	Robert de Dover	15	15
Arsic	18	16	Arsyke	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	Arsic	15	18
Piperelli	15	14	Peverel	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	Peverhelle	15	15 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mamignot	24	20 ²	Mamenot	24	24	Maminot	24	24
Port	12	12	Port	12	12	Port	12	12
Crevequer	5	3 knights, 2 tenants serving 40 days	Crevequer	3 knights and 3 tenants	3 knights and 3 tenants serving 58 days	Crevequer	5	3 knights, 3 tenants serving 60 days
Adæ fitz William	6	6 (3 fees recorded twice)	Certain Wards	3	2 fees serving 30 days, 1 fee serving 15 days.	Adæ fitz William	6	3
Totals Given (Summae Added)	172 $\frac{1}{10}$ (172 $\frac{1}{10}$)	160/3 $\frac{1}{10}$ and 5 tenants	Totals Given (Summae Added)	165 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{10}$ (165 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{10}$ and 3 tenants)	165 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{10}$ and 3 tenants	Totals Given (Summae Added)	172 $\frac{1}{10}$ (169 $\frac{1}{10}$)	168 $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{10}$ and 3 tenants

¹ List 1, *RBE*, 613-18; List 2, *RBE*, 706-11; List 3, *RBE*, 717-22.

² There are two men recorded here who do not have a number of fees entered after their names, which may account for the extra 4 who are included in the *summa*.